JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application in revision filed by Ganga Bai against an order of the Additional District Judge, Udaipur, dated 16th September, 1974, by which the petitioner's application under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, for revoking the authority of the arbitrator, namely Shri Amreek Singh, non-petitioner No. 2, and for his removal, was rejected. 2. The short facts giving rise to this revision-petition may be stated as follows:- Ganga Bai, petitioner, and Bansatilal, non-petitioner No. 1, entered into an agreement of partnership on 3rd December, 1971, for plying a bus under the name and style of M/s. Satyanarain Transport, Bansi, District Chittorgarh, on Udaipur-Banswara route via Salumbar Asod and Loharia. Garga Bai's husband Shri Narain Lal agreed to transfer his bus No. RJQ 2762 to the partnership firm without charging any premium whatsoever. The agreement included an arbitration clause No. 10 which reads as follows:- "In case of any dispute as regards to this indenture or any term or condition incorporated therein or with regards to interpretation thereof, shall be referred to the sole arbitration of Sardar Amrik Singhji s/o Sardar Singhji." 3. It was alleged by the petitioner that her husband Narainlal could not transfer the aforesaid bus to the partnership fir,. However, Bansanti Lal, non-petitioner No. 1 began to supervise and look after the running of the said bus as an agent holding general power of attorney on behalf of the petitioner and her husband Narain Lal. In the course of management of the bus, by Bansanti Lal, there were disputes and differences between the parties regarding accounts and other matters mentioned in the petitioner's application under section 5 of the Arbitration Act. As a result of the differences, the general power of attorney was cancelled and Basanti Lal was asked to furnish true accounts of the income and expenditure of the bus. Basanti Lal failed to furnish full and true account to the petitioner and her husband. Thereupon the matter was referred to Sardar Amrik Singh, Arbitrator, in pursuance to clause 10 of the partnership agreement. It is not disputed before me that the arbitrator gave his award on 2.7.74. The award as filed in the court, as is evident from the order sheet of the lower court dated 7.9.1974. Thereupon the matter was referred to Sardar Amrik Singh, Arbitrator, in pursuance to clause 10 of the partnership agreement. It is not disputed before me that the arbitrator gave his award on 2.7.74. The award as filed in the court, as is evident from the order sheet of the lower court dated 7.9.1974. In these circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is whether the authority of Sardar Amrik Singh, arbitrator, can be revoked and whether he can be removed and a new arbitrator be appointed after he had made the award. Mr. J.S. Saluja appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended before me that the authority of an appointed arbitrator can be revoked with the leave of the court even after the award is made by him, provided the award that not been made the rule of the court and that there is no reason to restrict the operation of section 5 of the Arbitration Act to cases where an award has not yet been made, in support of his above proposition Mr. Saluja relied upon Prafulla Chandra v. Panchanan, AIR 1946 Cal 426 wherein the following observations were made by Hon'ble Chakravartti J. at page 434:- "It might be asked whether Section 5 was not limited to cases where an award had yet to be made. I can see no reason to so limit its meaning. Till an award is made a decree of the court, the submission remains and it can, within the language of the section be revoked with leave." Mr. Dinkar Mehta appearing on behalf of the non-petitioner, on the other hand, argued, that the authority of an appointed arbitrator may be revoked before the award is actually made, because once an award is made by the arbitrator, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to apply to the court to have the award set aside, instead of applying for revocation of the authority. In support of his above contention, Mr. Dinkar Mehta relied upon Arbu Hindustan Steel v. Appejay, AIR 1967 Cal 391 Manni Lal v. Pahlad Das, AIR 1937 All 2141 and Rikhabdass v. Ballabhdas, AIR 1962 SC 551 . 4. I have carefully gone through there authorities. In Arbu Hindusthan Steel v. Appejay (supra) it was held that after the expiry of four months the arbitrator became functus officio unless the period was extended by Court. 4. I have carefully gone through there authorities. In Arbu Hindusthan Steel v. Appejay (supra) it was held that after the expiry of four months the arbitrator became functus officio unless the period was extended by Court. As in that case no application for extension of time after the expiry of four months was filed, it was observed that no question of reviving the authority of the arbitrators did arise, because the arbitrators could not function after the expiry of four months. In Munni Lal v. Pahlad Das (supra) it was observed as follows:- "We think that the lower Court misconceived the correct legal position and proceeded to decide whether the reference should be revoked. The reference having already been made and an award having already been given the only question which remained to be decided was whether the award was valid. The proper procedure as already indicated, was that the arbitrator should have been directed to file the award within a reasonable time & on the award being filed ten days should have been given to the parties to file their objections, if any, to the validity of the award. If any objection had been taken the same should have been disposed of. The Court would then have been in a position either to uphold the award and make it a rule of the Court or to supersede the arbitration. In this view the order of the lower court impugned in revision must be set aside & that Court should be directed to proceed as indicated above." In Rikhabdass v. Ballabhdas (supra), their Lordships were pleased to make the following observations at page 554:- "(8) Mr. Pathak contended that even if the case did not come within Section 16(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, the order in the present case can be supported under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which preserves the inherent power of a court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. It is true that Section 41 of the Arbitration Act makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before a court under the Arbitration Act. But it is well known that after making his award the arbitrator is functus officio. It is true that Section 41 of the Arbitration Act makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before a court under the Arbitration Act. But it is well known that after making his award the arbitrator is functus officio. To cite one authority for this proposition we may quote the observations of Mellish L J in Mordue v. Palmer, (1870) 6 Ch A.22 at P.31 :- "I think the result of the cases at law is that when an arbitrator has signed a document as and for his award, he is functus officio and he cannot of his own authority remedy any mistake." 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. In my humble opinion, the authority of an appointed arbitrator can be revoked before the award is actually made, because once an award is made by the arbitrator, he becomes functus officio, and if any party wants to challenge the validity of the award on any ground, he may apply to have the award set aside instead of getting the authority of the arbitrators revoked. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the learned Additional District Judge has committed an error in rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, because in this case the arbitrator has already made an award, which has been filed in the court. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the authority of the arbitrator has been revoked by implication since his application for stay of legal proceedings under Section 34 was refused by the learned Additional District Judge. In this connection, he referred me to Gul Mohd. v. Fata Bibi, AIR 1966 J&K 122 wherein it was held that if the Court has rejected the request of the appellant for stay of the proceedings, such rejection would mean that the suit could be heard on its own merits by the Court. If the suit is allowed to proceed, the authority of the arbitrator stands revoked by the court itself.In the present case no suit by the petitioner with respect to differences referred to the said arbitrators is pending in the court of the Additional District Judge, Udaipur, or in any other court. If the suit is allowed to proceed, the authority of the arbitrator stands revoked by the court itself.In the present case no suit by the petitioner with respect to differences referred to the said arbitrators is pending in the court of the Additional District Judge, Udaipur, or in any other court. The only proceeding pending in his court was an application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, for revocation of the authority of the arbitrator. Hence, it cannot be safely held that the work of the arbitrator automatically came to an end as soon as the Additional District Judge refused to stay the proceedings, which were initiated by way of an application under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, I do not feel persuaded to hold that the authority of the appointed arbitrator was revoked by implication. 7. The third contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the award was not actually made within four months and that the arbitrator ceased to exist after the expiry of four months as he could not legally function or make an award thereafter. The above contention also has no force, because the dispute was referred to the arbitrator on 17th November, 1973, as is evident from para 4 of the application of Shri Basanti Lal dated 23rd February, 1974, for appointment of a receiver and the time for making the award was extended on an application filed by him and the arbitrator was allowed four months further time to make an award. As stated earlier the arbitrator made his award on 2.7.1974 and Basanti Lal moved the court for making the award a rule of the court. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition has no force and is hereby dismissed. As the revision petition has been disposed of on legal points, the parties shall bear their own costs. *******