Judgement JUDGMENT.- This second appeal by the plaintiff of the original suit arises in the following circumstances: The plaintiff, Sunil Kumar Banerjee, filed a suit for injunction, both permanent and mandatory. The allegation was that he was the Receiver of the suit property and the defendant is a thika tenant in respect of the suit property at a monthly rental of Rs. 2.06 nP. and on payment of Municipal taxes paid separately to the plaintiff. The defendant, Shyamabala Shaw, without the consent and knowledge of the landlord made certain pucca and permanent construction in the suit land contrary to the provision of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. This unlawful construction the plaintiff wanted to have removed and he prayed also for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from making any furrier pucca construction on the suit land. The learned Munsif of the original court decreed the suit on the finding that the defendant raised unauthorised pucca construction as alleged by the plaintiff and besides allowing a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from making any pucca structure on the suit land there was the direction for removal and demolition of all pucca structures on the suit land against that decree. An appeal was taken by the defendant before the District Judge, 24-Parganas. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal found that the defendant-appellant did not challenge any of the findings of the learned Munsif on merit. He did not exactly challenge the judgment and the decree. On the day of hearing of the appeal, the defendant filed a petition giving an undertaking that she would remove the permanent structures from the suit land at her own cost and would not claim any compensation for the same in case she be evicted in future from the it land and on this undertaking the appellant wanted that the decree for mandatory injunction for demolition of the permanent structures be set aside. The prayer was opposed, but the learned Subordinate Judge of the appellate court below, on the basis of the decision in (1959) 63 Cal WN 824, though he dismissed the appeal on merit with costs to the Plaintiff-respondent, modified the decree passed by the trial court. The decree for mandatory injunction was set aside. Against that decision the present appeal has been filed. 2-3. I have heard Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant. The decree for mandatory injunction was set aside. Against that decision the present appeal has been filed. 2-3. I have heard Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant. Nobody, however, appears on behalf of the respondent. 4. The only point to be considered in this appeal is whether the learned Subordinate Judge below was justified in setting aside the decree for mandatory injunction for demolition of the pucca structures on the suit land according to law and on the basis of the decision referred to by him. Mr. Mukherjee submits before me that the decision relied upon by the learned appellate Court below was wrongly interpreted and in fact that decision does not support the appellate court below. It has also been contended that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in law causing injustice to the plaintiff by disturbing the decree for mandatory injunction in view of the fact that the court has no jurisdiction to allow a wrong to continue. 5. Going through the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge it appears that according to him the principle laid down in (1959) 63 Cal WN 824 allows the court to accept the undertaking and allow the pucca structure constructed illegally to stand till a thika tenant is evicted by the landlord The case of (1959) 63 Cal WN 824 is Monmatha Nath Mukherjee v. Sm. Banarasi. In that case the trial court accepted the plaintiffs version and allowed a decree for injunction as prayed for on being satisfied that the thika tenant wrongly made permanent structure on the suit land without the knowledge and consent of the landlord. An appeal was taken by the defendants but that failed. There was a second appeal which was taken before this Court and Mr. Justice Renupada Mukherjee remanded the case to the lower appellate Court for being reheard. There was the submission on behalf of the appellants that they were prepared to remove the structures at their own cost and without claiming any compensation from the plaintiff on the determination of their tenancy if it were found that they had no right to build any permanent or substantial structure upon the land covered by the tenancy. Mukherjee J., remanded the case on two points. Mukherjee J., remanded the case on two points. The second point reads as follows: (2) If the structures were completed before the institution of the suit, whether an order for demolition should be made on keeping in view the fact that the tenancy of the appellants has not yet been determined and also the fact that the appellants have undertaken in this Court to remove the structures at their own costs after the determination of the tenancy, if it is determined at any time, without claiming any compensation from the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court in that case on hearing the parties after remand with regard to the point No. 2 mentioned above said in his judgment:"..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .... So I am of opinion that though otherwise, the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory injunction, in view of this undertaking this injunction should not actually be allowed." Against that decision a second appeal was preferred. There again the question undertaking was considered and the finding of the court below was challenged. There the persons who gave the undertakings were not all the parties concerned but one. Kailash was unwilling to give any undertaking. In that subsequent second appeal Banerjee, J., held that in those circumstances he would not have allowed the appeal on the simple ground that the undertaking was ineffective. Then other questions of law were considered. From the reading of the entire judgment reported in (1959) 63 Cal WN 824 I do not find that any specific or clear proposition of law was laid down that if any undertaking is given by the tenant for demolition when there would be any occasion for a decree for eviction against him, such undertaking would be accepted or the court might accept that undertaking in spite of the specific finding that the permanent or pucca construction made by the tenant was unlawful and against law. In the facts and circumstances, I cannot say that the learned Subordinate Judge was justified to hold that on the basis of the decision of the case in (1959) 63 Cal WN 824 the unlawful construction made by the tenant should be allowed to remain on the of the undertaking. 6. There can be no dispute about the status of a thika tenant as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. 6. There can be no dispute about the status of a thika tenant as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. Such tenant cannot make any pucca or permanent construction on the tenanted land without the previous permission and consent of the landlord. Of course, the thika tenant using the land for a residential purpose may erect a pucca structure on such land for such purpose with the previous permission of the Controller and on an application made by the thika tenant in this behalf. The Controller may grant him permission to erect a pucca structure if the Controller is satisfied on certain points. In this connexion Section 10 (a) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act may be looked into. In the present case, both the trial court and the appellate court below held that the defendant-tenant made pucca and permanent constructions without the consent and knowledge of the landlord and that the said construction was unauthorised and illegal and liable to be demolished. Against the decision of the trial court when the appeal was taken up for hearing those findings were not challenged. But the defendant-tenant filed an application, as already stated giving an undertaking to demolish the same when there might be an occasion for her eviction in future. When the plaintiff got relief against a wrong done by the defendant, the question would be whether any court of justice will allow the wrong to continue if the said wrong is admittedly against the provisions of law. In the present case, if the undertaking is accepted it means that the wrong done by the tenant in the matter of making illegal construction will be allowed to continue. When the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief by way of mandatory, injunction for removal of the wrong besides permanent injunction, the court has no jurisdiction to withhold the relief to, which the plaintiff is entitled unless there is reasonable justification either according to law or good conscience and equity. Neither of these principles is applicable, in the present case. The defendant surreptitiously and illegaly against the provision of law made construction to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The wrong done to the plaintiff must be removed by demolition of the illegal structure. There can be no question of allowing the wrong to continue on any undertaking. Neither of these principles is applicable, in the present case. The defendant surreptitiously and illegaly against the provision of law made construction to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The wrong done to the plaintiff must be removed by demolition of the illegal structure. There can be no question of allowing the wrong to continue on any undertaking. I believe no court of justice can allow it either on the principle of equity or on the principle of good conscience when the defendant deliberately committed a wrong against the provision of law. I have no doubt to hold that the learned Subordinate Judge misread the decision appearing in (1959) 63 Cal WN 824 and applied a wrong principle of law causing injustice in the present case. In these circumstances, the appeal must be allowed and the modification made by the appellate court below must be set aside. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The order of modification passed by the appellate court below in respect of the mandatory injunction is hereby set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored in toto. I, however, pass no order as to costs in this appeal in the absence of the respondent. 8. Send the lower court records as early as possible. Appeal allowed.