JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Sri B.N. Singh, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad, dated November 14, 1973, allowing appeal No. 913/72 and setting aside the judgment and decree dated July 24, 1972 passed by the Additional S.D.O. Balrampur district Gonda in suit No. 213/25/231 under Section 229-B/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Sri Iqbal Ahmad, Advocate, has appeared on behalf of the appellant. None of the respondents have appeared inspite of personal service. Sri A.C. Dutt, advocate, appeared on behalf of the respondents on May 30, 1975 but he too has not appeared to argue the cause inspite of due notice. I have, therefore, heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the record. 3. The facts of the case are that Zahid Ali and 7 others, respondents, had filed a suit under Section 229-B/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R., Act against Vakil Ahmad, minor, through the guardianship of Smt. Khairunnissa grand mother, Deen Mohammad, Gaon Sabha Pipraha and U.P. State, claiming that they had acquired Sirdari rights in the plot in suit by having been in possession for a number of years, that the defendants had no concern with the land and that Deen Mohammad, defendant No. 2, who had filed a suit against them in civil court, had entered into a compromise to the effect that the plaintiffs were in possession of the land in suit. One Algoo, who was also arrayed as a plaintiff, did not sign the plaint. His name was, therefore, removed from the category of the plaintiffs and he was arrayed as defendant No. 5. He filed a written statement, supporting the title of Deen MOhammad and Vakil Ahmad. Deen Mohammad and Vakil Ahmad also filed written statement to the same effect. The State and Gaon Sabha did not take any interest in the case. The trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court, however, allowed the appeal and remanded the case for a fresh decision. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that Deen Mohammad, defendant No. 2, who was the most important party in the case, had died during the pendency of the suit. It is Deen Mohammad, who is recorded as the original tenure-holder of the land in dispute. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that Deen Mohammad, defendant No. 2, who was the most important party in the case, had died during the pendency of the suit. It is Deen Mohammad, who is recorded as the original tenure-holder of the land in dispute. It is he who has executed a sale deed of the land in favour of Vakil Ahmad, defendant-appellant. It is he who is alleged to have entered into a compromise with the plaintiff-respondents. This alleged compromise is the basis of the suit of the plaintiff-respondents. The trial court has observed in its judgment that during the pendency of the case the defendant Deen Mohammad and the plaintiff Jalil had died. Thus the death of Deen Mohammad is not disputed. Yet the plaintiff-respondents took no steps whatsoever for the substitution of the heirs of Deen Mohammad and Jalil. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit as well as the appeal will, therefore, abate on the ground of non-substitution. 5. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 89 in which a Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible the appeal against the other respondents will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. He has also cited Shri Chand v. Jagdish Prasad, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1427 in which another Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "Counsel for the first respondent contended that the appeal had abated in its entirely because the heirs of Basant Lal had not been brought on record and the ground on which the judgment of the High Court proceeded was common to all the sureties. In our view this objection must be upheld. The appeal of Basant Lal has abated since the legal representatives to his estate have not been impleaded and the record of the appeal is defective. That is not denied by the appellant. In our view this objection must be upheld. The appeal of Basant Lal has abated since the legal representatives to his estate have not been impleaded and the record of the appeal is defective. That is not denied by the appellant. But it is urged that this Court is competent to set aside an order of the High Court in its entirety on the ground that it is not maintainable in law and in any event to set aside the order in so far as it affects the claim of appellants 1 and 3 and the third respondent. Support was sought to be derived for the first contention from Order 41, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was urged that even if the decree be assumed to have proceeded on a ground common to all the sureties, it is open to any one or more of the sureties to appeal from the order and the appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the sureties. This plea stands refuted by the judgment of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1901. It was held by this court in Rameshwar Prasad's case (3), that an appellate court has no power to proceed with an appeal and to reverse and vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants under Order 41 Rule 4 when the decree proceeds on a ground common to all the plaintiff or defendants, if all the plaintiff or the defendants appeal from the decree and any of them dies and the appeal abates so far as he is concerned." The above weight pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court lay down the correct law in so far as abatement of suit and appeals on account of death of the defendant or respondent is concerned. It, therefore, must be held that the suit had abated on account of non-substitution of the heirs of Deen Mohammad, defendant. The trial court had rightly dismissed the suit though on different grounds. The learned Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction whatsoever to proceed with the appeal and to remand the suit for a fresh trail. 6. The result is that I hereby allow the second appeal and set aside the order of the lower appellate court. The order of the trial court is referred.