JUDGMENT Roy, J. : This appeal is directed against the judgment/Order dated 28th May 1970, made in Civil Rule No. 2983 (W) of 1965, by P.K. Banerjee, J. The learned Judge by the said order has discharged the Rule. 2. The appellant was initially appointed as a Commercial clerk under the Darjeeling Himalayan Railways and after the merger of the same with the Assam Railways, he was permanently appointed as a Tally Clerk, in the scale of Rs. 40-1-50-2-60/-. Such appointment was made at the instance of the Divisional Personnel Officer, Assam Rail Link Project, Kurseong. In his petition, the appellant has mentioned series of injustices caused to him and he has also given particulars of various instances of harassments and humiliations meted out to him, for the purpose of establishing malafide intention of the authorities concerned, in the matter of taking the impugned action against him. 3. The appellant has stated that since all his representations failed, he was compelled to file a case on 30th April 1964, before the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and in the said proceeding, he got an Award on 5th November 1965, for necessary increment. He has alleged that the said case was fixed for hearing on 25th July 1964 and he duly obtained four days casual leave from the Station Superintendent, Katihar, on the basis of an application dated 18th July 1964. The appellant has further stated that on 21st July 1964, he also prayed for a memo sparing him from duties for the purpose of proceeding to Darjeeling but the said Station Superintendent, instead of granting necessary permission, informed him that he will have to attend Gauhati Court on 24th July 1964 and as such, requested him further to get his case before the Deputy Commissioner concerned adjourned and he was further directed to appear before the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Katihar, for obtaining a second class pass, for enabling him to go to Gauhati. It has been alleged by the appellant that pursuant thereto, he duly presented himself for the necessary second class pass and he was directed by the said Assistant Commercial Superintendent, to meet the Head Clerk of the General Section, for obtaining the pass. It has been alleged by the appellant that pursuant thereto, he duly presented himself for the necessary second class pass and he was directed by the said Assistant Commercial Superintendent, to meet the Head Clerk of the General Section, for obtaining the pass. The appellant has alleged that the Head Clerk in his turn, instead of issuing a second class pass, granted a third class pass to him, stating that he was not entitled to a second class pass. It has further been alleged by the appellant that since a second class pass, as directed, was not issued, he in his turn, returned the third class pass as soon as he received the same and thereafter, neither the said third class pass nor a second class one, as was directed to be issued, has been returned to him and the happenings as aforesaid have been duly informed to the Station Superintendent, Katihar, by letter dated 22nd July 1964. It may be mentioned that for want of a proper pass, the appellant could not go to Gauhati and he has further alleged that in fact he did not refuse the memo in question but he in his turn after receipt, returned the same for the issue of a second class pass. 4. However, on 25th July 1964, the appellant was served with an order of suspension without assigning any reason and there is no dispute that he made a representation, pointing out the infirmities of the same. Thereafter, a charge sheet was issued by the District Commercial Superintendent, N.F. Railway alleging that on 22nd February 1964, the Station Superintendent, Katihar sought to serve a notice requiring him to attend the Gauhati Court on 24th July 1964, but he refused to accept the same and as such disobeyed the Station Superintendent's order. The appellant has alleged that the said charge sheet was issued by an authority, who is an officer below the rank of his appointing authority, viz., the Divisional Commercial Superintendent. The appellant has not only denied the validity and the very basis of the issue of the said charge sheet, but he has also denied the bonafide character of the same. The appellant has in fact contended that on 22nd July 1964, no order directing him to attend Gauhati Court, was served on him and in fact, on 21st July 1964 the memo in question was served. The appellant has in fact contended that on 22nd July 1964, no order directing him to attend Gauhati Court, was served on him and in fact, on 21st July 1964 the memo in question was served. He has further alleged that he never refused to accept the same and in fact, after due acceptance of the same, he had returned the same for the issue of a second class pass, but in fact he has not been favoured with the same. In fact he has contended that he was waiting for the necessary pass to go to Gauhati and there was or has been no neglect or laches on his part. 5. Then, there was an enquiry in the matter and the appellant has alleged that at the said enquiry definite charges in writing were not duly framed in terms of the requirements of the Railway Establishment Code and more particularly of Rule 1712 (5) and the sub-rules thereunder. However, he duly attended the enquiry even inspite of his objections and it appears that the enquiry officer made certain findings on the question of appellant's purported inaction in not accepting the notice or the fact of service of the same on 21st July 1964 or the subsequent offer of the same along with the pass on 22nd July 1964. In fact the enquiry officer has held to the following effect : "The staff concerned took the plea that when he reported to SS Office in the evening. On 22.7.64 OD his return from DCS's office with the report that he was not provided with a 2nd class pass, the SS/KIR did not ask him for the 2nd time to attend Gauhati Court on 24.7.64, with the original 3rd Class pass issued in his favour. The Station Clerk concerned at KIR, however, stated that on 22.7.64 the TRC. concerned was again asked to proceed to GHY on 3rd Class pass No. 23047 which was first offered to him on 21.7.64, but the Stn. clerk could not produce any documentary evidence to prove that he offered the original sparing memo and the 3rd class pass to Shri M.M Biswas for the 2nd time of 22.7.64. concerned was again asked to proceed to GHY on 3rd Class pass No. 23047 which was first offered to him on 21.7.64, but the Stn. clerk could not produce any documentary evidence to prove that he offered the original sparing memo and the 3rd class pass to Shri M.M Biswas for the 2nd time of 22.7.64. This refusal of duty by the Sr, TRC Shri M-M Biswas was reported by SS/KIR under his confidential letter No. Court–I/64-GHY of 22.7.64 to DCS/KIR (N) stating that he flatly refused to accept the sparing memo and the 3rd class pass No. 23047 stating that he was entitled to a 2nd Class pass. He was sent to DCS's office on 22.7.64 to obtain a 2nd class pass if he was actually entitled to, but he was returned from office with an endorsement on SS/KIR's memo that he was not entitled to a 2nd class pass. Subsequently he did not accept the 3rd class pass and the sparing memo to attend court at Gauhati." But even inspite of such findings, the enquiry officer found the appellant guilty, as he found him responsible for his refusal to accept the sparing memo on 21st July 1964 and the third class pass for attending Gauhati Court on 24th July 1964. Such findings, the appellant has alleged to be perverse and absolutely contradictory to and inconsistent with the findings of the enquiry officer. However, on the basis of such findings, the District Commercial Superintendent, Katihar, by memo dated 18th May 1965/2nd June 1965, informed the appellant that the charge were proved and he has come to the provisional conclusion that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to be retained in service and as such he should be removed and thus he asked the appellant to show cause why, he should not be removed from service. The appellant, amongst others, has also contended the said order to be void, as the Disciplinary Authority not being the Inquiring Authority, did not record its findings on the charges in terms of Rule 1713 of the said Code. The appellant has further alleged that his representation was neither heard by the District Commercial Superintendent nor he was given any personal hearing and as such there was not only violations of principles of natural justice, but such action was contrary to the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The appellant has further alleged that his representation was neither heard by the District Commercial Superintendent nor he was given any personal hearing and as such there was not only violations of principles of natural justice, but such action was contrary to the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. There after, by an order dated 25th September 1965, the appellant was directed to be removed from his services with effect from 1st October 1965. Such order, the appellant, amongst others, has alleged to be also violative of the provisions of the said Code as the same was never communicated to him duly. 6. From the said order of removal, the appellant preferred an appeal contending that the charges were not duly made out and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were contradictory and he was not afforded due and reasonable opportunities, inasmuch as he was not allowed proper representation of his case and to cross examine the witnesses or to examine the records used against him. It further appears that by a communication dated 7th April 1966, the order removing the appellant was confirmed. There has of course been claims and counter claims and allegations of not receiving the said order by the appellant. However, against the said order, the appellant preferred a further appeal to the General Manager, N. F. Railway and since nothing was done in the said appeal, he moved and obtained the connected Civil Rule, which as stated hereinbefore, was discharged. The learned Trial Judge has observed that since it has been found in the departmental proceeding that the appellant was not entitled to a second class pass but was entitled to a third class one and as such his refusal to attend Gauhati Court was improper, so it cannot be held as argued before him, that the findings of the enquiry officer and the charges were not the same thing or that the appellant was found guilty of the charges not levelled against him. 7. In this appeal, Mr. 7. In this appeal, Mr. Gupta appearing in support of the appeal, has contended after relying on the report of the Enquiry officer and the charge sheet, that in fact the appellant has been found guilty for allegations for which he has never been charged or could be charged and since there was or has been substantial difference between the said report and the ultimate findings and the charge sheet in question, so the entire proceeding should have been quashed by the learned Trial Judge. He has further submitted that the appellant has further been found guilty of gross insubordination, i. e. a, charge for which he was not charged. In any event, Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned Trial Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case failed to appreciate that there was no basis for the charges as levelled against the appellant, as there was no question or occasion of his refusing to accept the order and the more so when the Railway Authorities in their turn have in fact failed to provide any pass to him, after the pass as supplied to him, was returned for good, bonafide and sufficient reasons. Mr. Gupta further submitted that in any event the entire procedure inflicting the punishment on the appellant has been vitiated for non-compliance with the formalities of the Inquiry procedure as mentioned in Rule 1712 of the said Code and the more so when there has admittedly been non-compliance with the several clauses of sub-rule (5) of the said Rule 1712, as the records of the enquiry amongst others do not include the documentary evidence considered in the course of the enquiry and the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and so also those of the Inquiry Authority, It has further been contended that as the Disciplinary Authority, in the instant case, was admittedly not the Inquiring Authority, so there was or has been noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 1713 of the said Code. Mr. Gupta, on instructions, submitted that the aforesaid grounds were duly argued before the learned Trial Judge, but unfortunately the judgment impeached, is silent on those points. Mr. Gupta, on instructions, submitted that the aforesaid grounds were duly argued before the learned Trial Judge, but unfortunately the judgment impeached, is silent on those points. He, however, submitted that in any event, since those are paints of law and the relevant facts are available on the pleadings of the parties, they can be argued now and the more so when they go to the root of the matter and have been specifically taken in the grounds of appeal. Mr. Gupta, relying on Rules 1731 and 1732 of the said Code further sought to argue that the impugned determination was bad, as personal hearing at the appellate stage was not also admittedly granted to the appellant. But he, in his usual fairness, admitted that such hearing was never asked for by the appellant. We are of the view reading the Rules as quoted hereinbefore that such personal hearing will have to be asked for and in the absence of such prayer, the authorities concerned, have no obligation to give such personal bearing to the delinquent at the appellate stage. 8. Mr. Ajoy Kumar Basu, appearing for the Respondents first placed Memo No. 1/64 GRY dated 21st July 1964 (Annexure 'H'), whereby the appellant was informed to attend Gauhati Court on 24th July 1964 and also to attend at the office of the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Katihar for the purpose of collecting a second class pass and the appellant's reply (Annexure 'I') and contended that since in the said reply, the appellant has given the ultimatum to the effect that he would not be in a position to go to Gauhati with the third class pass as offered there has been a virtual refusal to carry out the orders by the appellant and as such, even if there is some discrepancy in the proceeding as submitted, there would be no justification in interfering with the determinations as made. He further submitted that even if a second class pass as claimed by the appellant, was not supplied as a Railway Servant, it was his obligation to proceed to Gauhati even with the third class pass, for the protection of the interest of the Administration and then to have the dispute settled. Such action, Mr. Basu has submitted to be a gross dereliction of duty and a case of insubordination. These submissions of Mr. Such action, Mr. Basu has submitted to be a gross dereliction of duty and a case of insubordination. These submissions of Mr. Basu, according to us are of little substance, since we are of the view that there was in fact no refusal to accept the order dated 21st July 1964 by the appellant. For all practical purposes, he accepted the said order but returned the same for clarification or in that event for the purpose of issuing a second class pass as directed. There is also no dispute that the appellant was directed to collect a second class pass and as such instead of that when he was offered a third class pass, it was not unnatural that he would have a reasonable doubt in his mind and as such he has not done anything wrong in asking for the required second class pass. It is also an admitted fact that there is no evidence that on such return of the pass in question the appellant was further supplied with a second class pass as claimed or even a third Class pass for the purpose of proceeding to Gauhati and which the Respondents have alleged to be made available to the appellant. Thus we find that the findings of the Enquiry Officer that the appellant was responsible for his refusal to accept the sparing memo dated 21st July 1964 and the third class pass for attending Gauhati Court, have no basis or any reason whatsoever. Furthermore, such findings are also at variance with the charge sheet which speaks that the appellant, while functioning as Senior T.R.S, at Katihar, on 22nd July 1964 refused to accept memo signed by the Station Superintendent Katihar, whereby be was asked to go to Gauhati on 24th July 1964. Apart from the apparent inconsistency in the said charge sheet and the finding, it further appears from the recorded findings of the Enquiry Officer that there is admittedly no evidence to show that the memo in question was again or if at all ever tendered to the appellant on 22nd July, 1964. 9. Although the arguments as advanced by Mr. Gupta on the provisions of Rules 1712 and 1713 of the said Code are not recorded in the determinations of the learned trial judge but we have entertained them, as on being questions. Mr. 9. Although the arguments as advanced by Mr. Gupta on the provisions of Rules 1712 and 1713 of the said Code are not recorded in the determinations of the learned trial judge but we have entertained them, as on being questions. Mr. Gupta, on instructions, informed that those points were really argued for and on behalf of the appellant/petitioner and the more so when they are really points of law and are available from the pleadings and as such would not be a surprise to the Respondents and all the more when, those points have been specifically taken in the ground of appeal. Mr. Basu, relying on the language of Rules 1712 and 1713 of the said Code submitted that the arguments advanced by Mr. Gupta are devoid of any substance and submitted that where the Disciplinary Authority, as in the instant case, has agreed with the findings of the Inquiry authority, no fresh reasons were required to be given or recorded. In support of his contentions, he first relied on the determination in the case of (1) Haridas Sarker v. Union of India, 73 CWN 656, where it has been observed by D. Basu, J. that where the Disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, he need not give fresh reasons and there is nothing in Rules 1713 and 1715 of the said Code to lay down any contrary rule. Mr. Basu, also thereafter relied an unreported decision of P.K. Banerjee, J. dated 3rd October 1969 in the case of (12) N.R. Mitra v. Union of India & ors., (Civil Rule No. 224 (w) of 1967) and that of Sabaysachi Mukharji, J. dated 10th November 1970, in the case of (3) Gouri Shankar Prosad v. Union of India & ors. (Civil Rule No. 2629 (w) of 1966), wherein the determinations in Haridas Sarker v. Union of India & ors, (supra) have been referred to and followed. But the views as expressed by D. Basu, J. himself and the other two determinations as mentioned hereinbefore seems to have been deviated from by a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (4) The Union of India & ors. v. Sashi Bhusan Biswas, AIR 1970 Calcutta 545, where D. Basu, J. himself, speaking for the Court has observed that Rule 1713 is mandatory. v. Sashi Bhusan Biswas, AIR 1970 Calcutta 545, where D. Basu, J. himself, speaking for the Court has observed that Rule 1713 is mandatory. It goes beyond the requirements of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and requires the punishing authority to apply his mind to the materials on the record over again even when he may agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It has also been held in that case that where the punishing authority does not examine the findings of the Inquiry Officer upon which the employee was found guilty and does not record his own findings separately on the charges, his order gets vitiated for non-compliance with Rule 1713. Thus, in view of the subsequent Bench decision of this Court in the case of The Union of India & Ors. v. Sashi Bhusan Biswas (supra), to which we also agree, the earlier determinations as cited by Mr. Basu are of little help and assistance to the arguments as advanced. Thus, considering the language of Rules 1712 and 1713 of the said Code, we hold that not only the Inquiry procedure as laid down in Rule 1712 of the said Code will have to be followed but the mandatory provisions of Rule 1713 of the same must also be followed by the Disciplinary Authority, if it is not the Inquiring Authority. Furthermore, such authority is to consider the record of the Inquiry and also to record its findings on each charge and the more so when claims, as in the present case have been made. But in making such determination the Disciplinary Authority, as observed by the Supreme Court, in the case of (5) The Union of India & ors., v. K. Rajappa Menon, AIR 1970 SC 748 is not of course required to discuss the evidence and facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in details and write as if it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal. Such determination of the Supreme Court do not certainly envisage a bald and bare order as in Annexure "N", which has been passed in this case in the following manner :– "On a careful consideration of the report and in particular of the conclusion reached in respect of the charges framed against Shri Mohini Mohan Biswas (name of the Railway servant) the undersigned agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and holds that the charges are proved. The undersigned has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri Mohini Mohan Biswas (name of the Railway servant) is not fit person to be retained in service and that he should be removed from service. Mohini Mohan Biswas is hereby given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. Any representation which he may make in that connection will be considered by the undersigned. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than 25.5.65." We are of the view that although the Disciplinary Authorities are not required to write out a judgment like a judicial tribunal but the application of their mind to the facts and circumstances of each case must be apparent from the very record and if such authority merely opens the order with the words "on a careful consideration of the report... ........." as in the instant case and as submitted by Mr. Basu, would be enough or sufficient compliance with the requirements of the said Rule 1713. 10. In view of the above, this appeal should succeed and the appeal is thus allowed, the judgment/order of the learned trial Judge is set aside and the Rule is made absolute. There will however be no order as to costs either in this appeal or in the Rule. 11. Let a writ of Mandamus be issued directing the Respondents to forebear from giving effect or any further effect to the order of removal dated 25th September, 1965 (Annexure "O") to the petition and to act on the basis thereof. 12. This order will not prejudice the Respondents from proceedings afresh in the matter in accordance with law and if so advised. Basu J. : I agree.