JUDGMENT:- The petitioner before me filed an application under Sec. 20 of Act IV of 1938 as early as 1973 and obtained an order of stay of execution by the order dated 18-6-1973. He did not care to file an application under Section 19 within sixty days of the said order, as contemplated under the proviso to Section 20. Later, i.e., on 11-4-1974, the application out of which the present civil miscellaneous appeal arises came to be filed under Section 19 for scaling down the debt. This is clearly barred by limitation. 2. It is contended on behalf of the appellant-judgment-debtor that Sec.19 itself does not provide for any period of limitation, that an application under that section can be filed at any time and that, therefore the proviso to S.20 should not be invoked in support of the contention that the application under Section 19 is barred by limitation. I am unable to agree with that contention. 3. The proviso to Section 20 clearly says that if an application under Section 19 had already not been filed and if such an application is not filed even within sixty days of the order of stay, then the decree shall be executed as it stands (without being scaled down). In Kumarasami Pillai v. Thiruvengadam Aiyangar, 1939-2 Mad LJ 308, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider whether the said proviso to Sec.20 is a condition precedent which means that beyond the period of sixty days provided therein no application under Section 19 can be entertained, any delay cannot be excused, or whether it prescribes only a period of limitation in which event Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked and the delay can be excused for proper and adequate reasons. The Division Bench held that the proviso prescribes only a period of limitation. 4. The contention on behalf of the judgment-debtor is that in spite of the above said proviso to Section 20, there is, no period of limitation at all in respect of an application under Section 19. It is true that if the judgment-debtor has not invoked Section 20 and obtained stay of execution, he can always approach the court which passed the decree (as long as the decree has not been satisfied), for scaling down the debt, if he is entitled to such scaling down on merits. It is true that if the judgment-debtor has not invoked Section 20 and obtained stay of execution, he can always approach the court which passed the decree (as long as the decree has not been satisfied), for scaling down the debt, if he is entitled to such scaling down on merits. But once he invokes the jurisdiction of the court under Section 20 and obtains stay of execution, then undoubtedly a period of limitation is prescribed by the proviso to that section which specifically says that unless an application under Section 19 (if it had not been already filed) is filed within sixty days from the order of stay the decree shall be executed as it stands. 5. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor referred to my decision in Dharmarajan v. Nagalinga Kandiar, 1975-2 Mad LJ 34 and that rendered by Mohan, J., reported in Krishnamurthi Iyer v. Sethurama Iyer, 1976-1 Mad LJ 10, in the course of his arguments. But these cases were concerned with the question whether if a court sale had taken place after the commencement of the Amendment Act, Act VIII of 1973, the judgment-debtor can invoke Section 23 (c) and pray for setting aside the same. It was held that the judgment-debtor having had enough opportunity to file an application under Section 19 (before the court sale takes place) in respect of sales which take place after the publication of Act VIII of 1973, Section 23 (c) cannot be invoked. Those decisions have nothing to do with the question of limitation that arises in the present case. 6. The conclusion of the court below that the present application under Section 19 is barred by limitation is correct. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.