JUDGMENT : J.B. MEHTA, J. 1. In respect of the collision accident which had taken place between the Mercedes car CJF 1953 and the parked truck GTF-1061 which had taken place on June 7, 1970 between 11-00 and 11-30 p.m. resulting in the death of Devendraprasad Jani and his wife Mrudulaben and his daughter Dharini and where a minor claimant son Khagesh had been injured and one other person, which is a matter of a separate claim viz. Ramanlal Haribhai Upadhyay, had also expired forms the subject matter of these two appeals. The First Appeals Nos. 188 and 115 of 1973 relate to the compensation claim in respect of the death of mother Mrudulaben while F.A. No. 189 and 116 of 1973 relate to the compensation claim in respect of the father. The Claims Tribunal had found only Mercedes driver Haribhai Thakershi and its owner Maneklal alongwith the British India General Insurance Company, the insurer of that car which had taken comprehensive policy liable for negligence while the parked truck owner Mahmodbhai with his driver Tapubha and its insurer Anand Insurance Company Ltd. were held not liable even though their insurance policy was also comprehensive one. In the mother's claim, the father and the mother of Mrudulaben had been also joined as party-opponents. The claim in respect of mother Mrudulaben had been made to the extent of Rs. 30,000/- and the prayer to increase the claim to Rs. 40,000/- had been rejected by the order as Ex.113. Similarly in the case of the father's death the claim to increase compensation from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,45,000/- by Ex.71 had been rejected because the claim for increase had been .made after the evidence of the applicant was over. The award in the case of the mother had been made by the Tribunal to the extent of Rs. 21,000 against the concerned opponents who were held liable in respect of the negligence in respect of the Mercedes car and in respect of the death of the father the awarded amount was of Rs. 66,000/- and interest was allowed at 4½%. In the appeal Mr. Oza has at the very outset before any effective hearing reduced the claim so far as the father is concerned only to sum of Rs. 1,05,000/- from the original claim of Rs. 66,000/- and interest was allowed at 4½%. In the appeal Mr. Oza has at the very outset before any effective hearing reduced the claim so far as the father is concerned only to sum of Rs. 1,05,000/- from the original claim of Rs. 1.45,000/- while in the case of the mother it had been reduced to a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as has been made before the Claims Tribunal even though originally in the appeal Rs. 45,000/- had been claimed. A question has also been raised as regards proper apportionment on the footing that the truck driver and its owner and insurer must also share responsibility for their blame in this composite negligence. 2. The finding regarding negligence rests on the material evidence which could hardly be challenged. The primary fact emerged from the evidence of the Panchnama, Ex.90, proved by panch witness Balvantrai, Ex.88, when it is appreciated in the light of the evidence of the eye witness Bashir Nannabhai, Ex.86 who had come immediately within 15 minutes when it is read with the evidence of driver Haribhai, Ex.106 and the driver Tapubha, Ex.108 alongwith the evidence of the brother Mahesh chandra Jani, Ex.85 and the head constable Shersing Sardarsing, Ex.119. The driver Haribhai Ex.106 had taken the car of the owner Maneklal Khamar. Haribhai was motor mechanic, Ex.106 and he has deposed that Maneklal told him that this Mercedes car was not being used and so he and Devendrabhai who was the neighbour in the same building might go far a stroll so that the battery might be charged. That is how Devendrabhai and his wife Mrudulaben and the two children were in the car. They started from Nandasan at about 9-30 or 10-00 p.m. They halted there for about 15 minutes and there Ramanlal Haribhai Upadhyaya, the claimant in the other matter which is not the subject matter of this appeal had joined them from Nandasan as he also wanted to go to Mehsana and he was allowed to sit in the car. It is thereafter that this accident has taken place on this highway road with this parked truck in question on this dark night. 3. The Panchnama Ex.90 which is proved by the panch witness discloses that the road in question from Nandasan in the south, to Mehsana in the north was 221 ft. It is thereafter that this accident has taken place on this highway road with this parked truck in question on this dark night. 3. The Panchnama Ex.90 which is proved by the panch witness discloses that the road in question from Nandasan in the south, to Mehsana in the north was 221 ft. wide road with 7' Kutcha shoulder on the east and the west. The truck in question had beed parked on the tar road itself and the Panchnama shows that the truck was facing north and its front left rear wheel was at 14' distance from the Mercedes car. The front wheel of the truck was at 12 ft. to the North and at a distance of 2 ft. from the western portion and it was on the Kutcha road. The truck was full of gravel material. The right-hand front wheel was at 2'-10' to East on the tar road and right hand rear wheel was at a distance of 11'-4' on the tar road. The truck had green colour. The right-hand rod, the right-hand portion of the body, the wheel portion angle, the right-hand tyre had been damaged. Both the wheels on the right-hand and the left hand had been separated. The back light had been broken. The chasis portion and the right hand portion of the body of the truck had been bent. It is thereafter mentioned that the car in question had been facing west and its front right wheel was at a distence of 4'-9' from the truck right rear wheel and the wheel had brushed and at a distance of 9½' the other right hand wheel was there. The back wheel was about 4' from the west and the back left hand wheel was at 4'-6' to the south from that wheel and it was also to the west of the tar road. The left-hand bumper and the light had been broken. The mudguard had taken the green colour of the truck. The bonnet had been bent having the- colour of the truck. The upper portion had been damaged and both the doors had been broken. The panch witness Balvantrai, Ex.88, had stated that the truck was lying on the road as its tyre had burst and it was facing to the north towards Mehsana while the Mercedes car was facing towards west at the time of the Panchnama. The upper portion had been damaged and both the doors had been broken. The panch witness Balvantrai, Ex.88, had stated that the truck was lying on the road as its tyre had burst and it was facing to the north towards Mehsana while the Mercedes car was facing towards west at the time of the Panchnama. The truck was lying on the tar road and only the front left side wheel was on the Kutcha road. The back side chasis portion was damaged while the left side upper portion of the car had been damaged along with the engine and the doors. He denied the suggestion that the truck was lying at a distance of 10' on the western side of the tar road. He also stated that the back light of the truck had been broken when the Panchnama was prepared. He also denied the suggestion that the back side left wheel of the truck was not at a distance of 2' from the tar road, from the left. He saw no reflection on the back side of the truck. Bashirbhai, Ex.86, who had come within 15 minutes after this accident in his car, has deposed that the Mercedes car had been practically smashed. He has deposed that at that time Haribhai had told him that he was driving the motor. The driver seat was empty at the time and he had taken Haribhai in his car and brought him to Mehsana. This independent witness has also categorically deposed that it was dark night at the time of the accident and the road had been blocked as the car was lying from east to west and the truck was on the left side of the road. This independent witness has also categorically deposed that it was dark night at the time of the accident and the road had been blocked as the car was lying from east to west and the truck was on the left side of the road. Head Constable Shersing Sardarsingh, Ex.119, has given earlier version of Haribhai in the police statement recorded on June 8, 1970 on the next day to the effect that one motor car was coming in full light from the opposite direction all of a sudden and so he had given a turn to his car on the left hand side and at that time one truck was standing ahead of him and in order to save he had given a turn to his car on the right hand side and at that time the wheel of his car had come on it and the car had taken a turn and had dashed with the truck standing ahead which had alight. 4. The last material witness Tapubha, Ex.108, driver of the truck, has stated that his right side rear wheel tyres had burst at about 8.0 p.m. and so he had kept the truck on the jack with dim light on in the front and the rear sides and he had gone to inform his master. The cleaner had been kept at the truck. He returned at about 10 or 10-30 p.m. Both he and the conductor had slept in the body of the truck. He denies having kept stone near the tyre the that had burst. He woke only at the time of the impact of the collision at about 11-0 or 11-30 p.m. According to him, Haribhai was driving the Mercedes car and was in the driver's seat. 5. From the aforesaid evidence primary facts which emerged are that the truck on this tar road had been parked because its tyre had burst on the tar road itself and only the front left wheel had been slightly on the Kutcha road. 5. From the aforesaid evidence primary facts which emerged are that the truck on this tar road had been parked because its tyre had burst on the tar road itself and only the front left wheel had been slightly on the Kutcha road. Even though the lights were on, he admitted even in the claim petition and as deposed to by the truck driver Tapubha, the fact remains that the truck was an obstruction on this highway road because it was a dark night when the other road users on this national highway would be finding this a great obstacle because the truck driver had not taken ordinary precaution to park the truck on the Kutcha portion of the road. There was no question of any extra precaution in such cases but teachings of the ordinary experience would have required the truck driver to take the normal precaution not to occupy so much of this road when other road users on this national highway would be so seriously obstructed. Traffic on such a dark night would be going with a fair amount of speed on this highway and conditions of our Indian roads would have taught lesson to such a driver that the vehicle coming with lights on might easily dazzle the vehicle on the opposite side resulting in loss of vision and loss of nerve so that the driver would have to bounce on such a parked truck. 6. The earlier version of Haribhai given before the head constable Shersing, Ex.119, that when the motor truck was coming with full light on from the opposite direction he had suddenly to turn his vehicle is probabilized by the telling story of this Mercedes car which at the time of the accident was facing west. That itself shows that the last minute attempt of the Mercedes car of Haribhai must be to take turn to the left which must be necessitated only on seeing the on coming vehicle with full lights on. Therefore, even though we may not believe Haribhai who is making all sorts of inconsistent statement that he was not driving or that he had taken a turn on the right hand side, so far as this particular earlier version of Haribhai is concerned it is clearly established by the telling circumstances which emerges from the panchnama of the scene of the incident, Ex.90. 7. Even though Mr. 7. Even though Mr. Shah vehemently argued that the truck driver has discharged all his duties by parking his truck on the left hand side of the road with back lights on as per the relevant regulations, he must share his share of the blame because his vehicle has constituted serious obstruction to the road traffic contravening statutory duty imposed by the safety provisions in this matter. The legal position in this context is well settled by three decisions of this Court in F.A. Nos. 287 and 288 of 1971 decided on February 20, 1973, F.A. Nos. 483 and 484 of 1973 decided on June 18, 1974 and F.A. Nos. 600 and 601 of 1972 decided on July 30, 1974. All these cases were in the context of parked vehicle colliding with the fast moving vehicle. "The relevant statutory provision in section 81 which deals with leaving the vehicle in a dangerous position enacts that no person in charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or allow the vehicle or any trailer to remain at rest on any road in such a position or in such a condition or in such circumstances as to cause or be likely to cause danger, obstruction or undue inconvenience to other users of the road." The relevant rules for lights or lamps are Rules 146 and 271. Rule 271 (2) deals with cases outside the limits of a Municipal Corporation, Municipality or Cantonment, if a motor vehicle is at rest within the hours during which lights are required in such a position as not to cause danger or undue inconvenience to other users of the road, it shall not be necessary for the motor vehicle to display any lights. Rule 146 (1) enacts that, save as hereinafter provided, every motor vehicle while in a public place during the period between half an hour after sunset and half an hour before sunrise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and vehicles on the road at a distance of 150 meters ahead shall carry the following lamps (hereinafter referred to as ‘obligatory front lamps’). (a) save in the cases of a motor cycle and an invalid carriage, two lamps showing to the front a white light visible from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. (a) save in the cases of a motor cycle and an invalid carriage, two lamps showing to the front a white light visible from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. xxx xxx xxx And shall, in every case, also carry: (i) one lamp (hereinafter referred to as the "rear lamp") showing to the rear a red light visible from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. (ii) a lamp, which may be the rear lamp or some other device, illuminating with a white light the whole of the registration mark exhibited on the rear of the vehicle so as to render it legible from a distance of one hundred fifty meters to the rear. xxx xxx xxx (2) Every lamp required under sub-rule (i) to be carried shall, during the aforesaid period, be kept properly lighted and in an efficient condition. Therefore, there is a statutory provision of section 81 which provides that such a truck cannot be parked on a public road in such a dangerous position so as to obstruct other road users especially on such a dark night in such a way that it occupies such a large portion of this tar road which is only 22½ wide, even though it had on its side Kutcha portion of 7' where if the vehicle had been parked there would have been no such risk or obstruction to the traffic on the high way road. Therefore, merely because the back lights were on, the truck driver cannot be exonerated from the liability for such obstruction on such dark night creating such dangerous obstruction to the other highway users by occupying such substantial portion of the tar road itself. The breach of such statutory provision itself would enhance common law duty to take care and would amount to a prima facie case of fault as there would be presumption of neglect which must be rebutted by the driver who had contravened the rule. Such statutory regulations are really safety regulations which create a duty to take care by not injuring the other road users and are clearly for the benefit of this class of individuals who are the other users of the road. Where a statute requires something to be done or not to be done, there can be no room for inquiry what a man of ordinary prudence would or would not do. Where a statute requires something to be done or not to be done, there can be no room for inquiry what a man of ordinary prudence would or would not do. When such a positive obligation of taking care to other road users had been imposed so as not to injure, the case would always be one of raising prima facie presumption, which must be rebutted by the offending driver as well. In F.A. Nos. 287 and 288 of 1971 decided on 20.2.1973 this Court had taken the view that the stationary parked vehicle which was lying without having necessary lights committed both obstruction and nuisance on the public road and even that parked vehicle had to bear its full share of responsibility of 50%. The effect of rule 146 had been summarised which requires that such a vehicle should also have a rear lamp or some other device illuminating with a white light the whole of the registration mark exhibited on the rear of the vehicle so as to render it legible from a distance of one hundred fifty meters to the rear. Rule 213 was also referred to which requires that every goods vehicle shall be fitted with two rear red reflectors having the diameter of not less than 750 MIs. across the reflectors on both the sides of the body. According to this rule, such reflectors shall, while the vehicle is in a public place during the period between half an hour after the sunset and half an hour before the sun rise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and vehicles on the road at a distance of 150 meters, be kept unobstructed and clean. It was pointed out that the whole emphasis was on the vehicle being not parked in a way so as to obstruct other users. In the last decision where collision with the parked truck had taken place because the driver bad been dazzled by full lights of the coming vehicle and so he lost both his vision and nerves, the whole blame was fastened on the parked trailor. In view of this settled legal position Mr. Shah could hardly rely on the decision of the Federal Court of Malaysia in Chan Loo Khee vs. Lal Siew San and Others, 1971 ACJ 408. In view of this settled legal position Mr. Shah could hardly rely on the decision of the Federal Court of Malaysia in Chan Loo Khee vs. Lal Siew San and Others, 1971 ACJ 408. In that case the learned Chief Justice had at page 411 in terms held that the driver of a stationary vehicle could reasonably foresee the risk in parking the vehicle on the road and he should have parked it on the grass verge otherwise he would have to share the blame which in that case in his opinion was apportioned to 20%. The other two judges had tried to draw a clear line in such a case in absence any statutory obligation, but such a course could never be adopted in this country where the statutory provisions clearly lay down the statutory obligation under section 81 so that there is a duty created not to create such a dangerous obstruction. In such cases the question is not of taking any extraordinary precaution but merely not to put out of consideration the teachings of experience when such highway is used in night hours and the night is also a dark night with no light on the road. In our Indian conditions when the goods traffic at night is moving on such national highways with almost full lights which would dazzle other vehicles and where there would be loss of vision and loss of nerves because of such situations, on such smaller roads with only 22' width, it would be surely a duty to keep the tar road clear from any obstruction. Therefore, the learned trial Judge had not noticed this crucial circumstance which clinched the issue of composite negligence that there was a statutory duty in the present case and it being an accident on such a dark night the driver of the parked vehicle must have his share of the blame. Mr. Shah's argument that the Mercedes driver was alone responsible because the back lights should have sufficiently warned him could not be accepted for the simple reason that, even though the parked vehicle had lights on, such a collision would always occur because the drivers travelling fast often do not realise that the other vehicle is stationary until they are very close. The driver of the Mercedes car having been dazzled is deposed to by the vehicle itself and in such circumstances whoever creates such unreasonable obstruction on the road must share the blame. Of course, as regards the quantum of apportionment the Mercedes driver must share a larger portion of the blame to the extent of 75% while the parked vehicle driver must share only to the extent of 25% because he had parked the vehicle on the left hand side and he had kept the lights on as admitted by the claimant himself and as is disclosed in the evidence. The truck was also a loaded truck. The driver and the conductor had slept on the truck and they had not been careful as was expected from them as per their statutory obligation and to that extent only by creating this dangerous obstruction they have to share this 25% blame on the theory of causation which we have discussed in L.I.C. vs. Legal Representatives of the deceased Naranbhai, 1973 ACJ 226 , where we have discussed the entire doctrine of the last opportunity which has now become obsolete and where we have pointed out how in such road accident cases the two relevant crucial questions must be determined by determining what faults were there which caused damage and what was the proportion in which damages should be apportioned having regard to the responsibility of those in fault. Therefore, the driver Haribhai could never urge any emergency. His situation was clearly of dilemma i that either he was not on the proper look out or he was going so fast that he could not avoid collision with this parked vehicle. In fact, the force of the impact makes it in terms clear that the driver Haribhai must share the larger part of the blame and so we have made the aforesaid apportionment of 75% and 25% as between the Mercedes car and the parked truck. 8. The Tribunal had rightly refused to believe Haribhai when he made contradictory statement that be was not driving the vehicle but the deceased Raman Lal was driving the Mercedes car at the time of the accident. 8. The Tribunal had rightly refused to believe Haribhai when he made contradictory statement that be was not driving the vehicle but the deceased Raman Lal was driving the Mercedes car at the time of the accident. The evidence of the panch witness Balvantrai, Ex.88 as well as the independent witness Bashirbhai, Ex.86, has rightly been relied upon because the driver's seat was empty and in fact in the earlier statement even before the head constable Shersingh, Ex.119, Haribhai had admitted that fact. The Mercedes insurer could not be exonerated as the policy of the car, Ex.129, was comprehensive. The proposal form has not been produced in spite of notice but there is clearly the Driver's Extension clause. The evidence of the owner Maneklal, Ex.123, that Haribhai was given the car to go to his house only has rightly not been accepted. The Mercedes car had been entrusted to this mechanic Haribhai, Ex.108, who had got the driver's licence so that the battery could be charged. Haribhai being thus clearly a licensed authorised driver as per the settled legal position in Naranbhai's case, the Driver's extension clause was rightly relied upon by the Tribunal and the policy being a comprehensive policy the insurer was rightly held liable. Similarly Mr. Nanavati's contention that the insurer was not liable for this gratuitous passenger has hardly any substance. The proposal form has not been produced even after notice and the fact remains that this car policy is a comprehensive policy where the passenger's risk is clearly covered. 9. Section 2 of the policy Ex.129 provides that "The company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums including the claimant's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by the insured." Therefore, the only exception for such third party risk is in the case of the employee risk which is taken only to the extent of statutory requirement under section 95. In respect of this gratuitous passenge rcomprehensive policy has taken the basic premium with extra discount as per the computation table mentioned therein which mentions in column (g) addition for expenses to passengers. Therefore, the Tribunal rightly held that the insurer of the Mercedes car was completely liable to meet the claim because of the comprehensive policy. As far as the truck policy, Ex.112 is concerned, it is an unlimited third party risk insurance policy and no contention has been advanced in that behalf by Mr. Shah. Therefore, the material question which arises is as to the assessment of compensation. The Tribunal has in terms relied upon the evidence of Surendraprasad, Ex.101, Executive Engineer in O.N.G.C. where the deceased Devendraprasad was serving as Technical Assistant Grade A and he would have gone upto the post of Executive Engineer. The pay scale of the deceased was 350-25-450-EB-25-600-EB-30-720 with benefits of house rent allowance and dearness allowance. He was a healthy man and at the time of the accident he was getting Rs. 750/- per month including dearness allowance. He was getting Rs. 50/- as house rent allowance. His total pay was Rs. 80/-. The Tribunal assessed that excluding Rs. 200/- which the deceased could have spent on himself, the dependency benefit as well as the saving to the estate can be capitalised on the basis of Rs. 600/- per month. The deceased was aged 29 years. He was the bread earner of the family and his promising career has been cut short at this young age. Therefore 15 years purchase factor would be a conservative estimate. Even on the basis of Rs. 550/- per month as the datum figure yearly amount would be Rs. 6,600/- and upon 15 years purchase factor the minimum compensation amount would come to Rs. 99,000/- as per the principles settled in Hirji Virji Transport vs. Bashiran Bibi, 1971 ACJ 458 , Mr. Oza has confined the claim only to Rs. 1,05,000. The conventional amount of Rs. 3,000/- if it is taken into account as per our settled line of decisions for loss of expectation of life, the award would come to Rs. 1,20,000/- but as the claim made was of Rs. Oza has confined the claim only to Rs. 1,05,000. The conventional amount of Rs. 3,000/- if it is taken into account as per our settled line of decisions for loss of expectation of life, the award would come to Rs. 1,20,000/- but as the claim made was of Rs. 1.00,000/- we would make the award accordingly and each of both the tortfeasors would be jointly and severally liable along with their insurer, so far as the claimants are concerned, but for working out the inter se liability the apportionment would be to the extent of Rs. 75,000/- so far as the Mercedes car driver and insurer are concerned while Rs. 25,000/- so far as the driver, the owner and the insurer of the truck are concerned. As far as the mother Mrudulaben is concerned, she was a teacher and the Tribunal found that she was getting a salary of Rs. 160/- per month including D.A. in the girls school at Mehsana. She was a young lady of 29 years and was healthy. As her family has been maintained by the husband who was the bread earner, from the wife's salary except for a small amount of pocket expenses of Rs. 25/- the balance of Rs. 135/- would be wholly saved and would be augmenting the saving. Therefore, loss on that head would have to be capitalised by yearly amount of Rs. 1,620/- and on 15 years purchase factor, the compensation amount for the mother's death would come to Rs. 24,300/- and if Rs. 3,000/- are added as conventional amount for loss of expectation of life, the compensation amount would be Rs. 27,300/- as per the settled principles in the aforesaid Bashiran Bibi's case'. If that amount is taken into account for determining interse liability of the tort-feasors, Rs. 20,475/- would have to be borne by the Mercedes driver, owner and insurer while Rs. 6,825/- would have to be borne by the truck driver, owner and insurer. But so far as the claimant is concerned, the liability of the tort-feasors would be joint and several. The whole estimate we have made is very conservative estimate. Mr. 20,475/- would have to be borne by the Mercedes driver, owner and insurer while Rs. 6,825/- would have to be borne by the truck driver, owner and insurer. But so far as the claimant is concerned, the liability of the tort-feasors would be joint and several. The whole estimate we have made is very conservative estimate. Mr. Oza wanted the sum to be augmented because of the mother's services having been lost to the minor claimant Khagesh, who was only 1½ years boy, but as we have capitalised the dependency benefit and the saving benefit and awarded almost the entire claim so far as the father was concerned and even so far as the mother was concerned, out of the whole claim of Rs. 30,000/- we have awarded the amount of Rs. 27,300/- we do not propose to go into the larger question. We may only mention the fact that the learned Tribunal had wrongly made deduction twice over so far as the expenses of the family were concerned because if they came from the father's salary, so far as the mother's salary was concerned, what would have to be deducted would be out of pocket expenses because the entire amount of the mother's salary would be saved. 10. In the result, both the appeals filed by the insurance company-British India Insurance Company, the insurer of the Mercedes Car F.A. Nos. 188 and 189 of 1973 in respect of the mother and the father must fail ; while so far as the claimants' appeals Nos. 115 and 116 of 1973 are concerned, they must be allowed. We modify the award of the Tribunal by holding that in the father's application respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 8, the driver, the owner and the insurer of the car as well respondents Nos. 3, 5 and 7. The Anand Insurance Company, the owner of the truck and the driver of the truck are jointly and severally liable so far as the claimants are concerned. So far as working out the interne liability is concerned of these tort feasors the liability interse shall be to the extent of Rs. 75,000/- so far as opponents Nos. 1,2 and 8 are concerned and Rs. 25,000/- so far as opponents Nos. 3, 5 and 7 are concerned. So far as the mother's claim is concerned, the award is modified by awarding a sum of Rs. 75,000/- so far as opponents Nos. 1,2 and 8 are concerned and Rs. 25,000/- so far as opponents Nos. 3, 5 and 7 are concerned. So far as the mother's claim is concerned, the award is modified by awarding a sum of Rs. 27,300/- against the aforesaid tort-feasors jointly and severally, opponents Nos. 1, 2 and 8, the driver, the owner and the insurer of the car and opponents Nos. 3, 5 and 7 the owner, the driver and the insurer of the truck and so far as their inter se liability is concerned, apportionment shall be of Rs. 20,475/- so far as opponents Nos. 1, 2 and 8 are concerned while Rs. 6,825/- so far as opponents Nos. 3, 5 and 7 are concerned. In both the awards the compensation amount shall carry the usual interest at 6% and not at the rate of 4½% awarded by the Tribunal from the date of the application till realisation. The claimants' Appeals are allowed with costs and the insurer's appeals are dismissed with costs. The claimants shall get full costs as their entire claim has been fully awarded in both the forums from the aforesaid concerned opponents. In respect of the mother Mrudulaben, the minor Khagesh and the grandmother both are awarded this entire compensation of Rs. 27,300/- and we maintain the apportionment made by the Tribunal that Rs. 10,000/- shall go to the grandmother while the balance shall be for the minor. As the minor gets a large amount we would direct that except the mother's amount of Rs. 10,000/- the rest of the awarded amounts with the interest accumulated shall be invested by the Tribunal in long term deposits with a Scheduled Bank. The Tribunal shall permit the cost amount to be withdrawn for the expenses of this litigation. From the interest amount the Tribunal shall permit monthly withdrawal of Rs. 250/- for the maintenance expenses and for that purpose a savings account may be opened. Liberty also shall be reserved to approach the Tribunal for larger withdrawals whenever necessary for the minor's interest. The amount shall be handed over to the minor Khagesh when he attains majority with all accumulation in his account. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.