JUDGMENT - B.N. DESHMUKH, J.:---This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by original accused No. 1, Chintaman Shridhar Joglekar. He was enlarged on bail by the trial Magistrate but a revision application being filed by the State that order was set aside and the bail has been cancelled. Being aggrieved he has filed this application. 2. The facts are very few and simple. According to the prosecution posters in three different places bearing the contents "down with dictatorship "were noticed by Police Constable Dambale at Dombivli on 16-8-1975 at about 9.50 a.m. He removed those posters and immediately reported that fact to the Sub-Inspector in charge of the Police Station. An offence was registered and search for the miscreant began. As two names of miscreants were reported to the police they were both arrested and a charge-sheet was ultimately sent up against them for contravention of the provisions of Rule 43(1)(c) and Rule 43(5) read with Rule 36(6)(e) of the Defence and Internal Security of Indian Rules, 1971. The investigation papers which were seen by the courts below and which were also made available to us show that the prosecution has recorded statements of two witnesses named Ramchandra Sunder Ghosalkar and Chandrakant Krishna Choudhare who claim to have seen the pasting of those posters by accused Nos. 1 and 2. 3. The brief story of the prosecution is that the two witnesses mentioned above attend their respective factories early morning at about 6 or 6.30 a.m. For that purposed they are accustomed to wake up at 3 or 3.30 a.m. every day. They are neighbours and after bath at about 4 or 4.30 a.m. or so, they usually go to a milk diary at Dombivli for fetching milk. According to the witnesses, 15th August, 1975 was a holiday for their respective factories. However, as per their usual habit they both woke up at about 3 or 3.30 a.m., took bath and between 4 or 4.30 a.m. proceeded to the usual milk diary centre for fetching milk. They saw both the accused persons pasting posters. Witness Ghosalkar seems to be knowing English but Choudhare did not know English. Ghosalkar enquired with Dada Jogalekar, the present petitioner, as to what they were doing. They saw both the accused persons pasting posters. Witness Ghosalkar seems to be knowing English but Choudhare did not know English. Ghosalkar enquired with Dada Jogalekar, the present petitioner, as to what they were doing. The reply given by the present petitioner was that he was torpedoing the dictatorship of Indira Gandhi. The witnesses left the place and went to their houses. 4. On 18th August, 1975 witness Ghosalkar found that Head Constable of Police Shri B.R. Patil known to him appeared to be in a hurry and was agitated. He enquired with the Havaldar as to whom he was searching and whether some information was received by him. The Havaldar then said that he was making enquiry in relation to the wall posters. The witness then gave the names of the two accused persons to the Havaldar and also added that he had himself seen the accused persons pasting the posters. After some investigation accused person were arrested and after completing investigation charge-sheet has been ultimately filed against them for the contravention of the various Rules as mentioned above. 5. Soon after the arrest both the accused applied for bail on 19-8-1975 to the learned Magistrate. Two points were pressed before him. It was urged that the accused were not the person who posted the wall posters. The evidence collected by the prosecution was discrepant and not believable. The other point that was raised was that assuming that the posters were pasted by the accused persons, the contents of those posters could not be described to be prejudicial report in any sense of the term. There were, therefore, reasonable grounds for believing that the accused persons were not guilty of the contravention of the said Rules. The bail was opposed. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the Counsel for the accused granted bail of Rs. 1000/- with one surety in like amount and further directed that the accused person should report every day at 6 p.m. to the local Police Station. 6. The Government carried the matter in revisions to the Sessions judge against both the accused. By the time the learned Sessions Judge heard the revision application, original accused No. 2 Bhalchandra Lohakare was detained under MISA. As a result of his discussion, the learned Session Judge felt that the contents of the posters could come within the mischief of Rule 36(6)(e) or the said Rules. By the time the learned Sessions Judge heard the revision application, original accused No. 2 Bhalchandra Lohakare was detained under MISA. As a result of his discussion, the learned Session Judge felt that the contents of the posters could come within the mischief of Rule 36(6)(e) or the said Rules. He, therefore, allowed the revision application, set aside the order granting bail and directed that both the accused be taken into judicial custody immediately. Being aggrieved only accused no. 1 has filed the present application. 7. When a prosecution is undertaken under the provisions of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 the relevant provisions to be borne in mind for the purpose of granting bail are those contained in Rule 184 thereof. This rule supersedes the provision of bail contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and authorises the granting of bail on two conditions being fulfilled. The prosecution is necessarily to be given an opportunity to oppose the application, if they so desired, and where the prosecution opposes the application the Court is to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such contravention. Since bail has been opposed in this case and is still being opposed, unless we find by taking into consideration the entire material collected by the police that the Court could be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the present petitioner-accused is guilty of the contravention of any of the Rules, bail could be granted. 8. Before us also two questions were agitated. One is that the evidence is discrepant, unbelievable and may not result in proving the participation of the accused persons in pasting the posters. The other is that even if they are shown to be the person who pasted the posters, neither the contents of those posters nor the evidence attending upon the same can lead to the conclusion that a prejudicial Act as defined by sub-para (e) of para (6) of Rule 36 of the Defence and internal Security of India Rules, 1971 has been committed by the accused. We propose to deal with the second question first. 9. What would about to prejudicial Act, the performance of which is made an offence under the present Rules does not seem to be open to any doubt. We propose to deal with the second question first. 9. What would about to prejudicial Act, the performance of which is made an offence under the present Rules does not seem to be open to any doubt. The language of Rule 36(6)(e) of the said Rules is very much similar to the language of sub-para (e) of para (6) of Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules made under the Defence of India Act, 1939. This language is again very much similar to, if not identical, with the language of section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offence of sedition. Before the present Rules came into force the law upon the subject has already been settled. We will very briefly indicate how there is hardly any scope now to take a view different from the one which has been laid down by the highest Court of this land and which interpretation is obviously acceptable to the legislature. 10. A matter from Calcutta reached the Federal Court where breach of sub-paras (e) and (k) of para (6) of Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 was alleged. a full-fledged debate took place before the Federal Court when a submission was made on behalf of Government that the language of the rule is clear enough that any adverse criticism of Government falling with in the ambit of that rule would fall within the definition of prejudicial report On the contrary it was submitted for the defence that the time was long past when mere criticism of Government was sufficient to constitute sedition, for it is recognised that the right to utter honest and reasonable criticism is a source of strength to a community rather than a weakness. Criticism of an existing system of Government is not excluded, nor even the expression of desire for a different system altogether. A distinction was further sought to be made that the Government established by law is not to be identified with the political party in power nor with the public men, who may be for the time being heading the Government or occupying Ministerial and other post. Neither criticism of these individuals manning Government nor the criticism of Government itself is objectable per se unless the attempt involves expresses a reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder. To bring about a charge of Government with peaceful means. Neither criticism of these individuals manning Government nor the criticism of Government itself is objectable per se unless the attempt involves expresses a reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder. To bring about a charge of Government with peaceful means. And to displace certain persons from the position of authority, again by criticism which does not lead to violence, is not only permissible but is the only machinery available in a democracy to oppose the ruling party. To prevent all such criticism is to effect adversely the very roots of democracy. 11. The Federal Court, therefore, points out that such an unqualified restriction could never have been intended and was not so intended. The learned Chief Justice Sir Moris Gwyer speaking for the Court relied upon a passage from the Judgment of Fitzgeral, J., in (1868) II Cox. C.C. 54 and concluded that it is those words, deeds or writing constitute sedition, if they have the intention or the tendency to create public disturbance, or promote public disorder, or incite others to do so. It is pointed out that the reason why such words, deeds, and writings constitute sedition is not far to seek as they bring the Government into contempt. Any criticism of Government or any criticism which offends the vanity of the Ministers is not intended to be covered by the offence of sedition. After such a conclusion, what is laid down is that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation, or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gift of the offence. The acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder, or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that this is their intention or tendency. 12. What is further pointed out is that the language of sub-para (e) of para (6) of Rule 36 was always similar to the language of section 124-A of the I.P.C. and the offence of sedition which is the only offence which is in the contemplation of legislature can be proved only if the Act complained of has the character and colour, as described above of leading to public disorder or reasonable anticipation thereof. Analysing the speech or speeches made by Niharendu Dutt Majumdar in that case which were undoubtedly in a very strong and violent language, the Federal Court observes that the speech was best a frothy and irresponsible performance, such as one would not have been expected from a member of the Bengal Legislature, but in the opinion of the Court to describe it as an Act of sedition is to do it too great an honour. The learned Chief Justice points out that there is an English saying that hard words break no bones, and the wisdom of the common law has long refused to regard as actionable any words which, though strictly and literally defamatory, would be regarded by all reasonable men as no more than mere vulgar abuse. Abusive languages even when used about a Government, is not necessarily seditions, and there are certain words and phrases which have so long become the stock-in-trade of the demagogue as almost to have lost all real meaning. The speech before the Federal Court was found to be full of such expressions and read as a whole it could never be described as nothing different than a mere vulgar abuse. The learned Chief Justice refuses to quote any further from the speech on the ground that he would not be a party to increase further the circulation of a debased or counterfeit currency. 13. This interpretation of the offence of sedition from the plain language of section 124-A. I.P.C. and carrying it to the provisions of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 which were similar in words, was called in question before the Privy Council in the case of (Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao)2, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 82. Their Lordships of Privy Council preferred to go by the plain language of either section 124-A I.P.C. or sub-paras (e) and (k) of para (6) of Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. The question thereafter arose before the Supreme Court of India in the year 1962 in (Kedar Nath v State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955. The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of sections 124-A and 505 of the Penal Code. The question thereafter arose before the Supreme Court of India in the year 1962 in (Kedar Nath v State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955. The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of sections 124-A and 505 of the Penal Code. So far section 124-A, offence of sedition is concerned, the Supreme Court after a long discussion and after tracing the entire history of the case law on the subject found that two interpretations were placed for their consideration. On behalf of Government the one interpretation adopted by the Privy Council was canvassed for acceptance that it was consistent with the plain words of section 124-A. On behalf of the appellant Kedar Nath the criticism was that on that interpretation which seeks to prohibit all criticism including legitimate criticism of Government, it officers and other public men manning the Government the provisions of section would offend the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) and would thus be unconstitutional. If on the contrary it is held that the offence of sedition consist in committing acts and using language which has the tendency to lead or to incite public violence or disorder that alone should constitute the offence and not any other kind of criticism. The Supreme Court found that in view of the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) the interpretation given by the Privy Counsel would render the second test unconstitutional and would have to be struck down. If, however, the other which is the limited interpretation, put by the Federal Court is accepted the section could be declared Constitutional. On the principle that when two interpretational rather than which would render it unconstitutional, the Supreme Court preferred, approved and confirmed the interpretation put on section 124-A I.P.C. by the Federal Court in Niharendu Majumdars case. 14. There is therefore, no doubt that what section 124-A I.P.C. means and how the offence of sedition is to be understood under that section is firmly laid down by the Supreme Court. Since assistance of that section is taken by the Federal Court for interpreting the provisions of sub-para (e) of para (6) of Rule 36 of the Defence of India Rules, whose language is comparable to section 124-A I.P.C., it is obvious that the offence of sedition so described in this rule has to be understood in the same manner as stated above. 15. 15. It may be now noted that this was the real meaning of the offence of Sedition judicially brought out and was known to the Parliament all along. In spite of it while framing the Defence of India Rules, 1971 which by amendment area now called "Defence and internal Security of India Rules, 1971" the same language has been adopted for describing the offence of sedition now contained in sub-para (e) of para (6) of Rule 36. When a certain interpretation of the Court is not acceptable to the legislature, it is well know that statutes are amended in a manner to efface the effect of the judicial pronouncement. When, however, statutes are re-enacted in the same language in the face of the clear judgments of the courts, it must be held that the legislature is in entire agreement with the meaning and interpretation of the Rules by the highest Court of the Country. 16. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the offence with which the present accused persons are charged and which offence is described as committing a "prejudicial act" which is prohibited, is the subject-matter of section 124-A of the I. P. C. as also the subject-matter of sub-para (e) of para (6) Rule 36 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. 17. We may incidentally point out that in view of the above history about the real meaning of the offence of sedition no doubt can ever be entertained. So far as this Court is concerned two Division Benches of this Court have already accepted the line of reasoning which we have reproduced above. In (N.P. Nathwani v. The Commissioner of Police)4, 78 Bom.L.R. 1 and (Binod Rao v. Minocher Rustom Masani)5, 78 Bom.L.R. 125 when occasion arose for consideration the legality of certain restrictions being on the ground of perpetration of prejudicial acts, reliance is placed upon the above quoted judgment of the Supreme Court and the law, as we have already discussed above, has been accepted as firmly established in that behalf. 18. Going now to the facts of this case and which facts as disclosed from the police record may be accepted for the time being, what do we find ? In the morning of 16th of August, 1975 some policeman see posters prominently pasted in three places at Dombivli. They contain the words down with dictatorship. 18. Going now to the facts of this case and which facts as disclosed from the police record may be accepted for the time being, what do we find ? In the morning of 16th of August, 1975 some policeman see posters prominently pasted in three places at Dombivli. They contain the words down with dictatorship. The two prosecution witnesses Ghosalkar and Chaudhare see the accused persons actually in the process of pasting the posters in the small hours of 16th August, 1975. They are accustomed to purchase milk between 4 and 4.30 a.m. every day from a certain milk dairy in Dombivli. The two witnesses were present as usual near the milk shop. They found posters being pasted. Admittedly the language of the poster is English. Out of the two witnesses of the prosecution, Ghosalkar alone knows that language and Chaudhare does not know English. He got the contents of the posters only from his friend Ghosalkar. Chaudhare as well as Ghosalkar knew both the accused persons and out of curiosity Ghosalkar enquired with Joglekar, present petitioner, as to what kind of posters were being pasted. Accused Joglekar, the present petitioner, is alleged to have said that he was torpedoing the dictatorship of Indira Gandhi. Having heard this and having communicated this information to Chaudhare about the contents of the posters, the two witnesses go to their respective houses. 19. This is the total evidence on record. Is it possible to say that the two young men pasting posters containing only those words down with dictatorship and accompanied by the further explanation to the two witnesses that the attack was on the dictatorship of Indira Gandhi, have by any stretch of imagination a tendency to inspite the public disorder or reasonable anticipation thereof. Could these words even if seen by the members of the public have the tendency to bring into contempt the Government established by law in this country. Undoubtedly the words are high sounding but do they really carry any message to any one for resorting to force with a view to topple down the legally established Government of the land. The words by themselves do not refer to any person as a dictator. It is only an explanation given by Joglekar to witness Ghosal for which refers to Indira Gandhi as being the object of comments contained in the poster. The words by themselves do not refer to any person as a dictator. It is only an explanation given by Joglekar to witness Ghosal for which refers to Indira Gandhi as being the object of comments contained in the poster. If the person who sees the posters knows that there is no dictatorship in this country, the only impression will be that what is being done is an exercise in futility by persons who are misguided. If the viewer himself believes that the present rule resembles dictatorship then again the only reaction will be that such abusive slogans are hardly a remedy and will lead no where. 20. In any case we think that the posters do not have the tendency to invite to resort to violence at all, whatever the belief the person who reads. If its only purpose is to criticise the present rule and to point out that replacement is needed by democratic means and peaceful, conversion, no exception can be taken. If, however, an attempt, though otherwise permissible, is sought to be achieved through invitation to violence, undoubtedly the offence contemplated by the Defence of India Rules would be deemed to be committed. The total evidence is of three posters being pasted in the entire suburb of Dombivli. All these facts will have to be taken into consideration to see whether this evidence led by the prosecution, even if fully believed, can ever lead to a reasonable conclusion that there was an attempt to invite public disorder or there can be reasonable anticipation thereof. Could it be said from such acts containing strong language that any reasonable person would be satisfied that the intention or tendency or this poster is to cause public disorder. That being the gist of the offence, as the Federal Court points out, and it being almost impossible to infer in that manner from the story words which have by consistent use almost lost their appeal and meaning, a conviction of the accused seems to be extremely doubtful. On the contrary the Court is normally bound to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the contravention of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971. On the contrary the Court is normally bound to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the contravention of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971. In the circumstances the case of the present petitioner falls within the provisions of Rule 184(b) of the said Rules of 1971 and the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail. 21. The other point relates to the involvement of the accused persons in the matter of pasting the posters. Undoubtedly there is the evidence of two witnesses and when they depose in Court the trial Court would be called upon to consider the effect of that evidence. However, we may point out that it does not appear to be the case of the prosecution that posters were being seen in Dombivli for more then two days or for two days and thereafter the policemen detected them. In the routine course of their duty the policemen detected the poster at 9.30 a.m. on 16th August, 1975. It is, therefore, legitimate to assume that they were pasted on the night between 15th and 16th August, 1975. While Head Constable B.R. Patil was looking out for offenders he accidently met witness Ghosalkar on 18th August, 1975 and Ghosalkar being inquisitive asked the Havaldar as to what he was searching for. Then Ghosalkar was told that the Havaldar wanted evidence about the posters being posted. Since the witness knew he disclosed the names of the persons and also perhaps the name of his friend, the other witness Chaudhare. We have gone through the Police statements of both the witnesses. They are certain that their factories were closed on 15th August, 1975 as that being a public holiday on account of Independence Day. Since the witness knew he disclosed the names of the persons and also perhaps the name of his friend, the other witness Chaudhare. We have gone through the Police statements of both the witnesses. They are certain that their factories were closed on 15th August, 1975 as that being a public holiday on account of Independence Day. They normally go to work at about 6 or 6.30 a.m. and are therefore accustomed to wake up at about 3 or 3.30 a.m. They thereafter go to diary at about 4 or 4.30 a.m. Through the factory was closed on 15th August both of them woke up by sheer normal habit and after bath went to fetch milk between 4 and 4.30 a.m. Since both of them refer to the factory being closed on 15th August and their waking up in spite of the fact that they need not have to wake up early on a holiday, we take it that this must be on the night between 14th and 15th 1975. The witnesses specifically refer to the day as being 15th August, 1975. Since the English Date changes after 12 midnight, both of them woke up at about 3.30 a.m. in the early morning of 15th August, 1975. If the posters were pasted in that night, they would have been seen by the entire town when the independence Day was celebrated. The police would never have missed the sight of these posters prominently at three places. The evidence of these two witnesses thus appears to be prima facie of doubtful character 22. However, it will be for the Court to ultimately appreciate such evidence as will be given in Court. Since Rule 184(d) requires the Court to reach certain satisfaction in a prima facie manner on the basis of record of in­vestigation. We are referring to this important aspect of investigation which makes the evidence of the two witnesses, suspect. For this additional reason we are able to reach the satisfaction required to be reached by Rule 184(d) of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 and hence allow this application, set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge and restore the order of the trial Magistrate. 23. We are, however, told by the learned Public Prosecutor that charge-sheet has already been filed and the case is otherwise ready for hearing. 23. We are, however, told by the learned Public Prosecutor that charge-sheet has already been filed and the case is otherwise ready for hearing. He is willing to go on for early hearing. We may much appreciate the early hearing of this case and its disposal as early as possible. We are also told that not only this case but there are many more cases pending in the trial Court similar to the present one. The trial Magistrate should dispose them of at his earliest convenience. 24. In the result, we allow this application, set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge and restore that of the trial Magistrate with the modification that the daily report at the Police Station should be any time between 6 to 7 p.m. 25. Rule made absolute. -----