Ram Nath Giri v. Union of India — 1976 DIGILAW 127 (PAT)

JUDGMENT K. B. N. Singh These three writ petitions, which involve common questions of law and facts, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common, order. 2. In C. W. J. C. 1433 of 1972 petitioner Ramnath Giri and nineteen other petitioners, the erstwhile employees of the Uranium Corporation of India Limited and who after having opted, were employed as members of the Central Industrial Security Force, have prayed for the quashing of the order dated the 2nd/7th September, 1972 (Annexure 5f1) appointing them as members of the Central Industrial Security Force. A prayer has been made for issuance of necessary direction to the authorities to Act, in accordance with law. By a supplementary petition the petitioners have sought to challenge the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968, under which the Central Industrial Security Force has been constituted, as ultra vires of Articles 14, 16 and 19 (I) (g) of the Constitution. In the other two writ petitions, which are by individual workers, Baijnath Singh and Ramnath Giri, the prayer is for quashing of the order of termination of their service from the Central Industrial security Force, a copy of which has been filed in each writ application as annexure 10. C.W.J.C. 1433 of 1972. 3. The petitioners in this writ application were employed in the Fire Service Branch of the Uranium Corporation of India Limited, Respondent no 4 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') for its Mills at Jaduguda in the district of Singhbhum. Petitioners no. 1 to 4 were employed as 'Leading Firemen', petitioners no. 5 to 7 were employed as 'Fire Engine Drivers-cum-Operators and the remaining petitioners were 'Firemen'. 4. On the 2nd December, 1968 the Central Parliament passed an Act, called the Central Industria1 Security Force Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity) and the said Act, after being assented to by the President became effective from the 10th. March, 1969. The Act, provided for constitution and regulation of a force called the Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as 'CISF') for the better protection and security of Government industrial undertakings as defined under section' (1) of the Act, and for its deputation to other industrial undertakings in public sector under the circumstances laid down in section 14. 5. The Act, provided for constitution and regulation of a force called the Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as 'CISF') for the better protection and security of Government industrial undertakings as defined under section' (1) of the Act, and for its deputation to other industrial undertakings in public sector under the circumstances laid down in section 14. 5. The petitioners' case is that the Corporation is a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, and it is a Government of India enterprise and is an industrial undertaking in public sector within the meaning of section 2 (I) (c) of the Act, which means an industrial undertaking owned, controlled or managed by a Government Company, as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, which is controlled or managed by the Government. 6. It is the common case of the petitioners in all the writ applications that on the 21st of April, 1972, the petitioners were informed by the Corporation by a notice (Annexure 1) that the Central Government had decided to constitute an Industrial Security Force for the Corporation and the work relating to Fire Service would he transferred to CISF in May 1972 and also asked the petitioners to exercise their option latest by the 8th May, 1972. It was also stated in the said notice that those who would not apply for absorption in the CISF would not be retained by the corporation and would be deemed to have decided to leave the service of the Corporation and that such employees would be relieved and paid retrenchment compensation according to Jaw. It was also stated therein that for those who would apply for absorption but could not be so absorbed in the CISF on account of physical disability or for reasons beyond the applicants control, the Corporation would try to offer them appropriate position outside the range of security duty in anyone of the establishments of the Corporation and the scales of pay of those employees would be protected. The optees would be put on probation for one year from the date of their appointment in CISF. The optees would be put on probation for one year from the date of their appointment in CISF. The notice also indicated, amongst other things, the various ranks in the force and their scales of pay and it was stated that the firemen working in the Corporation would be fixed in the scale of guard or head security guard in the CISF depending on their qualifications and suitability and the difference in the total emoluments would be made up by giving them a fire fighting allowance. It was also stated that they would get benefits of pension, on permanancy, as available to Central Government employees. The petitioners case is that they did not opt for absorption in the CISF as the terms offerred by Annexure 1 were prejudicial to their interest. On 20th May, 1972, the Corporation circulated a letter of the date (Annexure 2) from the Deputy Inspector-General. CISF, Eastern Zone, Calcutta (Respondent no.3) addressed to the General Manager of the Corporation stating that the designation of the Fire Services Unit of the Corporation would be retained and the optees would have the option to retain their own pay scales. The aforesaid letter was followed by a circular letter dated the 22nd. May, 1972 (Annexure 3) issued by the Corporation assuring that the designations of the optees for CISF would be retained and so would be their existing pay etc., and the petitioners were further asked to give their option by 5 p. m. on the 22nd. May, 1972. The petitioners' case is that thereafter they had opted for joining the CISF and they clearly stated in the option certificate that they wanted to retain their scale of pay and allowances admissible to them under the Corporation prior to their option for enlistment in CISF (Annexure 4). According to the petitioners, contrary to the assurance given by Annexure 3, by office order dated the 2nd/7th. September, 1972 (Annexure 5/1) the Assistant Inspector General of Central Industrial Security Force, New Delhi (Respondent no. 2) changed the designation of petitioners no. 1 to 4 to Head Security Guards, that of petitioners no. 5 to 7 to Drivers and that of the rest of the petitioners to Security Guards and reduced their scales of pay and allowances drastically. The said order was circulated to the petitioners by the Corporation by letter dated the 7th. October, 1972 (Annexure 5). 1 to 4 to Head Security Guards, that of petitioners no. 5 to 7 to Drivers and that of the rest of the petitioners to Security Guards and reduced their scales of pay and allowances drastically. The said order was circulated to the petitioners by the Corporation by letter dated the 7th. October, 1972 (Annexure 5). Against the said orders the petitioners filed representations, a sample copy of which filed by petitioner no. 1 is Annexure 6. The petitioners' case is that they had been paid by the Corporation upto the 30th September, 1972 as per their existing pay scales as given in Annexure 7, but the salary or wages for the month of October, 1972 were offered to the petitioners on a drastically curtailed rate of wages and allowances and the petitioners declined to accept the same as a mark of protest. The petitioners have filed a chart (Annexure 7/1) to demonstrate the reduction in their salaries or wages and their allowances. On the above averments, the petitioners have pleaded that the action of the respondents in transferring their services and appointing them in the CISF against the assurance given to them and the terms of option exercised by them was illegal, void and fit to be quashed. 7. Counter-affidavits and supplementary counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondents no. 1 to 3 and also on behalf of respondent no. 4. which also filed supplementary and additional counter affidavits to which the petitioners have filed replies. Some affidavits have also been filed in course of argument. They will be referred to in so far as they are relevant. 8. I shall first take up the questions raised in the main writ application (C.W.J.C. 1433 of 1972) and reference to documents will also be in relation thereto unless otherwise indicated. It may be mentioned, at the outset, that Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the three applications, has not challenged the vires of the Act. Mr. It may be mentioned, at the outset, that Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the three applications, has not challenged the vires of the Act. Mr. Roy has, however, urged that the constitution of the Central Industrial Security force is invalid, inasmuch as it could be constituted for the better protection and security of an "Industrial undertaking owned by the Government", while the notice issued by the Manager of the Corporation (Annexure I) shows that the security force was constituted for the Corporation, which is a Company constituted under the Companies Act, and not an industrial undertaking owned by the Central Government. He has further urged that the averments made in this regard in paragraph 3 of the writ petition as also in Annexure I have not been denied in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents no. 1 to 3 or in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4. All that is stated therein is that the statement contained in paragraph 3 of the writ petition needs no comment. There is no force in this contention, inasmuch as a reference to the Act, that the force (CISF) has to be constituted by the Central Government under section 3 of the Act, for the purposes laid down in the Act, and not by the Manager of the Corporation. What the Manager of the Corporation has stated in this regard is wholly redundant. The Act, itself has laid down the purpose for which the CISF is to be constituted, namely, for the protection and security of Government industrial undertakings, vide section 3(1), and may also be deputed, if need be, to other industrial undertakings in the public sector, vide section 14. Once CISF is constituted, its purposes are what is laid down in the four corners of the Statute. In view of the statutory provision in this regard in section 3 and 14, any statement by the Manager of the Corporation giving out a different purpose for the constitution of CISF would not invalidate its constitution. When the purpose for constitution of a body or force is referrable to the Statute under which it is constitute.1, then that alone will be its purpose for constitution. When the purpose for constitution of a body or force is referrable to the Statute under which it is constitute.1, then that alone will be its purpose for constitution. The force constituted under the Act, is Central Industrial Security Force meant for development throughout the country for the purpose envisaged in the Act, and not for any particular industrial undertaking such as respondent no.4, as suggested by its Manager's letter (Annexure 1). The very foundation of the argument of Mr. Roy in this regard is misconceived. 9. Mr. Ranen Roy has next contended that the Act, imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of profession of some of the petitioners and also is violative of the statutory rights under the Labour Laws. He has submitted that the security force and the fire fighting wing of the Corporation were closed down on the constitution of CISF under the Act, which otherwise could not have been possible in view of the protection given under the Industrial Disputes Act, and other labour legislations on the point. The unreasonableness or otherwise of a restriction, if any, has to be judged in the light of the purpose for which it has been enacted and the mischief sought to be suppressed. The mischief sought to be suppressed can be gathered from the statement of objects and reasons for this particular enactment, which may be usefully quoted here :- “At present security arrangements at important industrial undertakings in the public sector are handled by the watch and ward staff of the organisation concerned. The watch and ward staff is generally engaged in guarding the entrances or the perimeter of the industrial undertaking and in preventing entries of unauthorised persons. Unplanned recruitment, inadequate supervision, training and discipline have made the existing watch and ward staff ill-equipped to discharge responsibilities. It is considered necessary to strengthen the security arrangements in vital industrial undertakings. For that purpose it is proposed to constitute a centrally recruited, organised and trained industrial security force. The force will be primarily responsible for the watch and ward of industria undertakings owned by the Central Government al d may be deployed, at the request and cost of managements, for securitv duties of industrial undertakings in public sector". From the legislative history evidenced by the deposition given by Mr. S.N. Dutta, Adviser and the report of Mr. The force will be primarily responsible for the watch and ward of industria undertakings owned by the Central Government al d may be deployed, at the request and cost of managements, for securitv duties of industrial undertakings in public sector". From the legislative history evidenced by the deposition given by Mr. S.N. Dutta, Adviser and the report of Mr. Justice B. Mukherjee On the fire incident in the Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi. it is manifest that a disciplined and more efficient security force, not given to frequent hartals etc., Was the minimum and imperative need for the protection of industrial undertakings. Judged in this background, the restriction if any, imposed upon the petitioners by the Act, can hardly be said to be unreasonable. In my considered opinion, the alleged restriction, if any, is reasonable and necessary in public interest. It may be noted that Mr. Roy has not been able to point out any particular provision, either in the Act, or in the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969, which puts any restriction on the petitioners' right to carryon a profession of their choice. Perhaps what Mr. Roy has meant is that they are affected as a result of the constitution of CISF and its deployment or deputation. Besides that, there is no fundamental right of any fire service personnel of being employed by a particular master, as urged by Mr. Roy. The rights, if any, created by any Statute or statutory rules, are not fundamental rights. The Statute being the basis of those rights, they come into existence by virtue of the statute and disappear by the repeal or modification of such rights by a Statute. 10. Mr. Roy has next submitted that the option exercised by the petitioners in leaving their employment under the Corporation and joining the CISF is invalid as it was obtained by threat and induced by misrepresentation and they must, therekre, be deemed to be in employment of the Corporation and their appointment in CISF as per Annexures 5 and 5/1 is rendered ineffective on that score. In support of the contention that the option of the petitioners was obtained on the threat of termination of service, reliance has been placed on the statement made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition and paragraph of Annexure I. It is stated therein that in case the petitioners did not exercise their option, they would not be retained by the Corporation and they would be deemed to have decided to leave the service of the Corporation and would be relieved and paid retrenchment compensation as admissible under the law. Mr. Roy has urged that these statements have not been denied in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents. In paragraph 8 of counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 it is stated that they need no comment while in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 it is stated that it is for the Corporation (respondent no. 4) to give reply to the statements in paragraph 4. There is no substance in the submission of Mr. Roy that the petitioners' option was obtained under any coercion inasmuch as the petitioners themselves in paragraph 6 of the writ petition have stated that at first, they did not opt for absorption in the CISF as 'he terms offered were prejudicial to their interest. In view of this specific statement made by the petitioners themselves in paragraph 6 aforesaid, the statement contained in Annexure I that in case they did not opt they would be relieved, cannot be interpreted to be such a threat as to invalidate their appointment in CISF, particularly when their case is that it was only after certain assurances were given that they agreed to join the CISF and executed the agreement. It was then open to them to raise an industrial dispute if they thought that the threat of retrenchment given to them was illegal and unjustified under the Labour laws but no such thing was done by the petitioners. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioners in the CISF cannot be invalidated on the ground of their option for appointment in CISF having been obtained as a result of any threat. 11. Coming to the other part of the submission of Mr. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioners in the CISF cannot be invalidated on the ground of their option for appointment in CISF having been obtained as a result of any threat. 11. Coming to the other part of the submission of Mr. Roy that the option of the petitioners to join the CISF was obtained by misrepresentation that the difference between the total emoluments drawn by the members of the Fire Service wing of the Corporation and the scale of pay to be drawn by them as members of the CISF would be made up by giving them fire righting allowance and that their designations in the Fire Service "Wing of the Corporation would be retained and they would have the option to retain their own scales of pay, he has submitted that the averments made in this regard in paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 of the writ petition have not been specifically denied in any of the counter-affidavits. He has also relied upon Annexures 1,2 and 3 in this connection. Annexure 1 is a letter dated the 21st April, 1972 containing a formula for pay fixation in the CISF where by the total emoluments drawn by the members of the Fire Service Wing of the Corporation would be protected by the Government and it was stated therein that the previous services of the incumbents would be counted. (Annexure 1 has been referred to in some detail in paragraph 9). Annexure 2 is a letter dated the 20th May, 1972 from the Deputy Inspector General of CISF, Eastern Zone, Calcutta, addressed to the Manager of the Corporation, the contents of which may be usefully quoted here- In conformity with the scheme approved by the Central Cabinet, the Fire Wing of your Corporation is being taken over as an integral part of the CISF. As, however, you are aware, the detailed rules and regulations regarding the Fire Wing have not yet been finalised, though generally speaking, they would be on the same lines as have been obtaining in the Railway Protection Force pending finalisation of rules on the subject, various existing designations of the Fire Services Unit of your Corporation will be retained in the CISF as these are the same in the H.P.F. According to the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs, it will be upto the optees of your Fire Wing either to opt for the CISF scales or retain their own pay scales. So their existing pay and other allowances including facilities which they are enjoying naturally be protected and will continue to remain in operation according to the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs issued from time to time. The services put in by the optees in the U.C.I L. before their being taken over by the CISF will be deemed to be continued. 2. As the recommendation is provisional, final adjustment, if necessary, will be made in the light of the general policy which is adopted by the CISF in regard to Fire Wing in other undertaking in the country". Annexure 3 is a Circular dated the 22nd May, 1972 issued by the Manager of the Corporation to the effect that the present designations of the optees would be retained and there would be no loss in their pay. And it is by this Circular that the petitioners were asked to give their option by 5 pm. on that very day. Respondent no. 4 has denied the existence of the letter (Anexure 2). It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that all that Annexure 2 showed was that• the arrangement was provisional subject to the finalisation of the Rules by the Central Government. It appears to be so from the portions underlined by me in the quotation from Annexure 2 given above. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that all that Annexure 2 showed was that• the arrangement was provisional subject to the finalisation of the Rules by the Central Government. It appears to be so from the portions underlined by me in the quotation from Annexure 2 given above. Respondents no.1 to 3 have stated in their counter-affidavit that the designations of the petitioners were changed to conform to the ranks in the CISF as prescribed by Rule 3 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') and the ranks and pay scales given to them are equivalent as will appear from the chart given below :- Earlier designation Designation under CISF Leading Fireman Head Security Guard (Rs. 171-220) Fire engine driver-cum Driver operator (Rs. 171-220) Fireman (Rs. 150-179) Security Guard. It has been further stated in the counter-affidavit that this was done after proper secrutiny on the recommendation of the Screening Committee. It is emphatically denied that the pay and allowances of the petitioners were drastically reduced, and, in fact, they were allowed to draw pay and allowances as indicated in their last pay certificates. A t the initial stage, in the absence of last pay certificates, which were awaited from the Corporation, the petitioners were allowed according to a provisional arrangement, to draw the minimum in the pay scales of the CISF for the months of October and November. 1972, which they refused to accept. Subsequently, pay and allowances for the month of December, 1972 were drawn as indicated in the last pay certificates of the petitioners since received from the Corporation and arrears of salary etc. for the months of October and November, 1972 at the revised rate were also given which the petitioners accepted between the 11th and 19th January, 1973. It is also stated therein that some workmen have received payment in the revised rate which is more than the last pay drawn by them before being inducted to CISF and, thus, the assurance of protection of pay and allowances as well as rank bas been fulfilled. In the reply to the counter-affidavit the petitioners have stated that they accepted their revised salary in January, 1973 as they were goin1; without pay. In the reply to the counter-affidavit the petitioners have stated that they accepted their revised salary in January, 1973 as they were goin1; without pay. It is stated therein that the annual increments earned between June and September, 1972 by some of the petitioners have been ignored and their emoluments have been reduced. The petitioners have given a chart (Annexure 7) showing the pay scale, dearness allowance, variable dearness allowance and ex gratia bonus (Paid annually) raid to the leading fireman, fire engine driver-cum-operator and the fireman of the Corporation. In the chart at Annexure 7/1 they have indicated the pay drawn by the individual petitioners on the 30th September, 1972, which was paid by the Corporation, and the amount of reduction in their wages per month on being absorbed in the CISF. In the reply to the counter-affidavit they have attached a copy of the pay slip of petitioner Ramnath Giri (Annexure 8) for the month of September, 1972. The respondents also filed a counter-chart giving details of the fixation of pay of the optees, in order to show that the r petitioners were not being paid less but more than what they were getting under the Corporation. According to the stand of respondents 1 to 3 (para 8 of the counter affidavit), the petitioners would be deemed to be in the service of the CISF from the 1st June, 1972 and as such, the fixation of their pay will be on the basis of their pay of May, 1972, till when they were in the service of the Corporation and the pay drawn by them with effect from the 1st June, 1972 would be as employees of the CISF. In the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners it has been stated that while the petitioners were working under the Corporation they were being paid extra wages for any extra work taken from them beyond the scheduled working hours or for work done on holidays or weekly off-days at double their normal rates of wages and that they were allowed travelling expeness for going to their home and back while on leave. They have also filed an office order (Annexure 10, showing that petitioner Ramnath Giri had earned annual increment of Rs. They have also filed an office order (Annexure 10, showing that petitioner Ramnath Giri had earned annual increment of Rs. 4/-per month with effect from the 28th June, 1972, possibly to show that this annual increment had not been included in the pay at the time of fixation of his pay under the CISF. From Annexure 511, the letter of appointment, it appears that the petitioners absorption in the CISF became effective from the 1st June, 1972, and, therefore, Annexure 10 cannot be brought in aid of this petitioner to show that he was getting Rs, 4J-more per month when he exercised the option or from the 1st June, 1972 from which date he is deemed to be in service of the CISF. Petitioner No.3 Shyam nandan Singh has also filed a supplementary affidavit to show that while working under the Corporation he was being paid basic pay at the rate of Rs. 191 /- per month, Rs. 136/- as dearness allowance and Rs. 18/-per month as variable dearness allowance, the total being Rs. 345/-p'er month, as against which the respondents fixed his basic pay at Rs. 187/-per month and dearness allowance at Rs. 126/50 paise, the total of which comes to Rs. 313/50, thus putting him at a loss of Rs. 31/50 per month and thus the assurance given to him has not been fulfilled. A reference to Annexure Al will show that on the 9th December, 1972 the basic pay of this petitioner was fixed at Rs. 187/, dearness allowance Rs. 126.50 paise, washing allowance Rs. 2.50 paise and bonus equivalent to Rs.25.47 paise, the total of which comes to Rs. 341.47 paise per month. Thus, there is a difference of Rs. 3.53 paise and not Rs. 31.50 paise as asserted by this petitioner. It may be that in his case also, the difference is on account of some increment which the petitioner might have earned, as in the case of petitioner Ramnath Giri, after the 1st June, 1972. No other specific instance of reduction in the emoluments has been brought to our notice. Be that as it may, even assuming that there was some discrepancy between what was promised and what has been allowed to the petitioners, they would be entitled only to the full implementation of that promise. No other specific instance of reduction in the emoluments has been brought to our notice. Be that as it may, even assuming that there was some discrepancy between what was promised and what has been allowed to the petitioners, they would be entitled only to the full implementation of that promise. That would not entitle them to claim cancellation of their option to join the CISF and the order of their appointment (Annexure 5/1). They had also executed agreements as provided by Rule 15 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969. Rule 15 lays down that at the time of the appointment, every member of the CISF shall execute an agreement in the form given in Appendix A to the Rules. In my opinion, the relief asked for in the writ application does not follow from what is contended and pleaded on this score. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not pointed out any Statute or statutory rules which prevented the petitioners from being recruited in the CISF, giving up their earlier employment under the Corporation. They have got their earlier services under the Corporation counted on being recruited to CISF in the matter of fixation of pay and rank in the CISF. Thus, there is no conflict between the option or agreement and any statute or statutory rules, as urged by Mr. Roy. The recruitment of the petitioners to the CISF and the agreements signed by them are in themselves in terms of a Parliamentary enactment and the Rules made thereunder. Therefore, even if there was any Statute or Statutory Rules to the contrary, which, of course, have not been brought to our notice, there would not be any invalidity in the exercise of option and the execution of the agreement and the letter of appointment. 12. Apart from saying that the provisional fixation of pay and rank of the petitioners might be inconsistent with the promise held out, no other ground for invalidity of the letter of appointment bas been either pleaded or established by the petitioners. As already stated full pay and promised rank have been given to the petitioners. Even if the promised pay and rank have not been given in a particular case, that can be demanded from the authorities of the CISF; but the option, the impugned agreement and the letter of appointment cannot be held to be invalid on that score. As already stated full pay and promised rank have been given to the petitioners. Even if the promised pay and rank have not been given in a particular case, that can be demanded from the authorities of the CISF; but the option, the impugned agreement and the letter of appointment cannot be held to be invalid on that score. The case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing company versus Ulhasnagar Municipal council relied upon by Mr. Roy has no application to the facts of the instant case. In that case, the Municipality imposed octroi duty on the goods of the petitioner imported in the Municipal area against a solemn agreement entered into not to do so for a period of seven years and also contrary to the advice given by the Maharashtra Government not to do so. While setting aside the summary dismissal of the writ application challenging the imposition of octroi duty by the Municipality and remanding the case to the High Court for re-hearing, the Supreme Court observed that public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out the representations of fact and promises made by them. In that instant case, as discussed above, there is no flouting of the assurance given, if any, and equivalent ranks as admissible under the Rules were given to the petitioners and the total emoluments paid to them are not less than what they were getting under the Corporation. 13. Mr. Roy bas urged that the deputation of the Force being under the orders of the Central Government and not at the request of the Managing Director of the Corporation, as required by section 14 (1) of the Act, is invalid. Learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the respondents has urged that this point bad not been raised by the petitioners in the writ petition. The point has been raised for the first time, in the reply filed by the petitioners on the 18th November, 1974 to the supplementary counter• affidavit of respondent no. 4. Learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the respondents has urged that this point bad not been raised by the petitioners in the writ petition. The point has been raised for the first time, in the reply filed by the petitioners on the 18th November, 1974 to the supplementary counter• affidavit of respondent no. 4. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the reply to the counter-affidavit it bas been stated that the Corporation is not an industrial undertaking owned by the Central Government and as such the Central Government' could not constitute a force for the better protection and security of the Corporation, and, in absence of any request made by the Managing Director of the Corporation showing the necessity of deputation of CISF', no force could be deputed, as it was contrary to the provisions of sub-section (l) of section, 14 of the Act. In other words, according to the petitioners, the only situation in which CISF could be deputed to an industrial undertaking in the public sector like the Corporation would be at the request of the Managing Director of the Corporation made to that effect to the Inspector-General of the CISF, stating the necessity of such deputation, as laid down in section 14 (1) of the Act. Learned Solicitor-General, therefore, sought permission to file a reply to it and was so permitted and the case a1so remained part-heard on the eve of the Summer Vacation of the Court. When the case was taken up on the 23rd June, 1975, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 and a supplementary affidavit on behalf of the petitioners was also filed and both were allowed to be kept on the record. The case had to be adjourned to suit the convenience of learned counsel for the parties, and finally, its hearing was concluded in February, 1976. In the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 it has been asserted that by two letters-one dated the 25th December, 1971 (Annexure D) and the other dated the 2nd February, 1972 (Annexure D) (1) the Managing Director of the Corporation made a request to the Inspector-General of CISF for deputation of force for the Corporation. In the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 it has been asserted that by two letters-one dated the 25th December, 1971 (Annexure D) and the other dated the 2nd February, 1972 (Annexure D) (1) the Managing Director of the Corporation made a request to the Inspector-General of CISF for deputation of force for the Corporation. Annexure II to the letter dated the 25th December, 1971 (Annexure D) indicates the detailed reasons for such deputation, extracts from which may be usefully quoted here;- "The operations undertaken by this Company are of strategic importance and crucial to the development of atomic energy programme in the country. "The Plant has got considerable importance from the security point of view. At present this is the only project in the whole country which produces Uranium. The possibility of sabotage from the enemy is great. More-over the surrounding area is vulnerable to extremist activities. These were noted by the Dy. Inspector General of the CISF, Eastern Zone, when he visited this establishment in April, 1971. In view of the reasons explained above, it is felt very essential to depute Central Industrial Security Force to this Corporation in the interest and safety of this important establishment and also in the interest of the country in general". This letter is signed by Shri T. B. Malhotra Managing Director of the Corporation. The next letter Annexure D (1) is dated the 2nd February, 1972 and is addressed to the Inspector-General of CISF. In this letter reference has been made to the earlier letter (Annexure D) and the minutes of discussion held between the Deputy Manager (Personnel and Administration) of the Corporation and the D.I. G. of the CISF, Eastern Zone, Calcutta on the 19th January, 1972 and in pursuance of which request bad been made for certain additions in the requisition for force made earlier. In this letter it was also requested that the Fire Services Department of the Corporation should also be taken over by the CISF immediately, the details of which, according to this letter, had also been sent to the Inspector-General of the CISF. Along with the additional counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4, some other documents, marked Annexures E and F, have also been filed and they will be referred to in the particular context in which they are relevant. Mr. Along with the additional counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4, some other documents, marked Annexures E and F, have also been filed and they will be referred to in the particular context in which they are relevant. Mr. Roy has not seriously objected to the acceptance of this additional counter-affidavit as the petitioners themselves also filed an additional affidavit on the same day. What he has .challenged is the authenticity of Annexures D and D (1). The above additional counter-affidavit was sworn by Mr. R. C. Pattanayak, Deputy Manager (Personnel and Industrial Relations) of the Corporation and I do not find any reason to hold that the counter-affidavit sworn by him is false or the documents filed along with it are forged ones. It is stated in the additional counter-affidavit that as the question regarding deputation of force under section 14 of the Act, was not raised in the writ petition, the documents in question were not filed earlier. In view of the fact that specific request had been made by the Managing Director of the Corporation to the Inspector General of the CISF in terms of section 14 (l) of the Act, even if the Corporation is an industrial undertaking in the public sector as urged by Mr. Roy, the necessary conditions for deputation of CISF had been complied with. Even the reasons for deputation has been stated there in. There is also no substance in the contention of Mr. Roy that the Inspector -General of the CISF did not take any action at the request made per Annexure D. The request in terms of section 14 (I) of the Act, having been legally made, deputation of force will follow in accordance with law under the orders of the Inspector-General. Besides, the correspondence (Annexure II) shows that the Inspector General of the CISF was in the know of the matter. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Corporation is an industrial undertaking owned by the Central Government or not. Besides, the correspondence (Annexure II) shows that the Inspector General of the CISF was in the know of the matter. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Corporation is an industrial undertaking owned by the Central Government or not. It is also not necessary to consider the argument advanced by the learned Solicitor-General, that assuming that the deputation of the CISF to the Corporation had been made by the Central Government, still there would be invalidity in the deputation, because in terms of the Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association of the Corporation the President of India holds share in the Corporation and he is entitled to give directions binding on the Managing Director of the Corporation, when the President functions in this connection not as an individual in his private capacity but as the President of India and as such, he can Act, only through the Council of Ministers and in such matters it is only the Central Government which is the appropriate body to function on behalf of the President of India. 14. Another argument has been advanced by Mr. Roy in this connection which should be noted. He has submitted that the request made to the Inspector General of CISF for deputation of force under Annexure D in terms of section 14 of the Act, had not been made in respect of the Fire Service wing and thus it applied only to the security Department and not to the Fire Service wing of the Corporation. He has urged that the Annexure D I in which such a request had been made was by the Manager (Personnel and Administration) of the Corporation and not by the Managing Director of the Corporation. There does not appear to be any substance in this submission of Mr. Roy. It is true that in Annexure D (l) a request had been made that the Fire Services Department of the Corporation should be taken over by the CISF immediately, but that does not mean that the request to depute the personnel of CISF, as per Annexure D, for the Corporation did not include members of the Fire Service wing. From Annexure 2 it also appears that the Fire Service Wing of the Corporation was also taken over by the CISF as an integral part of the CISF. From Annexure 2 it also appears that the Fire Service Wing of the Corporation was also taken over by the CISF as an integral part of the CISF. The equivalent ranks of the workers in the Fire Service Wing of the Corporation in the CISF have already been indicated above, Therefore, when a request was made for deputation of employees of equivalent ranks, namely, Head Security Guard, Security Guard and Followers of CISF for the Corporation, it included Fire Service Wing of the Corporation as well. Central industrial Security 'Force is deputed for the protection and security of industrial undertakings and it would be idle to contend that such a well-equipped security force as envisaged by the Act, and the Rules would be without fire service personnel. Protection of an industrial undertaking from fire hazard is a part and parcel of the security arrangement and, therefore, the Act, ipso facto applies to fire service wing as well, particularly when it was constituted in the background of the fire incident in the Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi, as already mentioned above of which judicial notice can be taken. 15. There does not seem to be any force in the submission of Mr. Roy that Annexure D (1) though purported to have been signed by the Manager (Personnel and Administration) of the Corporation was not on behalf of the Managing Director. There is some controversy between the parties as to whether Annexure D(1) in which the request for taking over by the CISF Service Wing of the Corporation was made by Mr. P. A. Sahai, Manager (Personnel and Administration or was by Mr. T.B Malhotra, Managing Director of the Corporation. In paragraph 4 of the additional counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no 4 it is asserted that both the letters- Annex ures D and D (1)-were written by the Managing Director of the Corporation to the Inspector General of the CISF. Annexure D (1), as its contents show, appears to have been written in continuation of the earlier request made by Annexure D. By Annexure D request was made by the Managing Director of the Corporation for deputation of Central Industrial Security Force for the Corporation, which means the Force constituted under the Act. The word 'force' has been defined in section 2 (I) (a) of the Act, to mean the CISF constituted under section 3 of the Act. The word 'force' has been defined in section 2 (I) (a) of the Act, to mean the CISF constituted under section 3 of the Act. As already held by me, Fire Service Wing of the Force, by whatever name it is called, is also a part and parcel of the Force, as the Force is one. In view of the fact that request had been made by the Managing Director of the Corporation by Annexure D for deputation of CISF, it will cover the deputation of fire service personnel as well. Under the scheme of section 14 of the Act, augmentation of the strength or otherwise of the Force may not require fresh request from the Managing Director, as it is a matter for the Inspector-General of the CISF to decide. 16. Mr. Roy la5tly contended that the liquidation of the existing Fire Service Wing of the Corporation was invalid inasmuch as, there is no guideline or procedure provided therefore by the Act, or the Rules. This contention has no substance, firstly, because the question had not been raised in the pleading, and secondly, the question also does not arise inasmuch as the Act, or the Rules do not speak of liquidation of the Fire Service Wing of the Corporation. C.W.J.C. 519 and 520 of 1973 17. The questions raised in the other two writ applications now remain to be considered. 18. As already mentioned above, the petitioner in C. W. J. C. 519 of 1973 Baijnath Singh and the petitioner in C.W.J.C. 520 of 1973 Ramnath Giri have prayed for quashing of the order of termination of their service from CISF, dated the Ist March, 1973 passed by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Eastern Zone, Calcutta (Annexure 10). 19. As mentioned earlier, the petitioners case is that they opted to join CISF on the assurance given by the authorities in their letter dated the 20th May, 1972 (Annexure 2). Both the petitioners exercised their option on the 20th May, 1972 to give up their respective jobs under the Corporation to join CISF and it is alleged that on that day they executed agreements in the prescribed form under Rule 15 and Appendix A to the Rules. Both the petitioners exercised their option on the 20th May, 1972 to give up their respective jobs under the Corporation to join CISF and it is alleged that on that day they executed agreements in the prescribed form under Rule 15 and Appendix A to the Rules. It is claimed that petitioner Ramnath Giri added the words "Leading Fireman" and petitioner Baijnath Singh added the words "Fire Service" in the body of the agreement in regard to the posts to which they were to be appointed and both of them appended a note to the agreement (Annexure 4) regarding non-applicability of clause 2 (a) of the agreement in their case, they being optees and not direct recruits. The note has been filed as Annexure 4/ I. It is alleged that the petitioners and others received their appointment letter under the CISF dated 2nd/7th September, 1972 (Annexure 5/1) under protest-vide Letter dated the 9th October, 1972 (Annexure 6). After the petitioners joined the CISF, petitioners Baijnath Singh and Ramnath Giri were transferred to the CISF units attached to the Fertiliser Corporation of India at Talcher on the 17th January, 1973 and Coal washery at Dhanbad on the 20th January, 1973 respectively-vide copy of the office order dated the 17th January, 1973 (Annexure 7)-where the former joined on the 26th January, 1973 and the latter on the 5th March, 1973. Soon thereafter the impugned order (Annexure 10) terminating the services of petitioner Ramnath Giri was served on him on the 31st March, 1973 and that terminating the service of petitioner Baijnath Singh was sent to him by registered post to his home at Buxar on the 23rd March, 1973. The relevant portion of the order terminating the services of the petitioner reads thus :- "The services of the following individuals of UCIL, Jaduguda, 13 Battalion, CISF are terminated with effect from the date of serving this order in the terms of para 2 (a) of the Agreement Form, Appendix A to Rule 15 of CISF Rules 1969. They will be given one month's pay and al10wances in lieu of one month's notice. (I) HSG R.N. Giri (2) SG B.N. Singh." 20. Thereafter, the petitioners filed their respective writ petitions on the 24th April, 1973. 21. Mr. They will be given one month's pay and al10wances in lieu of one month's notice. (I) HSG R.N. Giri (2) SG B.N. Singh." 20. Thereafter, the petitioners filed their respective writ petitions on the 24th April, 1973. 21. Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel for the petitioners advanced the following arguments in support of his submission that the order of termination of the services of the petitioners is bad and ought to be quashed - (i) The petitioners '\ere not probationers and their services could not be terminated, even if there be rules to that effect: (2) Assuming that the petitioners were probationers, the termination of their services within the probationary period is bad; (3) Even the notice-pay was not properly tendered; and (4) The termination of the services of the petitioners was clearly motivated as they took leading part in the filing of C.W.J.C. 1433 of 1972. 22. I shall take up the last point first. The allegation that the termination of the services of the petitioners was motivated because they took leading part in the filing of C. W. J. C. 1433 of 1972 bas been denied in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.1. It is difficult to appreciate that the Deputy Inspector General of the Force against whom no personal malice is alleged, will fear offended because the petitioners chose to pursue their legal remedies for enforcing their rights. The petitioners have also failed to satisfy me that there is any truth in the allegation of malafide and it seems to have been made light-heartedly without any basis, and, therefore, this point must be rejected, 23. Points no. (1) and (2) maybe taken up together. Mr. Roy's contention that the petitioners were not probationers was founded on the assertion made in the writ applications that the petitioners were not direct recruits, as they were already in service under the Corporation and they belonged to a special class, being optees with guarantee of continuity of service on being absorbed in the CISF. Mr. Roy's contention that the petitioners were not probationers was founded on the assertion made in the writ applications that the petitioners were not direct recruits, as they were already in service under the Corporation and they belonged to a special class, being optees with guarantee of continuity of service on being absorbed in the CISF. In support of this, reliance has been placed on the letter of the Deputy Inspector-General, CISF, dated the 20th May, 1972 (Annexure 2) the contents of which have already been quoted in extenso, and on the letter of the Assistant Commandant, dated the 17th March, 1973 (Annexure 9 to C. W. J. C. 520 of 1973), forwarding the application of petitioner Ramnath Giri seeking interview with the Deputy Inspector-General, CISF, in which it has been stated that petitioner Ramnath Giri joined the unit "on permanent posting" from UCIL. Jaduguda, on the 5th March, 1973. Learned counsel also relied on the fact that in the agreements executed by the petitioners prior to their appointment in the CISF, they stated that they wished to be employed as "Leading Fireman" and "Fire Service", and had appended a note (Annexure 4/l) stating that clause 2(a) of the agreement relating to probationary period appeared to be redundant and that c1ause would not be applicable in the case of the petitioners. In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1. 2, 3, and 5 in C, W. J. C. 520 of 1973 it is asserted that no assurance was given to the petitioners that they would not be put on probation nor Annexure 2 gave such assurance, and in paragraph 5 of the same counter-affidavit it is asserted that the notes appended by the petitioners to the agreement (Annexure 4/1) is not a part of the agreement nor has it been accepted by none, meaning thereby of the competent authority. It is also asserted that the same condition is prescribed for an the optees to the CISF. Admittedly, the Force has been constituted under the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, lays down that the force shall be constituted in such manner as may be prescribed and shall consist of such supervisory staff etc. as may be prescribed by rules. Chapter IV of the Rules deals with appointment and consists of Rules 11 and 12. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, lays down that the force shall be constituted in such manner as may be prescribed and shall consist of such supervisory staff etc. as may be prescribed by rules. Chapter IV of the Rules deals with appointment and consists of Rules 11 and 12. Rule 11 lays down that appointments to the posts of Inspector and Sub-Inspectors may be made by the Deputy Inspector General concerned and appointments to the rank of Head Security Guards, Security Guards and Followers may be made by the Chief security Officer concerned. Rule 12 dealing with the method of recruitment lays down that the appointments to the force may be made (i) by direct recruitment, (ii) by deputation, and (iii) by promotion. Rule 14 contains the qualifications for direct recruitment which, under sub-rule (5) could be relaxed with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General. Rule 15, which is important, deals with Agreement and it reads as follows :- "At the time of appointment every member of the Force shall execute an agreement in the form in Appendix 'A'." The form in Appendix A, mentioned therein, shows that it is applicable in the case of appointment of Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-Inspectors, Head Security Guards, Senior Security Guards and Security Guards. I shall deal with the agreement form later on. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 19 lays down that all appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years, subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 on which Mr. Roy has relied in support of his contention that the service of the petitioners cannot be terminated during the probationary period, lays down that the appointing authority on finding that a probationer has completed the probationary period satisfactorily and is suitable, will pass order for his confirmation, and if found unsuitable, the probationer will be liable to be discharged in the case of a direct recruit or reverted in the case of a Promotee. I shall also deal with this point hereinafter. Under Rule 21 the Inspector-General has power to relax the Rules in the interest of formation and due functioning of the forces with the approval of the Central Government. 24. I shall also deal with this point hereinafter. Under Rule 21 the Inspector-General has power to relax the Rules in the interest of formation and due functioning of the forces with the approval of the Central Government. 24. A reference to the aforesaid Rules leaves no manner of doubt that according to Rule 15, every appointee has to execute an agreement in the form given in Appendix A to the Rules. Clause 2 of the agreement, which is relevant for our purpose and which deals with the termination of service during the probationary period, reads as follows :- "2. I understand and agree that my services can be terminated :- (a) By the Deputy Inspector General at any time during the period of my initial training or the period of my probation thereafter on issue of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice: or (b) by the appointing authority, without notice, on my failure to pass the final examination of the initial training course." The petitioners, however, relied upon the fact that being optees, they had appended a note to the agreements executed by them, which ran as follows-vide annexure 4/1 :- "Regarding the words appearing in clause 2(a) relating to probational (sic) period, I being an optee and not directly recruited, the clause appears to be rescinded (sic). This may not be made applicable.” Relying on this note it has been submitted by Mr. Roy that the petitioners must be deemed to have signed the agreement with the aforesaid note, making clause 2(a) of the agreement inapplicable in their case. As mentioned earlier, the respondents have asserted that the notes were no part of the agreements nor have they been accepted by the competent authority nor clause 2(a) rescinded. Even the letter of appointment (Annexure 5) shows that the petitioners had been put on probation for two years in the first instance. The respondents have denied receipt of the letter of protest (Annexure 6) under which the petitioners allege to have received their letter of appointment-vide paragraphs 6 and 7 of the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5 in C. W. J. C. 519 and 520 of 1973 respectively. The respondents have denied receipt of the letter of protest (Annexure 6) under which the petitioners allege to have received their letter of appointment-vide paragraphs 6 and 7 of the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5 in C. W. J. C. 519 and 520 of 1973 respectively. Nothing has been brought to our notice to show that there has been relaxation of the Rules in the matter of appointment of the petitioners in pursuance of the notes attached by them to the agreement. Therefore, as things stand, there is no scope for any argument that the appointment of the petitioners in the CISF was made with the modification suggested by the petitioners, making clause 2(a) of the agreement inapplicable in their case nor any assurance was given to them that they would not be treated as probationers. It is settled law that conditions of service are determined by the terms and conditions of the appointment and by the rules and regulations, if any, on the subject. The view of the clear provisions of the Rules and the agreement entered into by the petitioners filed along with the option form (Annexure A) to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5), and the letter of appointment (annexure 5, under which they held their respective posts, it must be held that both the petitioners were appointed on probation and there was no relaxation of the Rules in their favour treating them as not being put on probation. The assurance given by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF in annexure 2 to the effect that the service put in by the optees in the U. C. I. L. (corporation) before being taken over by the CISF will be deemed to be continued cannot override the statutory rules on the point. Besides that, the recommendations made in annexure 2 were all provisional, as mentioned therein, and they will only mean this that the services of the optees wiI1 be counted for the purpose of fixation of salary etc. and not that they will be deemed to be in the service of CISF even before its constitution, so as to do a way with the rule regarding putting the optees on probation. and not that they will be deemed to be in the service of CISF even before its constitution, so as to do a way with the rule regarding putting the optees on probation. The assurance given, if any, has to be read consistently with the Rules and the terms and conditions of appointment, The same will be the position in the case of annexure 9 in C. W. J. C, 520 of 1973, according to which petitioner Ramnath Giri is said to have joined the new job on permanent posting and this is also of no avail to him. 25. The second point urged by Mr. Roy is that the petitioners' services could not be terminated during the probationary period, and in view of Rule J 9, clause 2(a) of the agreement is invalid, being contrary to the provisions of Rule 19. He has also urged that Rule 15 is a general rule which is applicable to all who are directly recruited in the CISF, whereas Rule 19 is a specific rule regarding probationers and, therefore, according to him, anything contained in Rule 15 which is not in conformity with Rule 19 will have no effect. Rule 15 has already been quoted above. Rule 19 runs as follows :- "19. (1) All appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. (2) The appointing authority shall, on the expiry of the period of such probation or such extended period, pass an order declaring that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. If he considers him unsuitable, the probationer shall be liable to be discharged in the case of a direct recruit or reverted to his substantive post in the case of a promotee. If he considers him unsuitable, the probationer shall be liable to be discharged in the case of a direct recruit or reverted to his substantive post in the case of a promotee. Rule 19 relates to a situation when the appointing authority, on the expiry of the period of probation or extended period thereof, has to form an opinion as to the suitability or unsuitability of a probationer to be retained in service, whereas clause 2(a) of the agreement, which has the same force of a Rule, being a part of the Rules, provides that the service of a probationer can be terminated at any time during the period of his initial training or during the probationary period, On issue of notice of one month Or tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice, perhaps in the interest of discipline in the force. The Rules, which have been framed under section 22 of the Act, bad been laid before each House of the Parliament as provided under sub-section (3) of the aforesaid section 22 and they are statutory rules, and effect has to be given to each of the provisions of the Rules unless there is a positive inconsistency and repugnancy between one provision of the Rules and he other. Both the rules apply to all the appointees of CISF. Therefore, the distinction sought to be made, that one being special and the other being general is wholly misplaced in as much there is no positive inconsistency or repugnancy between them and they are intended to serve distinct objects sought to be achieved by the Rules. In view of the special provision in clause 2(a) of the agreement, it is difficult to accept the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the services of the petitioners could not be terminated during the probationary period. There is also no force in the contention of Mr. Roy that it is settled law that the ser• vice of a probationer can be terminated during the probationary period only on the ground of misconduct and even if the order of termination of service does not speak of misconduct, it will be deemed to be so. In support of the contention that the service of a probationer cannot be terminated during the probationary period, Mr. In support of the contention that the service of a probationer cannot be terminated during the probationary period, Mr. Roy relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court and Agra Electricity Supply Co. v. Alladin which do not support the extreme contention of Mr. Roy. The decisions relied upon relate to cases under the Industrial Disputes Act. There was no provision under relevant service rules in those cases for terminating the service of a probationer during the probationary period, except on ground of misconduct. In the case Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court it was held that an employee appointed on probation for six months will be deemed to continue on probation even after the period of six months, if at the end of the period, his service bad either not been terminated or be was not confirmed. It was further held therein as follows:- "It appears clear to us that without anything more an appointment on probation for six months gives the employer no right to terminate the service of an employee before six months had expired-except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons in which case even the services of a permanent employee could be terminated." From the words underlined by me above it will appear that this will be so only in the absence of any such provision in the standing order or contract of service. To the same effect is the other decision relied upon by learned counsel (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 512), where the expression "Ordinarily" used by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is significant, which I have underlined. In that case, according to the standing order, an employee was to remain on probation for a period of six months which could be extended upto twelve months in all. It was in that context that it was observed as follows :- "Ordinarily, that would mean that a probationer's service cannot be terminated except for misconduct until the expiry of the probation period." 26. Mr. It was in that context that it was observed as follows :- "Ordinarily, that would mean that a probationer's service cannot be terminated except for misconduct until the expiry of the probation period." 26. Mr. Roy has also contended in this connection that the termination of the service of petitioner Baijnath Singh was by way of punishment in as much as it is stated in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5 in C. W. J. C. 519 of 1973 that the service of petitioner Baijnath Singh was terminated as he Was considered to be unsuitable for being retained in CISF, and, according to learned counsel, this casts a stigma on him. There is nothing in the order of termination of service (Annexure 10) to suggest that the petitioners' services were terminated as a measure of punishment and cast any stigma on the petitioners. The order clearly shows that it was in terms of clause 2(a) of the agreement in the form prescribed by Rule 15 in Appendix A. Where the termination of the service of a probationer is in terms of a contract or agreement of employment, it is termination simpliciter. No advantage can be taken of the fact that in the counter-affidavit the respondents have mentioned that the service of Baijnath Singh was terminated as he was considered to be unsuitable for being retained in the CISF, in as much as no stigma attaches to termination of service in such terms. It has been held by the Supreme (Court in Hari Singh v. State of Punjab. that termination of service on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other defect not involving moral turpitude is not a stigma which can be called discharge by punishment Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim that the impugned order is in violation of the protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution. 27. In support of the third point that the notice-pay was not properly tendered to the petitioners and, therefore, the order terminating their service is bad. Mr. Roy has relied upon the averments made in paragraph 1 S of the writ application filed by Baijnath Singh (C.W.J.C. 519 of 1973) and paragraph 21 of the writ application filed by Ramnath Giri (C.W.J.C. 520/73). Mr. Roy has relied upon the averments made in paragraph 1 S of the writ application filed by Baijnath Singh (C.W.J.C. 519 of 1973) and paragraph 21 of the writ application filed by Ramnath Giri (C.W.J.C. 520/73). Petitioner Baijnath Singh has stated in paragraph 18 of his writ application that a sum of Rs. 801. 45 paise only was offered to him as one month's pay in lieu of notice and, petitioner Ramnath Giri has stated in paragraph 21 of his writ application that a sum of Rs.362/-only was offered to him as one month's pay in lieu of notice, which sums the petitioners did receive, under protest. It is no where stated that the amounts offered to them were less than their one month's pay and, therefore, they were not accepted. Realising this difficulty, learned counsel for the petitioners has advanced the argument that the last pay certificate on the basis of which the amount should be tendered should be related to the pay of the petitioners in September, 1972, which they received from the Corporation and not to the pay of May, 1972 when they exercised their option to be employed under the CISF. It is not disputed before us that the option was exercised in May, 1972 and along with that the petitioners also signed the agreement in. the form prescribed under Appendix A to Rule 15. The petitioners received their appointment letter in September, 1972, but their appointment in the CISF was made effective from the forenoon of the 1st June, 1972, in pursuance of which they joined. Therefore, they will be deemed to be in the service of CISF from the 1st June, 1972and the payment made by the Corporation on behalf of CISF would not change the position, This is what has been asserted by the respondents in paragraph of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents no. 1 to 3 in C. W. J. C. 1433 of 1972. 1 to 3 in C. W. J. C. 1433 of 1972. I have examind, in some detail, while dealing with C. W. J. C. 1433 of 1972; the contention raised in this regard on behalf of petitioner Ramnath Giri and I have come to the conclusion that his salary and allowances were correctly fixed by the CISF and that he was not entitled to claim the increment of Rs.4/-per month which he would have got had he continued in the service of the Corporation till September 1972, which he did not. This amount of increment is possibly the difference which petitioner Ramnath Giri might be claiming to show the difference in the salary. In the case of the ether petitioner, Baijnath Singh nothing has been pointed out to us to show that the tender was for a lesser amount than fixed by the CISF. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Roy that the salary tendered by the CISF to petitioners Baijnath Singh and Ramnath Giri was for a lesser amount than fixed by the CISF. Even if the petitioners were entitled to any high fixation of salary than what has been fixed by the CISF that would not invalidate the tender of the notice-pay. 28. Before I conclude, I would like to observe that if the petitioners feel that there has remained some discrepancy in the fixation of their pay and rank, they may make necessary representation before the authorities concerned and I am sure that the authorities will look to their grievances and dispose of their cases expeditiously in accordance with the rules and regulations on the point, uninfluenced by the fact that the petitioners' writ applications have failed in this Court, 29. Mr. Chunni Lal, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation (Respondent No.4) in all the three writ applications, has urged with some amount of vehemence that no writ could be issued against the Corporation. Several decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court including the case of Sukhdev Singh versus Bhagatram have been referred to. Mr. Roy has, however, asserted that the Corporation is a proper party to these writ applications, and even if no writ can be issued against it, the matter should be decided in its presence. It is needless to go into this question as the writ petitions are going to be dismissed. 30. Mr. Roy has, however, asserted that the Corporation is a proper party to these writ applications, and even if no writ can be issued against it, the matter should be decided in its presence. It is needless to go into this question as the writ petitions are going to be dismissed. 30. In the result, all the three writ applications are dismissed with the aforesaid observations. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.