JUDGMENT : P. Govindan Nair, J. These petitions challenging the orders passed by the Land Tribunal under S.77 read with S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, for short the Act, have come up before us on orders of references passed by the learned single Judges who beard the petitions and subsequent direction to post the cases before a Full Bench. Both the orders of references are based on the supposed conflict between the two Division Bench rulings of this Court in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 KLT. 628 and V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas, 1976 KLT. 120. 2. The arguments before us ranged over a wide field, and almost all the decisions of this Court bearing on the applicability and the interpretation of sub-section (2) of S.75 of the Act, the circumstances under which orders could be passed by the Land Tribunal under S.77 read with S.75 (2), the factors that have to be established by the applicant and the approach to be made by the Tribunal in reaching the conclusions necessary for holding that the terms of sub-section (2) of S.75 have been satisfied were elaborately dealt with and the appropriate provisions in the Act in sub-section (3) of S.75, sub-section (4) of that section, S.80B and sub-section (9) of S.80A were referred to. 3. The most important question that arises for determination in an application under S.77 read with S.75 (2) is the meaning to be attributed to the words “if he bona fide requires the land” for any of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S.75 (2). The applicant must of course in all cases satisfy the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) in sub-section (2) of S.75. The right given to the person in possession of the land (who for the purposes of the sub-section is referred to as the “landlord” and who is referred to as such hereafter in this judgment) is subject to two conditions; (1) that he bona fide requires the land and (2) that he satisfied clauses (i) to (iv) of subsection (2) of S 75. 4. 4. The question has arisen whether the section could be said to have been satisfied if the landlord established an honest desire or wish to build on the land A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Leach C. J., and Chandrasekhara Avyar J., in the decision in Narikkal Chathan of Muthuvannacha Amsom and Desom v. Veethiyottillath Kesavan Namboodiri AIR. 1942 Mad. 242, interpreting clause (5) of S.20 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, approved the meaning attributed to the words “requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation” occurring in that clause, by King J. in S.A. No. 538 of 1939. The section that was construed was in these terms: - “No suit for eviction of a customary verumpattamdar, kuzhikanamdar or kanamdar shall lie at the instance of his landlord except on the following grounds: ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (5) that the period of the verumpattam, kanam or kuzhikanam, as the case may be, has expired and there has been do renewal and the landlord requires the holding bonafide for his own cultivation or for that of any member of his family or tarwad or tavazhi who has a proprietary and beneficial interest therein.” King J. in interpreting this provision in S.A. No. 538 of 1939 observed: “The expression 'bona fide' cannot apply to a state of circumstances but only to the statements or intentions or actions of a human being. All therefore that is necessary in my opinion is for the Court to decide whether, when the landlord demands or asks for or sues for any land on the ground that he wishes to cultivate it himself, his statement that he wishes to cultivate it himself is a statement made bona fide.” The passage was approved by the Division Bench as embodying the correct interpretation of that clause and the court observed: “If the Court is convinced that the jenmi has really the intention of cultivating the land he is entitled to be put into possession of it. The fact that he has sufficient land under cultivation elsewhere to provide for the needs of himself and his family matters not. The fact that he has sufficient land under cultivation elsewhere to provide for the needs of himself and his family matters not. It is his land and if he really wants to cultivate it, he is entitled to regain possession when the kanom has expired and there has been no renewal.” The Court refused to follow the interpretation placed by the Calcutta High Court on S.11 of the Calcutta Rent Act, in Rekhabchand Doogar v. J.R.D'Cruz 1923 Calcutta 223 interpreting the words “bona fide” and “required'' occurring in the relevant section. The Calcutta High Court held that “The word in the Act is not “desire” but “require”. This involves something more than a mere wish and involves aa element of need to some extent at least.” This decision of the Calcutta High Court was distinguished by the Madras High Court on the basis that the observations were made with reference to an Act “which was a measure designed to prevent profiteering in houses, the war of 1914-18 having resulted in a shortage of residential accommodation and that the measure was merely intended to meet a position which was of a temporary nature”. The Malabar Tenancy Act, it was ruled, could not be read in the same way as the Calcutta Rent Act. The Calcutta High Court continued to take the same view that it took in Rekhabchand Doogar v. J.R. D'Cruz 1923 Calcutta 223 and in Naresh v. Kanai Lal Roy Chowdhury AIR. 1952 Calcutta 852 interpreting the provision in S.11(l)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (38 of 1948) which contained the words “bona fide requirement” held that “The word “require” is something more than the word “desire”. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of that need. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire”. 5. The Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal (1962) 2 S.C.R. 623 (AIR. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire”. 5. The Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal (1962) 2 S.C.R. 623 (AIR. 1963 S.C. 499) had to construe the provision in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 providing for eviction on the ground that the landlord wanted to reconstruct and observed that: “The investigation by the Rent Controller cannot be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances, otherwise the very purpose of the Rent Restriction Act would be defeated, if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the house without first establishing, that the plea is bona fide with regard to all circumstances, viz. that the houses need reconstruction or that they have the means to reconstruct them.” The above passage was relied on by this Court in the decision in Ahammad Kanna v. Muhammed Haneef 1967 KLT. 841 and Mathew J., observed: “It is impossible, therefore, to hold that the investigation should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances.” The Supreme Court had again to consider a provision which was similarly worded in the decision in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others AIR 1974 S. C. 1059 when it construed S.13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947). That section spoke of reasonable and bona fide requirement and Supreme Court with reference to the word “requires”in S.13 (1) (g) said: “It is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should need them for his own use and occupation.” 6. It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on provisions of various statutes which are more or less similarly worded in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. For satisfying S.75 (2) which insists that the landlord should “bona fide require” the land what has to be established is an honest intention held in relation to the surrounding circumstances. It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on provisions of various statutes which are more or less similarly worded in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. For satisfying S.75 (2) which insists that the landlord should “bona fide require” the land what has to be established is an honest intention held in relation to the surrounding circumstances. This means the establishment of an element of need of the landlord in the circumstances. We are not prepared to interpret the section as involving any element of “must have” as has been done by the Calcutta High Court in Naresh v. Kanai Lal Roy Chowdhury A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 852. What is necessary is, as the Supreme Court said, that he should need the land for any of the purposes enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s. (2) of S.75. We are also unable to understand the provision as demanding that it should be established that a “reasonable man” in the circumstances would require the land for any of the enumerated purposes. The section does not, unlike the provision in S.13 (1) (g) of the Act, construed by the Supreme Court, insist on bona fides and reasonableness. 7. There are observations in the decision of Eradi J., in Janaki v. Land Tribunal. Tellicherry & Others 1973 K. L. T. 923 wherein reference was made to the decision of the Madras High Court in Narikkal Chothan of Muthuvannacha v. Veethiyottillath Kesavan Namboodiri A.I.R. 1942 Madras 242 that an honest desire or intention may be sufficient. But the decision has been explained by the learned Judge in Abdul Rehiman v Ramu 1974 K. L. T. 741 wherein it has been laid down that the existence of other suitable properties where buildings for the purposes of the landlord or any member of his family could be erected is a relevant factor which should be taken into consideration for determining the question whether the claim of the landlord that he bona fide and honestly required the land can be accepted or not. This is the view that has been laid down more or less uniformly by the various decisions of this Court in Sreedharan v. 2nd Addl. Land Tribunal Pattanakad 1974 KLT. 764, Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 706, V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 and Saphiya Umma v. Land Tribunal, Cannanore & Another 1976 KLT 31 . Land Tribunal Pattanakad 1974 KLT. 764, Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 706, V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 and Saphiya Umma v. Land Tribunal, Cannanore & Another 1976 KLT 31 . We shall refer to these decisions in greater detail presently. We would now merely say that the language used in these decisions vary, emphasis being placed on a strict proof of the need of the landlord on the basis of the requirement of a reasonable man in certain cases, and in the other cases, a latitude being given to the landlord to choose the site where he would build even when other lands, apparently equally suitable, are available, we think that neither the first nor the second approach is the correct one to make. We have already said that a bona fide requirement is not identical with mere honest intention or desire. There must be an element of need from the point of view of the landlord established. This being so, the existence of other suitable sites for building is certainly a factor which the Land Tribunal can take into account in deciding whether the claim of the landlord that he bona fide requires “the land” is acceptable or not. At the same time, there is an element of choice left to the landlord in deciding where be would build or which plot he would like to utilise for the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) and (c). The right so to choose is certainly not a whimsical or fanciful one. The right to choose must be rested on grounds which considering human nature with its variable approaches and emphasis spell an understandable preference. Hence the personal equation can play a part. What is unimportant to one can be important to another. Sentiment is not ruled out. Every conceivable, but understandable reason-that is a reason which atleast to some would be a real reason-would supply the ground for establishing the preference. If such a reason is made out the shifting should be permitted. The Tribunal should not substitute its views as regards requirements. Nor are the views of the kudikidappukaran relevant. The landlord seeking eviction cannot refuse to disclose the reason for the preference. He must make out his particular preference to “the land” on the basis of the principles that we have stated above. The facts of the case in OP. The Tribunal should not substitute its views as regards requirements. Nor are the views of the kudikidappukaran relevant. The landlord seeking eviction cannot refuse to disclose the reason for the preference. He must make out his particular preference to “the land” on the basis of the principles that we have stated above. The facts of the case in OP. No. 962 of 1975 are useful for illustrating the principle that we have stated. The landlord owned several other pieces of land where the building could be constructed. The claim of the landlord put forward by counsel before us was that he had a particular affinity to “the land” because his ancestors were buried in that property. This case was however not pleaded in the application and the applicant when he was examined did not speak about it in his chief examination though the other side obligingly brought out the reason in cross-examination. Apparently this reason was not relied on before the Land Tribunal at the time of the arguments. There is no reference to this reason in the order and no point had been made in the Original Petition before this Court that this reason has been relied on before the Land Tribunal at the time of hearing and it omitted to consider that aspect. Counsel however very strenuously urged that the reason urged was a real one as far as the applicant was concerned and should therefore be given due weight and that the Tribunal has wrongly ignored it. Since the reason was not pleaded or seen to have been relied on before the Tribunal and not even relied on in the Original Petition we do not think that we can in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution deal with it. But we would like to add that the reason if it had been properly urged and relied on should have been taken into account by the Tribunal. It cannot be gainsaid that there are people who can honestly take the view that they would like to live or like their children to live in the property where their ancestors had been buried. In such circumstances it can be said that the preference for the land has been established. This example will illustrate the principle and the approach that, will have to be made by the Land Tribunal. 8. In such circumstances it can be said that the preference for the land has been established. This example will illustrate the principle and the approach that, will have to be made by the Land Tribunal. 8. We do not think that we should say anything further on this aspect as it would not be possible to deal with all conceivable grounds and circumstances. But what we have said, we consider, will serve as a guide line for dealing with the question. 9. We shall now refer to the decisions adverted to in Para.7 of this judgment in some detail so as to state as far as possible clearly the principles and approaches to be made. The view expressed in Abdul Rehiman v. Ramu 1974 KLT. 741 in reference to the interpretation “bona fide requires” when the applicant has other property has been generally accepted and has been adverted to with approval in the Division Bench rulings in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 KLT. 628 and in V. J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120. The passage that has been quoted from the judgment in Abdul Rehiman v. Ramu 1974 KLT. 741 in the judgment in V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 reads as follows: “In adjudicating upon the plea put forward by the landlord that he bona fide requires the said land for the said purpose the Land Tribunal can certainly take into account the nature of the property where the kudikidappu is situated, the existence of other alternative sites belonging to the landlord and consider whether, in the ordinary course of circumstances, a reasonable person situated in the position of the land owner in the case before it would ordinarily entertain a genuine intention to construct a residential house on the site of the kudikidappu”. This passage has to be read subject to what we have stated in Para.7 above. The landlord will have to establish the element of need of the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate. This need will have to be judged with reference to the needs of the particular landlord for preference of the land in question on understandable grounds. It is not enough if the landlord entertains a genuine intention to construct the building on the land. This need will have to be judged with reference to the needs of the particular landlord for preference of the land in question on understandable grounds. It is not enough if the landlord entertains a genuine intention to construct the building on the land. What is necessary is that there should be an element of need for “the land”, for one of the purposes enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2 of S.75 of the Act as far as the landlord was concerned. In the light of what we have already said towards the end of Para.7, the element of need which a landlord must establish has to be viewed also with reference to the peculiar circumstances in which he is placed and not with reference to the needs of a hypothetical reasonable man. We have explained this aspect at some length towards the end of Para.7 and the example with reference to the facts in O.P. No. 962 of 1975, one of the cases before us for decision, would provide the guide line in determining the question of what is meant by the expression that the landlord “bona fide requires the land”. 10. The observations that have been made in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 759 in regard to what is meant by “bona fide required” are more or less in consonance with what we have indicated in this judgment. It must however be remembered that those are observations made in a case where the landlord was admittedly in possession of 7 acres of land including the property of 2 acres and 39 cents in a corner of which the kudikidappu was situate, and those observations were made in answer to the specific contention raised by counsel which is stated at the end of Para.1 of the judgment: “In other words the stand taken by the learned counsel is that any landlord could, notwithstanding the fact that he might have other landin his possession equally or more suitable for putting up a building claim that he wants the site of the kudikidappu for the building. The choice in that behalf, counsel contends, must be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the landlord.” Such a contention had necessarily to be rejected. The observations in the decision in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom 1974 KLT. The choice in that behalf, counsel contends, must be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the landlord.” Such a contention had necessarily to be rejected. The observations in the decision in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom 1974 KLT. 706 are also made with reference to the contention raised by counsel that “the fact that there were other lands in the possession of the petitioners, not shown to be unsuitable for the purpose, was an irrelevant consideration while dealing with an application under S.75(2) read with S.77 (1) of the Act”. 11. In both the above decisions, emphasis has been placed on the fact that fixity of tenure was granted to a kudikidanpukaran by S.75 (1) of the Act. The right of kudikidappukaran to purchase his kudikidappu conferred by S.80A too has been emphasised and reference was made to S.72 of the Act by which it is provided that on the notified date, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the provisions of that section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date. In the light of these provisions it has been said that sub-section (2) of S.75 embodies an exception to the fixity of tenure and the consequent rights conferred on the tenant. Subsection (2) of S.75 will apply notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) and necessarily therefore notwithstanding any thing contained in S.80A and notwithstanding anything contained in S.72. We shall extract a passage from the judgment in Mathukutty v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 120. “Though the Act has introduced various restrictions in the matter of holding land and has conferred fixity of tenure on tenants and kudikidappukars it has not taken away the right to hold substantial property. S 75 (1) confers fixity of tenure on a kudikidappukaran. He is also entitled to the ownership of three or five or ten cents depending on whether the kudikidappu is within a panchayat, municipality or corporation area. S 75 (1) confers fixity of tenure on a kudikidappukaran. He is also entitled to the ownership of three or five or ten cents depending on whether the kudikidappu is within a panchayat, municipality or corporation area. Notwithstanding the conferment of the fixity of tenure under S 75 (1) of the Act, a person in possession of the land can by virtue of S.75 (2) ask for shifting if the requirements of that section had been satisfied.” 12. It only remains for us to notice the extreme view that has been taken in O. P. No. 1665 of 1973. It was observed in that case: “The landowner must have his own choice of the land where he may put up a residence for his purpose. It cannot be dictated by the kudikidappukaran.” This decision was distinguished in the decision in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 759. After extracting the above passage it was observed therein that this passage was capable of the same explanation as was given to the similar observations given in the decision in Abdul Rahiman v. Ramu 1974 KLT 741 . It was further observed in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 759 as follows: “In other words, when once the requirement of shifting of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is proved, it is not for the kudikidappukaran to dictate to the landlord and tell him that nevertheless he should choose some other land which he is possessed of”. This decision (1974 KLT. 759) was again adverted to by the Division Bench in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 KLT. 628 and it was observed that if the explanation that was given in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 KLT. 759 which we have just now referred to cannot be accepted, the view taken by the learned single Judge in O. P. No. 1665 of 1973 cannot also be accepted. The learned Judge who decided O. P. No. 1665 of 1973 had occasion to deal with this matter again in Sreedharan v. 2nd Addl. Land Tribunal, Pattanakad 1974 KLT. 764 and the observations therein, we think clarified the ambit of the earlier decision in O.P. No. 1665 of 1973. The learned Judge who decided O. P. No. 1665 of 1973 had occasion to deal with this matter again in Sreedharan v. 2nd Addl. Land Tribunal, Pattanakad 1974 KLT. 764 and the observations therein, we think clarified the ambit of the earlier decision in O.P. No. 1665 of 1973. After stating that it is neither for the Tribunal nor for the kudikidappukaran to decide where the landlord should build and stating that the landlord may choose, it was observed: “The landholder may choose the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate for numerous reasons of his own. He cannot say that he would not disclose them. It is for the Tribunal to decide whether the requirement is bona fide or not. Therefore, the Tribunal is entitled to know why he wants that particular land; and the Tribunal is to decide whether the reasons stated by the landholder are genuine or they are only some pretext to shift the kudikidappukaran. If the reasons are genuine, or in other words, if the requirement is bona fide, the Tribunal is bound to pass an order for shifting, subject to the other conditions in the section being satisfied.” This passage, we consider, is in consonance with what we have stated earlier in this judgment. 13. We shall summarise the conclusions from the above discussion: (1) Shifting can be bad only if the conditions of S.75(2) are satisfied. (2) The main condition to be satisfied by the landlord seeking eviction is that he “bona fide requires the land” for one of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (2) of S.75 of the Act. (3) A mere desire or intention honestly held will not amount to “bona fide requirement”. An element of need must be established. (4) All the circumstances of the case must be looked into in determining whether the element of need has been established. Where the landlord has other properties, that circumstance must be taken into consideration in determining whether the element of need of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate has been established. (5) The element of need may be peculiar to the particular landlord. Because of that peculiarity the reason should not be ignored. The matter has to be approached, as we said, by finding out whether there is an understandable preference. (5) The element of need may be peculiar to the particular landlord. Because of that peculiarity the reason should not be ignored. The matter has to be approached, as we said, by finding out whether there is an understandable preference. The question is whether the reason would be a real reason, a genuine reason, as far as the landlord is concerned. 14. Now passing on to the two decisions, Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 KLT. 628 and V. J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120, the question to be considered is what is meant by the words “the land” occurring in Sub-S. (2) of S.75. It may appear on a cursory reading of the judgments that there is conflict between the two decisions, for the observations in the decision in V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 K. L. T. 120, which was decided a few days before the decision in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 K. L. T. 628 was rendered, that “the land” means the whole of the land may be misunderstood to mean that the actual site (in the sense of the immediate surroundings of the kudikidappu) need not be shown to be required. Similarly the expressions used in the judgment in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 K. L. T. 628 might be capable of the meaning that what the landlord has to establish is that he wishes to build over the very site on which the kudikidappu is situate. Neither the one nor the other is the real position and the two judgments, have not held as indicated above. As we see it. there is no conflict between the two decisions. We shall clarify the position. Whenever a shifting of a kudikidappu is sought under Sub-s. (2) of S.75 it will have to be shown that “the land” is required for one of the purposes in (a), (b) and (c). The land will take in the entire land on which the kudikidappu is situate and necessarily therefore the site of the kudikidappu. If the entire land including the site of the kudikidappu or any part of it is not required bona fide, the application will have to be rejected. The land will take in the entire land on which the kudikidappu is situate and necessarily therefore the site of the kudikidappu. If the entire land including the site of the kudikidappu or any part of it is not required bona fide, the application will have to be rejected. So the question will always arise whether the site of the kudikidappu in the sense the plinth area of the hut or the homestead as well as the limited portion of the land around it or any part of it is also required along with the other portion of the land. This is a matter that has to be considered and decided. In other words, the applicant will have to show that for the purposes as enumerated in clauses (a), (b) or (c) he requires bona fide the whole of the land including the site of the kudikidappu or any part of it situated in the land. But it is not necessary to establish that the building will have to be erected on the particular portion of the property which is in the occupation of the kudikidappukaran. It appears that it is in this light that it was observed in the decision in Sahhiya Umma v Land Tribunal, Cannanore & Another 1976 KLT 31 that “It was unnecessary for the applicant to make out that she requires for the said purpose the particular portion of the A schedule property which is in the occupation of the kudikidappukaran.” When the question arises, the matter will have to be dealt with in the light of what we have stated earlier in this paragraph with reference to the two decisions in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 K. L.T. 628 and V.J. Mathuktty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 K. L. T. 120. To sum up on this aspect all that we need state is that the landlord seeking eviction from the land must establish not only that he wants the land in which the kudikidappu is situate for one of the purposes in clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (2) of S.75 but he must establish that he requires the whole of the land, including the site of the kudikidappu or land appurtenant thereto, or atleast a part of the kudikidappu and the land appurtenant thereto. 15. 15. The question has often arisen about the extent of the land that can be said to be bona fide required for building purposes. We have come across many decisions, where the land was fairly extensive and even where it was only about half an acre, the Tribunal taking the view that a kudikidappu will take only 10 cents and therefore the kudikidappu can be shifted to one corner of the property and the remaining 50 cents or a lesser area according to the views of the Land Tribunal would be sufficient for building purposes. Based on that assessment of the Tribunal of the requirement many applications have been rejected. What has to be borne in mind in dealing with this aspect of the matter is the words of the section “bona fide requires”. We have already pointed out that these words mean what is honestly required by the landlord, in the surrounding circumstances. There is certainly a pronounced subjective element in such honest requirement. So in cases where it has been established that the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is the land on which the building should be constructed the claim of the landlord should be given not only serious consideration but due weight. This Court pointed out in the decision in V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 that the area of the land is a very relevant consideration. We would like to repeat that it is so. The land may be very extensive, so extensive that to say that the whole of that land is required for building purposes may indicate lack of bona fides. So the question must always be considered whether the claim of the landlord is on an honest basis or whether he is putting forward a claim merely for the purpose of evicting a kudikidappukaran. It was contended before us that the observation “Ordinarily therefore, if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not more than an acre the claim for shifting it from the land has to be held to be reasonable'' in Para.8 of the decision in V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 at p. 124 is capable of the interpretation that in all cases where the total extent is an acre or less, the shifting sought should be allowed. 120 at p. 124 is capable of the interpretation that in all cases where the total extent is an acre or less, the shifting sought should be allowed. So to read the sentence would be to ignore what has been said in the earlier part of that paragraph in the judgment. We pointed out that the location of the land would be a relevant factor. We stressed that the question whether it should not normally be left to the landlord to say how much of the land should be required for the purpose of constructing the building or for the other purposes mentioned in the section should be given due consideration and allowed unless his claim is found to be unreasonable so as to spell lack of bona fides. We clarified by stating that when once it was established that there were no other lands available or suitable and there was bona fide requirement of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate the claim for shifting should be allowed unless the demand for the entire area of the land indicated an extravagant disposition on the part of the person, or an unreasonable or an unfair attitude. The last sentence in that paragraph must therefore be read subject to the above considerations It was emphasised that it had not been so read by this Court in Saphiya Umma v. Land Tribunal, Cannanore & Another 1976 K. L. T. 31 as is clear from the observation in Para 4 of the judgment referring to the decision in V.J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 that “The Division Bench also pointed out that going by the indications contained in the Act itself, ordinarily, the claim for shifting a kudikidappu from a land cannot be regarded as unreasonable it the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu situates is not more than one acre”. This is a reproduction of the last sentence in Para.8 of the judgment in V. J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120. If the sentence is taken out of its context and read by itself there would be an overstatement of the position. This is a reproduction of the last sentence in Para.8 of the judgment in V. J. Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120. If the sentence is taken out of its context and read by itself there would be an overstatement of the position. The sentence “Ordinarily therefore, if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not more than an acre the claim for shifting it from the land has to be held to be reasonable” has to be read subject to and in the light of what is stated earlier in the judgment. “There may be cases where the land is so extensive that it would be unreasonable to expect any person bonafide to require the entire land for building purposes. In such cases the obvious answer to be given by the Land Tribunal would be that it had not been established that the person in possession of the land required the land for building purposes. But when the area diminishes from a very large extent to a reasonable holding the question becomes much more difficult to answer. It may be that one person may take the view that he wanted an acre of land where his residential house should be. Another may be content with 50 cents or less. The Tribunal may think that 25 cents would be enough. It is not the subjective view points that should govern the matter. What is reasonable in the context must be the principle that should be applied. The location of the land would be a relevant factor. The land may be situate inside the corporation or the municipality, or within the panchayat in an Agricultural area. It is normal for people to have a larger extent of land for building purposes in a rural set up. It may not be unreasonable to state that one acre of land is required in a rural area for building purposes. The same certainly cannot be said if the land is inside the corporation or municipality. Along with this aspect must be considered the question whether it should not normally be left to the person in possession of the land to decide how much of land is required for the purpose of constructing a building or for other purposes mentioned by the section. Along with this aspect must be considered the question whether it should not normally be left to the person in possession of the land to decide how much of land is required for the purpose of constructing a building or for other purposes mentioned by the section. In other words when once it is established that land is required for building purposes, the extent of the land required as stated by the appellant should be given due consideration and unless his claim is found to be unreasonable as to spell lack of bona fides should be allowed.” 16. The above discussion leads to the following conclusions:- (1) Even when it is established by the landlord that no land is available or suitable for the purposes in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of S.75, it does not follow that eviction from the land in question should be ordered. (2) The area of the land in question is a very relevant consideration. So the landlord must further establish that the whole of that land including the kudikiddappu and land appurtenant thereto or atleast a part of the kudikidappu and land appurtenant thereto is required. (3) In determining the area required, the location of the land, its nature, the particular purpose for which it is required are all relevant. (4) When no other land is available or suitable for the purpose is established the area of an acre mentioned in S.75(3) is also a relevant factor, subject to the consideration whether the demand for the entire area where it is an acre or less indicated an unreasonable or extravagant or unfair attitude on the part of the landlord. 17. We have already adverted to the facts in O. P. No. 962 of 1975 in Para.7 above. We consider that if the point urged had been taken at the appropriate time, that should have been dealt with by the Land Tribunal. As it is, we see no reason to allow counsel to raise the point before us in the Original Petition, for the first time, at the time of arguments. This petition has therefore to be dismissed. We do so. 18. O. P. No. 4992 of 1975 has also to be dismissed. The evidence in the case was only one way. The applicant was examined on 5-6-1975, but he was not even cross-examined though the respondent was represented on that day. This petition has therefore to be dismissed. We do so. 18. O. P. No. 4992 of 1975 has also to be dismissed. The evidence in the case was only one way. The applicant was examined on 5-6-1975, but he was not even cross-examined though the respondent was represented on that day. And on the next adjournment date, 13-6-1975, also the respondent was represented but he only prayed for time. We cannot in these circumstances accept the contention that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner before us. Opportunity was given to cross-examine but this was no: utilised. It was only on 25-6-1975 that a motion was made that the applicant should be recalled for cross-examination and when that petition was rejected on 5-7-1975 and the case was posted to 15-7-1975 and later to 25-7-1975, respondent's counsel there has been yet another change of counsel-was not prepared to examine the respondent unless he was permitted to recall the applicant. It was thus that the respondent was not even examined in the case. In these circumstances, we do not consider that there is any justification for the plea that any principle of natural justice had been violated in that no reasonable opportunity was granted to the petitioner to adduce his evidence. We dismiss this petition There will be no order as to costs in both these Original Petitions. P. Subramonian Poti J.:- 1. I had the advantage of reading the Judgment of the learned Chief Justice. I agree with the ultimate decisions reached by the learned Chief Justice in the Original Petitions, but in view of a slightly different approach to the question for decision I wish to state my reasons for the Judgment. 2. S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) enables a landholder to require the kudikidappukaran to shift to a new site belonging to him subject to certain conditions provided the land holder requires the land for one or other of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (2). “Building purposes for himself or any member of his family purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority and any industrial purpose, are the three matters indicated in the said sub-section. “Building purposes for himself or any member of his family purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority and any industrial purpose, are the three matters indicated in the said sub-section. The words “may, if he bonafide requires the land” found in sub-section (2) have been the subject of construction in a number of decisions of this Court. The view taken on this cannot be said to be uniform. This has occasioned the reference to the Full Bench. 3. Sub-section (2) of S.75 of the Act reads: “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (i). the person in possession of the land on the which there is a homestead or hut (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landholder) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or (b) for purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority; or (c) for any industrial purposes, require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to a new site belonging to him, subject to the following conditions, namely: (i) the landholder shall pay to the kudikidappukaran the price of the homestead, if any, erected by the kudikidappukaran; (ii) the new site shall be fit for erecting a homestead and shall be within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu; (iii) the extent of new site shall be the extent of the existing kudikidappu, subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major municipality, five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any panchayat area or township; (iv) the landholder shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site. Where the above conditions are complied with, the kudikidappukaran shall be bound to shift to the new site.” Two questions concerning the construction of this sub-section arise. They are: (1) scope of the term “requires” whether it is synonymous with desire (2) whether the requirement is to be shown as that of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate how the question of determination of such requirement is to be approached. 3. They are: (1) scope of the term “requires” whether it is synonymous with desire (2) whether the requirement is to be shown as that of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate how the question of determination of such requirement is to be approached. 3. The term “requires” in sub-section (2) of S.75 indicates an element of need. It is not enough that the landholder merely desires to get at the land. Interpreting a similar provision in S.13(1) (g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947, Bhagwati J, speaking for the Supreme Court, expressed the idea thus in P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel A.I.R. 1974 S. C. 1059: “The District Judge did not misdirect himself in regard to the true meaning of the word “requires” in S.13 (1) (g) and interpreted it correctly to mean that there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to 'require' premises for his own use and occupation. It is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should need them for his own use and occupation.” 4. I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the establishment of the element of need of the landlord in the circumstances is what is meant by the term “bonafide required.” The Calcutta High Court in Naresh v. Kanai Lal Roy Chowdhury A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 852. was only explaining the identical idea when it observed “The word “Requires” is something more than the word “desire”. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of that need. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire.” If it is agreed that 'desire' and 'require' refer to two different concepts the distinguishing nature being an element of need in 'require', I am not, with great respect, able to agree with the observations of the learned Chief Justice “We are not prepared to interpret the section as involving any element of “must have” as has been done by the Calcutta High Court in Naresh v. Kanai Lal Roy Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 852-” Bonafide requirement must mean an honest need. Proof of need requires something more than proof of intention or desire. The existence of desire or intention on the part of the person seeking shifting of a kudikidappu would not be sufficient. It must be shown that the person honestly needs the land on which the kudikidappu is situate for any of the purposes mentioned in the Section. 5. Bonafide requirement is a matter for assessment. When the Land Tribunal is called upon to decide this issue it has necessarily to consider the plea of such requirement in relation to the circumstances of the case. The genuineness of the plea relating to the purpose mentioned in the subsection, the availability of other suitable land for such purpose, the assessment of the honesty in the plea that the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is itself required for such purpose are all matters which call for consideration in making a decision as to whether the person bonafide 'requires' the land. The decisions of this court have indicated and I think on this all these are now agreed that what the section requires is not proof of a need of some land for one or other of the purposes mentioned in the subsection but proof of requirement of “the land”. The term 'the land' in the sub-section refers to the land on which the kudikidappu is situate. Therefore it is evident from the section itself that in order to justify a motion for shitting the landholder is called upon to prove that the land on which the kudikidappu is situate is required for one or other of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2). Mere proof of the fact that the landholder requires land for putting up a building for himself or for one or other of the persons mentioned in sub-clause (a) or for the purposes mentioned in sub-clause (b) or for the industrial purpose mentioned in sub-clause (c) would not entitle a person to an order of shifting, for, then, it would be merely proof of requirement of land and not of requirement of “the land”. The building which is to be constructed as contemplated in sub-clause (a) need not necessarily occupy the site of the land. The construction of the building may require not only land for its site but also land as appurtenance. The building which is to be constructed as contemplated in sub-clause (a) need not necessarily occupy the site of the land. The construction of the building may require not only land for its site but also land as appurtenance. If the site of the kudikidappu or even part of it is required for one of the purposes mentioned in sub clauses (a) to (c) an order for shifting must follow. I believe this requires to be categorically stated so that the Land Tribunals may be guided properly in their approach to this question. 6. The view I have expressed here is more or less the view adopted in most of the decisions of this Court and I think a reference to them in this contentment would be appropriate. 7. Our learned brother Eradi J. in the decision in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry 1973 KLT. 923, made the following observations: “If the requirement does, in fact, exist the owner of the land has the freedom to decide whether he would put up the building in the site where the kudikidappu stands or whether he would rather not disturb the kudikidappukaran.” Possibly if there was no occasion for the same learned Judge to explain the statement later, I would have been constrained to disagree with the view expressed by the learned Judge. It is also evident from the judgment that the learned Judge has relied on the decision in Narikkal Chathan v. Kesavan Namboodiri AIR. 1942 Mad. 242(2), to support the view that the word “requires” has a totally different content from the expression “needs.” On this the Supreme Court has spoken differently as has been indicated earlier and therefore the view expressed by my learned brother may not be correct. In Rehiman v. Ramu 1974 KLT. 1942 Mad. 242(2), to support the view that the word “requires” has a totally different content from the expression “needs.” On this the Supreme Court has spoken differently as has been indicated earlier and therefore the view expressed by my learned brother may not be correct. In Rehiman v. Ramu 1974 KLT. 741 the same learned Judge explaining the earlier decision observes: “The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner sought to rely on certain observations contained in a judgment of mine reported in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry, 1973 KLT 923 , as lending support to the petitioner's contention that it was not open to the Land Tribunal to say that the B schedule property is much more suitable for construction of a residential building for the petitioner and to reject the prayer for shifting on such a ground What has been laid down by me in that decision is only that in cases where the owner of the land who has applied for relief under S.75 and 77 has satisfactorily established that he bonafide requires the land on which the kudikidappu is situated for building purposes it is not open to the Tribunal to reject the prayer for shifting on the ground that the applicant is in possession of some other property which is better suited for serving the said requirement. Care was taken by me to make it clear in the said judgment that it will be perfectly open to the Land Tribunal to take into account the existence of such other suitable sites while considering the question whether the plea of bonafide requirement put forward by the owner can be accepted as true If the owner satisfies the Tribunal that he genuinely intends to construct a residential building on the land where the kudikidappu is situated in such a case the Tribunal cannot thereafter disallow the prayer for shifting on the ground that in its opinion, it will be more advantageous for the land owner to construct the building on some other land belonging to himself which it may regard as most suitable for the said purpose. The prayer for shifting is liable to be granted only after the Tribunal is satisfied that the landholder requires the land, viz, the site of the homestead occupied by the kudikidappukaran, for the purpose of erecting a residential house for himself. The prayer for shifting is liable to be granted only after the Tribunal is satisfied that the landholder requires the land, viz, the site of the homestead occupied by the kudikidappukaran, for the purpose of erecting a residential house for himself. In adjudicating upon the plea put forward by the landlord that he bonafide requires the said land for the said purpose the Land Tribunal can certainly take into account the nature of the property where the kudikidappu is situated, the existence of other alternative sites belonging to the landlord and consider whether, in the ordinary course of circumstances, a reasonable person situated in the position of the land owner in the case before it would ordinarily entertain a genuine intention to construct a residential house on the site of the kudikidappu. Nothing contained in my decision aforesaid precludes the Land Tribunal from conducting such investigation:” 8. My learned brother Bhaskaran J. has explained the rule in very succinct terms and it may be useful to quote from the judgment of my learned brother. Bhaskaran J. said in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom 1974 KLT. 706 thus: “As a general rule under sub-s. (1) of S.75 all kudikidappukars enjoy protection from being evicted from the homesteads by the landlords. Sub-s. (2) of the said section in effect operates as an exception to the general rule enunciated in sub-s. (I). There should therefore be acceptable proof of the bonafide requirement of the land on which the kudikidappu is situated, on the part of the landholder to entitle him to invoke the provisions of sub-s (2). The approach to the problem in the manner contended for by Sri. Poti would run contra to the spirit of the provision That a landholder has bonafide requirement of land for building purposes generally would not automatically enable him to obtain an order for shifting the kudikidappukaran; it requires something more; and that is the land on which there is the homestead or the hut in the occupation of thekudikidappukaran is bonafide required for that purpose. In that view other lands available with the landholder in the context of his requirement may prove to be a relevant consideration. In that view other lands available with the landholder in the context of his requirement may prove to be a relevant consideration. No penalty or follow up action appears to have been provided in the Act in case the landholder after reducing the kudikidappu site to his possession in pursuance of an order of shifting under S.77 of the Act, does not utilise it for the purpose alleged as a ground for shifting. It is, it seems, not only within his rights not to utilise the land for the alleged purpose, but it would also be within his competence to forget altogether the ground on which the shifting order was passed and dispose of the land the very next moment without the fear of an evil consequence This immunity enjoyed by the landholder who invokes sub-sections (2) and (4) of S.75 read with S.77 is in contradistinction with the safeguards provided in S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965) to protect the interest of the tenants against the landlords who secure eviction of buildings alleging ground of bonafide need for occupation or reconstruction and thereafter act in contravention of the terms of the order. The temptation on the part of the landholders to secure orders for the shifting of kudikidappukars putting forward “bona fide requirement” merely as a ruse has to be checked by the Land Tribunals by properly assessing the genuineness behind the plea of 'bona fide' requirement.” I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. Though Isaac J. in the unreported judgment in O. P. 1665 of 1973 appears to have expressed the view that the landowner must have his own choice of the land to put up a residence and it cannot be dictated by the kudikidappukaran, in the subsequent decision of the learned Judge reported in Sreedharan v. 2nd Addl. Land Tribunal, 1974 KLT. 764 he expressed the idea thus: “I cannot, therefore, accept the petitioner's contention that the landholders would be entitled to an order for shifting the petitioner's kudikidappu, if they have got other suitable lands for the purposes for which the shifting is sought for by them. Land Tribunal, 1974 KLT. 764 he expressed the idea thus: “I cannot, therefore, accept the petitioner's contention that the landholders would be entitled to an order for shifting the petitioner's kudikidappu, if they have got other suitable lands for the purposes for which the shifting is sought for by them. I repeat, lest I may be misunderstood, that what is relevant is whether the purpose alleged for the requirement is real or genuine, and if so, whether the requirement to have the particular land occupied by the kudikidappukaran is bonafide In deciding whether it is so or not, the suitability of that land for the said purpose as well as the existence of other equally or more suitable lands for that purpose are relevant facts. These are matters to be considered by the Tribunal. The existence of other equally or more suitable lands need not necessarily establish that the requirement to have the particular land occupied by the Kudikidappukaran is not bonafide. The desire of the landholder to have a particular land and his ideas and conceptions about its suitability must receive a predominant consideration.” I must point out here that it is difficult to agree with the learned Judge that the desire of a landholder to have a particular land and his ideas and conceptions about its suitability must receive a predominant consideration. The desire of the landholder for the land in which the kudikidappu is situate must be shown to be justified by the need of that site. His desire or intention, however honest it be, is only one of the factors to be taken into account, as the basis for investigation as to whether such desire is justified on account of the need of the landholder for such site. 9. I may now advert to the decision of the Division Bench in Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom, 1975 KLT 73. In that case Ext. P1 order of the Land Tribunal disallowing the application for shifting was under challenge. The landholder moved the court challenging the order of the Land Tribunal. The learned single Judge dismissed the petition. 9. I may now advert to the decision of the Division Bench in Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom, 1975 KLT 73. In that case Ext. P1 order of the Land Tribunal disallowing the application for shifting was under challenge. The landholder moved the court challenging the order of the Land Tribunal. The learned single Judge dismissed the petition. In appeal the Division Bench, considering the order of the Land Tribunal which held that the writ petitioner did not require the land bonafide for constructing the house since he was residing comfortably with his paten's in a house owned by his father, held that the Land Tribunal was wrong in thinking that it was for the petitioner to establish that he or the family member concerned had no place at all where a building can be constructed and there was dire necessity to construct a building. Of course, the section does not require the proof of dire necessity and therefore there can be no dispute that such an approach would be wrong. But there are certain observations in the Division Bench decision which are likely to be misunderstood. The lamed Judges said “What has to be proved by a person who seeks the relief of shifting a kudikidappukaran under S.75 (2) of the Act is only that the applicant “bonafide requires the land for building purposes for himself or any member of his family.” The said condition is satisfied if the applicant is able to establish by acceptable evidence that he or the member of his family for whose sake the relief of shifting is sought does not have a residential house of his own and that he genuinely desires and intends to construct a building for the residence of himself or the said member of his family on the site where the kudikidappu exists.” If what the Division Bench intended to express was that it was sufficient to show a genuine desire or intention on the part of the petitioner to construct a building that would be to read the term “requirement” as synonymous with desire or intention. That would, it appears to me, be against the categorical statement by the Supreme Court. 10. That would, it appears to me, be against the categorical statement by the Supreme Court. 10. In Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda 1974 K. L. T. 759 this Court said: “In other words while the normal rule is that the kudikidappukaran cannot be evicted, in certain cases the landlord may be entitled to seek the shifting of the site of the kudikidappu, on certain requirements being satisfied, to other suitable land. To read S.75 (2) of the Act as one enabling a landlord to seek the shifting of the site of a kudikidappu merely on showing that the landlord requires some land for the purposes mentioned in the subsection would be to make serious inroad into the right of the kudikidappukaran to fixity, for, the question of shifting would then depend not upon the necessity of the particular site in which the kudikidappu is situate, nor upon the availability of other suitable sites in the possession of the landlord, but merely upon the will of the landlord to displace the kudikidappukaran. To construe the section in that manner would be to jeopardise the right of the kudikidappukaran to fixity contemplated by the Act. Not that this result should persuade the court to construe the provision in a manner different from what it plainly speaks to. But I am referring to this only as a prelude to reading and understanding S.75 (2) as it should be.” Later in the same judgment the Court said: “In other words, it is open to the landlord to show that, notwithstanding the fact that he possesses other lands on which he could have constructed buildings for the purposes mentioned, the land on which the kudikidappu is situate is the most suitable site. In such cases, notwithstanding the possession of other land he will be able to establish that he requires “the land''. Once it is shown that his requirement will be satisfied only by the land on which the kudikidappu is situate or that it is that land which will meet his requirement most satisfactorily it will not be an answer to say that the landlord should nevertheless choose some other land in his possession” The same view was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad, 1975 K. L. T. 628. 11. 11. The reference of these cases to the Full Bench seems to have been occasioned by what was felt to be expression of different views in two Division Bench decisions of this Court, i. e. in Cheekkutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 K. L. T. 628 and Mathukutty v. Thomas, 1976 K. L. T. 120. I was a party to the former decision while the learned Chief Justice was a party to the latter decision. On the question whether the requirement to be proved is of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate there is no divergence of views in these decisions. The provisions of the Act envisage a scheme whereunder fixity to the kudikidappukaran just as fixity to the tenant is contemplated. S.75 (1) confers fixity on a kudikidappukaran subject to certain exceptions. S.80A confers on the kudikidappukaran the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him along with the land adjoining thereto. S.75 (1) enumerates the exception to the right to fixity. S.75 (2) enables the shifting of a kudikidappu on the request by a landholder and that under certain conditions. Evidently the purpose of S.75 (2) is to give relief to the landholder is cases where he will be put to hardship if the kudikidappu is not shitted. A similar provision for shifting is contained in S.75 (4) The Kerala Land Reforms Act is an agrarian measure. Fixity to tenants is conceived as promoting agrarian reforms. Kudikidappukars also are treated under the Act in the same manner. Even in the case of a tenant on whom fixity is conferred provisions for resumption under certain circumstances are made such as resumption for the benefit of small holders. The exceptions to the rule of fixity envisaged in the case of a tenant as well as kudikidappukaran do not negative the rule of fixity. They would operate as exceptions and any one pleading such exception must prove the same The object and purpose of the Act, the treatment of that purpose in the Act and the specific provision conferring not merely fixity but right to purchase indicate, the scheme whereunder the fixity of kudikidappukaran is conferred subject to exceptions, those exceptions being such as the ones provided in S.75 (2), and S.75 (4). In this context I may notice what the learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, said in Mathukutty v. Thomas 1976 K. L T. 120. In this context I may notice what the learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, said in Mathukutty v. Thomas 1976 K. L T. 120. “Though the Act has introduced various restrictions in the matter of holding land and has conferred fixity of tenure on tenants and kudikidappukars it has not taken away the right to hold substantial property. S.75 (1) confers fixity of tenure on a kudikidappukaran. He is also entitled to the ownership of three or five on ten cents depending on whether the kudikidappu is within a Panchayat, municipality or corporation area. Notwithstanding the conferment of the fixity of tenure under S.75 (1) of the Act, a person in possession of the land can by virtue of S.75 (2) ask for shifting if the requirements of that section had been satisfied “ With this statement of law I am in full agreement. 12. It appears to be evident from S.75(2) that in the event of a contest the proof by a landholder must be of the need for shitting the kudikidappu from its existing location to another suitable site in order to satisfy one or other of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.75. It would be necessary to show that the whole of the property in which the kudikidappu is situate or part of that property including the site is required for such purposes. The landholder may have extensive lands available for the use for which he seeks shifting of the kudikidappu from its site Any of such lands might be used with equal advantage. If so one would naturally ask why the site of the kudikidappu is required. II would not be an answer to say that the landholder desires that it should be so. It will be difficult to read bonafide need in the circumstances unless something more is shown. The preference may be because the other lands in the possession of the landholder may not be suitable and it may be that the site of the kudikidappu is therefore more desirable. It may also be that there are special reasons for the preference of the landholder to the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate. The question is not whether any reasonable man would need this land but whether the petitioner needs this land. This is a matter for assessment by a Tribunal. It may also be that there are special reasons for the preference of the landholder to the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate. The question is not whether any reasonable man would need this land but whether the petitioner needs this land. This is a matter for assessment by a Tribunal. Normally the standard of a reasonable man would be applied in making such assessment. But that need not always be the case, as for example, where for some particular reason the petitioner is able to show to the Tribunal that there are reasons for his peculiar preference for the land in which the kudikidappu is situate. That would be a matter for the petitioner to establish. 13. It is also possible that in certain cases where a petitioner may seek shifting in order that he may us the property for one or other of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.75, the property may be of sufficient extent to allow the kudikidappukaran to continue his residence therein notwithstanding the use of a portion of the property for such purpose. Therefore, merely because the property in which the kudikidappu is situate is the one to be utilised for such purpose it would not necessarily follow that the kudikidappu should be shifted from the property. It must further be shown that for utilisation of the property for such purpose shifting would be called for. In this context I am unable to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Mathukutty v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 that if the property be of the extent of I acre or less the kudikidappu could be shifted. I see no warrant in the provision in S.75(2) for such an assumption. What extent is to be occupied by a building and its appurtenance must vary from case to case. A person constructing a six bed room bungalow must necessarily take more space than a person who constructs a three roomed house and in the latter case the extent of land required would be much less than the extent of land required for the former. May be there are cases where, in view of the nature of the construction even if the area of the property is more than 1 acre the person could seek shifting of the kudikidappu situate in the property. May be there are cases where, in view of the nature of the construction even if the area of the property is more than 1 acre the person could seek shifting of the kudikidappu situate in the property. It is particularly so when the property is required for industrial purpose. The requirement may be not of 1 acre but of much more and therefore even if the property is of an extensive area of more than 1 acre the landholder may be entitled to seek shifting. There may be cases where the construction of a house may require only 10 cents or 15 cents and the property may be of an extent of 1 acre. In such a case the proof, merely of the requirement of construction of a building in the property, may not be sufficient to show the need of “the land” which justifies the shifting. I am afraid that any statement of the law that if the property in which the kudikidappu is situate is 1 acre or less the kudikidappu is liable to be shifted may not be correct. To that extent Mathukutty v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 120 must be found to have been wrongly decided and the decision in Saphyia Umma v. Land Tribunal, Cannanore 1976 KLT. 31 which purports to follow the decision of the Division Bench must also be found to be wrong. 14. In Mathukutty v. Thomas this Court said: “In determining the bona fides the extent of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate is not an irrelevant consideration; on the other hand it is a very relevant consideration. There may be cases where the land is so extensive that it would be unreasonable to expect any person bonafide to require the entire land for building purposes. In such cases the obvious answer to be given by the Land Tribunal would be that it had not been established that the person in possession of the land required the land for building purposes. But when the area diminishes from a very large extent to a reasonable holding the question becomes much more difficult to answer. It may be that one person may take the view that he wanted an acre of land where his residential house should be. Another may be content with 50 cents or less. The Tribunal may think that 25 cents would be enough. It may be that one person may take the view that he wanted an acre of land where his residential house should be. Another may be content with 50 cents or less. The Tribunal may think that 25 cents would be enough. It is not the subjective view points that should govern the matter. What is reasonable in the context must be the principle that should be applied. The location of the land would be a relevant factor. The land may be situate inside the corporation or the municipality or within the panchayat in an agricultural area. It is normal for people to have a larger extent of land for building purposes in a rural set up.” With the general statement contained in the above passage I lake no exception. But what follows thereafter is a statement of law with which I find it difficult to agree. The Division Bench proceeds to state: “It may not be unreasonable to state that one acre of land is required in a rural area for building purposes. The same certainly cannot be said if the land is inside the corporation or municipality. Along with this aspect must be considered the question whether it should not normally be left to the person in possession of the land to decide how much of land is required for the purpose of constructing a building or for the other purposes mentioned by the section. In other words when once it is established that land is required for building purposes, the extent of the land required as stated by the appellant should be given due consideration and unless his claim is found to be unreasonable as to speall lack of bona fides should be allowed. Certainly the initial burden under S.75(2) of the Act is on the applicant to establish bonafide requirement. Once it is shown that no other land is available and there was bonafide requirement of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate the claim for shifting should be allowed unless the demand indicated an extravagant disposition on the part of the person or an unreasonable and unfair attitude. What has been stated above should be the proper approach in deciding when other factors required by the section are established. In determining whether the demand for a particular extent of land is reasonable the provision in S.75(3) is helpful. What has been stated above should be the proper approach in deciding when other factors required by the section are established. In determining whether the demand for a particular extent of land is reasonable the provision in S.75(3) is helpful. That sub-section indicates that if the person in possession of land has only an acre or less of land on the whole he can seek acquisition of other land. This shows that the Act contemplates that having an acre to oneself is permissible. Ordinarily therefore, if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not more than an acre the claim for shifting it from the land has to be held to be reasonable.” J may first refer to S.75(3) of the Act. That section reads: “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), where the total extent of land held by a person, either as owner or as tenant, is less than one acre and there is a kudikidappu on any land held by him, he may, if he requires the land occupied by such kudikidappu for constructing a building for his own residence, apply to the Government for the acquisition of land to which the kudikidappu may be shifted: Provided that after the expiry of a period of two years from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, an application shall not be made under this sub-section except with the consent of the kudikidappukaran. Explanation; For the purposes of this sub-section, (a) the total extent of land held by a person shall be computed as on the 1st day of July, 1969; (b) in calculating the total extent of land held by a person who is a member of a family, the extent of the land held by any member of his family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall also be taken into consideration”. That enables any person who is in possession of less than 1 acre, in all, to apply to the Government for acquisition of the land to which the kudikidappu may be shifted in case he requires the land occupied by the kudikidappu for constructing a building for his own residence. It may be noticed that this section refers only to construction of building for the residence of the landholder and not for the members of his family. It may be noticed that this section refers only to construction of building for the residence of the landholder and not for the members of his family. It also enables only a person who does not possess 1 acre in all to seek such acquisition. It does not enable a person to seek acquisition merely because the property in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than 1 acre. In other words the sub-section does not indicate in any manner that a person is entitled to have a property of 1 acre to put up a building irrespective of the area of other land in his possession. The sub-section does not, with great respect, support the view that if the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not more than 1 acre the claim for shifting is reasonable. A person may have 10 or 12 acres of land and the kudikidappu may be situate in one of his properties measuring 1 acre or less. S.75(3) would not enable such a person to seek acquisition of the land under S.75(3) so as to shift the kudikidappu and if that be the case how S.75(3) is to be taken to indicate that it would be reasonable to permit a person to seek shifting in case the property is less than 1 acre is not evident. 15. As indicated by me earlier it will be wrong to lay down any rule that any particular extent would be the reasonable extent for building purposes or any other purposes mentioned in S 75(2). That must depend upon the Facts and circumstances of each case. The extent required may vary. It may be, say as small as 10 cents in a particular case or, say, as large as 5 acres in another case. There is no indication in the Act as to what that extent should be. Therefore when a person seeks shifting from a property the total extent of which is 1 acre it does not follow that be is entitled to an order of shifting irrespective of the question whither his requirement does cover the entire property. Nor is there any scope for presumption that if the property is only 1 acre in extent it would be reasonable for him to seek shifting from the property. 16. Nor is there any scope for presumption that if the property is only 1 acre in extent it would be reasonable for him to seek shifting from the property. 16. Reference may also be made to the decision of Eradi J., in Saphyia Umma v. Land Tribunal, Cannanore 1976 KLT. 31. I have already indicated that it is not sufficient to show a reasonable and honest desire to construct a building in order to justify shifting. In the above decision my learned brother Eradi J. said: “All that is required to be established under the Section is that the applicant bonafide requires the land for the purpose of putting up a building for himself or a member of his family” With this statement of the law there could be no disagreement. But then follows the statement - “......and this condition will be satisfied if it is shown by satisfactory evidence that the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable and honest desire and intention to construct a building for the applicant or the particular member of the family.” With this part of the statement I find it difficult to agree. As stated earlier, it would not be sufficient to show an intention however honest or bonafide it may be. The element of need roust necessarily be shown. In the same decision my learned brother Eradi J. observes “The Division Bench also pointed out that going by the indications contained in the Act itself, ordinarily, the claim for shifting a kudikidappu from a land cannot be regarded as unreasonable if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu situates is not more than 1 acre.” As I have already indicated, there is no warrant in any of the provisions of the Act to assume that if the extent of the holding in which the kudikidappu is situate is less than 1 acre irrespective of the requirement of the entire land for the purposes mentioned in S.75(2) the landholder is entitled to seek shifting. Therefore, to that extent the observation of the learned Judge cannot, with great respect, be sustained. 17. Therefore, to that extent the observation of the learned Judge cannot, with great respect, be sustained. 17. The learned Chief Justice, has in the main judgment, attempted to explain the observation “Ordinarily therefore, if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not more than an acre the claim for shifting it from the land has to be held to be reasonable” in Mathukutty v. Ouseph Thomas 1976 KLT. 120. It is indicated that if this observation has the meaning that in all cases where the total extent is an acre or less, the shifting sought should be allowed, that would be to ignore the earlier part of the relevant paragraph in the judgment in Mathukutty's case. But in summing up the discussion on this point the learned Chief Justice observes: “When no other land is available or suitable for the purpose is established the area of an acre mentioned in S.75(3) is also relevant factor, subject to the consideration whether the demand for the entire area where it is an acre or less indicated an unreasonable or extravagant or unfair attitude on the part of the landlord.” The reference to an acre in S.75 (3) has, according to me, no bearing at all on the question whether the entire extent of the property in which the kudikidappu is situate is required for the one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2) of the Act. As I indicated earlier such extent may vary from case to case, may be much less than 1 acre in a case or may be much above 1 acre. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the approach on this question by my learned brother in the main judgment in the case. 18. T may also indicate that the observations in some of the judgments that it must be shown that the site of the kudikidappu is required for the purpose of S.75 (2) have led to some misunderstanding. 18. T may also indicate that the observations in some of the judgments that it must be shown that the site of the kudikidappu is required for the purpose of S.75 (2) have led to some misunderstanding. Eradi J. in Rehiman v. Ramu 1974 K. L. T. 741 stated thus: “The prayer for shifting is liable to be granted only after the Tribunal is satisfied that the landholder requires the land, viz., the site of the homestead occupied by the kudikidappukaran for the purpose of erecting a residential house for himself.” In Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad 1975 K. K. T. 628, the Division Bench said : “That would mean that it is not sufficient for an applicant seeking shifting of a kudikidappu merely to show that he has a bonafide intention to construct a building for himself or for a member of his family and that he requires some land for such construction but further that the land so required bonafide is the very site in which the kudikidappu is situate.” This does not mean that no other area than the site of the kudikidappu is required by the landholder for the purpose of S.75 (2). It is not sufficient to show that some area in the property in which the kudikidappu is situate is required to justify the shifting. It must be further shown that it is either the whole land or some area in that land inclusive of the site of the kudikidappu that is required. That is the idea conveyed in the decision of the Division Bench in Cheekutty v. Land Tribunal, Alangad, 1975 K. L. T. 628. I believe my learned brother Eradi J does not intend to convey a different view in Para.5 of the judgment in Saphya Umma v. Land Tribunal Cannanore, 1976 K. L. T. 31 as explained in the main judgment in this Case. The learned Judge said - “There is yet another ground mentioned by the land Tribunal for finding point No. (1) against the writ petitioner and that is that the writ petitioner had failed to prove that she requires the portion of the land in the occupation of the kudikidappu for the purpose of constructing a building for her son. The learned Judge said - “There is yet another ground mentioned by the land Tribunal for finding point No. (1) against the writ petitioner and that is that the writ petitioner had failed to prove that she requires the portion of the land in the occupation of the kudikidappu for the purpose of constructing a building for her son. This reasoning also cannot stand in view of the aforesaid pronouncement by the Division Bench in writ appeal No. 102 of 1975 wherein it has been held that “the expression 'the land' occurring in S.75 (2) refers to the whole of the land on which the kudikidappu situates and not the particular portion which actually constitutes the kudikidappu.” In other words, what the applicant in this case has to establish is that she requires the A schedule land for the purpose mentioned in the application, namely, for putting up the building for the applicant's son. It was unnecessary for the applicant to make out that she requires for the said purpose the particular portion of the A schedule property which is in the occupation of the kudikidappukaran. The third reason mentioned by the Land Tribunal is also thus erroneous. Hence it follows that the finding entered by the Land Tribunal on point (1) that the writ petitioner has not made out her plea of bonafide requirement for building purpose for her son has to beset aside.” It may not be correct to state that when once the requirement of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is established even though the requirement may not take in the entire land and would be satisfied with a portion of the land still the applicant would be entitled to an order to shift the kudikidappu. In such a case it would be necessary to establish that the land inclusive of the site of the kudikidappu is required for one or other of the purposes contemplated in S.75 (2). 19. It is well to remember what has been said by my learned brother Bhaskaran J. in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Vaikom 1974 KLT. 706 that the Kerala Land Reforms Act contains no provision to take any action against the landholder who, after reducing the kudikidappu site to his possession, does not utilise the land for any of the purpose for which he sought shifting. 706 that the Kerala Land Reforms Act contains no provision to take any action against the landholder who, after reducing the kudikidappu site to his possession, does not utilise the land for any of the purpose for which he sought shifting. The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has enacted provisions which enable the tenant ousted from the building occupied by him on the ground that the building is required for certain purposes to seek reparation. Similar provisions are absent in the Kerala Land Reforms Act. A landholder who seeks shifting and obtains an order is immune from any consequence even if he does not utilise the land for any of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2). He can loudly proclaim to the world that he said so only for obtaining the order for shifting of the kudikidappu and now that he has achieved that purpose he is not proposing to utilise the site for the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2). The party affected as well as the court would be powerless to meet the situation. 1 am indicating this only to emphasise that what the Act contemplates is not the desire or intention on the part of the land older but something more substantial. The restrictions in S.75 (2) are safeguards to the kudikidappukaran. It is not a safeguard to him to be told that though he may lose the site in which the kudikidappu is situate he may get another site instead. If he has a valuable right to remain in the same property except in exceptional cases I do consider the continuance in a property in which one's kudikidappu is situate as a very valuable right it cannot be assumed that the Act has made provision for forfeiture of such right merely on the expression of desire or intention on the part of the landholder that the kudikidappu should be shifted. It is true that the word “bona fide” qualify the requirement of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2). But bona fides has to be adjudged not from subsequent conduct. 20. It may be useful to sum up what I have stated elsewhere in this judgment: 1. Any landholder seeking the shifting of a kudikidappu has to prove that he bonafide requires the land on which the kudikidappu is situate for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2). 2. 20. It may be useful to sum up what I have stated elsewhere in this judgment: 1. Any landholder seeking the shifting of a kudikidappu has to prove that he bonafide requires the land on which the kudikidappu is situate for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2). 2. It would not be sufficient to show mere intention or desire on the part of such person to use the land for such purpose after shifting the kudikidappu. Such intention however honest, genuine or bonafide would not be sufficient to entitle the person to get relief. It must further be shown that apart from intention or desire there is an element of need. 3. 'Requirement' which involves the concept of an element of need is to be determined by assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. The genuineness or good faith of the intention to use the property for one or other of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2), the availability of other properties for such purpose, the reasons for seeking the property in which the kudikidappu is situate for such purpose are all matters which call for consideration in the assessment of the question of requirement. 4. There is no rule that any particular extent is required for any of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.75. The extent of the area required is a question fact. It may vary from case to case and must depend upon the particular facts of each case. Therefore even in cases where a person possessed of other properties establishes requirement of the property in which the kudikidappu is situate for one of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2), if the property is of so extensive an area that it could be put to the use for the purposes mentioned in S.75(2) without disturbing the kudikidappu shifting of such kudikidappu cannot be justified. 5. S.75(l) confers fixity of tenure in a kudikidappukaran and S.75(2) and (4) are exceptions to that rule, provided by the statute. Any one seeking the benefit of these exceptions must prove that circumstances justifying the application of these exceptions. 6. What is to be established in an application for a shifting is that either whole of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate or portion of it inclusive of the site of kudikidappu is required for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2). 6. What is to be established in an application for a shifting is that either whole of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate or portion of it inclusive of the site of kudikidappu is required for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2). 21. Coming to the cases before us: In O. P. 962 of 1975 the landholder owned several plots of land in any of which he could construct a building. His case of particular affinity to the land in which the kudikidappu is based on the plea that his ancestors were buried in that property. This is not a case pleaded before the Land Tribunal nor brought out in the chief examination of the applicant. Evidently this was not a ground relied on at the time of argument before the Land Tribunal. The learned Chief Justice therefore did not find reason to entertain this plea in the Original Petition. To that extent I agree with the Chief Justice. But it appears from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice that it that had been so pleaded that would have been a good ground. I refrain from expressing any opinion on it. Whether that would be a special reason to enable a person to proper the particular land for construction must be a question of fact and must depend upon assessment of various factors. It appears to me that it may not be proper to consider it as a question of law and state the conclusions of this Court on this question. It is especially so when that is not required for the purpose of this case. That is the reason why I desist from expressing any view on this question. The finding that the petitioner had failed to plead this is sufficient to negative the petitioner's request. Hence O.P. 962 of 1975 is to be dismissed. In O.P. 4992 of 1975 there was only the evidence of the petitioner. He was not even cross-examined in the case and on the available evidence the Land Tribunal has based its decision. I do not see any justification for the plea that any principle of natural justice had been violated. No such principle would be available in a case where opportunity given to a party has not been availed of. He was not even cross-examined in the case and on the available evidence the Land Tribunal has based its decision. I do not see any justification for the plea that any principle of natural justice had been violated. No such principle would be available in a case where opportunity given to a party has not been availed of. Hence I agree with the learned Chief Justice that O.P. 4992 of 1975 also is to be dismissed.