Judgment :- 1. These applications are filed for stay of proceedings of company claims filed by the Official Liquidator before the company court for realisation of amounts alleged to be due from the applicants. In all these cases the applicants claim benefit of S.3 of Act 30 of 1975, namely the Kerala Debtors Temporary Relief Act, 1975. S.3 of that Act reads as follows: "3. Bar of suits and applications and other proceedings. No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made and no appeal, revision petition or application for review against any decree or order in any such suit or application shall be presented or made in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of one year from the commencement of these Act or such longer period as may be specified by the Government by notification in the Gazette; and all such suits, applications, appeals and petitions instituted, made or presented before such commencement and pending at such commencement shall stand stayed for the said period. Explanation I. In this section, the term "suit" shall not include a claim to a set-off made in a suit instituted by a debtor." The Official Liquidator's objection to these applications is that the proceedings initiated by him are not suits or applications for execution of decrees and hence the benefit of S.3 is not available to these applicants. But, the applicants contend that the proceedings against them are really suits for recovery of amounts alleged to be due from them and therefore these proceedings are liable to be stayed under the above section. The question that arises for consideration therefore is whether 'suit' mentioned in the Section takes in these claims. As the question is considered fairly important, the learned judge dealing with company cases has referred these applications for consideration by a Division Bench and thus these applications are before us for consideration. 2. One of these applications is in respect of a claim filed by the Official Liquidator to recover amount due to a banking company in liquidation. Under S.45 B of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any suit instituted or claim made by or against a banking company which is being wound up. Under S.45 B of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any suit instituted or claim made by or against a banking company which is being wound up. S.446 (2) of the companies Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the court which is winding up a company shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company, (b) any claim made by or against the company including claims by or against any of its branches in India, (c) any application made under Sec-ction 391 by or in respect of the company, (d) any question of priorities which may relate to or arise in course of winding up of the company. The Companies Act and Banking Regulation Act differentiate a suit, a claim and an application though all of them are in respect of a company and relate to proceedings taken by or against a company. The expression'claim' is not defined in the Companies Act. So one has to understand that expression to mean a claim which is legally enforceable and not barred by limitation of time. A 'suit' ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint, and detailed provisions are contained in the Code of Civil Procedure for the particulars to be mentioned in a plaint. The object of sub-section 2 of S.446 is to have a speedy and a summary procedure for enforcing the existing liabilities due to the company and that is why that section confers the jurisdiction on the company court to entertain suits by or against the company, claims made by or against the company and other proceedings taken by or against the company. In the context of sub-section 2 of S.446 of the Companies Act it is not possible to understand a claim to mean a suit as well. 3. S.3 of Act 30 of 1975, according to us, does not take in claims made by the company against debtors of the company. In the context of sub-section 2 of S.446 of the Companies Act it is not possible to understand a claim to mean a suit as well. 3. S.3 of Act 30 of 1975, according to us, does not take in claims made by the company against debtors of the company. The section takes in only a suit and an application in a civil or a revenue court Suits in which reliefs other than one for a recovery of a debt are prayed for are also deemed to be a suit for recovery of a debt, but a decree or a suit for possession where mesne profits is claimed is directed to be treated as a suit not for recovery of a debt. The intention of the Legislature thus seems to be to cover only suits instituted by the presentation of a plaint, or in other words, S.3 is intended to take in only suits and applications for execution of a decree as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure. This is further clear if one considers the scheme of the section which we shall refer to hereunder. 4. Provision is made in he Section prohibiting the institution of a suit for recovery of a debt or an application far execution of a decree in respect of a debt and any appeal, revision petition, or application for review against any decree or order passed in any such suit or application. Other proceedings for recovery of a debt are not mentioned in the Section. Hence it is clear that S.3 does not apply to any proceeding taken to recover the debt due to a company in liquidation. The other sections of the Act which provide for extension of the period of limitation also suggest that the intention of the Legislature in enacting S.3 was only to bar suits and applications for execution of a decree as contemplated in the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression'decree' has to be understood with reference to the definition of a 'decree' in the Code of Civil Procedure. It means the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the right of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint and which is not to be treated as a suit under any provision of the Act is not a suit. It means the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the right of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint and which is not to be treated as a suit under any provision of the Act is not a suit. A decision given therein is not a decree. The expression 'suit' in S.3 of the Act therefore should be confined to such proceedings as under that description are directly dealt with in the Code of Civil Procedure or such proceedings which by the the operation of any particular Act which regulates them are to be treated as suits. A claim filed by the Official Liquidator does not satisfy this test. 5. A contention was raised that for the purpose of Limitation Act a claim against a company is deemed to be a suit and the period of limitation governing suits is applied to such claims But that argument is legally unsound. S.3 of the Limitation Act provides that every suit instituted after the period of limitation prescribed by Schedule.1 snail be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Explanation to that Section refers to the point of time at which a suit is, for the purpose of S.3, to be treated as instituted. The Explanation says that in ordinary cases a suit is instituted when the plaint is presented to the proper officer. But to this two exceptions are prescribed, namely, in the case of a suit by a pauper the time at which that suit is instituted is to be taken as on an earlier date, namely, the date when his application for leave to sue as a pauper was made; and in the case of a suit against a company which is being wound up by the Court the institution of the suit is advanced also to an earlier date, namely, the date when the claim was first sent to the Official Liquidator. The resort to a legal fiction to treat an earlier date as the date of institution of the suit only shows that a pauper application and a claim are not comprehended by the word "suit" mentioned in the Limitation Act. The resort to a legal fiction to treat an earlier date as the date of institution of the suit only shows that a pauper application and a claim are not comprehended by the word "suit" mentioned in the Limitation Act. The question whether an application made by the liquidator to recover certain amounts from persons from whom money was due to the company was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act was subject matter of decision by the Privy Council in Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M. E. T. Co (AIR. 1933 PC. 63). A contention was urged in that case that the application filed by the liquidator for recovery of the amount should be treated as a suit instituted within the meaning of S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908. At page 64 their Lordships observed as follows: "The word "suit" ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. The application of the liquidators would not be a suit within S.3, if that section stood alone, unaccompanied by the explanation. An argument however was addressed to their Lordships, founded upon the Explanation, to this effect. That the Explanation shows by its including sentence that a claim against a company in compulsory Liquidation (even though) made by a proceeding not instituted by the presentation of a plaint is considered to be a "suit instituted" within those words in S.3, and that a claim similarly made by or on behalf of such a company must necessarily, or may similarly, be treated as a "suit instituted" within the section." Lower down they further observed: "But their Lordships do not accept the view that a claim against such a company, not made by a proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint is by virtue of the explanation to be considered to be a "suit instituted" within the section. The explanation is not concerned with the question of what is a suit, or is to be considered a suit within S.3. It is addressed to quite a different subject-matter. It assumes the existence of a suit which has been instituted by the presentation of a plaint, and is concerned only with the point of time at which that suit is for the purpose of S.3 to be treated as being instituted. It is addressed to quite a different subject-matter. It assumes the existence of a suit which has been instituted by the presentation of a plaint, and is concerned only with the point of time at which that suit is for the purpose of S.3 to be treated as being instituted. The ordinary rule is stated by the Explanation to be that the suit is instituted when the plaint is presented; but to this two exceptions are prescribed, viz., (1) in the case of a suit by a pauper, the time at which that suit is (for purposes of S.3) instituted, is to be taken as an earlier date, viz., the date when the application for leave to sue as a pauper was made; and (2) in the case of a suit against a company which is being wound up by the Court, the institution of the suit is (for the purposes of S 3) advanced also to an earlier date, viz., the date when the claim was first sent in to the official liquidator Their Lordships are unable to find in an Explanation, which on its face only deals with the point of time at which suits are instituted within the meaning of S.3 any sufficient justification for extending the meaning of the word suit in that section. The application by the liquidators cannot therefore be dismissed as being a "suit instituted" after the prescribed period of limitation." So a claim by the Liquidator was not reckoned as a suit. 6. Before we conclude it is also necessary to refer to some of the other decisions cited during the course of the argument in this case. Counsel for the applicants referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in Chotilal v. Jawantraj (AIR. 1966 Madras 322) and contended that the expression'suit' in S.3 of the Act should be interpreted in a broader sense meaning a proceeding which has commenced with a statement in writing of a cause of action. That decision is, according to us not of any help in considering the scope of the expression'suit' in S.3. There a reference under the Land Acquisition Act pending before a Civil Court was taken as a suit for the purpose of Usurious Loans Act. Similarly, the decision of the Punjab High Court in Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Sardul Singh (AIR. 1961 Punjab 87) and Prem Nath v. Prem Nath (AIR. There a reference under the Land Acquisition Act pending before a Civil Court was taken as a suit for the purpose of Usurious Loans Act. Similarly, the decision of the Punjab High Court in Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Sardul Singh (AIR. 1961 Punjab 87) and Prem Nath v. Prem Nath (AIR. 1963 Punjab 62) are not very useful in finding out the true meaning of the expression 'suit' in S.3. The decision in Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Sardul Singh (AIR. 1961 Punjab 87 turned on the construction of the word 'suit' in Clause.9 of Letters Patent (Lahore). A liberal construction was given to the expression 'suit' in that clause by the Punjab decision. But that is not of any help in this case. To the same effect is the decision in Prem Nath v. Prem Nath (AIR. 1963 Punjab 62). We are to be guided in this matter more by the intention of the Legislature in using the expression 'suit' in S.3. That we have already noticed earlier. These decisions are not of any help in this matter. 7. It is well settled that the provision regarding the bar of jurisdiction should be construed strictly. Unless the bar is expressly stated or necessarily implied by the language used in the Section it is not possible to assume that there is a bar for the entertainment of any proceeding to recover a debt due to a company in liquidation Therefore, we are satisfied that the intention of the Legislature in enacting S.3 of Act 30 of 1975 was not to prohibit claim proceedings for realisation of the debts due to a company in liquidation. 8. In the result, we hold that the claims filed by the Official Liquidator for recovery of amounts alleged to be due from the debtors of the company in liquidation are not covered by the expression 'suit' in S.3 of Act 30 of 1975 and consequently such claim proceedings are not liable to be stayed under the above Section. Therefore, these applications are dismissed. But, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.