JUDGMENT H. L. Agrawal J. This appeal by the defendant-tenants arises out of a suit for their eviction from a premises appertaining to Municipal Holding No. 456/470 in Ward no.7 of the Muzaffarpur Municipality. 2. The original plaintiff, the grand father of the substituted plaintiff-respondents sought eviction of the appellants on three grounds; (i) Personal necessity for carrying business, (ii) Statutory default in paying the monthly rents for two months, namely, January and February, 1967 and (iii) Breach of the conditions of tenancy. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants and all the three grounds advanced by the plaintiff were controverter. 4. The trial, court dismissed the suit but on appeal, the learned District Judge, decreed the same on the first two grounds. 5. It may be stated that the original plaintiff died in the trial court and was substituted by his three grand-sons. They examined themselves in support of their case of personal necessity for starting a business as they had grown up and were sitting idle and had no other alternative to earn their livelihood. This evidence has been accepted by the court of appeal below. It may be mentioned that the original plaintiff and the substituted plaintiffs formed a joint Hindu family. A Bench of this Court in Madho Lal @ Madhab Lal Tewari and others Vrs. Madan Mohan Agrawalla and others AIR 1976 Pat 154 has observed that" where the necessity pleaded by the original plaintiff is of the entire family, on his death, his heirs would prosecute the litigation on the same cause of action and the right to evict a tenant survives upon them." Apart from this authority, as a1ready indicated earlier, the ultimate court of fact has accepted the case of the substituted plaintiff of their personal necessity which is apparenty a finding of fact binding upon this Court in a second appeal. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of appellants that the case of personal necessity could not be enquired into after the death of the original plaintiff. 6. Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad, appearing for the appellants, however, vehemently challenged the finding of the learned District Judge regarding default in making the payment of the rent for the period in question. In this regard, the defendants' plea was that they had paid a sum of Rs, 49. 6. Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad, appearing for the appellants, however, vehemently challenged the finding of the learned District Judge regarding default in making the payment of the rent for the period in question. In this regard, the defendants' plea was that they had paid a sum of Rs, 49. 94 as municipal tax for the holding in question for the July-September quarter, 1966,to the Muzaffarpur Municipality and, therefore, by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 8A (2) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (briefly the Act) they were entitled to recover the same "from the landlord by adjustment towards the rent payab1e by him” It was, therefore, contended that the appellants were entitled to adjust this amount of municipal tax paid by them towards the rent for the month of January, 1967, the monthly rate of rent being Rs. 46/-only. 7. This contention which was advanced before the learned District Judge also has been negatived on reference to the provisions contained in Section 133 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, ( briefly ,the Municipal Act'). Sub-Section (2) of Section 8A of the Act, no doubt, entities the tenant to adjust any payment made by him as municipal rates, taxes or the like" because of the default of the: landlord to meet those charges" ,but, according to the above provision under section 133 of the Municipal Act, a municipality is not entitled to make any recovery fro n a tenant (occupier) of any tax of any holding unless the sum due from the owner remains un-paid after the notice of demand has been duly served upon him and the owner is not a resident within the municipality or otherwise its place of residence is not known. Section 133 also provides that if an occupier, in the circumstances mentioned in the section, has to make any payment he may deduct from the next and following payments of his rent, the amount which may be so paid by or recovered from, him. Applying this provision of the Municipal Act, the learned District Judge held' that there was no evidence led on behalf of the defendants that the conditions of section 133 of the Municipal Act, were satisfied and, there fore, the tax paid by them legally recoverable from them by the Muzaffarpur Municipality. Applying this provision of the Municipal Act, the learned District Judge held' that there was no evidence led on behalf of the defendants that the conditions of section 133 of the Municipal Act, were satisfied and, there fore, the tax paid by them legally recoverable from them by the Muzaffarpur Municipality. Accordingly, he held that the payments of the tax did not ensure to their benefit and they were not entitled to adjust the same under sub-section (2) of Section 8A of the Act. 8. In this court Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad seriously contended that the provisions of the Act, were self contained and Section 8A (2) ipso facto entitled the defendants to claim adjustment the moment the landlord bad defaulted in making the payment of the Municipal rates or taxes and, therefore, the terms of section 133 of the Municipal Act, could not be imported to defeat this right of the defendants and if that be so, they could not be held to be defaulters. 9. The contention, although prima facie attractive, is devoid of any merit. Long back this court in a full Bench decision in Niranjan Pal alias Niranjan Kumer Pal Vs. Chaiyanya lal Ghosh 1964 BLJR 583 (F.R) overruling an earlier Bench decision taking a view as canvassed by Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad, held that the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, "cannot have the effect of abrogating or repealing all provisions relating to leases of buildings; it only gives the provision an overriding effect over a provision in other enactment with which it is in conflict. Jaleshwar Prasad, held that the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, "cannot have the effect of abrogating or repealing all provisions relating to leases of buildings; it only gives the provision an overriding effect over a provision in other enactment with which it is in conflict. So long as there is no inconsistency and the provisions of the Act, and the Central Act, can both be given effect to, and can stand together, the clause will not come into operation." In this connection, I may also usefully refer to the analogous provisions in section 103 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevant clause being clause (g) thereto, is as follows: "108 (g) If the lessor neglects to make any payment which he is bound to make, and which if not made by him, is recoverable from the lessee or against the property, the lessee may make such payment himself, and deduct it with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor." In the Full Bench case, the question was as to whether for maintaining a suit for eviction of a tenant under the provisions of the Buildings Act, a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, determining the tenancy in question was necessary. A contention was raised, as before me, that inasmuch as the Buildings Control Act, is a self- contained Act, it does not contemplate the service of any such notice and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, cannot be imported. As already said earlier. this contention was over ruled by the Full Bench decision. 10. Following the dictum laid down in this decision, it has to be seen as to whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the Municipal Act, the Transfer of property Act, and Section SA (2) of the Act. In my considered opinion there does not appear to be any conflict. The Buildings Control Act, was enacted much later than the Municipal Act, and the Legislature must be deemed to be aware of the relevant provisions of the said Act. According to the provisions of the Municipal Act, merely on non-payment of the owner of any holding of any municipal tax or rates, the obligation of the occupier to make the payment does not arise ipso facto unless the conditions and limitations laid down in the said section are fully satisfied. According to the provisions of the Municipal Act, merely on non-payment of the owner of any holding of any municipal tax or rates, the obligation of the occupier to make the payment does not arise ipso facto unless the conditions and limitations laid down in the said section are fully satisfied. If those conditions are satisfied, the Municipal authorities are entitled to recover the taxes from the occupier on account of the default of the landlord. If an occupier or a tenant makes payment of any such municipal rates Or taxes, the protection or privilege pro vided under Section 8A (2) of the Act, will be available to him. There does not appear to be any inconsistency in these analogous provisions much-less any conflict, and by this interpretation, the provisions of all the statutes, can be properly given effect to, and can stand together. I do not find, therefore, that the learned District Judge has committed any error in his judgment on this score and it must be held that the defendants being not entitled to adjust the tax paid by them, committed a default in paying the rent for the month of January, 1967. 11. Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad next contended that the rent for the month of February, 1967, had been remitted by money order before the expiry of that month itself. The learned District Judge bas found the money order coupon in question as not acceptable as being suspicious. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that any error of law has been committed by the court of appeal below calling for any interference by this court. The defendants have, therefore, been rightly held to have committed default in payment of rents for a period of 2 months and accordingly liable for eviction. 12. For the reasons discussed above, I do not find any merit in this appeal and would accordingly dismiss the same. In the circumstances, however, I shall make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.