JUDGMENT : D.A. DESAI, J. 1. Two petitioners in these two petitions were co-delingitents in a joint inquiry held against them and several others on certain charges and which ultimately resulted in removal of the petitioners in these two petitions from service of the Government. 2. Chandrashankar Chunilal Vyas, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1481 of 1970 was removed from service of the Government of Gujarat by the General Administration Department Resolution dated 7th July, 1970. K.H. Shukla, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1476 of 1970 was removed from service by an identical order of the identical date. The petitioners question the correctness and validity of this order in their respective petitions. As common questions of law were raised in both the petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. For appreciating the contentions raised in these petitions, I would take the facts of Special Civil Application No. 1481 of 1970. Petitioner Chandrashankar Chunilal Vyas was serving at the relevant time as Assistant in the office of the Chief Minister at Ahmedabad, and at the same time Mr. K.H. Shukla, the petitioner in the cognate petition was serving as Assistant in the office of the Gujarat Public Service Commission. The Gujarat Public Service Commission regularly holds various Departmental Examinations, one such being Revenue Qualifying Examination. It was alleged that the two petitioners in conspiracy with several others hatched a scheme to give unfair assistance to the candidates who were to appear at the Revenue Qualifying Examination by obtaining illegal gratification with a view to helping them by substituting answer books which they had given at the time of examination by the answer books subsequently prepared and for this purpose the petitioners obtained illegal gratification of Rs. 700/- to Rs. 800/- per candidate. Some peons also assisted them in substituting answer books. One Mr. M.P. Pandya was serving as Aral Karkun and he was required to pass the Revenue Qualifying Examination and he came to know of this easy method of passing the examination and he is alleged to have paid certain amount to the petitioners, but it appears that the plan went amiss and Mr. Pandya failed to pass the examination.. Mr. Pandya felt that he was exploited and he exposed the conspiracy. Ultimately the enquiry was handed over to the Anti-Corruption Bureau on 29th March, 1967. Pandya failed to pass the examination.. Mr. Pandya felt that he was exploited and he exposed the conspiracy. Ultimately the enquiry was handed over to the Anti-Corruption Bureau on 29th March, 1967. The Anti-Corruption Bureau made a preliminary enquiry and submitted its report to the Government on 1st September 1967. The Government having been satisfied that there was a prima facie good case for departmental enquiry into the misconduct alleged to have been committed by these petitioners and other conspirators, a charge-sheet was drawn up and served on the petitioners. The petitioner was suspended with effect from 27th October 1967. The charge against the present petitioner was that he gave inducement to candidates to pass the Revenue Qualifying Examination held by the Gujarat Public Service Commission, and accepted Rs. 700/- to Rs. 800/- as illegal stratification from several candidates appearing at the Examination and, with the active assistance of the petitioner in the cognate petition, he obtained answer books and supplementary from the office of the Public Service Commission and used to supply them to the candidates who had paid or agreed to pay the illegal gratification in order to enable them to write out the answers outside the examination hall and to substitute the answer books for the original answer books and the charge also listed assistance of certain peons. The second charge was that this was a conduct unbecoming of a responsible Government officer. It may be mentioned that between the time conspiracy successfully worked and the time when the petitioner was suspended he was already promoted from the post of Assistant to the post of Superintendent (now styled as Section Officer). A joint enquiry was held by the Enquiry Officer against (1) C.C. Vyas (the petitioner herein), (2) K.H Shukla (the petitioner in Special Civil Application No 1476 of 1970), (3) U.P. Patel, Aval Karkun, (4) B.M. Barot, (5) K.S. Masalia, (6) C.C. Shah and (7) B.M. Macwan. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer held that charge No 1 framed against the present petitioner has been partly proved and charge No. 2 has been fully proved. In the case of Mr. K.H. Shukla, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding as set out by the Government it its show cause notice that charge No. 1 has been partly proved and charge No. 2 and charge No. 3 have been fully proved against him. In the case of Mr. K.H. Shukla, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding as set out by the Government it its show cause notice that charge No. 1 has been partly proved and charge No. 2 and charge No. 3 have been fully proved against him. The Government accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and issued a notice under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution on 26th March, 1970. The petitioner sent a very lengthy reply on 21st April, 1970 to the show cause notice dated 26th March, 1970. By the impugned order dated 7th July, 1970 the Government of Gujarat removed the petitioner from the service of this State. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was not accepted by the Government as per its order dated 25th August, 1970. 4. Petitioner Chandrashankar Chunilal Vyas questions the correctness, validity and legality of the impugned order on diverse grounds. Contentions raised by Mr. N.R. Oza, learned Advocate for the petitioner, are: (1) That the impugned order dated 7th July 1970 removing the petitioner from service, being quasi-judicial order, it is bad and illegal, as reasons in support of the order and conclusions are not given, and the appellate order suffers from the same vice. (2) The P.S.I. Anti-Corruption Branch who made preliminary enquiry is not examined as a witness of the Department despite an application given by the petitioner and yet his report has influenced the Enquiry Officer. (3) The petitioner was one of the seven delinquents against whom a joint enquiry was held, and yet contrary to all rules of procedure, or rules of fair play and justice, the petitioner was summoned as witness for the Government in the same enquiry in which he was delinquent and was cross-examined by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the co-delinquents and this has completely vitiated the enquiry. (4) The witnesses who were called by the Department to prove its case were before their examination by the Enquiry Officer -supplied their statements and this had an adverse effect on the evidence. (5) The petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the statement of various witnesses as delineated in the application were not supplied to him. (6) The finding of the Enquiry Officer more or less is based upon the evidence of Mr. (5) The petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the statement of various witnesses as delineated in the application were not supplied to him. (6) The finding of the Enquiry Officer more or less is based upon the evidence of Mr. M.P. Pandya who was twice punished by the Department for misappropriation and even though he is a man of dubious repute, in order to bolster up his evidence against the petitioner he was given a certificate of appreciation before the conclusion of the enquiry and this has adversely influenced the mind of the Enquiry Officer about the probative value of the evidence of Mr. Pandya. It was said that he has unnecessarily received an undeserved boost. (7) The petitioner was not given hearing after the second show cause notice even though his co-delinquents were given such an opportunity. (8) As many as 5 persons were made approver's and this is sufficient to vitiate the inquiry because the persons who are made approvers could be said to have participated in the conspiracy alleged to have been hatched by the petitioner and their evidence cannot stand on a footing higher than the statements of the petitioner. (9) The enquiry was held by different Officers one Mr. Saraiya and the other Mr. Dayal. Mr. Dayal does not know Gujarati language well and hence his appreciation of evidence is bound to be inherently infirm. (10) The entire report of the Enquiry Officer is based essentially on the police statements and it is hazardous to place any reliance on the statements recorded by the Anti-Corruption Bureau without examining the persons who recorded the statements. 5. Mr. M.R. Anand, learned Advocate who appeared for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1476 of 1970 raised not only these contentions, but wanted to raise some other contentions also; but as ground No. 1 is common to both and as I am inclined to. dispose of the petition on ground No. 1 alone, I have refrained from setting out them here merely to add to the length of this judgment. 6. The first ground of attack is that the impugned order removing the petitioner from service is bad and illegal because no reasons in support of the conclusion are given. The impugned order is Annexure 'D' (P. 194) of the record. 6. The first ground of attack is that the impugned order removing the petitioner from service is bad and illegal because no reasons in support of the conclusion are given. The impugned order is Annexure 'D' (P. 194) of the record. The petitioner, at the relevant time, that is, on 7th July 1970 when the impugned order was made was serving as Superintendent and the petitioner in the cognate petition was serving as Assistant in the Gujarat Public Service Commission. The order removing both of them from service was made by the Government of Gujarat as per its G.A.D.N. resolution dated 7th July 1970, At this stage, I will first examine the order removing the petitioner Mr. C.C. Vays This Resolution will have to be analysed threadbare because the contention of Mr. R.H. Mehta, learned Assistant Government Pleader, is that this order cannot be said to be a non-speaking order, or that it cannot be said that no reasons in support of the conclusion are given. Before, I analyse this order, in order to ascertain whether the reasons are given or not, let two things be made abundantly clear. 7. The enquiry was held by the Enquiry Officer. He submitted a detailed report. On receipt of the report, the Government served a notice dated 26th March 970 Exh.13 (P.51) By this notice, the Government communicated to the petitioner that, on the basis of, the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Government Had come to the conclusion that out of charlres Nos. 1 and 2 mentioned in the charge-sheet, served upon the Petitioner, charge No. 1 has been partly proved and charge No. 2 has been fully proved, it is further stated that the Government proposes to remove the petitioner from service on account of misconduct as disclosed in the charges proved against him. The petitioner is, therefore called upon to show cause within a fortnight from the date of the receipt of the notice wits the proposed action should not be taken in regard to the petitioner. A copy of that report of Enquiry officer was annexed to this notice. In response to this notice, the petitioner submitted his explanation which runs into closely typed 75 pages (it is to be found at, pp. 119 to 193 of the record). In this reply, the petitioner has raised a number of contentions, challenging the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. In response to this notice, the petitioner submitted his explanation which runs into closely typed 75 pages (it is to be found at, pp. 119 to 193 of the record). In this reply, the petitioner has raised a number of contentions, challenging the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. He has also raised a number of contentions about the validity, the procedural legality, the method adopted by the Enquiry Officer and the failure of the Enquiry Officer to afford him reasonable opportunity to defend his itself. After the reply was received by the Government, the impugned order was made. 8. As usual with all Government Resolutions in the preamble of the Resolution the Government has set out six different communications which were read by the officer concerned the reply, the report of the Enquiry Officer, the show cause notice was the reply of the petitioner. Then starts the resolution, para 1 of the resolution sets out the charge. Both charges Nos. 1 and 2 are set out extenso. The next succeeding paragraph is important and may be reproduced: "After considering the reply given by Shri Vyas in his letter dated 18-3-1969, the said enquip was handed over to the Special Officer for Departmental Enquiries (for Non-Gazetted Government Servants, Ahmedabad vide Government Resolution No. SCE/2468 PSC-945-KH, dated 19/21.4.1969. After carefully considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, Government has come to the conclusion that out of the charge, put against Shri C.C. Vyas, Superintendent, General Administration Department. Charge No. 1 is partly proved and charge No. 2 is fully proved. Alter carefully considering the reply given by Shri Vyas in his letter dated 27.4.1970, to the show cause notice, given on a report of the Enquiry Officer, by Government vide Government letter General Administration Department No. SCE 2468-PSC-945 (1)-KH, dated 26.3.1970, Government has come to a conclusion that the charge put against Shri C.C. Vyas, Superintendent, General Administration Department, is proved. Government has, therefore, decided to remove Shri C.C. Vyas, Superintendent, General Administration Department, from Government service with immediate effect for the Said mistake on his part." This is the operative portion of the order. The reply dated 18th March 1969 was prior to the commencement of the enquiry. Government has, therefore, decided to remove Shri C.C. Vyas, Superintendent, General Administration Department, from Government service with immediate effect for the Said mistake on his part." This is the operative portion of the order. The reply dated 18th March 1969 was prior to the commencement of the enquiry. Then comes the cryptic statement "After carefully considering the report of the Enquiry Officer Government has come to the conclusion that out of the charges put against Shri C.C. Vyas (petitioner) charge No. 1 is partly proved and charge No. 2 is fully proved." This is nothing but reproduction of what the Enquiry Officer him reply If has stated. Then comes the statement. "After carefully considering the reply given by Shri Vyas (petitioner) in his letter dated 27-4-1970 to show cause notice.........Government has come to a conclusion that the charge put against Sher C.C. Vyas (petitioner) is proved." These are all the reasons which I can find in this impugned order. And if this is the reason, one should not bother to find out the reasons. If this magic formula or careful consideration is to be treated as adequate substitution for the duty of giving reasons, no useful purpose would be served by trying to assert times without number that an officer discharging quasi-judicial functions must give reasons in support of the order. The duty to give reasons must be treated indisputable. I will presently examine the legal contention of Mr. R.H. Mehta, learned Assistant Government Pleader, that where the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings of the inquiry Officer it is not at all necessary to give separate reasons. Suffice it to say that the duty to give reasons is implicit in a quasi-judicial proceedings and the reasons must be such as would disclose title application of mind of the concerned authority. In a departmental enquiry this is very much necessary. 9. When an Enquiry is to be held against a delinquent officer, ordinarily the Disciplinary authority appoints an Enquiry Officer. Ordinarily, the punishing authority must itself inquire into the charges so that he can come to a correct conclusion, whether the charge is proved or not and on the proof of the charge what must be the nature of punishment that should be imposed. But the Courts have accepted the right of the Disciplinary Authority to get the enquiry done by an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer holds the enquiry. But the Courts have accepted the right of the Disciplinary Authority to get the enquiry done by an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer holds the enquiry. tie sums up his findings. He submits his reports. In the report, tie states whether the charge is proved or not. Now, it is well settled that the report of the Enquiry Officer is not binding on the Disciplinary Authority file Disciplinary Authority can cove to its own conclusion. Either it may agree with the Enquiry Officer or it may wholly differ. Mr. Mehta fairly conceded that where the Disciplinary Authority differs with the Enquiry Officer. It must give reasons why it differs with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Enquiry Officer. But urged Mr. Mehta that where the Disciplinary Authority agrees and accepts or agrees with the findings of the enquiry Officer it is absolutely unnecessary to give separate reasons of its own in reaching the same conclusion which the Enquiry Officer has reached. 10. Power to punish is in the Disciplinary Authority. It is the Disciplinary Authority which must be satisfied that misconduct has been committed. It is delegate's finding and not a finding of its own. Therefore, it must clearly apply its mind both to the evidence recorded by toe Enquiry Officer and the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and come to its conclusion that the finding is not only correct or acceptable but consistent with the evidence and is based upon reliable and trustworthy evidence. This the Disciplinary Authority can do by reading the evidence and the report of the Enquiry Officer. But, if thereafter nothing else is brought to the notice of the Disciplinary Authority, its conclusion that it accepts the Enquiry Officer's report as being correct, may have to be accepted when it proceeds to impose punishment. But between acceptance of the report of the Enquiry Officer and imposition of punishment, there is an intermediate stage constitutionally provided, namely, to issue a notice to the delinquent officer to show cause why the report should not be accepted and why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. This is not just a processual or procedural stage; it is a constitutional mandate, any departure therefrom would vitiate the final order. It must be carried out in its true letter and spirit. It is the most important stage, as I would presently point out. 11. This is not just a processual or procedural stage; it is a constitutional mandate, any departure therefrom would vitiate the final order. It must be carried out in its true letter and spirit. It is the most important stage, as I would presently point out. 11. The Enquiry Officer sums up evidence and records its conclusion. It is incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to give a copy of the report to the delinquent officer. This not disputed. A Copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer is required to be given to the delinquent officer for the obvious reason that he gets an opportunity to controvert, to comment or to criticise the same so that the Disciplinary Authority may have material to decide whether the report should or should not be acted upon. That is the reason why Article 311 (2) gave a constitutional mandate to serve a notice, giving an opportunity to the delinquent officer to show cause why the report should not be accepted and why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. Now, where the Disciplinary Authority itself inquires into the charges, the situation would be slightly different. The Disciplinary Authority records its conclusion and issues a notice after provisionally deciding punishment inviting the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. There one can say that the reply is material for the quantum of punishment because opportunity to challenge the charges was given to the delinquent officer during the course of the inquiry to the Disciplinary Authority itself. But where the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority are two different bodies and the Enquiry officer merely records evidence and sums up the case and records a, finding and power to punish is in the Disciplinary Authority, it is the Disciplinary Authority, who must appreciate the evidence and look at the report, examine the finding and come to the conclusion that the findings are consistent with the evidence and then decide the provisional punishment. Even at this stage, if the Disciplinary Authority points out that it has decided to accept the report, no serious exception can be taken to it. But soon thereafter comes the stage where the delinquent officer, interposes himself. Even at this stage, if the Disciplinary Authority points out that it has decided to accept the report, no serious exception can be taken to it. But soon thereafter comes the stage where the delinquent officer, interposes himself. At this stage the delinquent officer, in response to the notice, may point out a number of defects, lacunae, credibility or trustworthiness of the evidence, processual or procedural illegality committed by the Enquiry officer, denial of reasonable opportunity to defend and invite the Disciplinary Authority to reject the report in entirety. If such serious contentions are put forth and yet the Disciplinary Authority merely recites that having considered the reply it chooses to accept the finding of the Enquiry Officer without giving reasons it is alibi for not applying the mind and not giving reasons and it cannot be countenanced. And if a cryptic statement like this, that the Government has come to the conclusion that the charge against the delinquent officer is proved, amounts to giving reasons, the whole gamut of quasi-judicial inquiry and duty to give reasons would stand defeated. The reply of the delinquent officer questioning the correctness of the finding, the legality of the enquiry and other contentions provide a stage which calls for application of mind; and in order to show that mind has been applied, reasons will have to be given, because, when the reasons are given, any other body including the High Court under Article 226 can ascertain from those given reasons whether mind was applied or not. The magic formula of "carefully answering the reply given" cannot be an adequate substitute for giving reasons. There may he such serious allegations which must be dealt with by the Disciplinary Authority. To illustrate, suppose in the reply to the second show cause notice the delinquent officer says that the Enquiry Officer demanded Rs. The magic formula of "carefully answering the reply given" cannot be an adequate substitute for giving reasons. There may he such serious allegations which must be dealt with by the Disciplinary Authority. To illustrate, suppose in the reply to the second show cause notice the delinquent officer says that the Enquiry Officer demanded Rs. 5,000/- from him and said that if such amount is given he would exonerate the delinquent officer and (the delinquent officer said in his reply that he being an honest man would not participate in such an undesirable demand of the Enquiry Officer and therefore, he has been maliciously convicted by the Enquiry Office,- and if such an allegation is to be disposed of under the magic formula of careful consideration, it is better that the second show cause notice is not at all given because the constitutional mandate would be reduced to a pretence. I am not saying anything new. In fact there is a precedent in this Court. I had myself an opportunity to examine this contention in Special Civil Application No. 622 of 1915 decided on 6th July, 1910 wherein I have said that it is absolutely incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to give some reasons for rejecting the contentions put forth by the delinquent officer, in response to the second show cause notice served upon him and an identical view was taken by Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar, J. in just Appeal No. 739 of 1974 decided oil 24/25th February, 1976 and I was informed that the Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of M.P. Thakkar, J. has been recently dismissed by the Division Bench of this High Court. In the case before my learned brother, in response to the show cause notice a very serious contention was put forth before the Disciplinary Authority regarding it not to accept the findings of the Enquiry Officer. That aspect was not examined by giving some independent to sons and it was merely said that, having considered the reply, the report is accepted. ln this connection it was observed that the dimension of the offence put forth by the delinquent was not at all considered and the Disciplinary Authority had not recorded any speaking order for agreeing with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and when the contention was taken, the Disciplinary Authority was bound to consider the defence for whatever worth it was. On this ground also, the final order was quashed and while quashing the order it was observed that the Disciplinary Authority has passed a non-speaking order which betrays a complete non-application of mind on its part. The same conclusion has been reached by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shri H.K. Khanna vs. Union of India, 1971 (1) SLR 618. It may incidentally be mentioned that the High Court in that case after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Madras vs. A.R. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 , reached its conclusion. In fact, a duty to give reasons is being examined independently of the circumstances which came to be examined in Srinivasan's case. 12. In this case I would like to add one more ground which conclusively shows that the final order discloses complete non-application of mind. The Enquiry Officer held that charge No. 1 was partly proved and charge No. 2 was fully proved. That finding was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority as would be evident from the show cause notice. It was however stated in the impugned order while removing the petitioner from service that the charge put against the delinquent officer is proved. This sentence would clearly imply that, that part of the charge namely this second part of charge No. 1 which was held not proved both by the inquiry Officer as well as by the Disciplinary Authority before giving the second show cause notice has been held proved at the final stage. This clearly shows complete non-application of mind. On this account alone, the impugned order is illegal and invalid. 13. Mr. Mehta very seriously contended that once the Disciplinary Authority accepts the findings of the Enquiry Officer it is not at all necessary to record its own independent reasons for accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer. It is by now well settled by a catenia of decisions that two stages envisaged by Article 311 are both quasi-judicial. In Bachhitar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 , it has been in terms held that the first stage where the enquiry starts and the second stage when show cause notice is given under Article 311, both these stages are equally judicial. In Bachhitar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 , it has been in terms held that the first stage where the enquiry starts and the second stage when show cause notice is given under Article 311, both these stages are equally judicial. In fact the second stage is no less judicial than the earlier one and consequently any action decided to be taken against the delinquent officer found guilty of misconduct a judicial order. In Special Civil application No. 512 of 1966 decided on July 31, 1970, it has been in terms held that both the first authority and the appellate authority must give reasons for its own conclusion. In this case question of the appellate authority does not or very seriously arise and I would presently point out that it is not necessary to consider that aspect save and except for setting aside the order if it is required to be set aside. Now, as against this, Mr. Mehta, learned Assistant Government Pleader, invited my attention to the State of Madras vs. A.R. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 . He specifically relied upon the following observations. "In dealing with the question State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. That enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the put delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may he in favour of the delinquent officer, and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think, as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are no doubt, quasi-judicial but, having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." It was urged that the question whether the State Government should give reasons while accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer and agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer stands concluded by this decision of the Supreme Court. Mr. Mehta also pointed out that in the case before the Supreme Court, the officer in response to the show cause notice submitted an elaborate explanation of his case that he was completely innocent of all the -charges framed against him. Mr. Mehta pointed out that even though the delinquent officer had submitted an elaborate explanation yet the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary for the State Government to record reasons while accepting the report of the Tribunal in that case. It is true that as a matter of fact the delinquent officer in the case before the Supreme Court had submitted an elaborate explanation. It is nowhere to be found as a contention before the Court that he had raised such contention which necessitated disposal by the Government. It does not appear to have been contended that when ever some specific contentions are taken in reply to the second show cause notice the State Government should be deemed to have examined them on merits applied its mind and can be taken to have disposed them of in just and fair manner by merely stating that having carefully considered the reply of the delinquent officer it proceeds to impose the penalty provisionally decided. It is not possible to read into this judgment the general proposition canvassed for by Mr. It is not possible to read into this judgment the general proposition canvassed for by Mr. Mehta, that where even delinquent officer puts forth serious and weighty arguments against the report of the Enquiry Officer requesting and inviting the Disciplinary Authority to reject the report or reopen the inquiry the Disciplinary Authority owes no duty though dealing with quasi-judicial proceedings to give reasons in support of the conclusion. In fact it is now well settled that the administrative authority discharging quasi-judicial functions must give reasons in support of its conclusion or decision. There are number of decisions on this point. But I would refer to the latest ruling on the subject. In the Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. vs. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "If Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced. It is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." Usual formula adopted of having carefully considered would be a mere pretence as opined by the Supreme Court in this case and it would not meet with the requirement of law. 14. If any such formula were always to be adopted it would put premium on lethargy in the sense that instead of examining contentions and reject them by giving appropriate reasons, one can dispose of a number of contentions by merely stating that "having carefully considered the reply". 14. If any such formula were always to be adopted it would put premium on lethargy in the sense that instead of examining contentions and reject them by giving appropriate reasons, one can dispose of a number of contentions by merely stating that "having carefully considered the reply". In this context it is necessary to recall here the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.P. Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 wherein it was observed that the condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made, and it also enables an appellate or supervisory Court to keep the tribunals within bounds A reasoned order is desirable condition of judicial disposal. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. A seeking order will at its best be a reasonable one and at its worst be at least a plausible one. Therefore, when it is held that the second stage is equally judicial a the first one vide Srinfvasans's case (supra), the duty to give reasons must be read as per Sieman's case (supra) and reasons must be such as would show application of mind. The impugned order in this case suffers firm non-application of mind and the authority having not given reasons failed to make a sneaking order and the final order will have to be quashed. 15. The order removing the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1476 of 1970 suffers from the same vice and it is no use analysing that order in the same manner. 16. It appears that the petitioner in each petition preferred appeal and the appellate order is to the effect that the appeal is not accepted. There is some confusion in this regard. In the case of both the petitioners. order removing the petitioner from service was made by the Government. If the disciplinary Authority was the Government or Gujarat, there is no appellate or higher authority to which appeal can be preferred. It appears that the petitioners in each petition approached the Chief Minister and took at the manner in which the matter is disposed of. The order removing both the petitioners was signed by the then Chief Secretary. If the disciplinary Authority was the Government or Gujarat, there is no appellate or higher authority to which appeal can be preferred. It appears that the petitioners in each petition approached the Chief Minister and took at the manner in which the matter is disposed of. The order removing both the petitioners was signed by the then Chief Secretary. He was the competent officer to act on be half of the Government of Gujarat, the Government rejected the appeal preferred by each petitioner under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government. I am not commenting upon further non- application of mind but as the appeal was incompetent that order must fail on that ground alone. 17. At one stage, Mr. Mehta said that, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order does not contain reasons, he is in a position to show that the appropriate authority has drawn up detailed note running into 22 pages after the reply was received from the petitioner. Office notes are not on record. They are not referred to in the affidavit. In fact this petition was opened for hearing on 27th July 1976 and was part-heard when some negotiations took place. The matter was adjourned for the reply of the Government. Thereafter it came up for hearing on 13th August 1976 till that date Mr. Takwani appeared and thereafter Mr. Mehta appeared, It was at the time when Mr. Mehta was called upon to answer the first point that he referred to the existence of the notes in the Government records. It was not clear whether Mr. Mehta would like to produce then, He was inclined to show the notes to me. The question whether it can be shown to other side or not was yet to be determined by the competent authority. The Court would not look into any document which is not disclosed to the other side. In fact the notes could have been annexed to the affidavit, if they were to be relied upon. Notes ultimately form part of the files and not of the impugned order. That is the decision of the Government drawn up in the name of the Governor. If the notes were placed on record, the other side could have controverted it. Therefore, I am not inclined to look into the notes at this very late stage. Notes ultimately form part of the files and not of the impugned order. That is the decision of the Government drawn up in the name of the Governor. If the notes were placed on record, the other side could have controverted it. Therefore, I am not inclined to look into the notes at this very late stage. Such notes would not fill in the lacuna arising out of not giving reasons. 18. Both the petitioners had raised a number of contentions. Contentions in the, first petitioners have been set out by me. But it is not necessary to examine all the contentions as the impugned order removing the petitioner from service is found to be bad, it must be quashed and set aside. It would he open to the Government to proceed further in accordance with law. However, in order to be fair and just to the petitioners, both the petitioners should within a period of three weeks from today submit their explanation whatever they want to Rive in writing to the Government and the Government should take them into consideration and make a speaking order whatever it wants to make, after taking into consideration not only the report of the Enquiry Officer but all the contentions that may have been put forth by them in the earlier reply and that may be put forth in the fresh reply which permit the petitioner to give in each petition to he submitted to the appropriate authority within three weeks from today. No other contention not examined herein is given up or disposed of as in the circumstances herein mentioned. I am not inclined to examine the same and these contentions would he open to the petitioners whatsoever they want them to agitate. 19. Accordingly both the petitions are allowed by issuing a writ of certiorari and quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 7th July 1970 removing each of the petitioners from service and also by issuing a writ of mandamus by directing the Government to permit the petitioners to put forth their written explanation within three weeks from today and to reach a proper conclusion on the contentions already taken and that may be put forth by the petitioner in their written explanation which they are permitted to make and to dispose of the proceedings by a speaking order. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.