Judgment :- 1. These two appeals raise the question of the sustainability of the action of the Inspector-General of Police in having directed by his order dated 19 31964 that the Special Armed Police a Unit of the Police Department would be treated as a separate and independent unit, separate from, and independent of, another unit, the State Police Radio (S. P. R. G) Unit. The Government, by the orders challenged in the writ petitions giving rise to these appeals reversed the decision of the Inspector-General and held that the two Units cannot be regarded as separate and independent ones. Our learned brother Eradi J. in O. P. No. 1287 of 1972 against which Writ Appeal No. 273 of 1974 has been filed, held that the Inspector-General had power and authority to direct that the two Units be treated as separate and that the Government was wrong in reversing the said decision and coming to a contrary conclusion. In that view, he quashed Ext. PI3 order of the Government treating the promotions in the S. A. P. Unit as provisional, and and also Ext. PI4 in so far as it directed that the S. A. P. Signal Branch should be deemed as part of the State Police, Radio Unit. Writ Appeal No. 273 of 1974 is against the said decision. Our learned brother Poti J. in O. P. No. 5311 of 1971 followed the judgment of Eradi J. and held that the Special Armed Police, Signal Unit was entitled to be considered as a separate Unit, till the impugned order of the Government on 7 81971 and that the petitioners in the writ petition who were working until that date in the said Unit, will have their seniority determined on the basis that the Unit was a separate one and was unified with the State Police, Radio Unit, only on and from that date. Writ Appeal No. 370 of 1974 is against the said judgment of the learned judge. 2. It would be convenient to refer to the exhibits with reference to Writ Appeal No. 273 of 1974. By Ext. P4 order dated 6 31963, the Commandant of the S. A. P. made certain suggestions to the Inspector-General. He was referring to the transfer of one Naik, three Lance Naiks and five police constables to the S. A. P. from the Radio Unit. By Ext. P4 order dated 6 31963, the Commandant of the S. A. P. made certain suggestions to the Inspector-General. He was referring to the transfer of one Naik, three Lance Naiks and five police constables to the S. A. P. from the Radio Unit. The letter stated: "It is presumed that for the purposes of promotion, the S. A. P. as it already exists, wilt form a separate unit in respect of the radio unit. I have commenced the training of selected operators for manning the stations. They are expected to complete training within 3 months ready to be absorbed as Class III Operators in the radio unit of S. A. P. It will also leave behind a small reserve for leave vacancies as well as for future absorption as operators. If this principle is adopted, there will not be any need for any further posting of operators from the radio unit to the S. A P. as envisaged in Para.2 of D. I. G.'s letter. There is also no necessity for the Lance Naiks and Naiks now posted in the S. A. P. to sit for any promotion test held in the Radio unit as envisaged in para 3 of the D.I. G.'s letter". By Ext. P5 memo dated 19 31964 of the Inspector-General, the Commandant was informed that the suggestion was acceptable and that the transfers by the order dated 13 21963 could be treated as on a permanent footing. It was stated that the State Police Radio Unit and the S. A. P. Radio Unit, will be treated as separate units for the purpose of promotion etc. Some years later, by Ext. P 11 dated 13 11969, the Inspector-General of Police recounted the proceedings dated 19 31964 treating the S. A. P. as a separate unit and pointed out that no Government orders had been obtained for doing so, and therefore the order declaring the S. A. P. Signal Unit as a separate one, was irregular. Those personnel were to be given option to go back to the Police Radio Unit. Options were called for from the persons concerned, who were not willing to go back to the Radio Unit, as they were holding higher posts in the S. A. P. Unit. Recounting these developments, Para.4 of Ext. P 11 stated: "4. In the circumstances stated above, the transfers and subsequent promotions in (he SAP. Options were called for from the persons concerned, who were not willing to go back to the Radio Unit, as they were holding higher posts in the S. A. P. Unit. Recounting these developments, Para.4 of Ext. P 11 stated: "4. In the circumstances stated above, the transfers and subsequent promotions in (he SAP. Radio Unit made on or after 2712 62 are declared as provisional, pending review of the individual claims and readjustments necessary to make final arrangements in a just and equitable manner". These proceedings of the Inspector General were challenged in O. P. No. 2625 of 1969 of this Court. The learned Judge Mathew J. of this Court (as he then was) who disposed of the writ petition, observed: "2. It would appear that the Government have recognised that these two units are separate for certain purposes. How far, therefore, the IG. is competent to pass Ext. P5 order treating these units to be one for the above purpose is a matter for the Government to consider. I would, therefore, direct the Government to consider the question whether they propose to treat these two units as one as proposed by the LG. in Ext. P5, and pass an order after giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, and also after taking into consideration the representation which the petitioner may file before the Government. Until an order is passed by the Government there will be no reversion of the petitioner from the post new held by him The petitioner will file the representation within two weeks from today, and the Government will pass the order within three months from that date". It was after the re-consideration thus directed by this Court that Exts. P13 and 14 orders impugned herein were passed. By Ext. P13 order dated 5-7-1971, the Government approved Ex. P11 proceedings of the Inspector-General treating the transfers to the S.A.P. Unit as provisional pending review of the individual claims and finalisation of the arrangements in regard to the two units. This was followed by Ext. P14 by which it was said that it was not the Government's intention to constitute the S.A.P. Signal Branch as a separate unit and that the same will be deemed to be part of the State Police Radio Unit from the date of its formation. 3. It would be noticed that Exts. This was followed by Ext. P14 by which it was said that it was not the Government's intention to constitute the S.A.P. Signal Branch as a separate unit and that the same will be deemed to be part of the State Police Radio Unit from the date of its formation. 3. It would be noticed that Exts. P13 and P14 orders have not been passed, in vacuo, but in pursuance of the direction in Ext. P12 judgment of this Court. That being so, on the decision of the Government on such reconsideration, any readjustments of rights by way of promotions or transfer would only be inevitable, and we cannot appreciate the grievance that such decision retrospectively affected promotions and transfers already made. A decision in regard to the administrative set up of the two units in the Police Establishment was one which the Government had been directed to take by the judgment of this Court; and save on strong grounds we see little scope for interference with such a policy decision of the Government. We think that interference by the learned judges in these cases was wrong. 4. But it was said that the Inspector-General of Police had power and authority to constitute the S.A.P. as a separate unit and that the Government was wrong in thinking that he had no such power and in directing that the S.A.P. was to be deemed part of the State Police, Radio Unit from the date of its formation. S.16 of the Kerala Police Act read with S.4 (1) thereof was relied on. S.4 (1) vests only the administration of the Police throughout the State, in the Inspector-General, subject to the control of the Government. Mark the two limitations, only the administration vests in the Inspector-General and even that subject to control by the Government. S.16 is as follows: "16. Inspector-General to control for and make rules. S.4 (1) vests only the administration of the Police throughout the State, in the Inspector-General, subject to the control of the Government. Mark the two limitations, only the administration vests in the Inspector-General and even that subject to control by the Government. S.16 is as follows: "16. Inspector-General to control for and make rules. The Inspector-General may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the Government, frame such orders and rules, not inconsistent with this Act, as he may deem expedient, relating to the general government and distribution of the police force, the places of residence, the classification, rank and particular services and duties of the members thereof their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements, and other necessaries to be furnished to them; to the collecting and communicating intelligence and information; for preventing abuse or neglect; and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of all its duties." We may also refer to S.69 of the Act which gives power to the Government, by rules, to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of members of the Police force. In the light of these provisions, we cannot, with respect, agree with our learned brother Eradi J. that Ext. P5 order passed by the Inspector-General was within his powers. The limited power conferred on the Inspector-General under S.16 is itself subject to approval by the Government. It should also be not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act Admittedly Government had not approved the action of the Inspector-General under Ext. P5. They had been directed by Ext. P12 judgment to consider the question and Exts. P13 and P14 orders were the result of such consideration. There was neither any jurisdictional error nor any patent error of law in the Government's decision. The learned judges were wrong in interfering under Art.226. 5. The learned Advocate-General relied on K.R..C.S. Balakrishna Chetty and Sons and Co. v. The State of Madras (AIR. 1961 SC. 1152) where the meaning of the expression "subject to" was discussed and considered by the Supreme Court. Following the principle of the decision in Province of Madras represented by the Collector of Salem v. K. R. C. S. Balakrishna Chetty and Sons (AIR. 1956 Mad. 377) and the other cases noticed it was ruled that the expression meant conditional upon observance of the conditions prescribed. Following the principle of the decision in Province of Madras represented by the Collector of Salem v. K. R. C. S. Balakrishna Chetty and Sons (AIR. 1956 Mad. 377) and the other cases noticed it was ruled that the expression meant conditional upon observance of the conditions prescribed. Counsel for the Respondent cited the decision in Mohammed Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (AIR. 1958 Allah. 681) and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shri. Mohan Lal Gupta v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab Chandigarh ((1973) (2) Services Law Reporter p. 537) as authority for the position that the term "subject to approval" would mean that an action taken without approval will remain valid till disapproved In the light of the Supreme Court decision, we cannot accept this position as correct. 6. On this analysis, we cannot hold that Ext. P5 proceedings of the Inspector-General were valid. Our learned brother Eradi J. after referring to S.16 of the Act, observed: "Though the exercise of the said power is made subject to the approval of the Government the section does not require that prior approval of Government should be obtained before issuing such orders or rules". In the light of the exposition by the Supreme Court in the decision already noticed, we cannot assent to the above statement of the law. We feel it does not represent the correct position. 7. The learned judge has given one further reason for holding the Government's action unjustified, as follows: "It is certainly open to the Government to take a decision that those two units should hereafter be unified and treated as one and to issue consequential direction; but to reverse the course of events beginning from 1964 onwards, by a purported clarification of the order Ex. P5 passed by the then Inspector-General of Police, in such a way as to prejudicially affect officers in whose favour valuable rights have accrued in the meantime is not legally open or permissible because such an executive order can have only prospective operation". As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out, the doctrine of "sitting back" with a sense of security cannot, is the nature of things arise in this sphere of provisional promotions liable to be reviewed at any time. They were conditional upon approval of the Government, which was never granted. As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out, the doctrine of "sitting back" with a sense of security cannot, is the nature of things arise in this sphere of provisional promotions liable to be reviewed at any time. They were conditional upon approval of the Government, which was never granted. We note that our learned brother Eradi J. stated in his judgment that there was no case that the appointments were otherwise than on a regular basis. For reasons noticed, we can only regard these as inchoate promotions, not approved by the Government. As Ext. P11 and the proceedings recited therein show, the promotions made in 1964 had come up for re-examination, and in 1968 options had been called for. No question of vested rights acquired by these promotions being affected retrospectively by the Government's executive order can arise, as observed by Eradi J. As part of the arrangement for the organisational set up of the S.A P. Unit certain promotions were directed by the Inspector-General, which were treated as provisional by the Government, and later on not sustained by them. There was no question, in the circumstances, of retrospectively affecting the promotions already ordered by any executive order. The promotions must ultimately depend upon the finalisation of the organisational set up. The doctrine of "sitting back" cannot apply to the sphere of such provisional promotions. 8. The learned judges were wrong in interfering with the Government's orders Exts P13 and P14. We allow these writ appeals, set aside the judgments under appeal and direct that O.P.Nos 1287 of 1972 and 5311 of 1971 shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.