JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. The preliminary judgment and decree for partition and redemption of the plaintiff's 94/116 share in the plaint schedule property, passed by the trial court, in the suit giving rise to this second appeal, have been confirmed by the first appellate court. Out of the many grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal the one, which was stressed by the counsel for the appellants during the course of his arguments, relates to the question as to whether a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad attains divided status, conferring en him an alienable and heritable share of the tarwad properties, on his issuing a notice to the karanavan of his fixed intention to separate from the rest of the tarwad, without issuing such notices to the other members of the tarwad. Considering the importance of the question of law involved, the learned Judge before whom the second appeal came up in the first instance adjourned it for being heard by a Division Bench which, in its turn, has referred it to a Full Bench; that is how the matter ultimately came up for hearing before us. 2. The appellants are defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. The plaint schedule property in 50 cents of land forming part of a survey number, 1.55 acres in extent, which belonged to a Nair tarwad. The whole property was outstanding on mortgages granted by the tarwad in the years 1061 and and 1071 and purakkadams of 1079, 1080 and 1086. The plaintiff (respondent herein) obtained the mortgage right over the plaint schedule property. Defendants 1 and 2 (appellants herein) obtained, as plaintiffs in O. S. No. 454 of 1951 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Attingal, wherein the respondent herein (plaintiff) was 1st defendant, on behalf of his branch (sakha), a decree for redemption of a 1/3 share of the mortgage property. Ext. P-13 is the copy of judgment dated 30-9- 1957 in that suit. The finding in Ext. P-13 judgment under Issue No. 4 was to the effect that the tarwad of the appellants herein has become divided into three sakhas; and that was the reason why redemption allowed in favour of the appellants on behalf of their sakha was confined to 1/3 of the mortgage property, though the appellants had claimed relief with respect to the entire property. 3. 3. The plaintiff in the present suit admittedly is a stranger to the tarwad of the appellants. His suit is on the strength of Exts. P-l, P-4 and P-24, sale deeds executed by 94 out of 116 members of the appellants' sakha, preceded by registered notices to the karanavan of the sakha. Ext. P-14 series are postal receipts in evidence of the issue of notices to the karnavan by the vendors in Exts. P-l, P-4 and P-24 sale deeds. 4. Virtually the 2nd defendant alone contested the suit. The main defence put forward by him was that those who executed Exts. P-l, P-4 and P-24 sale deeds issued no notice of their intention to separate from the rest of the tarwad to the other members, except the karanavan and therefore they did not attain divided status or obtain any alienable share in, the tarwad property, and therefore the plaintiff derived no title to the plaint schedule property by or under Exts. P-l, P-4 and P-24. 5. Reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellants on the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenhcamma, AIR. 1964 SC. 136=1964 (I) SC. Appeals 593 wherein Subba Rao J., as he then was, has observed as follows: "One cannot declare or manifest his mental state in a vacuum. To declare is to make-known, to assert to others 'Others' must necessarily be those affected by the said declaration. Therefore a member of a joint Hindu family seeking to separate himself from others will have to make known his intention to the other members of the family from whom he seeks to separate." In that case the Supreme Court did not accept the view of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Narayana Rao v. Purushotama Rao lLR. 1938 Madras 315 wherein, speaking for the Bench, Varadachariar, J , has stated as follows: "It is true that the authorities lay down generally that the communication of the intention to become divided to other coparceners is necessary, but none of them lays down that the severance in status does not take place till after such communication has been received by the other coparceners. * * * * It may be that if the law is authoritatively settled; it is not open to us to refuse to give effect to it merely on the ground that it may lead to anomalous consequences; but when the law has not been so stated in any decision of authority and such a view is not necessitated or justified by the reason of the rules, we see no reason to interpret the reference to 'communication' in the various cases as implying that the severance does not arise until notice has actually been received by the addressee or addressees." Commenting on the above quoted passage from the decision in Narayana Rao v. Purushotama Rao ILR. 1938 Madras 315 what has been stated by Subba Rao J.. as he then was, reads as follows: "We regret out inability to accept this view. Firstly, because, as we have pointed out earlier, the law has been well settled by the decision of the Judicial Committee that the manifested intention should be made known to the other members of the family affected thereby, secondly, because there would be anomalies on the acceptation of either of the views. Thirdly, it is implicit in the doctrine of declaration of an intention that it should be declared to somebody and who can that somebody be except the one that is affected thereby." In Adiyalath Katheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu ILR. Thirdly, it is implicit in the doctrine of declaration of an intention that it should be declared to somebody and who can that somebody be except the one that is affected thereby." In Adiyalath Katheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu ILR. 1950 Madras 502 as there was difference of view between Satyanarayana Rao and Panchapagesa Sastri JJ., on on the question as to whether, to effect severance in status, it would be sufficient to serve notice on the karanavan or the manager of the joint family, as he was the representative of the family, Viswanatha Sastri J., to whom it was referred, held: "......a unilateral declaration of an intention to become divided on the part of a member of a joint Hindu family effects severance in status and therefore, the despatch to, or receipt by, the other members of the family of the communication or notice announcing the intention to divide on the part of one member of the family is not essential or its absence fatal to a severance in status." The conclusion of Viswanatha Sastri J. is as follows: "The only reasonable rule that can be deduced from the texts and the several decisions of the Judicial Committee is that the declaration of an intention to divide on the part of a member of the family should be clear and unequivocal and should be indicated, manifested or published in such manner as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case. One method, but not the only method, of such manifestation or publication is by delivering a notice containing a declaration of intention to become divided to the other members of the family. * * * * There must be some manifestation, indication, intimation or expression of that intention to become divided, so as to serve as authentic evidence in case of doubt or dispute. What form that manifestation, expression, or intimation of intention should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case, there being no fixed rule or rigid formula. * * * * There must be some manifestation, indication, intimation or expression of that intention to become divided, so as to serve as authentic evidence in case of doubt or dispute. What form that manifestation, expression, or intimation of intention should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case, there being no fixed rule or rigid formula. The despatch to or receipt by the other members of the family of a communication or notice announcing the intention to divide on the part of one member of the family is not essential nor its absence fatal to a severance in status." Commenting on the above passages from the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri J., Subha Rao J., observed as follows: "We agree with the learned Judge in so far as he held that there should bean intimation, indication or expression of the intention to become divided and that what form that manifestation should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case. But if the learned Judge meant that the said declaration without it being brought to the knowledge of the other members of the family in one way or other constitutes a severance in status we find it difficult to accept it. In our view, it is implicit in the expression 'declaration' that it should be to the knowledge of the person affected thereby. An uncommunicated declaration is no better than a mere formation or harbouring of an intention to separate. It becomes effective as a declaration only after its communication to the person or persons who would be affected thereby". 6. From the observations of Subha Rao J., as he then was, in the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is clear that not only there should be a declaration of the intention on the part of the member who wants to sever from the joint family, but there should also be a communication by him of that intention to the other members who are likely to be affected by such unilateral declaration. However, in what form or manner such communication has to be effected has not been laid by the Supreme Court. However, in what form or manner such communication has to be effected has not been laid by the Supreme Court. It would appear that Subha Rao J., as he then was, deliberately refrained himself from laying down any hard and fast rule in regard to the manner in which the intention of the member to separate was to be communicated to the other members of the tarwad who were to be affected by such severance. It is fairly clear that such an inference is warranted from observation of the learned Judge in the said decision: "......The process of manifestation may vary with circumstances". 7. We should not also lose sight of the fact that the question that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma AIR. 1964 S.C. 136:= 1964(1) S. C. Appeals 593 was not the same or even identical to the one that is posed before us in this second appeal. What engaged the attention of the Supreme Court was the question whether an unequivocal declaration, unilaterally by a member of a joint Hindu family, of his intention to separate himself from the rest of the family members would ipso facto, without communication of such intention to the other members of the family, cause disruption of the joint status in so far as such member wanting separation was concerned. In the case before us, the question is whether it would be sufficient for the purpose of attaining divided status for a member who declares his unequivocal intention to separate himself from the tarwad, to communicate his intention to all the other members of the tarwad without resting content with a notice issued to the karanavan who is the head, manager and mouth-piece of the tarwad. It was submitted by the counsel for the appellants that in a case relating to a Mappila Marumakkathayam tarwad, involving the same question as the one which has arisen in the present case, Unnikrishna Kurup J., in P. Kunhammad & Others v. V. Moossankutty 1972 KLT. 328 after having discussed the dictum laid down by Subba Rao J., as he then was, in the decision of the Supreme Court in A Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma AIR. 328 after having discussed the dictum laid down by Subba Rao J., as he then was, in the decision of the Supreme Court in A Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma AIR. 1964 S.C. 136= 1964 (1)"S.C. Appeals 593 has stated as follows: "...The intention should be communicated to the person or persons sought to be affected and there is therefore no reason to chink that it would be sufficient to communicate the intention to the manager alone." This sentence, we find, has been extracted from the head note to the decision which, in our opinion, does not fully reflect the idea sought to be conveyed by the learned Judge. The learned Judge, who appears to have doubted in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court, whether there was any reason to think that it would be sufficient to communicate the intention to the manager alone, hastened to add "However, no final opinion need be expressed on this point in this case as on the facts I have found that there is no proof of any communication having been sent claiming partition prior to the date of Soopikutty's death." As a matter of fact the finding in that case was that Exts. A 1 and A 3 could not be accepted as true copies of the notices alleged to have been sent by the member of the tarward who wanted to separate himself; and therefore there was really no need to pronounce anything on the hypothetical question of law whether, if, it was proved that notice of intention to separate from the tarwad was sent to the karanavan, that would be sufficient to confer divided status on the sender of the notice. That is the reason why Unnikrishna Kurup J. while expressing his doubt whether, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, it would be sufficient to issue notice to the karanavan alone for the purpose of effecting division of status, added that there was no need to express any final opinion on that point in that case. 8. We have also to bear in mind the fact that the status of the father (manager) of a Hindi joint family is not the same as that of the karanavan of a Marumakkathayam family. 8. We have also to bear in mind the fact that the status of the father (manager) of a Hindi joint family is not the same as that of the karanavan of a Marumakkathayam family. The karanavan of the tarwad not only manages the affairs of the tarward but also symbolises the unity and solidarity of the members who constitute it. In so far as the outsiders are concerned, the karanavan represents the entire tarwad, its assets, and its members and he is competent to give a valid discharge on behalf of the tarwad. Though Subba Rao. J., as he then was, disagreed with that part of the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri J., in Adiyalath Matheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu I. L. R.1950 Madras 502, wherein he stated. "..The despatch to or receipt by the other members of the family of a communication or notice announcing the intention to divide on the part of one member of the family is not essential nor its absence fatal to a severance in status," the learned Judge did not expressly, or even impliedly, disagree in so far as he held that "there should be an intimation, indication or expression of the intention to become divided and that what form that manifestation should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case." It has always been taken for granted that for the purpose of of severance of status in so far as a member who wants to separate is concerned, all that he is required to do is to deliver a notice intimating such intention to the karanavan of the tarwad. On the principle of stare decisis we are inclined to hold that it continues to be the correct law and no deviation therefrom is called for. The true position after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Raghavamma's case (AIR. 1964 SC. On the principle of stare decisis we are inclined to hold that it continues to be the correct law and no deviation therefrom is called for. The true position after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Raghavamma's case (AIR. 1964 SC. 136 : 1964 (1) Supreme Court Appeals 593) is that the extreme view that an unequivocal declaration of the intention to separate from the rest of the tarwad unilaterally by a member by itself, without communication of such intention to the other members of the tarwad, who are likely to be affected, would bring about severance of status, no longer holds good; but all the same, it has not been laid down either by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or by the Supreme Court that such communication should be by notice to each and every one of the members of the tarwad, and that notice to the karanavan who represents the tarwad and all its members could not be deemed to be a communication to all the members. If, on the other hand, we hold that a notice to every member is an absolute necessity to claim divided status by a member who wants to separate himself, it may run counter to the true spirit of the provisions contained in S.39 of the Travancore Nair Act and S.62 of the Cochin Nair Act and the right to claim partition conferred by the statute might be rendered illusory. 9. Various other decisions have been brought to our notice; and they are: Lekshmikutty Amma v. Madhavan Pillai 1957 KLT. 1196 FB.; C. Kuttimalu Amma v. C. Lakshmi 1960 KLT. 1201 FB.; Anna Cherian and another v. Achutha Menon and others AlR. 1963 SC. 128 : 1962 KLJ. 1105, Kuriakko v. Ouseph 1963 KLT 61 D. B.; Theyyunni Menon v. Ramunni Menon 1965 KLT 83 and Parameswaran Nair v. Lakshmi Amma 1968 KLT 51 . We are, however of the opinion that it is not necessary to advert in detail to the aforesaid decisions for the reason that in none of them the question as to whether the delivery of notice of intention to separate from the tarwad by a member of the tarwad to the karanvan alone, without such notices being issued to other members of the tarwad, would confer divided status and alienable and heritable interest in tarwad properties on such member, came up for decision. In Lakshmikutty Amma v. Madhavan Pillai 1957 KLT 1196 F. B. the question to be decided was whether a claim in a written statement by a member of a Marumakkathayam community to whom the right to compulsory partition of his share in the family property has been extended by legislation, effects a severance of status for him from the rest of the family; and it was @page-KLT496# answered in the affirmative by the Full Bench of this Court. The question before the Full Bench of this Court in C. Kuttimalu Amma A. Lakshmi 1960 KLT 1201 F.B. was whether there was any presumption that in every case of partition of a tarwad, a group of members to whom properties are allotted on partition takes them as tenants in common; and it was held in the negative by the Full Bench. In Anna Cherian and another v. Achutha Menon A. I. R.1963 S. C. 128 == 1962 KLJ 1105 where the question of validity of a sale deed executed by all the junior members of the tarwad and the power of attorney-holder of the karanavan, who was away from the country, was under challenge, the Supreme Court held, on the facts of the case, that the sale deed was valid and binding on all the members of the tarwad including the karanavan. In Kuriakko v. Ouseph 1963 KLT 61 D. B. the question posed was whether the seniormost member of a tavazhi was competent to represent the tavazhi while the division was among the tavazhies; and the Division Bench held that the respective senior-most members of different tavazhies of an undivided tarwad by themselves could not effect a division among the tavazhies. The primary question that was to be decided in Theyyunni Menon v. Ramunni Menon 1965 KLT 61 was whether from the mere delay or omission to claim maintenance an inference of waiver could be drawn, and the Division Bench held that no such inference was possible. In Parameswaran Nair v. Lakshmi Amma 1968 KLT 51 the main question to be decided was whether there was a resumption that the tarwad continues even after it had become divided, and it was held by Madhavan Nair J. that the presumption was that once a tarwad had become divided, ' it continues to be such unless a reunion is clearly made out. It was held in the same decision: "In law, a unilateral declaration of intention to separate communicated to the other members effects a status of division between the member so demanding and the others. The moment the communication of such intention takes place, the status of division becomes an accomplished fact." However, the mode of communication to the other members was not a point in issue in that case. 10. One other point passingly urged by the counsel for the appellants is that the suit for partition was bad, as it was one for partial partition, and as such the suit ought to have been dismissed by the courts below. The trial court held that the contention of the second defendant could not be accepted, as no other item was shown to have been possessed jointly by the plaintiff and the defendants! While confirming the finding of the trial court, the first appellate court in Para.5 of its judgment stated, inter alia“ "...the second respondent has not proved as to what arc the other divisible properties belonging to the sub-tarwad. So, the plea of partial partition and nonjoinder of parties is also to be found against". As both the trial court and the first appellate court court have rejected the plea of partial partition stating valid reasons, and it being purely a question of fact, we do not think that it would be necessary for us to go into the details of this plea. The appellants are not entitled to succeed on the plea of partial partition also. 11. Having, in the light of foregoing discussion, come to the conclusion that to attain divided status it would be sufficient for a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad to deliver notice to the karanavan alone and that there is no need for issuing notices to all the members individually for that purpose, we confirm the preliminary judgment and decree of the courts below and dismiss this second appeal with costs. Dismissed.