Judgment :- 1. The case has been referred to the Full Bench is view of the importance of the question raised in the Civil Revision Petition. The revision is against an order passed by the Taluk Land Board, Hosdrug in the matter of the ceiling return filed by the petitioner under S.85A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 (in short, the Act). The return was filed by him before the Land Board, Trivandrum showing the details of land owned or held by him as an adult unmarried person. The return so filed was transferred by the Land Board under S.85A (3) of the Act to the Taluk Land Board for disposal by it. The Special Deputy Tahsildar was directed by the Taluk Land Board to verify the return and after such verification the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered was provisionally determined. Notice in Form No. 3 along with the draft statement in Form No. 2 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules was issued to the assessee calling upon him to file objections, if any, to the draft. The ceiling limit applicable to the petitioner was 7.50 acres and in the view that he held excess land he was directed to surrender 1 acre 24.5 cents. This proposal was objected to by the petitioner. According to him he did not hold any excess land and any land was not liable to be surrendered. This objection was not accepted with the result that by the final order passed by the Taluk Board the petitioner was directed to surrender possession of 1 acre 24.583 cents of land in R. S. No. 26/1. It is this order that is the subject-matter of the Civil Revision Petition. 2. That the petitioner is an adult unmarried person is admitted. The extent of land he could hold as ceiling area would be 5 standard acres working out to not more than 7.50 acres. It is such 7.50 acres that the petitioner is entitled to be in possession of as on that date to be notified under S.83. The date notified is 1-1-1970. But on 1-1-1970 the petitioner did not own or hold any land except 6 cents, about which there is some controversy which will be referred to later. He acquired land thereafter. It is such 7.50 acres that the petitioner is entitled to be in possession of as on that date to be notified under S.83. The date notified is 1-1-1970. But on 1-1-1970 the petitioner did not own or hold any land except 6 cents, about which there is some controversy which will be referred to later. He acquired land thereafter. On 29-3-1971 he purchased 7.50 acres of land which extent, according to him, was within the ceiling area. On 30-4-1971 he assigned 1.50 acres out of this area to his sister with the result that he was in possession of only 6 acres. On 5-8-1971 he purchased 1.10 acres of land and came into possession of that area. On 16101971 he purchased another item of 13.5 cents of land. Thus, according to him, he was not in possession of more than 7.50 acres of land at any time and therefore he was not liable to surrender any extent of land. It appears that when the Special Deputy Tahsildar (Land Reforms) was asked to verify the return be found that on 2 31962 the petitioner's mother had acquired 19 cents of land in her name as also that of the petitioner and his brother. It was therefore assumed by the Special Deputy Tahsildar that the petitioner was entitled to 1/3rd of 19 cents working out to 61/3 cents. It was further assumed that when on 29 3 1971 the petitioner purchased 7.50 acres be really held not only that area but in addition the said area of 6 cents (61/3 cents rounded off to 6). If so the transfer effected by him on 30 41971 of 1.50 acres of land was, according to the Special Deputy Tahsildar, void. Therefore it was found that the properties transferred in favour of his sister were also to be considered as property held by him. 3. The petitioner has a case that though 19 cents had been purchased jointly in the name of his mother, himself and his brother, he had at no time any title to that property or possession thereof and therefore that area should not be taken into account. Rightly this question has not been urged before us for, the petitioner has failed to urge this contention before the Land Board in his objection though the draft statement had included this item also as that held by him. Rightly this question has not been urged before us for, the petitioner has failed to urge this contention before the Land Board in his objection though the draft statement had included this item also as that held by him. In this view, we are not called upon to consider that question. We, therefore, take it that the petitioner was in possession of 6 cents of land on 111970, and also when he purchased 7.50 acres on 29 31971. If so, when he purchased 7 acres 50 cents he came to be in possession of an area in excess of the ceiling limit by 6 cents. It was thereafter that he executed the assignment to his sister for 1 acre 50 cents of land. The question is whether the assignment would be bad to the extent of the entire 1.50 acres or only to the extent of 6 cents which was the excess. The view taken by the Land Board is evidently that the entire transfer was void and therefore it is not to be taken note of for the purpose of determining the ceiling area. It is in this background that the petitioner has been called upon to surrender 1 acre 24.500 cents of land. If the assignment is void only to the extent of 6 cents which was the excess area, then, it would only be that area that could be directed to be surrendered by the petitioner. The determination of this controversy calls for the construction of S.84 of the Land Reforms Act. 4. S.84 of the Act reads as follows: "84. If the assignment is void only to the extent of 6 cents which was the excess area, then, it would only be that area that could be directed to be surrendered by the petitioner. The determination of this controversy calls for the construction of S.84 of the Land Reforms Act. 4. S.84 of the Act reads as follows: "84. Certain voluntary transfers to be null and void: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the Gazette, otherwise than (i) byway of partition; or (ii) xxxxx (iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 27th July, 1960, and continued to be so till the date of transfer; (iv) xxxxx by a family or any member thereof or by adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area, or otherwise than by way of gift in favour of his son or daughter, or the son or daughter of his predeceased son or daughter by any person owning or holding and in excess of the ceiling area shall be deemed to be transfer calculated to defeat the provisions of this Act and shall be invalid: Provided that, without prejudice to any other right of the parties to any such transfer, when any purchase price is payable under S.56 or any compensation is payable under S.72H or S.88 for any land covered by the said transfer, it shall be competent for the Land Tribunal to award to the transferee, out of the purchase price or compensation amount in respect of such land, such sum as the Land Tribunal may consider just and proper. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected by any person (other than a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person) owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area after the 1st July, 1969, otherwise than (i) by way of partition or (ii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 27th July 1960, and continued to be so till the date of transfer; Provided that without prejudice to any other right of the parties to any such transfer, when any purchase price is payable under S.56 or any compensation is payable under S.72H or S.88 for any land covered by the said transfer, it shall be competent for the Land Tribunal to award to the transferee, out of the purchase price or compensation amount in respect of such land, such sum as the Land Tribunal may consider just and proper. (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (1) of S.82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)." The section indicates that all voluntary transfers falling within the scope of that section shall be (1) deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and (2) shall be invalid. This would be the case where the land in excess of the ceiling area is held by a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person. Though the transfer is deemed to be invalid, the proviso to sub-section (1) provides for payment to the transferee out of the purchase price or compensation amount such sum as the Land Tribunal may consider just and proper. The question is whether a transfer hit by the section is invalid in toto or is invalid only to the extent it operates to defeat the provisions of the Act. It may be said that the transfer is invalid for all purposes and even as between 'the transferor and transferee no right would pass by reason of the transfer. Another possible view is that the transfer would be invalid only to the extent required to achieve the object of the provision. It may be said that the transfer is invalid for all purposes and even as between 'the transferor and transferee no right would pass by reason of the transfer. Another possible view is that the transfer would be invalid only to the extent required to achieve the object of the provision. Such object is indicated in the section itself, namely to see that the provisions of the Act are not defeated. If that view be taken the transfer would be bad only to the extent it would be objectionable as a transfer of a land in excess of the ceiling area. That would be only in regard to 6 cents. 5. Courts have been, from time to time, called upon to construe the provisions of statutes capable of a narrow as well as a wide meaning. The object of the Act, the context in which the provision occurs, and the purpose sought to be achieved by the provision may quite often supply the clue to the-appropriate meaning. If two alternative constructions are equally possible the one which is consistent with the scheme envisaged by the enactment and which promotes the purpose and object of the provision is to be preferred. The legislative intent and purpose behind the provision and the result sought to be achieved will have to be considered. The meaning to be attributed must be consistent with the intent and the result sought to be achieved. The adoption of a wider meaning may result in extending the scope of the provision to matters which may not be necessary to be provided for under the scheme of the Act or for the purpose of the Act and to attribute such a wide meaning may lead to undesirable results. In such cases the adoption of a wider meaning ought : to be avoided. 6. Dealing with the question as to when limitation is necessary on the language of statute, Craies on Statute Law, (7th Edition), observes at page 177 thus: "But in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. Lord Herschell said, in Cox. 6. Dealing with the question as to when limitation is necessary on the language of statute, Craies on Statute Law, (7th Edition), observes at page 177 thus: "But in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. Lord Herschell said, in Cox. v. Hakes "It cannot, I think, be denied that, for the purpose of construing any enactment, it is right to look, not only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some limitation." Words, however general, must therefore be understood as used with reference to the subject-matter in the mind of the legislature and limited to that subject-matter. Lord Haldane said in Watney Combe, Reid and Co. Ltd. v. Berners "The intention must be found in the language finally adopted in the statutes under consideration and in that language alone No doubt general words may in certain cases properly be interpreted as having a meaning or scope other than the literal or usual meaning. They may be so interpreted where the scheme appearing from the language of the legislature, read in its entirety, points to consistency as requiring the modification of what would be the meaning apart from any context, or apart from the purpose of the legislature as appearing from the words which the legislature has used, or apart from the general law." Sir George Jessel M. R. said in Holme v. Guy (1877) 5 Ch. D. 901 at 905 "The Court is not to be oblivious of the history of law and legislation. Although the court is not at liberty to construe an Act of Parliament by the motives which influenced the legislature, yet when the history of law and legislation tells the court, and prior judgments tell this present court, what the object of the legislature was, the court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other, and to read the section with a view to finding out what it means, and not with a view to extending it to something that was not intended." Cases where courts were called upon to adopt a wider or a narrower construction are numerous. Reference may be made to one of the earliest cases Phillpotts v. Phillpotts (1850) 20 L. J. C. P. 11. S.7 of the Parliamentary Elections Act 1695 bad to be construed in that case. That section made conveyance of properties made solely to give a vote contrary to that section to be "void and of none effect." The question for consideration was whether the conveyance was void only in so far as it would prevent the right of voting being acquired, which was evidently the object of the Act. It was held to be so. In other respects the conveyance was found to be valid between the parties so as to pass property. In this context it was observed in that case by Maule J. thus: "The common law, and the statute which is declaratory of it, and also enacting, are confined to matters respecting the voting at elections of Parliament. The 7th section of the Act says, "Be it enacted, that all conveyances of any messuages, lands, tenements, or hereditaments in any county, city, borough, town corporate, port, or place, in order to multiply voices, or to split and divide the interest in any nouses or lands among several persons, to enable them to vote at elections of members to serve in parliament, are hereby declared to be void and of none effect, and that no more than one single voice shall be admitted for one and same house or tenement." The question then is, what is the effect of this act of parliament? It does not use the words commonly used in acts avoiding instruments. It does not say that the deed is to be void, but the conveyance; it does not say that it is to be void to all intents and purposes. It only says the conveyance is to be void, and no more than one voice is to be allowed. Effect, therefore would be given to this statute by holding the deed to be void for the purpose of giving a vote. The spirit of the act does not require us to go further, nor do the words. The words apply to avoiding conveyances so far as regards their fraudulent effect." Jervis C. J. observed in the same judgment thus "The statute of Will 3 is declaratory of the whole then existing law on the subject it refers to. The spirit of the act does not require us to go further, nor do the words. The words apply to avoiding conveyances so far as regards their fraudulent effect." Jervis C. J. observed in the same judgment thus "The statute of Will 3 is declaratory of the whole then existing law on the subject it refers to. It declares that no more than one vote should be admitted for one house or tenement, and any conveyance made to defeat that parliamentary law was declared by the statute to be void. Now, it would fully carry out the intention of that statute if the grant were to held to have no effect to confer a vote, and yet the covenant be held to be good as between the parties to the deed." 7. S.16 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 provided that nothing in the Act should apply to seamen. In Kennedy v. Come, 1891 (I) L. R. (Q.B.) 771 this was construed to mean that the penalty and punishment provided by the Act were not to fall on seamen, but not to mean that anyone may commit this offence against seamen, 8. Reference may be made to Ilford Corporation v. Belterclean (Seven Kings) Ltd. (1965) 2 Q.B. 222. The Betterclean (Seven Kings) Limited carried on the business of a coin-operated launderette occupying a shop for that purpose in Ilford, Essex. They did not close the shop for serving of customers on Sunday, 2nd February 1964 and thereupon information was preferred by the Illford Corporation that they had contravened S.47 and 59 of the Shops Act, 1950, S.47 provides "Every shop shall be closed for the serving of customers on Sunday." The premises of the defendants contained 17 washing machines operated by the insertion of a 6d. piece, a machine for the supply of hot tea, coffee and cream, which refreshments were obtained by inserting a 6d. piece, a general vending machine for the supply of change which supplied two 3d. pieces on a 6d. piece being inserted, detergents and polythene bags, which machine had two slots, one taking a 6d. piece, the other a 3d. piece, and an open sink for general use. On Sunday the premises were open and a number of persons were using the washing, drying and general vending machines installed on the premises. pieces on a 6d. piece being inserted, detergents and polythene bags, which machine had two slots, one taking a 6d. piece, the other a 3d. piece, and an open sink for general use. On Sunday the premises were open and a number of persons were using the washing, drying and general vending machines installed on the premises. The Illford Corporation preferred an information against the defendants on the ground that they did not close the shop for the serving of customers on Sunday contrary to the provisions of the Shops Act. The question was whether the shop had been closed for serving of customers on Sunday. In appeal against the decisions of the justices who were of opinion that the serving of customers in S.47 meant personal service to customers and since no personal service was rendered on Sunday the defendants were not guilty of the offence, Lord Parker C. J. on behalf of the Bench agreed with the view expressed in an earlier decision that the term "for the serving of customers" meant "for the personal service on customers" and held that though the shop was open to be operated on Sunday too there was no violation of S.47 of the Act. 9. Reference may be made to the following observations of Lord Shaw of Dunfarmline in Shannoon Realties v. St. Mickel 1924 A.C.185. "Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system." Viscount Simon L. C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Colieries Ltd. 1940 A.C. 1014 stated the rule thus at page 1022 of the report: "At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." 10. It is unnecessary to rely merely on English decisions because the principles to be followed in such cases have been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to rely merely on English decisions because the principles to be followed in such cases have been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court. Thus in R.M. D. C. v. Union of India A. I. R.1957 S. C. 628 the Supreme Court observed: "When a question arises as to the interpretation to be put on an enactment, what the court has to do is to ascertain "the intent of them that make it", and that must of course be gathered from the words actually used in the statute. That, however, does not mean that the decision should rest on a literal interpretation of the words used in disregard of all other materials. The literal construction then has, in general, but prima facie preference. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the remedy." After considering the aspects mentioned above the Court held that S.2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 1955 (42 of 1955) though wide and unqualified in its terms will apply only to competitions in which success did not depend to any substantial extent on skill but on chance. The same principle which we may term 'reading down' a section or a statute to make it conform to the real intention of the legislature has been applied by interpreting a provision by giving it a meaning which would make the provision consistent with the Constitution. There are a number of decisions of the Supreme Court where a limited meaning had been given to a provision to make the provision conform to the Constitution. We may refer to the decisions in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR. 1962 S.C 955, Tilkayat Sri Govindalalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others, A.I R.1963 S C. 1638 and R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.1230. 11. S.83 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act prohibits owning, holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area by any person after the specified date. v. State of Rajasthan and others, A.I R.1963 S C. 1638 and R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.1230. 11. S.83 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act prohibits owning, holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area by any person after the specified date. The excess over the ceiling area is to be surrendered to the Government before the specified date and such land is to vest in the Government. S.86 of the Act provides for vesting of excess lands. The Kerala Land Reforms Bill 1963 was published in the Gazette in 1963 and became law on 141964. But the provision limiting the area of land to be owned or held or possessed under a mortgage by a person, S.83 of the the Act came into force only on 1 11970. Provision had to be made to treat voluntary transfers made in the meanwhile or thereafter with a view to defeat the provisions relating to ceiling as inoperative in order that the object of the Act that the excess land over the ceiling area must be surrendered and such land should vest with the Government. Apparently that object is sought to be achieved by S.84. That section fitsel, as we indicated earlier, shows that certain transfers which are considered to be objectionable are to be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act. Those transfers are declared invalid by S.84 so that the provisions and the object of the Act may not be defeated. The circumstances amply justify the construction of the term "shall be invalid" in a restricted sense, viz., that the transfers would be invalid to the extent they would operate to defeat the provisions of the Act. In the case before us the petitioner was entitled to possess 7.50 acres as land within the ceiling area and it was when he held 6 cents in excess of the area that he executed the assignment in favour of his sister of 1 acre 50 cents. He was entitled to hold 7.50 acres and any transaction by way of transfer of property within that ceiling area would not have been objectionable. He was entitled to hold 7.50 acres and any transaction by way of transfer of property within that ceiling area would not have been objectionable. The property which was liable to be surrendered at the time of transfer was only 6 cents and the provisions of the Act as to surrender could be defeated by the transfer only in regard to such 6 cents. Therefore the provision in S.84 which is intended to meet the mischief in such a case would operate only to the extent the area owned or held by the petitioner at the time was in excess of 7.50 acres. Hence the assignment deed to his sister would be invalid only to that extent. It would be operative and valid with regard to 1.44 acres. Since the property acquired by him later was less than 1 acre 44 cents he would at no time thereafter hold or possess property in excess of 7.50 acres. Consequently the liability to surrender any excess land acquired subsequently contemplated by S.87 of the Act would not arise. The consequence would be that the transfer by the petitioner to his sister is to be considered as invalid only to the extent of 6 cents and so he would be liable to surrender only 6 cents. Since the identity of the 6 cents to be surrendered calls for fresh determination we remit the case back to the Land Board for that purpose. The Revision is allowed as above. Parties are directed to suffer costs in the Revision. Allowed.