JUDGMENT : A.D. DESAI, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Mr. V. V. Bedarkar, District Judge, Rajkot in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1969 by which he reversed the decree of dissolution of marriage passed by the learned trial Judge in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 7 of 1968. The facts giving rise to this appeal to state briefly are that the appellant husband married according to the Hindu rites the respondent on or about March 6, 1961 at village Dhrol. After marriage the parties cohabited at Rajkot and the respondent had a son by the appellant on November 4, 1962. According to the appellant the respondent left his house and went to her parents' house. Finally she came to his house in January 1965 and lived with him upto April 25, 1965. Thereafter she had not come to his house inspite of his several attempts to call her. The appellant, therefore, filed Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965, claiming a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In the said petition an order granting restitution of conjugal rights was passed on February 28, 1966 and the decree in pursuance of the judgment was signed on March 28, 1966. The respondent did not abide by the decree for a period of 2 years and, therefore, the appellant husband filed Hindu Marriage Petition No. 7 of 1968. In the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Rajkot for a decree of dissolution of marriage under the provisions of section 13(1A) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent filed written statement, Ex. 9, contending that the appellant had made no attempt to call her back to his house. According to her she did not know about the decree and that after February 28, 1966 the appellant had neither called her nor given her any notice for returning to his house and thus did not desire restitution of conjugal rights. She finally contended that the appellant had no cause of action and so was not entitled to a decree for divorce. She finally contended that the appellant had no cause of action and so was not entitled to a decree for divorce. The learned trial Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the respondent had not abided by the decree of restitution of conjugal rights for a period of 2 years and that there was no obligation on the husband after the said decree was passed to call upon the wife to come to stay with him in pursuance of the said decree. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the respondent wife preferred Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1969 in the Court of the District Judge, Rajkot, who reversed the decree granting divorce passed by the learned Trial Judge holding that, even though the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed in favour of the husband, it was necessary for him to inform the wife by notice that there was such a decree, that she should go and reside with him to satisfy the decree and this was necessary in order to show that he had made all bona fide attempts for restitution for which he had filed the petition. According to the learned Judge admittedly the appellant husband had not acted in that manner and, therefore, was not entitled to the decree for divorce. It is this judgment and decree which is challenged in this appeal. 2. In support of the decree which is passed by the learned appellate Judge, Mr. Shah appearing for the respondent had raised certain contentions which require first to be dealt with because, if any one of them is accepted, the decree passed by the learned appellate Judge has to be maintained. The first contention of Mr. Shah was that the learned trial Judge erred in not allowing the respondent to produce documents annexed with Exh. 24. If the said documents were permitted to be produced and proved in the case the resumption of cohabitation after the decree of restitution of conjugal rights surely would have been established. Mr. Shah also argued that, when the plaintiff husband was in the witness box, certain questions were put to the husband to prove that the respondent wife had actually cohabited with the husband for a week in the year 1967, i.e., after the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was passed. Mr. Shah also argued that, when the plaintiff husband was in the witness box, certain questions were put to the husband to prove that the respondent wife had actually cohabited with the husband for a week in the year 1967, i.e., after the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was passed. But these questions were not allowed to be put with the result that the relevant evidence came to be gagged. Now both these points were raised before the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that application, Ex. 24, to produce the documents was made at a very late stage of the proceedings and there was no affidavit on the record to support the say of the wife, that those documents could not have been produced in the case earlier. He therefore, rejected the application Exhibit 24. So far the questions put to the plaintiff-husband during the course of cross examination regarding cohabitation in the year 1967 are concerned, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that a new case was sought to be made out by the wife inasmuch as there was no pleading in respect thereof. The learned appellate Judge had also considered the two objections. The learned appellate Judge observed as under :- "So, it will be necessary for me to appreciate whether the allegation of Mr. Lalani that the evidence of the wife was gagged. Of course, if I come to that conclusion then either I shall have to record evidence here before me or I shall have to remand the matter, or if without appreciating that evidence I can come to the conclusion that the husband is certainly trying to take advantage of his own wrong, then probably I will have to consider whether the decree of divorce deserves to be confirmed or not." Then again the learned Judge observed as under :- "It is true that in the pleadings it is nowhere stated that the wife had gone and stayed at the house of the husband after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. But, it is to be noted that, even in spite of the absence of these pleadings the lower Court has raised issue no. 2 whether there has been resumption of cohabitation between the parties or not. If this issue is there, I see no reason in disallowing the evidence to be led. But, it is to be noted that, even in spite of the absence of these pleadings the lower Court has raised issue no. 2 whether there has been resumption of cohabitation between the parties or not. If this issue is there, I see no reason in disallowing the evidence to be led. It is, of course, open for the Court not to believe that evidence as after thought, but to my mind it is not proper to disallow the evidence when the issue to that effect is there. Evidence is permitted on issues and not on pleadings. Issues are framed on the strength of the pleadings and if the issue is there, the parties cannot be disallowed from leading the evidence to that effect. But, apart from that, even if this evidence would have been allowed and considered, I feel that it can certainly be considered as afterthought, because in the written statement the wife has never pleaded that she had gone and stayed with the husband. On the contrary, in the written statement it is clear case that she did not know about the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and even thereafter the husband has never made any attempt." Obviously the aforesaid conclusions are contradictory. So far as Ex. 24 is concerned, the learned trial Judge rightly rejected the same because the documents were sought to be produced at the fag end of the cross-examination of the plaintiff and such production would have resulted in injustice. The learned trial Judge was also right in concluding that the respondent wife had not pleaded in her written statement at all that there was cohabitation in the year 1967. The case was sought to be made out for the first time when the evidence of the plaintiff was coming to a close. The learned trial Judge was also right in holding that no sufficient cause had been show as to why the documents were not produced at the earlier stage and this is so because the application was not supported by any affidavit. The learned trial Judge was also right in disallowing the questions put during the cross-examination of the husband and this is so for a two reasons. The learned trial Judge was also right in disallowing the questions put during the cross-examination of the husband and this is so for a two reasons. The first reason is that there was no pleading in the written statement on that count and allowing the parties to raise a new case at a late stage would certainly result in injustice No issue in a case be raised without pleading in respect of the subject matter of the issue. Pleadings are the foundation on the basis of which issues are raised and, therefore, when an issue is raised, the pleadings in that connection must be noticed to find out its true nature. In the present case issue No. 2, namely, "whether there has been resumption of cohabitation between the parties for two years or upward after passing of the said decree of restitution of conjugal rights in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965 to which both are parties" was raised by the trial Court on the allegation of denial in the plaint of cohabitation and the case put forward by the respondent wife in her written statement that the husband was under a legal duty to call her after obtaining the decree of restitution of conjugal rights and had not discharged this duty. The question of the cohabitation in the year 1967 is one of fact which the respondent-wife did not plead and, therefore, no evidence on the point could be led as the same would obviously result in injustice to the plaintiff husband It may be noted that the respondent-wife had sought amendments in the written statement twice but never sought to raise the contention of such cohabitation in the amendment applications. 3. It was next contended by Mr. Shah that under section 13 (1A) of the Act the appellant husband could have filed an application for divorce on the ground that there had been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties provided two years or upward after he passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights had elapsed without any cohabitation. In the present case, contended Mr. Shah, the date on which the decree is signed is March 28, 1966 and the period of two years has to be counted from that date and if so counted the application for divorce is premature because the same was filed on March 2, 1968. In the present case, contended Mr. Shah, the date on which the decree is signed is March 28, 1966 and the period of two years has to be counted from that date and if so counted the application for divorce is premature because the same was filed on March 2, 1968. Now there is no substance in this argument. Admittedly the judgment in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights was signed on February 28, 1966 and the decree in pursuance of the judgment was signed on March 28, 1966. But it is necessary to note the provisions of Order 20 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides, so far relevant, that the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment is pronounced. Under the provisions of this rule the decree comes into existence on the date of the judgment though it is signed later. Therefore, it is evident that the time of two years is to be counted from February 28, 1966 and, if counted in that manner, the application for divorce cannot be treated as premature. 4. In order to understand the next contention of Mr. Shah, it is necessary to state certain facts. When Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965 was filed in the Court by the appellant-husband, an attempt was made to serve the respondent wife of the summons of that petition. The respondent wife tried to avoid the service but ultimately the same was effected and the said petition was decided on February 28, 1966. Then after the expiry of 2 years the appellant filed Hindu Marriage Petition No. 7 of 1968 to obtain a decree for divorce. The respondent wife thereafter filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned trial Judge allowed the said application. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-husband filed Civil Revision Application No. 1213 of 1970 in this Court and the said revision application was decided on February 7, 1973 and it was held that the trial Court was in error in setting aside the ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned trial Judge allowed the said application. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant-husband filed Civil Revision Application No. 1213 of 1970 in this Court and the said revision application was decided on February 7, 1973 and it was held that the trial Court was in error in setting aside the ex-parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The High Court held that the respondent wife was avoiding the service of the summons of the said petition, that she was served with the summons of the said petition and ultimately set aside the order passed by the trial Court setting aside the ex-parte decree passed in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965. The contention of Mr. Shah, is, therefore, that the period of two years should be considered from February 7, 1973, because it is on that date that the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was confirmed. It was further argued that the present petition for divorce hence was incompetent. Now it must first be noted that Hindu Marriage Petition No 7 of 1968 for divorce decree was filed after the expiry of two years from the decree of the restitution of conjugal rights passed in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965. At the date when the said petitions was filed, the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was in existence. How an application was made by the respondent wife to set aside the ex-parte a decree. It is true that the said application was allowed by setting aside the ex-parte decree, but in revision the High Court set aside the order passed in the said application and that the decree passed in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 260 of 1965 remained operative and enforceable from the date on which it was passed. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Shah on this count cannot be accepted. 5. It was next contended by Mr. Shah that both the Courts have not taken into account the evidence of Parshottam Shamji, Ex. 27, who is the uncle of the appellant-husband who had deposed on behalf of the respondent that there was cohabitation between the appellant and the respondent for period of about one week in the year 1967. 5. It was next contended by Mr. Shah that both the Courts have not taken into account the evidence of Parshottam Shamji, Ex. 27, who is the uncle of the appellant-husband who had deposed on behalf of the respondent that there was cohabitation between the appellant and the respondent for period of about one week in the year 1967. Now it must be noted that the lower Courts had come to the conclusion that there was no specific pleading in the written statement that the wife had gone to the husband to reside with him after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed and as a matter of fact both the Courts came to the conclusion that such a plea was an after thought. It is for these reasons that the Court did not specifically dealt with the evidence of Parshottam. There is no dispute that there is no specific pleading in the written statement that the wife had gone to stay with the husband in the year 1967 and thus cohabited with the husband. On the contrary if the written statement is read as a whole, it appears that the contention of the wife was that the husband had not made any attempt to call her back to his house and that the husband desired restitution of conjugal rights. The effect of this pleading is that there was no plea of cohabitation between the parties in 1961 as was subsequently raised by the respondent wife. The evidence of Parshottam Shamji, Ex. 27 is, therefore, of no value. The contention, therefore, of Mr. Shah on this point cannot also be sustained. 6. The last contention, a material one, which arises in this case, is whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that it was for the appellant husband to inform the respondent wife by notice that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed in his favour and that she should go and reside with him to satisfy the decree. The learned appellate Judge relied upon the decision in Sm. Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose, A.I R. 1970 Cal. 328, in support of the aforesaid conclusion. The learned appellate Judge did not accept the decision in Gulab Kaur v. Gurdev Singh Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 493. The learned appellate Judge relied upon the decision in Sm. Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose, A.I R. 1970 Cal. 328, in support of the aforesaid conclusion. The learned appellate Judge did not accept the decision in Gulab Kaur v. Gurdev Singh Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 493. Now section 13(1A) (ii) So far relevant provides that either party to a marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties. Now the aforesaid provisions were introduced by the amendment of the Act by the Hindu Marriage Amendment Act, 1964, which came into force on December 20, 1964, prior to this the relevant part of section 13 provided that any marriage solemnised. whether before or after the commencement of the Act, might on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party had not resumed cohabitation for a space of two years or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation against that party or had failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of the decree, vide section 13 (1) clauses (viii) and (ix). Under the amended provisions right to obtain a decree for divorce is given to either party in the marriage. It was not the case under the unamended section. Clauses (viii) and (ix) of unamended section 13 have now been deleted. The object of the amendment was to enlarge the right of divorce by conferring it on either party to the marriage. Section 13 (1A) refers to the existing state of affairs and has no reference to a wrong committed in past by a party to the marriage or by whom the wrong is committed. The provisions themselves did not give an absolute right to obtain a divorce, decree and this is so because the Court has to take into consideration the provisions of section 23 (1) of the Act. The provisions themselves did not give an absolute right to obtain a divorce, decree and this is so because the Court has to take into consideration the provisions of section 23 (1) of the Act. As far as the present case is concerned the relevant provision of section 23(1) is clause (a) to that section, which is to the effect that in any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not if Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, then, and in such a case but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly. It is true that clauses (b) (c) and (d) should also be complied with, but these provisions do not come in our way in this case. A bare reading of section 23 (1)(a) of the Act, shows that it has no reference to the past conduct of the person applying for the decree for divorce. Wrong or disability referred to in section 23 (1)(a) must be a wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief as the party wants in the petition before the Court. That the Court has to take into consideration is the conduct of the party asking for the relief of dissolution of marriage subsequent to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The Bombay High Court in Madhukar Bhasker Sheorey v. Smt. Saral Madhukar Sheorey, A.I.R. 1973 Bombay 55, takes the same view. The provisions of section 13 (1A) and provisions of section 23(1) (a) of the Act are to be read together. Section 13 (IA) is a substantive provision giving a right to a party to apply for a decree of divorce, but the Court when considering the said question has to take into account the provisions of section 23 (1) (a) of the Act and see whether subsequent conduct of the person asking for the divorce in any way disqualifies him from obtaining such a decree. It must be noticed that neither the provisions of section 13(1A) nor those of section 23 (1) (a) of the Act impose any obligation on a party applying for divorce to see that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights is satisfied. It must be noticed that neither the provisions of section 13(1A) nor those of section 23 (1) (a) of the Act impose any obligation on a party applying for divorce to see that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights is satisfied. To take a view that the provision of the aforesaid sections or either of them pets such an obligation on the party asking for divorce is to say that the degree-holder has to take steps to satisfy the decree or to ask him to execute the decree himself. Apparently there is no obligation cast the stritute on the party asking for relief of dissolution of marriage that he should call upon the other party against whom the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed to satisfy the decree, and that being so, it cannot be said that the party asking for divorce on such ground is in "wrong" if it has not followed such a course. The learned appellate Judge, therefore, was in error in construing the provisions of section 13 (1-A) (ii) of the Act to the effect that it was necessary at least for the appellant-husband in the present case to call upon the respondent-wife to satisfy the decree. The learned appellate Judge has not relied upon the decision in Gulab Kaur's case (supra). But it is not necessary to deal with it in detail because the said decision was given on the basis of the unamended section 13(1) of the Act. The learned trial judge relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kanak Lata's case (supra). The Calcutta High Court did not consider the provisions of section 13 (1-A) or 23 (a) but merely interpreted the decree passed in that case. In that case the suit was instituted by the husband on the allegation that he was willing to take the wife back but she was not returning to him. The wife contested the suit and alleged cruelty against her husband. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Judge and there was an appeal in the High Court against the said decree. The High Court did not go into the question of cruelty at all as the husband made an offer in the High Court to take the wife back. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Judge and there was an appeal in the High Court against the said decree. The High Court did not go into the question of cruelty at all as the husband made an offer in the High Court to take the wife back. The offer of the husband was treated as genuine and, therefore, the Court ordered that the wife should return to the husband's house though not necessarily Naihati as mentioned in the plaint and render him conjugal rights. Now Naihati was the place where the husband and wife resided immediately after the marriage. The Wife was with the husband for 4-5 days and thereafter she had never gone to the husband. The Court interpreted this decree and held that as under the provisions of the said decree the wife was to go to the husband not necessarily at Naihati meant that there was an obligation on the husband to all possible steps for the return of his wife to his house. It is in this context that the Calcutta High Court made the following observation. "It is true that direction in the decree for restitution of conjugal rights also contemplates the wife's return to her husband at the Naihati house. Even then, in view of what happened in the past, the initiative for the wife's return to the Naihati house should have been taken by the husband. It was the duty of the husband to assure the wife after the disposal of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights that on her coming to the family dwelling house at Naihati she would be properly received not only by the husband but also by the other members of the husband's family. It should be remembered that the husband instituted a suit for obtaining a decree for nullity of marriage some two or three weeks after the marriage on the allegations that fraud was perpetrated upon the husband by solemnising his marriage that the wife instead of the girl actually shown to the husband-and his people before the marriage, that the wife was suffering from hereditary lunacy and that she was lame. The wife was medically examined and found to be normal. The husband ultimately withdrew the suit, but he was directed to pay costs. The wife was medically examined and found to be normal. The husband ultimately withdrew the suit, but he was directed to pay costs. The husband must have instituted the suit for nullity with the tacit consent of the members of his family. That being the position her embarrassment in returning to the family dwelling house of the husband at Naihati can easily be imagined. Besides, even in normal circumstances, a Hindu wife is not expected to go to her father-in-law's place unless escorted by the husband or any other responsible member of the husband's family. In any event, either the husband or the father-in-law or the mother-in law sends a message to the paternal home of the wife for the return of the wife to her father-in-law's place. It is not usual for a Hindu wife to go to her father-in-law's place of her own accord without being asked to do so by the father-in-law or the mother-in-law or the husband. Even if nothing unpleasant happened in the past, even if every thing proceeded normally, it was the duty of the husband in the instant case to arrange for the return of the wife to her father-in-law's place if the husband wanted the wife to join him in the Naihati house and if he had no intention of setting up a separate matrimonial home." In the present case the summons of the suit for obtaining restitution of conjugal rights was served on the respondent-wife and, therefore, she knew about the suit. There was no obligation under law on the husband to convey to the wife that an ex parte decree was passed against her as the respondent wife knew about the suit for restitution of conjugal rights. It was for her to satisfy the ex-parte decree. She did not take any steps to satisfy the decree, but on the other hand she filed an application to set aside the ex parse decree and this indicates that she did not attend to reside with the husband. There was no legal obligation on the appellant husband to call upon the respondent wife to satisfy the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. 7. For the aforesaid reasons the decree passed by the appellate Judge dismissing Hindu Marriage Petition No. 7 of 1968 filed by the husband to obtain divorce is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored. 7. For the aforesaid reasons the decree passed by the appellate Judge dismissing Hindu Marriage Petition No. 7 of 1968 filed by the husband to obtain divorce is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.