Judgment :- 1. The question raised in this appeal which the learned judge in the judgment under appeal declined to consider as it was felt that the statutory remedies available were adequate turns on the interpretation to be placed on the proviso to S.12A of the Kerala Education Act, 1958, for short, the Act. We shall extract the section: 12A. Disciplinary powers of Government over teachers of aided schools. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in S.11 or S.12 and subject to such rules as may be prescribed, the Government or such officer not below the rank of an Educational Officer, as may be authorised by the Government in this behalf, shall have power to take disciplinary proceedings against a teacher of an aided school and to impose upon him all or any of the penalties specified in the rules made under this Act. (2) The Government or the officer authorised under sub-section (1), as the case may be, may suspend a teacher of an aided school when any disciplinary proceedings is proposed to be taken against him under that sub-section or when such disciplinary proceedings are pending: Provided that (a) before exercising the powers under sub-section (1) the Government or the authorised officer as the case may be, may intimate the manager regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action against the teacher concerned and give the manager a reasonable opportunity of taking disciplinary action; and (b) If the manager fails to take appropriate action it shall be open to the Government or the authorised officer to take appropriate disciplinary action against the teacher concerned." 2. This section was inserted by the amending Act 31 of 1969. There is a purpose behind the section. The inactivity of a manager or bis lenient attitude in regard to a certain teacher or his inability to enforce discipline should not lead to deterioration of discipline in a school as it would be against public interest. So if the manager omitted to take necessary disciplinary action, the educational authorities themselves can rectify that omission. This can be done only subject to the terms of the proviso which we have extracted. So if the manager omitted to take necessary disciplinary action, the educational authorities themselves can rectify that omission. This can be done only subject to the terms of the proviso which we have extracted. The contention that is raised before us by the appellant, a manager-cum-teacher in a school who has been convicted of a criminal offence is that the educational officer has disregarded the proviso in the section and had not intimated the manager, that is himself, the need for disciplinary action and without doing so has passed the order Ext. P1 removing the appellant, from service. It was submitted by counsel that this action of the Educational Officer, the 1st respondent being against the statutory provisions and therefore according to counsel, without jurisdiction, this Court can interfere in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. Mr. M. K. Rawther, Government Pleader contended before us that we should read the proviso in a limited manner as being not applicable to cases where the manager who has to take action is also the teacher against whom action should be taken, for in such cases to ask the manager to take action against himself can in most cases end in an unsatisfactory manner. A human mind is normally biased or prejudiced in its own favour and to ask a man to punish himself after considering all the aspects would be a travesty of justice. He reminded us of the well-known principle that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause. He invited our attention to a passage from the judgment of Cotton L. J. in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education 43 Ch. D. 379 which reads as follows: "Of course, the rule is very plain that no man can be plaintiff, or prosecutor, in any action, and at the same time sit in judgment to decide in that particular case either in his own case, or in any case, where he brings forward the accusation or complaint on which the order is made." This judgment was quoted with approval by Lord Atkinson in Frome United Broweries Limited and Another v. Keepers of the Peace and Justices for County Borough of Bath 1926 L. R. A. C. 586. It is unnecessary to multiply references to decided cases on this aspect excepting to say that in India we have adopted this principle, as far as we know, uniformly. It is unnecessary to multiply references to decided cases on this aspect excepting to say that in India we have adopted this principle, as far as we know, uniformly. To apply the proviso giving to it its literal grammatical meaning will therefore lead to the position that this Court has directed that something should be done which is opposed to the principle that we have stated. This of course we cannot do and we do not think we can read the proviso as insisting upon any such procedure being followed as such procedure would lead only to manifest injustice. We cannot therefore accept the argument that has been advanced by counsel for the appellant that the order Ext. P1 must be set aside on the ground that the proviso to S.12A had not been complied with. In those circumstances, we have to apply another well-known principle as has been stated by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar in the decision in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh and others AIR 1955 S. C. 830. The principle is "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence." This principle has been relied on by the Supreme Court in a number of other decisions but we may refer to only one more decision in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway and another v. T.R. Challappan AIR 1975 S. C. 2216. Applying this principle, we will read the proviso as non-applicable to cases where the manager happens to be the teacher against whom action is to be taken. It is unlikely that there will be such combinations of managers and teachers hereafter in view of R.8 in Chapter III of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 which has been brought to our notice by counsel for the respondents but there may be a few cases where the question can arise because of the proviso to R.8 which says that those who have been allowed to function before the rule came into force may continue as such. A ruling on this aspect therefore, we consider, is necessary and this is one of the reasons why we have decided to deal with this question raised by the appellant in the Original Petition on the merits. 3. The other reason which compelled us to deal with the petition on the merits is the further contention raised by the petitioner that even assuming that the District Educational Officer has not acted disregarding the proviso to S.12A he has acted in a manner violative of the principles of natural justice in that no opportunity had been afforded to him for being heard. The pleadings in the case commenced by saying that there has been no such opportunity afforded. The only question then is whether in such circumstances it is not necessary to afford an opportunity. The rule under which actions have been taken which culminated in the order Ext. P1 is R.77A in Chapter XIV (A) of the Rules reading as under: 77A. Notwithstanding anything contained in R.75, 76 and 77, (i) where a penalty is imposed on a teacher on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) where the authority imposing the penalty is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules, or (iii) where such authority for reasons to be recorded in writing is satisfied that in the interests of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure; such authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." There is no recording of reasons as envisaged by S.77A (ii) or 77A (iii). The last part of the rule is important which says that "such authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit". "Consider", the Supreme Court pointed out, is not the same as "determine", in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway & another v. T. R. Challappan AIR. 1975 SC. 2216. The last part of the rule is important which says that "such authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit". "Consider", the Supreme Court pointed out, is not the same as "determine", in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway & another v. T. R. Challappan AIR. 1975 SC. 2216. But the Court also emphasised in Para.21 of the judgment referring to R.14 of the concerned Rules which provided the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit" that, "The statutory provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service." 4. An impartial consideration can be had only after giving an opportunity to the person against whom action should be taken. What he has to say will have to be considered. There are different forms of punishment even when a person has to cease to function in the capacity in which he is functioning. He may be dismissed or removed from service or compulsorily retired. These have been statutorily provided in R.65 in Chapter XIV (A) of the Rules. Any authority taking action under R.77A in Chapter XIV (A) will have necessarily to decide with reference to the facts of that case after due consideration of all the relevant circumstances and the representations of the person against whom action should be taken of the exact punishment to be imposed on the delinquent even if it be a case where one of the three major penalties indicated above should be inflicted. There has been no such consideration in this case. Therefore the order Ext. P1 has to be vacated. We allow this appeal and set aside the order Ext. P1. 5. There has been no such consideration in this case. Therefore the order Ext. P1 has to be vacated. We allow this appeal and set aside the order Ext. P1. 5. The 1st respondent will pass fresh orders after giving an opportunity to the appellant to state his case and it will be open to the appellant to seek such remedies as are available to him under the statute if he is aggrieved. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. 6. We have chosen to deal with this petition on the merits notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had another remedy only because the case involved the interpretation of a section on which there is no ruling and the question was likely to arise again. Allowed.