JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :Roy, J.: In this appeal, the appellants have impeached the judgment and decree dated July 29, 1966. made in case No. 71 of 1964, by Shri J.N. Mandal, Judge, Employees' Court, West Bengal. 2. On or about August 3, 1964 the Respondents herein (hereinafter referred to as the said Corporation) filed an application under section 75 (2) (a) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), against the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the Company) for recovery of contribution amounting to Rs. 6,357.68P. alleging them to be a factory in terms of section 2 (12) of the said Act. It was also contended that the said Company were liable to pay their contributions under the provisions of section 40 (1) of the said Act and at the rates as provided in section 39 of the same read with Schedule 1. It was further alleged that the said Company failed and neglected to pay or deposit their due contributions for a period from 1957-1961, particulars of such default have been mentioned in a Schedule to the application. It has also been alleged that they were also guilty of laches for non-production of the relevant records, inspite of due demand. 3. The said Company in their turn admitted the coverage of their establishment under the said Act, at first since January 1960 and thereafter they also admitted in the proceeding that they were in fact covered from 1959. They contended that they had no liability or any obligation to pay any contribution prior to the period of January 1, 1960 as there were no coverage prior thereto. It was contended by them that only in January 1, 1960, they were established as a factory in terms of a letter of November 5, 1963, issued by the Chief Engineer of Factories. Apart from denying the material allegations in the application under section 75 (2) (a) of the said Act, the said Company denied the allegations that papers and necessary records and documents were not prodl1ced by them. They also denied the correctness of the calculation made by the said Corporation in support of their application and contended the same to be arbitrary and baseless. 4. They also denied the correctness of the calculation made by the said Corporation in support of their application and contended the same to be arbitrary and baseless. 4. In the proceeding before the learned Court below, the said Corporation, apart from leading oral evidence, further produced the inspection reports of Shri B.B. Biswas (Ext. 2), that of Shri J. P. Roy (Ext. 2a), two reports by Shri B. B. Sir car (Exts. 2b and 2c) and that of Sori S. K. Banerjee (Ext.2d), in support of their claim and contention that although the relevant documents were not produced by the appellants the necessary and relevant information’s were derived through the said reports, on inspection being taken from other documents and mere particularly the Balance Sheets, from the office of Registrar, Joint Stock Companies. It further appears from the list of documents admitted in evidence for the said Corporation that those exhibits were taken in evidence on admission. 5. There is also no dispute that in the initial proceeding, the said Company also admitted their coverage under the said Act from 1959 to 1964. So far as the periods from 1957-1958, the learned Court below, on consideration of the reports as mentioned hereinbefore and also on consideration of other evidence as available from the purpose Day Book for the years 1956-1959 (Ext. A). General Ledger for the years 1958 and 1959 (Exts. Band B(1), Cash Book for the year 1959 (Ext. C) and the Attendance Register for the year 1960 (Ext. E) apart from Ext. D, which is an extract from the Purchase Day Book, came to the conclusion that for the years in question viz., 1957-1958 the said company was also liable under the said Act. 6. In this appeal, Mr. Gupta, appearing for the said Company has firstly contended that the entire determination was void, invalid, irregular and unauthorised as (i) the basis of calculation which was adopted, was incorrect, (ii) inadmissible evidence was received in evidence and (iii) the reasons are fallacious. He secondly submitted that the said Company being engaged in the business of printing would not come within the purview of the said Act as printing would not come within the meaning of "manufacturing process". 7. In support of his first contention and the different branches under the same Mr. He secondly submitted that the said Company being engaged in the business of printing would not come within the purview of the said Act as printing would not come within the meaning of "manufacturing process". 7. In support of his first contention and the different branches under the same Mr. Gupta submitted that the Balance Sheets, which are the basis or the primary evidence of the reports in question, not having been produced or received in evidence, the learned Judge should not have relied on them and made the determination on the basis thereof. He also submitted that in any event, Shri S. K. Banerjee, viz, the Inspector concerned, not having deposed or tendered for cross examination his report (Ext. 2d) should not have been looked into or received in evidence and relied on for making the impugned determination. Such arguments of Mr. Gupta, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Ghose, has lost all force and efficiency because the reports in question were taken into or received in evidence on admission by the parties. 8. In support of his second contention, Mr. Gupta placed reliance on the definition of "Factory" as contained in section 2(12) of the said Act and contended without reference to the provisions to the effect that "The expression" 'manufacturing process' and power shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Factories Act, 1948." as mentioned under the said section 2(12) of the said Act and submitted that in terms of the said definition "printing" would not come under the expression "manufacturing process". Thus, for the purpose of finding out the validity and determining the arguments as advanced by Mr. Gupta viz., "printing", if at all comes under a "manufacturing process", we shall have to look to the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the more so when the relevant definitions under the Factories Act, 1948 have been made applicable and adopted for the expressions as mentioned hereinbefore. The relevant provision of the Factories Act, 1948 which would be necessary for consideration, is section 2(k), which defines 'manufacturing process" and sub-section (iv) thereunder, which is to the following effect :(iv) composing types for printing by letter, press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding." (v) ......... ...... ......... which again makes it clear that printing is and in fact has been included in the definition of "manufacturing process." 9. ...... ......... which again makes it clear that printing is and in fact has been included in the definition of "manufacturing process." 9. Thus "printing' is a manufacturing process under the said Act. 10. In view of the above, Mr. Ghosh is amply justified in his submissions that the contentions of Mr. Gupta on the point are without any substance and the reference to the case of (1) Union of India & Anr. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 791 which he did on the question of and in support of his arguments, whether printing is a manufacturing process is of no assistance at all. 11. Thus all the arguments of Mr. Gupta fail. The appeal is therefore dismissed. There will however be no order for costs. Basu, J.: I agree.