JUDGMENT - N.D. KAMAT, J.:---The petitioners (1) Balkrishna Chandrakant Sawant and (2) Vimal B. Sawant are husband and wife and on June 24, 1974 they have been convicted by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 21st Court, Bandra, Bombay, under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, and each of then has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. On the following day the learned Police Prosecutor made an application requesting the learned Magistrate to pass an order under section 18, sub-section (2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, against both these petitioners , who were occupying a flat in Krishna Bhavan situate within distance of 200 yards from a certain educational institution and a number of Nursing Homes in Hindu Colony, Dadar. On receipt of this application from the learned Police Prosecutor, the petitioners-accused were called upon to show cause why an order under section 18(2) of the Suppression of ImmoralTraffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, should not be passed against them. Being aggrieved by the convictions recorded and the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Magistrate, the petitioners-accused preferred an appeal to this Court which was later on transferred to the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay, for disposal according to law. That appeal came to be numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 40 1976 and is still pending in the Sessions Court. As the original record and proceedings in the criminal case against the petitioners-accused were sent to the Sessions Court in appeal, the hearing of the application dated June 25, 1974, filed by the learned Police Prosecutor before the learned trial Magistrate was adjourned from time to time. Although the petitioners-accused before the learned Magistrate in response to the show caused notice issued to them, they did not file any written statement or objections to the application filed by the learned Police Prosecutor. On the other hand, they chose to file Revision Application No. 100 of 1976, requesting the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, to pass an order staying the hearing of the application filed by the learned Police Prosecutor before the learned Magistrate. On the other hand, they chose to file Revision Application No. 100 of 1976, requesting the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, to pass an order staying the hearing of the application filed by the learned Police Prosecutor before the learned Magistrate. The learned Additional Sessions Judge heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners-accused and came to the conclusion that the application made by the petitioners-accused was designed to circumvent the operation of section 18 and there was no provision of law permitting stay of the hearing of an application like the one presented before the learned trial Magistrate. He, therefore, passed an order on April 12, 1976, rejecting the revision application filed by the petitioners-accused, who have thereupon filed the present application in this Court on April 19, 1976. Mr. Gupte, learned Counsel for the petitioners-accused, urged that an order under section 18, sub-section (2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, is to be passed by the learned trial Magistrate convicting the accused persons forthwith and not on some subsequent date thereafter. According to Mr. Gupte, a Magistrate while convicting the accused has also to pass an order under section 18(2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, and that after passing the judgment he becomes functus officio and will have no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 18(2) of the said Act. Mr. Gupte urged that the provisions contained in section 18(2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, do not contemplate any application by any of the parties moving the Magistrate to pass an order under section 18(2); but, on the other hand, they contemplate that at the time of convicting the accused person the Magistrate is required to pass an order or refuse to pass an order under section 18(2) of the said Act. Mr. Gupte further urged that in this case the learned Police Prosecutor had urged in his arguments that the Magistrate should pass an order under section 18(2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, and the learned Magistrate not having passed such an order, he must be deemed to have impliedly refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under section 18(2) of the said Act. Section 18, sub-section (2) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, reads thus :--- "18. (2) A Court convicting a person of any offence under section 3 or section 7 may pass orders under sub-section (1), without further notice to such person to show cause as required in that sub-section. (3) Orders passed by the Magistrate or Court under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be subject to appeal and shall not be stayed or set aside by the order of any Court, civil or criminal, and the said orders shall cease to have validity after the expiry of one year : Provided that where a conviction under section 3 or section 7 is set aside on appeal on the ground that such house, room, place or any portion thereof is not being run or used as a brother or is not being used by prostitutes for carrying on their trade, any order passed by the trial Court under sub-section (1) shall also be set aside." From the above wording of section 18 of sub-section (2) it is clear that a Court convicting a person of any offence under section 3 or section 7 is authorised to pass orders under sub-section (1) without even issuing further show cause notice. This cannot, however, mean that the Court is prevented from issuing a show cause notice if it so desires. I am, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Guptes argument that under section 18, sub-section (2) the Court is bound to pass an order forthwith and it has no jurisdiction to pass an order under sub-section (2) after the Court has passed its judgment and the accused are convicted. Having regard to the above wording of section 18, sub-section (2), it is, to my mind, clear that the Court may pass an order forthwith at the time of convicting the accused or if it so chooses, it may even issue a show cause notice and pass an order under sub-section (2) after hearing the parties. I, therefore, reject the legal submission made by Mr. Gupte. It may also be pointed out that after the learned Police Prosecutor made an application on June 25, 1974, requesting the learned trial Magistrate to pass an order under sub-section (2) of section 18, notices were issued to the petitioners-accused and they appeared before the learned trial Magistrate. I, therefore, reject the legal submission made by Mr. Gupte. It may also be pointed out that after the learned Police Prosecutor made an application on June 25, 1974, requesting the learned trial Magistrate to pass an order under sub-section (2) of section 18, notices were issued to the petitioners-accused and they appeared before the learned trial Magistrate. The hearing of the application was adjourned from time to time as the petitioners-accused had preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court. What is of importance to be noted is that the petitioners-accused did not even file a written statement before the learned Magistrate saying that he had no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 18(2); but preferred to go in revision to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, and then to file the present application in this Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, seems to be right in making an observation in his judgment that this seems to be an attempt on the part of the petitioner-accused to evade the provisions of section 18, sub-sections (2) and (3) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. The judgment of the learned trial Magistrate is not produced in these proceedings and it is, therefore, not possible to know whether the learned Police Prosecutor or had urged the learned Magistrate in his arguments to pass an order under section 18(2). Even if he had advanced such an argument, the learned trial Magistrate was entitled to issue a show cause notice hear the parties concerned and then pass an order. From the fact that at the time of convecting the accsued under section Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, the learned trial Magistrate did not pass an order under section 18(2) of the said Act. I find it extreme difficult to reach the conclusion that the learned trial Magistrate must be deemed to have impliedly refused to pass that order. If he had really refused to pass such an order after hearing the arguments of the learned Police Prosecutor, he would ordinarily say so even after hearing the parties now. I fail to understand the of petitioners-accused to approach the higher courts without putting-forth their contentions before the learned trial Magistrate. After hearing the arguments advanced by Mr. If he had really refused to pass such an order after hearing the arguments of the learned Police Prosecutor, he would ordinarily say so even after hearing the parties now. I fail to understand the of petitioners-accused to approach the higher courts without putting-forth their contentions before the learned trial Magistrate. After hearing the arguments advanced by Mr. Gupte, learned Counsel for the petitioners-accused, I am not satisfied that after passing the judgment in the criminal case the learned trial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 18 sub-section (2) or that in this case he must be deemed to have impliedly refused to pass an order under this sub-section; The petitions, therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged. Mr. Guptes oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. ----