JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are the owners of house No. 10-B (old), 26-B (new) Beli Road, New Katra, Allahabad, of which the appellant is the tenant. The aforesaid respondent filed an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for permission to bring a suit for ejectment against the appellant from the aforesaid house on the ground that the same was required by them for their personal occupation. They alleged that the accommodation in their occupation was insufficient to meet their requirement and, therefore, they wanted the said re-commodation for their use and occupation. The application was contested by the appellant, and the claim of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 that their need was genuine and bona fide was denied. The appellant asserted that he was living in the disputed house for the last more than 30 years and that he had no other alternative accommodation available to him in the city where he could shift. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Office with the finding that the need of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was not genuine. A revision filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 against the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was also dismissed on August 7, 1970. The said respondents, thereafter, filed a representation under section 7-F of the Act before the State Government. The representation was allowed and the application made by the aforesaid respondents was allowed. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition in this court, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. Hence the appeal. 2. The main point urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant was that the State Government committed an error in allowing the representation filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 without considering the need of the appellant and comparing the same with that of respondents 2 to 4. The proposition of law so far as it goes is now beyond dispute. 2 to 4 without considering the need of the appellant and comparing the same with that of respondents 2 to 4. The proposition of law so far as it goes is now beyond dispute. It has been laid down by a Full Bench of High Court in Asa Singh v. B.D. Sanwal, 1968 A.L.J. 713 that the proceedings under section 3 of the Act are of quasi judicial nature, and that an authority dealing with an application under section 3 of the Act is required to weigh the pros and cons of the matter and come to a certain conclusion before he makes the order. Hence, it was necessary for the State Government to have considered the need of the appellant and to have found whether the appellant was likely to suffer greater hardship by the acceptance of the application than what would have been suffered by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 by its rejection. 3. The question, however, is whether the State Government had, in fact, considered the need of the appellant and compared the same with that of respondents Nos. 2 to 4. A perusal of the judgment of the State Government shows that according to its finding the need of the appellant was also genuine and that he had no alternative accommodation of his own which he could occupy in case e application made by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was allowed. The State Government, however, thought that as the appellant had been offered the accommodation occupation of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, therefore, the offer made by these respondents satisfied the requirement of weighing the pros and cons. This approach of the State Government appears to us to be erroneous. True it is that case the appellant was offered an adequate alternative accommodation and still refused to occupy the same, the requirement of comparison of needs would became to have been satisfied. But, in order to reject the claim of a tenant on is ground it is necessary to find that the offer made by a landlord is in respect accommodation which is adequate and is suitable to the need of the tenant very offer of alternative accommodation cannot result in defecting the right of e tenant to the consideration of his read. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant is a Professor and plead of the Department of Economic in the Allahabad University. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant is a Professor and plead of the Department of Economic in the Allahabad University. His status and position in life required a dignified and decent house. He could not be expected to shift and occupy a house which may not be suitable to carry on his professional work and studies. Accordingly, the State Government should have considered the offer made by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from this angle, and as the State Government did not do we are unable to uphold its order. It may be noted that the offer made by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had not been found in keeping with the position of the appellant by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. It was, therefore, still more necessary for the State Government to have addressed itself on this question. If after considering this aspect it would have found that the accommodation offered by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was suitable for the need of the appellant, it could certainly allow the application made by the aforesaid respondents. 4. Another circumstance which weighed with the State Government was that the request of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to occupy a portion of the premises in the tenancy of the appellant was not acceded to by him. Taking this circumstance into account, the State Government found that the application made by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 could be allowed. We do not Erna any substance in this ground as well. Before accepting this plea, the State Government should have found whether the appellant could part with the portion of the house in his tenancy conveniently and his attitude of not doing so was unreasonable, but without examining the relevant facts pertaining to this issue it erroneously found the same to be sufficient for allowing the application of respondents Nos. 2 to 4. The fact that the appellant refused to give a part of the tenancy was not by itself sufficient to decide the case against him. 5. For these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, and the order of the State Government dated 25-9-1971 is quashed. No order as to costs. The State Government is directed to decide the representation afresh keeping the observations made above in mind.