JUDGMENT 1. - The facts of this case may be stated in brief. The respondent No. 2 was employed as a Conductor in a temporary capacity by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") by the order dated February 18, 1974 for a period of two months on a salary of Rs. 90/- p.m. and dearness allowance admissible in accordance with the Rules framed by the Corporation on the terms and conditions mentioned in that order. The temporary employment of the respondent No. 2 was thereafter extended upto May 18, 1974 by the order of the Regional Manager of the Corporation dated April 25, 1974. Then on July 25, 1974 the Regional Manager of the Corporation passed an order by which the services of the respondent No. 2 were extended upto July 25, 1974 i.e. the very date of the last mentioned order. The respondent No. 2 then submitted an application order section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") alleging that the respondent No. 2 was a permanent employee of the Corporation and that he was illegal removed from service without any notice and praying that the removal of the respondent No. 2 from service be set aside and the Regional Manager of the Corporation may be directed to reinstate the respondent No. 2 on his post with full back wages. The application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed by the respondent No. 2 against the Regional Manager, Jaipur Region of the Corporation, who opposed the aforesaid application and submitted in his reply that the respondent No. 2 was appointed only for a fixed term, which was extended upto May 18, 1974 and then upto July 25, 1974 and that as there was no further extension of the temporary employment of the respondent No. 2, the same came to an end on account of the expiry of the term thereof. The Tribunal in its order dated April 10, 1975 expressed the opinion that the order of the Corporation extending the3 period of employment of the3 respondent No. 2 upto July, 25, 1974 was a combined order of extension as well as of termination of the service of the respondent No. 2, as it was issued on that very date on which the service of the respondent No. 2 was sought to be terminated. It was also held by the Tribunal that the termination of the service of the respondent No. 2 in this manner amounted to unfair labour practice. According to the Tribunal, the employer ought to have passed an order of the extension of the service of the concerned workman to make some other arrangement for his livelihood and as the service of the respondent No. 2 was extended only upto July 25, 1974 by the order of that very date, the respondent No. 2 did not get any time for making alternative arrangements for his employment. However, the Tribunal did not give any finding on the plea raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that he was a permanent employee of the Corporation and could not be removed from service. On the other hand, the Tribunal observed that if the employee was appointed temporarily he was at least entitled to know the time upto which his temporary appointment was to continue. After making all the aforesaid observations, the Tribunal by its order dated April 10, 1975 set aside the order passed by the Regional manager of the Corporation on July 25, 1974 extending the period of the service of respondent No. 2 upto that date and passed an order of reinstatement of the respondent No. 2 with back wages. 2. The Corporation has submitted the present writ petition against the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal on April 10, 1975 and the principal ground canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation before this Court was that the setting aside of the order of the Corporation dated July 25, 1974 by the Tribunal in substance amounted to the setting aside of the order of extension of the service of the respondent No. 2, but that was not the case of any one of the parties before the Tribunal. It was further argued by the learned counsel that as the respondent No. 2 was a temporary employee appointed for a fixed term, he could be kept in the employment of the Corporation only upto date his service was extended by the Corporation and thereafter the temporary service of the respondent No. 2 automatically came to an end. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submitted that the said respondent was permanent employed on the post of a conductor by the Corporation and as such he could not have been removed from his post in this manner and that the Tribunal was right in holding that the removal of such an employee without any notice amounted to unfair labour practice. 4. So far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 is concerned. I may observe that the Tribunal has not expressed any opinion in respect thereof and as such it would not be proper for this Court to consider the aforesaid submission at this stage. However, on a perusal of the order of the Tribunal dated July 25, 1974 it appears that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. The Tribunal without applying its mind to the matter in controversy between the parties, proceeded to give the following direction in the operative part of the award:- "The order is, therefore, set aside and the workman is reinstated with back wages." The only order which was subject matter of consideration before the Tribunal and which was not even desired by the respondent No. 2 to be set aside was that was passed by the3 Regional manager of the Corporation on July 25, 1974 extending the term of the respondent No. 2 on the post of Conductor upto that date. Even if the order of the Corporation dated July 25, 1974 was construed by the Tribunal as an order of extension of service of the respondent No. 2 as well, which could not have been intended by the Tribunal. In case the said order is set aside then the extension of the employment of the respondent No. 2 upto July 25, 1974 which extended the employment of respondent No. 2 upto that date could not have been set aside by the Tribunal. In case the said order is set aside then the extension of the employment of the respondent No. 2 upto July 25, 1974 which extended the employment of respondent No. 2 upto that date could not have been set aside by the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, there was no order passed by the Corporation terminating the service of the respondent No. 2, nor it was the case of the respondent No. 2 before the Tribunal that his service was terminated by the Corporation. The Tribunal has not all applied its mind to that aspect of the matter. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal suffers from an error on the face thereof. The respondent No. 2 did not urge before the Tribunal that this employment was terminated by the Corporation by its order dated July 25, 1974 and the Tribunal clearly misconstrued the aforesaid order. An order setting aside the extension of service of the respondent No. 2 and as a consequence thereof an order of his reinstatement with back wages could not have been passed by the Tribunal in the aforesaid circumstances. In fact no dispute was at all raised before the Tribunal by any one of the parties regarding the validity of the extension of the service of the respondent No. 2 upto July 25, 1974. The real question canvassed before the Tribunal was as to whether the respondent No. 2 was a permanent employee of the Corporation and his service was illegally terminated without any notice but that aspect of the matter did not receive the attention of the Tribunal and was not decided by it. As the order of the Tribunal is apparently erroneous it deserves to be set aside. 5. In the result the writ petition is allowed and the3 award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan dated April 10, 1975 is set aside. The case is remanded back to the aforesaid Tribunal for a proper decision of the application of the respondent No. 2 under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, in accordance with law and the light of the observations made above. The Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan is directed to dispose of the case expeditiously. The parties are left to bear their own costs. *******