Judgment :- 1. This matter has been referred to the Division Bench by a learned judge of this Court as he felt that the decision in Kunju Kunju Estate of Kerala (1971 KLT. 350) did not expressly refer to S.7 (1) (c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, and that the later decision of one of us (myself) in O.P. Nos. 1285 and 1488 of 1974, while it noticed S.7 (1) (c) and S.12 (5) of the Act felt that the latter Section furnished an answer to non-compliance with S.7 (1) (c) of the Act. The learned judge was inclined to doubt the correctness of this view. 2. The question arises in this case in regard to the affairs of the Kasaragod Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank, whose area of operation falls in part within the area of operation of the Hosdurg Taluk Land Mortgage Bank, which has been directed to be registered under S.7(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act. The contention raised by the petitioner's counsel is that the Registrar (in this case actually the action was taken by the Deputy Registrar) has not applied his mind to, or been satisfied about, the condition under S.7(1)(c)of the Act namely that the areas of the two Societies should not overlap before registration could be granted. For the one thing, we are not prepared to accept this on the averment of the petitioner; for another, assuming that this is so, and that he granted registration overlooking this requirement, it appears to us that a Society like the petitioner cannot have any legal grievance against the action which can be redressed under Art.226. To that effect is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in J. M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar (AIR. 1976 SC. 578) following the principle of the earlier decision in N. R. & F. Mills v. N. T. C. and Bros. (AIR. 1971 SC. 246). To that effect was also the decision of Eradi, J. in 1971 KLT. 350 referred to earlier, and noticed in my earlier judgment in O. P. Nos. 1285 and 1488 of 1974. On this principle, we are of the opinion that the petitioner in this case cannot have any grievance. That is sufficient to dismiss this writ petition. 3. The petitioner then complained against Ext. 350 referred to earlier, and noticed in my earlier judgment in O. P. Nos. 1285 and 1488 of 1974. On this principle, we are of the opinion that the petitioner in this case cannot have any grievance. That is sufficient to dismiss this writ petition. 3. The petitioner then complained against Ext. P3 letter of the Deputy Registrar directing the petitioner-Society (Kasaragode Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank) to take necessary steps to delete the Hosdrug Taluk from its area of operation as this was covered by the area of operation of the Hosdrug Taluk Land Mortgage Bank, newly registered. This is only a suggestion or an advice and can hardly be quashed in these proceedings. 4. It remains for us to deal with the observations made in the Order of Reference about the two decisions, one by our learned brother Eradi, J. in Kunju Kunju v. State of Kerala (1971 KLT. 350) and the other, by one of us in O. P. Nos. 1285 and 1488 of 1974. As already stated no exception can be taken to the principle of the decision in Kunju Kunju's case. It has the support of the recent Supreme Court decision in J. M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar (AIR 1976 S.C. 578) noticed earlier. The fact that it did not expressly refer to S.7(1)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act does not, in our opinion, detract from the correctness of the principle of the decision. 5. Next, as to my judgment in O.P. Nos. 1285 and 1488 of 1974. The same followed the principle of Eradi, J.'s judgment in 1971 KLT. 350. That was sufficient to sustain the dismissal of the writ petition. It proceeded however to notice the statutory provisions which bad bearing on the question of registration of a Society and its bye-laws. It was in this context that reference was made to S.7(1)(c), prescribing one of the conditions for registration of the Society and the bye-laws. It was observed that "the question of registration of bye-laws is yet to arise and the objection based on S.7 may well await a decision at the appropriate stage". This meant only that the objection in so far as it related to the registration of the bye-laws could be taken when they were sought to be registered, which had not been done. This meant only that the objection in so far as it related to the registration of the bye-laws could be taken when they were sought to be registered, which had not been done. The case that I was dealing with was actually one where registration of the Society under S.7 was over, but not of the bye-laws. The observations in the judgment about S.12(5) of the Act only mean that statutory power for alteration of the bye-laws was available under S.12(5) of the Act, and therefore in regard to the said action the petitioner could not complain of want of authority. The dismissal of the Original Petitions was on the principle of the decision in 1971 KLT. 350. The statutory provisions were referred to. 6. We dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs. Dismissed.