Judgment :- 1. In all these cases, the scope and ambit of S.125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, for short, the Act, arises for consideration in one form or the other. This is a new section that has been introduced into the Act by Act 35 of 1969. S.125 as it stood before the amendment merely stated that "125. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. No order of the Land Tribunal or the Land Board under this Act shall be called in question in any court except as provided in this Act." By S.102 of Act 35 of 1969, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, which introduced several amendments and elaborate changes in the Act the present S.125 has been introduced. That section is in these terms: "125. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. - (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. (2) No order of the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any civil court, except as provided in this Act. (3) If in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only. (4) The Land Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under sub-section (3) and return the records together with its decision to the civil court. (5)The civil court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other proceedings accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it. (4) The Land Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under sub-section (3) and return the records together with its decision to the civil court. (5)The civil court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other proceedings accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it. (6) The decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the civil court. (7) No civil court shall have power to grant injunction in any suit or other proceeding referred to in sub-section (3) restraining any person from entering into or occupying or cultivating any land or kudikidappu or to appoint a receiver for any property in respect of which a question referred to in that sub-section has arisen, till such question is decided by the Land Tribunal, and any such injunction granted or appointment made before the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or before such question has arisen, shall stand cancelled." By sub-section (1) the jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government has been ousted. The only saving provision is that nothing contained in the sub-section would apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. There was the further bar introduced by sub-section (2) which is a reproduction of the old S.125 which we have already read. Thereafter came the most crucial provision for the purpose of these cases in sub-section (3) which is rather sweeping in its ambit in that it comprehends any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran. If any such question arose, the civil courts have been enjoined to stay the suit or other proceeding and refer the question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only. If any such question arose, the civil courts have been enjoined to stay the suit or other proceeding and refer the question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only. While sub-section (1) of S.125 refers to "any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined" by the Land Tribunal etc., sub-section (3) comprehends "any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran". It appears to us that for the application of sub-sect on (3) it is unnecessary that the Act by other provisions should have provided or required that the question that may arise under sub-section (3) should be settled, decided or dealt with or determined by the Land Tribunal. By virtue of the provision in sub-section (3) itself it is required that such questions should be referred to the Land Tribunal and by virtue of sub-section (4) the Land Tribunal has been given the right to decide the question referred under sub-section (3). The combined effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) is a bar on the civil court to try the question and a conferment of power on the Land Tribunal to decide. This amounts to an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court and a conferment of the jurisdiction on a different Tribunal. It is true that the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court should not easily be presumed. But it is equally well established that when the provisions regarding ouster of jurisdiction are clear those provisions will have to be given full ambit and force. S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself states that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It appears to us that there is an express bar by virtue of the provisions in sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of S.1.25. Even if there is no express bar, there is certainly an implied bar. We must hasten to add that this ouster of jurisdiction is only as regards the court of first instance. It appears to us that there is an express bar by virtue of the provisions in sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of S.1.25. Even if there is no express bar, there is certainly an implied bar. We must hasten to add that this ouster of jurisdiction is only as regards the court of first instance. That court has to accept the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question and then proceed to decide the suit. (Section 124 (5)). But the decision of the Land Tribunal has to be treated as a finding of the civil court for the purpose of the appeal [S. 124 (6)]. The appellate court can therefore consider the correctness of that finding. 2. Dealing with sub-sections (1) and (3) of S.125 of the Act, this Court said in the judgment in C.R.P. No. 298 of 1973: "S. 125(3), according to me will have to be interpreted in the light of S.125(1) and if so interpreted, the civil court's jurisdiction is taken away only in respect of any question arising in any suit or other proceedings regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran." The view thus expressed has been doubted by a Division Bench of this Court in Sankaran v. Rajammal (1974 KLT. 488) wherein it was observed: "There is no warranty to construe S.125(3) in the light of S.125 (1). Both the provisions deal with different matters." We think that this is the correct view to take on this aspect of the matter. The ambit and scope of S.125(3) cannot be whittled down by interpreting sub-section (3) as applicable only to cases where S.125(1) is attracted. The two provisions have to be read independently. If S.125(3) is satisfied the matter will have to be referred to a Tribunal, even if in given cases the terms of sub-section (1) of of S.125 have not been satisfied. 3. The next aspect to be considered is as to whether the court must be prima facie satisfied that there is a real question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran or whether a person is a real tenant or a kudikidappukaran, before the suit or proceeding is stayed and the matter referred to the Land Tribunal. 3. The next aspect to be considered is as to whether the court must be prima facie satisfied that there is a real question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran or whether a person is a real tenant or a kudikidappukaran, before the suit or proceeding is stayed and the matter referred to the Land Tribunal. The section of course does not state that only if the court is prima facie satisfied that any question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran or whether a person is a real tenant or a kudikidappukaran arises, the question need be referred to the Tribunal. On the other hand, the wording of the section seems to indicate that whenever a question of a right such as that referred to by the sub-section arises, the suit must be stayed and the question referred to the Land Tribunal. If it is assumed that the court should decide, though only prima facie, whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran or not and whether he has any real right as a tenant or as a kudikidappukaran, by holding that prima facie he has no right or that he is not a tenant or a kudikidappukaran, jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to deal with the matter can be ousted. Similarly if a court comes to the conclusion that prima facie a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran or that he has some right as a tenant or as a kudikidappukaran and referred the question to the Land Tribunal, it is possible that the Land Tribunal may come to a different conclusion. The Act does not contemplate any such conflicting views being expressed by the Court and the Land Tribunal. On the particular question that arises exclusive jurisdiction has been granted on the Land Tribunal and sub-section (5) of S.125 indicates that the decision of the Land Tribunal has to be accepted by the civil court and sub-section (6) indicates that such a finding accepted by the court should be deemed to be a finding of the civil court for the purpose of appeal. All such questions will, therefore, have to be exclusively determined by the Land Tribunal. All such questions will, therefore, have to be exclusively determined by the Land Tribunal. The only matter to be considered in the court is whether any question regarding the rights of a tenant or a kudikidappukaran including the question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran arises in a suit or proceeding. This, the court will have to examine and for this purpose what will have to be examined are the pleadings, and we consider, nothing else. Whether the plea is frivolous or sustainable or prima facie true or not are all foreign to the scope of the enquiry before court. We are in complete agreement with the decision in Sankaran v. Rajammal (1974 KLT. 488) where all the decisions on the subject on analogous provisions of previous enactments have been reviewed. The view has been taken in the decision that S.125 (3) has barred any consideration by the court of the question even for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been established. 4. The next question to be considered is whether any dispute regarding the applicability or otherwise of the exemption enumerated in S.3(1) of the Act can be settled by the court or whether such a dispute should also be referred to the Land Tribunal for decision. The question was adverted to in Narayana Menon v. Kallandi (1973 KLT. 983). With reference to S.3 (1) (ii) of the Act this Court observed: "Counsel 5or the revision petitioner would contend that the question as to whether the transaction in question is exempt 5rom the provisions of Chapter II by reason of S.3(1) (ii) of the Act had first to be decided by the Court, and it is only thereafter that the matter can be referred to the Land Tribunal to consider the question regarding the rights pleaded, of a tenant or a kudikidappukaran as the case may be. The argument is prima facie attractive. But the difficulty seems to arise by reason of the explanation which is an integral part of S.3 (1) (ii) of Act." Section 3 (1) (ii) with the explanation is in these terms: "3. Explanations: - (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to (i) (ii) leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse, and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. Explanations: - (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to (i) (ii) leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse, and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. Explanation:- Permission given to a kudikidappukaran to occupy a but shall not be deemed to be a lease of building for the purposes of this clause;" 5. If a plaintiff in a suit had claimed that the base was only of the building and the site thereof with the land appurtenant thereto and sought recovery of the building and the site and the land appurtenant thereto and the defendant had claimed that the lease was not only of the building and the site thereof with the land appurtenant thereto, the question that would arise is whether the exemption provided under S.3 (1) (ii) is available to the plaintiff or not. If it is not available to the plaintiff, the lease will not be exempted from the provisions of Chapter II of the Act and the defendant will be entitled to rely on the provisions in the Chapter. Those provisions confer rights which will fall within "any right of a tenant" referred to in S.125 (3) of the Act. It appears to us therefore that when such questions arise, in reality and in substance, the question is regarding the rights of a tenant. No doubt, it will depend upon the decision as to whether the exemption would apply or not but such a decision so inextricably and intrinsically involves a decision regarding the rights of a tenant. In substance the decision would involve a decision as to whether the defendant is entitled to the rights of a tenant conferred by Chapter IV of the Act or not. Though the court in Narayana Menon v. Kallandi (1973 KLT. 983) referring to the argument that the question of exemption will have to be considered by the court observed that "the argument is prima facie attractive", did not accept it in view of the explanation to S.3 (1) (ii). The court said "therefore the question as to whether the transaction in question was a lease of a building with the land appurtenant thereto is inextricably linked up with the plea of the tenant in this case that he is a kudikidappukaran" and referred the matter as required by sub-section (3) of S 125. The court said "therefore the question as to whether the transaction in question was a lease of a building with the land appurtenant thereto is inextricably linked up with the plea of the tenant in this case that he is a kudikidappukaran" and referred the matter as required by sub-section (3) of S 125. Even in the absence of the explanation the question as to whether a particular exemption applied or not, we think, will always be inextricably linked up with the plea of the defendant disputing the applicability of the exemption. So the question as to whether any of the exemptions applied, if such questions have arisen in a suit, must also be referred to the Tribunal. 6. In cases where recovery of possession was sought and the defendant pleaded that he is a tenant and therefore recovery of possession should not be had, since the plea of tenancy will have to be determined for the purpose of granting relief to the plaintiff, it has to be held that the right of a tenant arises in the case and the suit will have to be stayed and the question referred to the Land Tribunal. 7. There can be yet another type of cases where the plaintiff pleaded that while he was in possession the defendant trespassed on the property and on that basis sought recovery of possession and the defendant pleaded that he did not trespass on the property but had always been in possession of the property as a tenant and that in any view of the matter since he (the defendant) is in possession and he is also a tenant no recovery should be ordered. In such cases also the question arises whether the suit should be stayed and the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not should be referred to a Tribunal, It has been contended by the opposite side that in such cases if the plaintiff does not establish his possession prior to the trespass and the act of trespass by the defendant, he will not succeed and the determination of such questions does not involve the determination of any right of a tenant and therefore the suit must be allowed to proceed. But it is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander and others AIR. 1968 SC. But it is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander and others AIR. 1968 SC. 1165 that the claim for recovery based on a possessory title will only be available against those who have no title to the property. So in cases where the plaintiff had been in possession but had been dispossessed by the true Owner and a suit had been filed after the period of six months provided by S.9 of the Specific Relief Act against the true owner the plaintiff cannot succeed and the suit will have to be dismissed. The suit will have to be dismissed because the plea based on the possessory title will not be available against the true owner. We think the same principle must apply where the defendant though not the full owner has the right to enjoy the property and fixity of tenure as he is a tenant. In these types of cases also therefore subsection (3) of S.125 would be attracted and the suit will have to be stayed and the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not referred to by the Land Tribunal. 8. Now we come to the most difficult aspect. The question has arisen, in suits for injunction based entirely on the alleged possession of the plaintiff and the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff is not in possession and further that he is in possession as a tenant whether the civil court will have jurisdiction to decide the question whether the plaintiff was in possession or not and grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from entering on the property in case the plaintiff's possession is established, without referring the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not for decision by the Land Tribunal. This Court has been consistently taking the view that the question that arises in such cases in such circumstances is only as to who is in possession of the property; the plaintiff or the defendant and the further question whether the defendant, if he is in possession, is in possession as a tenant is immaterial and therefore there is no bar of jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with the matter. The principle of these decisions appears to be rested on the view that this court has taken that an injunction may issue at the instance of a person in possession even against the true owner. It is not necessary to refer to more than one decision of this court on this aspect. In Vasudeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma 1964 KLT. 468 Raman Nayar J. observed thus: "On behalf of the 3rd defendant it has been contended that a person in possession without title is not entitled to get an injunction against the true owner I should think that: this matter is concluded by the order of this court in the previous appeal. That apart, whatever the English law might be, it seems to be the policy of the Indian law that a person in possession, albeit without title, is entitled to remain in possess ion, even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law. The lawful owner is not entitled to take the law into his own hands and throw out the person in possession. This is the policy underlying both S.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and S.9 of the Specific Relief Act; and it is significant to note that under S.54 of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction may be granted not merely to protect a plaintiff's right to property but also to protect his enjoyment thereof True, the grant of an injunction is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised in accordance with the policy of the law which, as I have already said, is that a person in peaceful possession should be maintained in possession until evicted in due course of law. If a person in possession is dispossessed, he canbring a suit under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act within six months of the dispossession and recover the property even though he has no title and his dispossessor has. If that be so, why should the court not prevent the dispossession and why should it insist on his being actually dispossessed before it gives him relief? The decision of the Judicial Committee in Ismail Ariff v. Mohammed Ghoas (I. L. R.20 Calcutta 834) and of a division bench of the Bombay High Court in Fakirbhai v. Maganlal (AIR. If that be so, why should the court not prevent the dispossession and why should it insist on his being actually dispossessed before it gives him relief? The decision of the Judicial Committee in Ismail Ariff v. Mohammed Ghoas (I. L. R.20 Calcutta 834) and of a division bench of the Bombay High Court in Fakirbhai v. Maganlal (AIR. 1951 Bombay 380) throw some light on the matter though they do not go to the extent of saying that a person in peaceful possession can get an injunction even as against the true owner." - Even so the further question will arise whether on the plaintiff establishing possession an injunction would issue against the defendant who had been able to establish that he is the tenant of the property. In this connection S.125(7) is relevant. That section reads thus: 125 (7). No civil court shall have power to grant injunction in any suit or other proceeding referred to in sub-section (3) restraining any person from entering into or occupying or cultivating any land or kudikidappu or to appoint a receiver for any property in respect of which a question referred to in that sub-section has arisen, till such question is decided by the Land Tribunal and any such injunction granted or appointment made before the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or before such question has arisen, shall stand cancelled." 9. No doubt the inhibition contained in the section against the grant of an injunction or the passing of an order appointing a receiver will apply only till the question referred to the Tribunal in accordance with sub-section (3) of S.125 is decided by the Land Tribunal. Evidently, the court can consider after the decision of the Tribunal is secured whether an injunction should issue or not. But the more difficult aspect is whether in such circumstances an injunction should issue against a tenant who has the right to be in possession. This aspect does not arise in any of these cases before us and we would not like to express any opinion on this aspect. 10. These must be some purpose behind sub-section (7) of S.125. This section clearly contemplates that an injunction should not be issued till a finding is available on he question whether the defendant is a tenant or not. 10. These must be some purpose behind sub-section (7) of S.125. This section clearly contemplates that an injunction should not be issued till a finding is available on he question whether the defendant is a tenant or not. The object is that in cases where an injunction is sought to be issued or receiver sought to be appointed the court must have the benefit of the finding of the Land Tribunal as to whether the defendant is a tenant or not before deciding the issue of injunction or appointment of a receiver. Even this does not answer the point raised by counsel for the plaintiff that in cases where the plaintiff rested his rights purely on possession the plea of the defendant that he is a tenant, is irrelevant and immaterial and consideration of that aspect of the question is unnecessary for determining the suit and hence the question whether he is a tenant or not does not arise in that suit and therefore S.125 (3) is not attracted. This is the view that has been expressed by this court in Alavi v. Mohammedkutty Haji & others 1973 KLT 937 and Narayana Menon v. Kallandi 19/3 K.L.T. 983. In Alavi v. Mohammedkutty Haji & others 1973 KLT 937, this court observed: "A person even if wrongful is entitled to maintain his possession even against the true owner, till evicted by due process of law. S.125(3) is not attracted to suits for injunction simpliciter, even where the plaintiff claims possession on the ground that he is a tenant. That is because, suits for injunction are merely concerned with the fact of possession, and not with the nature or the character of the possession or the capacity of the possessor. If the plaintiff is found to be in possession, no matter whether in his capacity as a tenant or not, he is entitled to the injunction If he is not in possession, he is not entitled to the injunction, and it is unnecessary to consider whether the defendant is in possession whether as a tenant or not. Therefore the order of the Munsiff staying the suit and referring the issue of tenancy for determination was unsustainable by the Land Tribunal in Law." 11. An identical view has been expressed in very similar language in the decision in Narayana Menon v. Kallandi 1973 K.L.T. 983. The matter raises a difficult question. Therefore the order of the Munsiff staying the suit and referring the issue of tenancy for determination was unsustainable by the Land Tribunal in Law." 11. An identical view has been expressed in very similar language in the decision in Narayana Menon v. Kallandi 1973 K.L.T. 983. The matter raises a difficult question. In one sense it is correct to say that if the plaintiff is found to be in possession a further question whether the defendant is a tenant or not is immaterial and therefore it does not arise in the case. But we have to remember that in most of the cases of this type on the plea by the defendant that be is a tenant and a denial by the plaintiff of that plea an issue would normally have been framed whether the defendant is a tenant or not. We have not come across cases where in such circumstances the plaintiff sought to strike out the issue regarding the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not. It is even doubtful whether in such circumstances he could legitimately claim that the issue framed should be struck off If there is such an issue framed in the case can it be said that the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not does not arise in the suit? We do not think it is possible and it is not as though a finding on such an issue has no bearing or has no relevance in determining the question of possession. In cases of disputed possession the evidence regarding possession will be conflicting. And very often the evidence would be mainly oral and it will be difficult to conclude whether the plaintiff's witnesses were speaking the truth or whether the defendant's witnesses were speaking the truth when each group asserted that the one or the other, the plaintiff or the defendant, was in possession. In such a situation the presumption that possession follows title which courts may draw in given cases, particularly, when it is established that the man with title had been in possession at some time, (though there is no specific statutory provision in the Evidence Act regarding such a presumption as in the case where title is presumed on possession being established under S.110 of the Evidence Act) may be pressed into service. A finding whether the defendant is a tenant is therefore an important factor in cases of disputed possession and conflicting evidence. Further in all cases a finding on the question whether a defendant is a tenant or not would not only be relevant but useful for evaluating the evidence in the case regarding possession and in determining the probative value of such evidence. This being so we do not think the correct approach in such cases should be to proceed as if the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not has no bearing when the plaintiffs have chosen to rest their case purely on possession. With respect we are unable to agree with the view expressed in the two decisions to which we have referred to as well as in the other decisions of this court. These decisions have to be overruled and we do so. Justice Krishnamoorthy Iyer in the judgment in C. R. P. 298 of 1973 which was referred to in Para.5 of the judgment in Sankaran v. Rajammal 1974 K. L. T. 488 observed that "the enquiry regarding the status of a person as a kudikidappukaran or as a tenant is only for the purpose of deciding the rights of a tenant or a kudikidappukaran. If incidentally the relationship between the parties has to be resolved for giving relief to the plaintiff in respect of matters not covered by Act I of 1964, I do not think that by the wording of S.125 (3) of Act I of 1964 there is an ouster of jurisdiction. For example, if in a suit for injunction whereby the plaintiff wants to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the property the defendant raises a plea that he is in possession of the property as a tenant, a very literal interpretation of S.125 (1), (2) and (3) will compel the court to refer the issue to the Land Tribunal. If the reference is made and the civil court is obliged to decide the suit on the basis of the finding of the Land Tribunal there is an abdication of the function of the civil court. The question in such cases is only who is in possession of the property on the date of suit. If the reference is made and the civil court is obliged to decide the suit on the basis of the finding of the Land Tribunal there is an abdication of the function of the civil court. The question in such cases is only who is in possession of the property on the date of suit. The defendant's claim of possession based on the tenancy is immaterial for the reason that if it is found that the defendant is in possession of the property, whether it be as a lessee or otherwise, no relief of injunction can be granted to the plaintiff. In such cases, counsel appearing in the case, agreed that no reference under S.125 (3) is called for." With great respect we cannot agree with this view. Even assuming that the question whether the defendant is a tenant or not arises only incidentally in the suit, as we have pointed out, a decision on that question, very often, would have a direct bearing on determining the question of possession. The civil court's jurisdiction for deciding the suit has not been ousted. The ouster is only of the jurisdiction of the trial court to decide the question that would fall under S.125(3). Those questions will have to be determined by the Land Tribunal and on the basis of the decisions of the Tribunal the trial court can proceed to decide the suit. But all questions that would fall under S.125(3) will have to be decided by the Tribunal. It is not as though this decision of the Tribunal is final. That decision will become a finding of the trial court which can be challenged in appeal. This is clear from S.125(6). We see no reason to limit the natural meaning of the words in S.125(3) by holding that the section will apply only in cases where the questions referred to therein are the main or the primary questions to be decided in the suit. 12. In cases where the defendant had pleaded that he is a tenant and an issue had been framed whether be is a tenant or not on the plaintiff denying that the defendant is a tenant, the court in which the suit is pending must follow the mandate of sub-section (3) of S.125. 13. In the light of the above conclusion we shall now proceed to deal with the cases one by one. 13. In the light of the above conclusion we shall now proceed to deal with the cases one by one. C. R. P. No. 1329 of 1975 14. The suit was for the redemption of an alleged mortgage. The defendant contended that he is a lessee. By the order sought to be revised the court had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the transaction was in reality a mortgage. The defendant had moved a petition that the question whether he is a mortgagee or a lessee must be referred to the Land Tribunal in accordance with S.125(3). The court rejected this prayer by the order now challenged in this revision petition. In the light of what we have held in this judgment the order cannot stand. We set aside the order and remit the matter to the court below to be dealt with in accordance with S.125(3) of the Act. There will be be no order as to costs. C.R.P. No. 197 of 1975 15. In this revision petition also the question has risen whether the defendant is a tenant or not. By the order sought to be revised the suit has been stayed and the question has been referred to the Land Tribunal. The plaintiff of course has a case that if there is a tenancy it is exempted under S.3(1)(x). Even that question we have held must be referred to the Tribunal. There is no error in the order challenged in this revision petition. We therefore dismiss this revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. S. A. No. 1091 of 1972 16. At no stage of the proceedings till now it had been contended by the appellant that he is a tenant. So no question such as is referred to in subsection (3) of S.125 arose in the suit when it was pending before the trial court. The court could not therefore have proceeded under that sub-section. The inhibition from deciding such questions as fall under S.125 (3) is only as regards the trial court. The trial court found that the 2nd defendant was a lessee under the mortgagee, the 1st defendant, and that his case that he was a lessee directly from the mortgagor is not true. The inhibition from deciding such questions as fall under S.125 (3) is only as regards the trial court. The trial court found that the 2nd defendant was a lessee under the mortgagee, the 1st defendant, and that his case that he was a lessee directly from the mortgagor is not true. The appellate court by the judgment under appeal has also considered this aspect fully and has come to the conclusion that the second defendant is a tenant under the mortgagee. It also held that such a tenancy will fall outside the purview of the Act in view of the exemption contained in S.3 (1) (iv) of the Act. We find no infirmity in this finding. The question whether a tenant under a mortgagee is one exempted under S.3 (1) (v) of the Act has not been considered by the Munsiff. The appellate authority as we said was certainly entitled to consider the question. The point not having been raised at the relevant time we do not think that we should now set aside the concurrent finding of fact that the second defendant was in possession under Ext. D3 mortgage and direct the Land Tribunal to decide whether such a tenancy would be exempted under S.3 (1) (v). It is patent that in such circumstances. S.3 (1) (v) would apply. That clause of S.3 (1) is in these terms: "3(1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to (v) tenancies in respect of land or of buildings or of both created by mortgagees in possession or by persons deriving title from such mortgagee. Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to such tenancies (i) created before the commencement of this Act in Malabar; or (ii) created before the 3rd day of March, 1943, in any area to which the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, VIII of 1118, extended; or (iii) created before the commencement of this Act, where the lessee is entitled to fixity of tenure under S.4A; or (iv) where the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest has acquired or acquires equity of redemption; or We dismiss this appeal. There will be no order as to costs. C. R. P. No. 1772 of 1974 17. This revision is by the plaintiff. It is directed against an order staying the suit under S.125 (3) of the Act. There will be no order as to costs. C. R. P. No. 1772 of 1974 17. This revision is by the plaintiff. It is directed against an order staying the suit under S.125 (3) of the Act. The suit was based on title and there is a prayer for recovery of possession of a building with two rooms. The defendant contended that the building, which appears to be a shop building, and the land around have been in his possession for 15 years on a lease and that he was a tenant under the Act. The question whether the defendant is a - tenant or not therefore arose in the case and the order challenged in the revision petition staying the suit and referring the question is in accordance with subsection (3) of S.125. No grounds have been made out to interfere. We dismiss this civil revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. C. R. P. No. 42 of 1975 18. Issue No. 2 framed in the case reads as follows: "Is the 1st defendant entitled for the benefits of Act I of 1964? Is he a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure?" This issue indicates that a question regarding the rights of a tenant arises in the case. Even if the further question, whether the particular lease pleaded will come under any of the exemptions provided under S.3(1) also arises that question too will have to be decided by the Land Tribunal. So there is no error in the order sought to be revised staying the further proceedings of the suit and referring the issue to the Land Tribunal for its decision. 19. We dismiss this revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. C.M.A. No. 70 of 1975 20. The order appealed against is one refusing to allow an application for the appointment of a receiver for the plaint properties. The application has been dismissed. The plaint consisted of two schedules of properties The A schedule has an extent of 3 acres 12 cents and the B schedule is 3 acres 10 cents in extent. The case of the plaintiff is that he is in possession of A and B schedule properties. The coastings defendants have denied this and have urged tenancy rights in relation to portions of the properties in the plaint. The case of the plaintiff is that he is in possession of A and B schedule properties. The coastings defendants have denied this and have urged tenancy rights in relation to portions of the properties in the plaint. They also asserted that they are in possession of the various items to which they laid claim. 21. On a former occasion the court appointed a receiver for the plaint properties. The order was appealed against in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal 134 of 1974. The contention that was raised in the appeal was that the suit should have been stayed because of the provision in sub-section (3) of S.125 of the Act. We shall extract a part of the appellate order disposing of the appeal. "The court below should have considered whether in the present suit, the rights of tenant or a kudikidappukaran are involved. In so considering the question, it will be open to the court below to take into account the history of the antecedent litigation between the parties and the judgments and the orders passed therein, and in the light of these, to come to a conclusion as to whether the suit fell within the scope of sub-section (3) of S.125, and therefore attracted the bar of sub-section (7). As the question has not been approached from this point of view, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the court below, and remit the matter back to that court for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment" 22. In the present order under appeal the various aspects to be considered and which were directed to be considered by the appellate order had not been dealt with. Though the court observed that "the plaintiffs have proved their title and prima facie possession" it dismissed the application because of the provision in S.125(7). The court took the view that no receiver can be appointed till the disposal of the Land Tribunal proceedings. It is not clear from the order which are the proceedings before the Land Tribunal and what are the properties involved in these proceedings. The court below remarked in one part of its order: "In this case rightly or wrongly the matter has been referred to the land tribunal and the Land Tribunal has taken suo moto proceedings. It is not clear from the order which are the proceedings before the Land Tribunal and what are the properties involved in these proceedings. The court below remarked in one part of its order: "In this case rightly or wrongly the matter has been referred to the land tribunal and the Land Tribunal has taken suo moto proceedings. Even though the plaintiff's title and possession are proved by judgments because of the pendency of the Land Tribunal proceedings S.125(7) is immediately attracted." 23. What is meant by the observation that the Land Tribunal has taken sue moto proceedings is not clear. What matter or matters have been referred to the Land Tribunal and the extent of the property involved in those proceedings are not known. These aspects have not been adverted to or considered in the order under appeal. 24. Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended before us that relating to the A schedule item the Land Tribunal has already found that there is no tenancy right. If this is the correct position, a receiver should have been appointed for that item. And S.125(7) would not be a bar to the appointment of a receiver the matter having been already dealt with by the Tribunal. 25. Regarding the B schedule item it appears various defendants are claiming different bits of that property. Whether in regard to each of these there are proceedings before the Land Tribunal either because of application for purchase filed by the alleged tenants or because of reference orders passed in former suits will have to be found out and if questions such as those that would fall under S.125(3) are pending before the Land Tribunal in regard to any specific portions of the properties a receiver can be appointed for those bits of the properties only after receipt of the decision of the Tribunal regarding those questions. But if there are any portions of the properties in relation to which no proceedings are pending the court will have to consider whether in this suit any question arises with reference to those portions regarding the rights of a tenant or whether the defendants claiming these bits are tenants. If any such question arises with reference to any portion of the properties regarding those portions of the properties such question will have to be referred to the Land Tribunal and proceedings under the suit stayed. If any such question arises with reference to any portion of the properties regarding those portions of the properties such question will have to be referred to the Land Tribunal and proceedings under the suit stayed. If there are any portions of the property in regard to which no proceedings are pending and no reference need be made under S.125 (3) the court will pass appropriate orders on the receiver's application regarding these properties and in doing so it will also consider the question whether a receiver should be appointed for the A schedule item in the light of the contention of the plaintiff that the Tribunal has already found that the A schedule property is not included in any lease. 26. We set aside the order under appeal in so far as it has dismissed the receiver application and remand the case to the court below to be dealt with in the light of what we have stated above. There will be no order as to costs.