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1976 DIGILAW 133 (RAJ)

Banshi Lal v. Samir Singh

1976-04-28

S.N.MODI

body1976
JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Bhilwara, dated August 28, 1975, in a suit for eviction and arrears of rent. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit against Ram Kumar alleging that Ram Kumar took the suit shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 30/- per mensem on August 21, 1958. The plaintiff sought eviction of the tenant Ram Kumar on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. The defendant Ram Kumar admitted having taken the shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 30/- per mensem. He, however, disputed that the plaintiff required the disputed shop reasonably and bonafide for his own business or for the business of his brothers and sons. The defendant also challenged the validity of the notice terminating the tenancy served upon the plaintiff before the filing of the suit. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:- 1- vk;k oknh dks eqruktk nqdku dks vius [kqn ds fy, resaonableand nona fide vko';drk gS \ 2- vk;k oknh }kjk fn;k x;k VsusUlh VjehfuUV djus dk uksfVl vo/ks; gS bldk nkos idj D;k vlj iM+rk gS \ 3- vk;k oknh us izfroknh dks ukfVl nsus ds ckn blh nqdku ds ikl ef'kpe [kqn dh fcfyfMax esa pkj dejksa dk njoktk vke jksM ij fudky dj pkj nqdkus cukbZ vkSj vUgsa fdjk;s ij ns nh \ 4- nknjlh D;k gksxh \ During the course of the trial, the defendant-tenant Ram Kumar died and his legal representatives, who are the appellants before me, were brought on record. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff. It further held that Ram Kumar was a statutory tenant and on his death, his legal representatives were not entitled to any protection under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". The trial Court accordingly decreed the suit. The legal representatives of the deceased defendant Ram Kumar went in appeal to the District Judge, Bhilwara, who transferred it to the Court of Civil Judge, Bhilwara, for disposal in accordance with law. The learned Civil Judge agree with the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2 and held the notice to quit to be valid. The legal representatives of the deceased defendant Ram Kumar went in appeal to the District Judge, Bhilwara, who transferred it to the Court of Civil Judge, Bhilwara, for disposal in accordance with law. The learned Civil Judge agree with the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2 and held the notice to quit to be valid. He further upheld the finding of the trial Court that the legal representatives were not entitled to any protection under the Act. Since no other point was pressed before him, he dismissed the appeal. It is against this decree that the legal representatives of the deceased-defendant Ram Kumar have preferred this second appeal. 3. Before this appeal was filed in this Court, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, was amended by the Rajasthan Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 published in Rajasthan Gazette on September 29, 1975. The Ordinance was subsequently enacted into an Act of the Legislature viz., the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 14 of 1976) on February 13, 1976. The Ordinance was subsequently enacted into an Act of the Legislature viz., the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 14 of 1976) on February 13, 1976. After the amendment, clauses (d), (e) and (f) Section 13-A read as under:- "(d) no Court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amendment Ordinance, pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction solely on the ground that due to the death of the tenant as defined in clause (vii) of Section 3 as it stood before the commencement of the amending Ordinance, his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of Section 3 were not entitled to the protection against eviction under this Act as it stood before the commencement of the amending Ordinance; (e) no decree for eviction passed by any Court before the commencement of the amending Ordinance shall, unless the same already stands executed before such commencement, be executed against the surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of Section 3 if such decree was passed solely on the ground as is referred to in clause (d) and such decree shall be deemed to be a nullity as against them; and (f) the provisions of clause (d) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals, or applications for revisions preferred or made, after the commencement of the amending Ordinance;" It is abundantly clear from the above clauses that no Court can either in appeal or revision or any other proceedings pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction solely on the ground that due to the death of the tenant his surviving spouse were not entitled to the protection against eviction under the Act. In these circumstances, the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge on the ground that the legal representatives of the deceased-tenant were not entitled to any protection under the Act, cannot be sustained. 4. The learned Civil Judge did not go into the findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 3 because the defendants might have thought unnecessary to do so on account of the settled law that the legal representatives of a deceased tenant were not entitled to any protection under the Act. 4. The learned Civil Judge did not go into the findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 3 because the defendants might have thought unnecessary to do so on account of the settled law that the legal representatives of a deceased tenant were not entitled to any protection under the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants however submits that the trial Court committed gross error in deciding issue Nos. 1 and 3 against the defendant-appellants. Since the appellate Court gave no finding on these issues, I consider it proper to remand the case back to the first appellate Court for fresh decision after deciding issue Nos. 1 and 3. It may also be observed that in view of the Amending Act of 1976, no decree on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity can be passed unless the question of comparative hardship has been gone into. In this view of the matter, it is necessary to frame one more issue to the following effect, - "Whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether any other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it ?"The lower appellate Court shall take additional evidence on this new issue framed by this Court and decide it along with other issues as stated above. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside, and the case is remanded back to the lower appellate Court for fresh decision on merits in accordance with the law on the lines indicated above. The cost of this appeal shall abide the result. 6. The parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on May 24, 1976. The parties are further directed to submit list of witnesses to be examined by them on the new issue framed by this Court on or before May 24, 1976. The evidence already on the record shall be read in evidence in deciding the appeal. 7. The record of the Courts below, if received, shall be sent back to the lower appellate Court immediately.Appeal allowed. *******