Judgment 1. This is an application for quashing a proceeding taken against the petitioner u/s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (briefly the Act) pending before a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Buxar. 2. On 2.05.1973, while the petitioner was carrying 62 bags of paddy on a bullockcart from his village home for sale to the purchasing centre of a rice mill, namely, Bishwanathji Mills, of Buxar, said to be the nearest market from his village the Project Executive Officer, Rajpur Block, seized the said foodgrains, arrested the petitioner and lodged a first information report with Rajpur Police Station. According to the allegation made in the aforesaid first information report, the petitioner was carrying on business of purchase and sale in foodgrains without having a licence under the Bihar Food-grains Dealers Licensing Order and has, accordingly, committed an offence under Section 7 of the Act. The police registered a case under Section 7 of the Act on the basis of the said first information report and submitted a charge-sheet on 12-5-1973, a copy of which has been made Annexure 1 to the application. In the 7th column of the charge-sheet meant for stating the particulars of the offence and the circumstances connected therewith, the Investigating Officer made only a very brief statement to the effect that on investigation of the allegations made by the first informant in his written report, a case under Section 7 of the Act was established against the petitioner and, accordingly, the Police sent up the petitioner for trial. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid charge, the learned Subdivisional Magistrate, Buxar, by his order dated 23-5-1973 took cognizance against the petitioner for the offence under Section 7 of the Act and transferred the case for trial to the Court of Shri B.N. Singh, Magistrate, First Class, Buxar. 4. Mr. S.B. Sanyal appearing for the petitioner contended that the charge-sheet, on the basis of which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner, did not disclose the necessary facts constituting any offence under Section 7 of the Act and, therefore, the requirement of Sec.11 of the Act for taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act having been not complied with, the order taking cognizance cannot be sustained in law. 5. 5. Sec.11 of the Act prescribes a special procedure for taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act and debars a Court from taking any such cognizance "except on report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in Sec.21 of the Indian Penal, Code." It has since been well settled by a long line of judicial decisions that a charge-sheet submitted by the Police stating the facts constituting such offence will meet the requirement of this section. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwati Saran V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 928 = (1961 (2) Cri LJ 24) observed that this report need not contain the evidence in support of the charge. It should merely afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case and the details which would be necessary to bring home the guilt to the accused will be details which would emerge at a later stage. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case referred with approval to two cases; one of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Chatterji V/s. Emperor, AIR 1946 All 416 = (47 Cri LJ 876) and the other in Rachpal Singh V/s. Rex, AIR 1949 Oudh 66 = (50 Cri LJ 469) which were cases under the Defence of India Rules containing provisions analogous to Sec.11 of the Act. It was held in these cases that the requirement of Rule 130(1) of the Defence of India Rules was not complied with. As in the present case, so also in the case before the Allahabad High Court, the report only contained the following recitals: "Prejudicial act to the interest of the public and had prejudiced the success of financial measures with a view to the efficient prosecution of the war." This statement was held to be absolutely vague inasmuch as even the particular rule or provision of law which was said to have been contravened, was not mentioned in the report. In the Oudh case, the report ran as follows:- "On the statement of the informant an offence under S.(R.?) 81(2), Defence of India Rules, has been committed for which the charge-sheet is being submitted." And it was held that the facts alleged to constitute the contravention were not set out in the report and that the Magistrate had, therefore, no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. 6 Examining the recitals made in the charge-sheet of the case on hand and following the principles laid down in the aforesaid cages, I feel inclined to hold that these recitals are too vague and could not afford any basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case as no particulars of the contravention which could be an offence under Section 7 of the Act were stated. 7. Some argument, however, was made on behalf of the State that inasmuch as reference in the charge-sheet was made to the first information report, the learned Magistrate taking cognizance could refer to the said report for taking cognizance because the first information report and the charge-sheet both taken together did furnish the relevant facts constituting an offence committed by the petitioner. 8. This argument can be met by stating certain further facts. In course of the investigation made by the Police in the allegations made in the first information report itself, on the evidence collected, it found that the petitioner was a cultivator and was producing foodgrains in large quantity, and that he was not a dealer in foodgrains. Nonetheless, the police took the view that for taking the foodgrains in question, the petitioner was required to give prior intimation of this fact to the local officers such as, the Block Development Officer, the Subdivisional Officer, etc. and thereafter he could carry the paddy on obtaining permit. In paragraph 26 of the case diary, on the evidence collected in course of the investigation, the police has come to a definite finding that the petitioner was not a dealer in foodgrains and, therefore, he was not required to take out a licence and purported to submit the charge-sheet for altogether different offence. In paragraph 26 of the case diary, on the evidence collected in course of the investigation, the police has come to a definite finding that the petitioner was not a dealer in foodgrains and, therefore, he was not required to take out a licence and purported to submit the charge-sheet for altogether different offence. On these facts obtaining from the records of this case which have been annexed to the application, it is obvious that the allegations made in the first information report were found to be untrue by the police and, therefore, if the same could be referred to by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance against the petitioner, they could not constitute any report of the facts for which the police submitted the charge-sheet and sent up the petitioner for trial. A Bench of this Court in the case of Ratanlal Sultania V/s. State of Bihar, (1968 BLJR 353) observed that if a Supply Inspector instead of filing a written report directly to the Magistrate for his taking cognizance, files a first information report before the Police, it shows that he was not satisfied by himself that a prima facie case was made out. The matter was then left to the discretion of the Police, and if the Police, after investigation, came to the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out, no cognizance could be taken for any offence as the provision of Sec.190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable to prosecution under the Act inasmuch as it was governed by a special procedure provided in Sec.11 of the Act. 9. Applying the principles, discussed above, to the facts of this case, I feel satisfied that the recitals made in the charge-sheet referred to above, do not disclose the material facts affording a basis which could enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case against the petitioner. 10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It was contended by Mr. Sanyal that even the facts found during the Police investigation that the petitioner (not being a dealer) was transporting the foodgrains in question without giving prior intimation, much less obtaining any permit for that purpose, did not constitute any offence inasmuch as there was not such law requiring a cultivator to obtain any permit for movement of his agricultural produce for sale from one place to another in the same district. It was, accordingly, contended that the prosecution of the petitioner would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Learned advocate appearing for the State could not point out to me any provision which required a cultivator to obtain any permit for such movement of foodgrains by a cultivator. In the case of the Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi V/s. Smt. Lila D. Bhagat, AIR 1975 3C 495 = (1975 Cri LJ 325), it was pointed out that in an appropriate case it may be, rather, is, permissible to protect a person from illegal and vexatious prosecution by grant of appropriate writ in exercise of the inherent or revisional powers of the High Court. 11. For all the reasons discussed above, I feel satisfied that it is a fit case on its own special facts to set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Buxar, taking cognizance against the petitioner, and for the same reason, it must be held that the prosecution of the petitioner, in the circumstance, is illegal and fit to be quashed. 12. In the result, I would allow his application and quash the impugned order and the proceeding pending against the petitioner.