VENKATACHALAIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE three regular first appeals RFA. 7 of 1973, RFA. 8 of 1973 and rfa 9 of 1973 are by the State of Karnataka and are directed against the three judgments and decrees dated31-7-1972 in OS. 28 of 1968, OS. 19 of 1967 and OS. 21 of 1969 respectively on the file of the Civil Judge, bellary, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suits for declaration of its title and consequential reliefs respecting sandalwood extracted from trees on private lands in the former State of Sandur. ( 2 ) AS the underlying basis of the Slate's alleged title is common to the claim in all the three suits and as common grounds are urged in support of these appeals, they nre disposed of together by this judgment. ( 3 ) THE question relates to 1ns ownership of sandalwood trees in the private Isr. ds in the territories of the erstwhile princely State of Sandur after the repeal in 1949 of UK Sandur Forest Act, 1943, under the provisions of ss, 49 and 50 of which the sandalwood trees were the exclusive property ov the Sovereign of the erstwhile principality of Sandur. ( 4 ) THE undisputed faels are that on 29-7-1948 the territories of the then sandur State. w?re merged into the Dominion of India and stood transferred? to the then State of Madras and became part of the District of Bellary. On 14-7-1949 in exercise of the powers under S. 4 of the Extra-provincial jurisdiction Act, 1949, (Central Act XLVII of 1947) read with the Notification of the Ministry of States, Government of India No. 91-P dated 19-4-1949. the madras Forest Act, 1882 and the Notifications, Orders and Rules made or issued in pursuance of the powers conferred by or under (he said Act, as in loree in the Bellary District were made applicable to 11 State of Sandur with effect from 2-8-49. Clause 2 of the said Notifies (ion further provided as follows : (2) The said Act shall be deemed to repeal the corresponding state Act, if any (by whatever name CALLLED ). at present in force in the said State. The Madras Act did not contain provisions analogous to Ss. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act. Clause 2 of the said Notifies (ion further provided as follows : (2) The said Act shall be deemed to repeal the corresponding state Act, if any (by whatever name CALLLED ). at present in force in the said State. The Madras Act did not contain provisions analogous to Ss. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act. On 1-10-53 BELLARY District was transferred to and became a part of the State of Mysore in pursuance of the provisions of the andhra State Act, 1953. Mysore Adaptation of Laws Order 1953, issued in exercise of the powers under S. 54 of ths Andhra State Act, 1953, adapted , and applied the provisions of the Madras Forest Act and all Rules made thereunder to the District of Bellary. With effect from 1-4-1956, Mysore forest Act, 1900, excepting the provisions of S. 69 to 75 there of wap extended to Bellary District. Ss. 69 to 75 of the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, dealt with the exclusive right of the Government in respect of sandal wood trees. In the year 1960, which is the material period, the provisions of the said Mysore forest Act, excepting, however, the provisions therein providing for the exclusive right of the State to sandalwood trees, was applicable to the territories of the quondam State of Sandur. It is also common ground between the parties-and we have proceeded on the basis of this undisputed position-that sq far as sandalwood trees in Sandur area were concerned rules known as the "sandalwood Transit Rules for the Districts of anantapur, Bellary, Chittoor, North Arcot, Salem, South Arcot; Trichinapally; madura, Tinnevelley, Ramanad, Coimbatore, The Nilgiris and South kanara," were in force which stipulated the requirements of registration of 'pass-hammer marks'; permits for transportation etc. , respecting sandalwood trees on private lands. ( 5 ) WE may now advert to. the facts leading up to the three suits from which these appeals arise; (a) the first defendant in O. S. No. 28 of 1968 from which RFA. 7173 arises, a firm of partners under the name and style m|s. Karthikeswara Trading Co;. , purchased from owners of private lands in the villages of Lakshmipur, Bhujanganagar, Krishnanagar and Daultpur of Sandur Taluk 76 sandal wood trees. The firm applied to the concerned authorities of the Forest Department for permission for the extraction, transportation and dressing of these trees. 7173 arises, a firm of partners under the name and style m|s. Karthikeswara Trading Co;. , purchased from owners of private lands in the villages of Lakshmipur, Bhujanganagar, Krishnanagar and Daultpur of Sandur Taluk 76 sandal wood trees. The firm applied to the concerned authorities of the Forest Department for permission for the extraction, transportation and dressing of these trees. In pursuance of the order of the divisional Forest Officer, Bellary, in Memo No. P. SDL-926j60-61 dated 6-9-1960, the first respondent is stated to have extracted and transported the sandalwood trees concerned. But, on 30-10-1960, the sandalwood extracted from these trees were seized by the Range Forest Officer, working plants Unit, Bangalore, apparently on the ground that they belonged to government and were illicitly removed. However, C. C. I (63 on the file of the Special Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bellary, in which the partners of the sa,id firm were prosecuted, ended in an acquittal and in Cr. A. No. 340)1966 connected with Cr. R. P. 666 (67 in the High Court the said acquittal was affirmed on 29-1-1968 and the sandalwcod concerned in the proceedings was ordered to be returned to the accused-partners. On 11-7-1968 OS. No. 28 (68 was instituted in the Court-below for declaration of plaintiff's alleged title and for possession of the sandalwood trees. (b) M|s. Prabhakar Trading Company (also known as v. M. G. Trading Company) the defendant in O. S. 19j67 purchased sandalwood trees concerned in the said suit from pattadars of private lands in Ramghad, Jai- singpur, Venkatagiri and other villages uf Sandur Taluk and the Forest department accorded permission for their extraction and transportation. Later, however, on a, complaint filed by the Range Forest Officer, Sandur, the Police registered a case against the said firm for offences of theft and receiving of stolen property. The investigation that ensued however culminated in a 'b' report filed before the Munsiff-Magistrate, Kudligi, on 13-11-1964. On 19-11-1964 the Court directed the property seized during investigation to be delivered to the defendant. That order was affirmed on 11-7-1967 by the District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, in Cr. RP. No. 267. The State has instituted the present OS. 1967 for a declaration of its title and consequential reliefs respecting the said sandalwood ; (c) the sandalwood concerned in OS. 2169 from which RFA. That order was affirmed on 11-7-1967 by the District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, in Cr. RP. No. 267. The State has instituted the present OS. 1967 for a declaration of its title and consequential reliefs respecting the said sandalwood ; (c) the sandalwood concerned in OS. 2169 from which RFA. 973 arises is of trees extracted from private lands in Yeswanthanagar, Jaisingapur, taranagar, Dowlatpur, Lakshmipur, Bannihatti and Ganglapur of Sandur taluk. The firm Ms. R. Shankarappa and Co. , purchased these trees from pattadars and applied under Exts. D5 and D6 dated 28-5-1960 and 30-5-1960 respectively to the Forest Department for grant of hammer-marks and for permission to extract. Ext. D7 is the permit granted on 28-7-1960. Sandal wood so transported was thereafter sold by the sa^d Mjs R. Shankarappa and Co, to the first defendant M s Lakshmi Trading Co, under Exts. D2, D3 and D4. Mjs. Lakshmi Trading Co. , pledged the sandal weed with the 8th defendant. However, on a complaint lodged by the Range Forest Officer, jiospet, the Police registered a case in Cr. No. 110 62 against the concerned defendants under Ss. 379 and 411 IPC read with certain provisions of the mysore Forest Act. The sandalwood was also seized on 21-10-1964. In the prosecution that ensued in CC. 2j66 on the file of the Special Judicial magistrate, First Class, Bellary, the defendants were acquitted and in Cr. A. No 358160 connected with Cr. R. P. 383|68, the High Court by its order dated 22-7-1968, affirmed the acquittal and directed the release of the property to the defendants. The present suit for declaration of its title was instituted by the State on 21-2-1969. ( 6 ) THE defendants in the three suits (except for variations incidental to particular facts of the case) have urged substantially similar defences. It was, inter-alia, urged that the repeal cf the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, had the effect of making the owners of private lands in the territories of the erstwhile Sandur State, the absolute owners of the sandalwood trees standing thereon and that officers of the State Government having granted the requisite sanction for the extraction, transportation and dressing of the sandalwood in question, are estopped from questioning the title of the defendants. ( 7 ) THOUGH separate issues in each ol these cases have been settled, the following issues which are, common to all the suits, are material : (i) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants were removing sandalwood trees under invalid permits ? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of Sandalwood tress at Sandur ? (iii) Whether the orders of the plaintiff's officers and their conduct act as estoppel ? ( 8 ) HOWEVER, certain allegations to the effect that sandalwood trees in. the suits were not from trees on private lands having been alleged by the plaintiff and denied by the defendants, certain issues touching that question were also settled and answered against the plaintiff by the Court-below. As that ground is not urged in these appeals by the plaintiff-appellant, the said issues do not survive. ( 9 ) LIKEWISE, the plea as to the bar of limitation was not alsoi pressed in these appeals and accordingly the concerned issues do not also survive. ( 10 ) ON an appreciation of the evidence on record, the Court below recorded findings against the plaintiff on al] the material issues and dismissed its suits. ( 11 ) WE have heard Sri N. Venkatachala, learned II Additonal government Advocate for the plaintiff-appellant in these appeals; Sri H. R. Venkataramaniah, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent in RFA 8|73; Sri Jai Vittal, Kolar, learned Counsel for respondents 1, 2 and 6 and Sri S. S'hivaswamy, learned counsel for respondents 8 to 10 in RFA. 9|73, and Sri a. V. Albal, learned counsel appeared for the defendant in RFA. 7173 at the initial stages of the hearing and made some general submissions. Later, however, he reported no instructions. ( 12 ) SANDALWOOD tree is a small evergreen tree, which thrives on the well-drained loamy laterite soils of the highlands of South India. The tree is stated to be a root-parasite living parasitically on other plants by sending haustoria which attach to the roots of the host-plant. It is stated that sandalwood tree is a slow growing tree and generally trees less than 30 years, old are not commercially exploitable. The sandalwood concerned in these suits are extracted from the trees which were cut in about the year 1960. It is stated that sandalwood tree is a slow growing tree and generally trees less than 30 years, old are not commercially exploitable. The sandalwood concerned in these suits are extracted from the trees which were cut in about the year 1960. It is'not disputed tha,t they were in existence on private lands in the erstwhile Sandur State even prior to the repeal of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943. ( 13 ) SRI N. Venkatachala, learned II Additional Government Advocate for the plaintiff-appellant, formulated the following propositions in support of the appeals : (i) That the ownership of the trees of which the Sandur Sarkar was the exclusive owner prior to replacement of Sandur Forect Act by Madras forest Act and, later, of Madras Forest Act by the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, does not affect the said ownership of the successor State of Karnataka ; (ii) That the right to sandalwcod trees in Sandur reserved for the sarkar under S. 49 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943 included rights to obtain the requisite sustenance and nutrients from the soil of the private owners and the said rights were, even after the repeal of the said Sandur Forest act, 1943, saved by virtue of the provisions of S:6 of the General Clauses act. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the defendants have however, formulated the following propositions in support of their case : (i) The Madras Forest Act, 1882, that repealed Sandur Forest Act, expressed the manifest intention of extinguishing the rights to sandalwood trees of the Sandur Sarkar under the repealed Sandur Forest act; and that the rights of the Sandur Sarkar under the latter Act were not saved; (ii) That whatever may have been the position under the Sandur forest Act, 1943, after the repeal of the Act, the sandalwood trees standing on private lands became part of the land and the owner of the land also became the owner of the trees on the principle of Quicquid plantatur Solo Solo Cedit. " (iii) That the permits for extraction and transportation of the sandalwood in question having been granted in pursuance of and after compliance with Rule 9 and after an examination of relevant conditions therein, and the said permits not having been revoked or cancelled in a manner recognised by law, no relief in these suits, which would have the effect of detracting from the finality of or nullifying the permits, could be granted; and. (iv) That the first defendant in O. S. 21 of 1969 being a subsequent purchaser having purchased the sandalwood in question from previous owners on the strength of the permits granted by the Forest department, the plaintiff, even assuming that the grant of permits was invalid, would be estopped from questioning the title of the first defendant. ( 15 ) THE points that arise, therefore, for determination in these appeals are : (i) Whether notwithstanding the repeal of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, plaintiff continues to be the owner of the sandalwood concerned in the suits end wntitled to a declaration of its title in respect thereof ; (ii) What is the legal effect of the grant of registration of the property mark and issue of permits respecting the sandalwood under the Transit rules, and (iii) Is the plaintiff estopped from asserting its title respecting the sandalwood in question ? ( 16 ) POINT No. (i): Ss. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943. read : "49. All sandal trees in Sandur shall be the exclusive property of sarkar, unless the same be situated in an area in which the Sarkar may have expressly alienated its right to sandalwood. 50 (1) Every occupant or holder of land shall be responsible for the due preservation of all sandal trees growing thereon, and shall, in the event of an injury to any such tree for whatever cause at once report such fact to the nearest local Revenue Officer. (2) * * * * ( 17 ) IT is not disputed that the Madras Forest Act which was extended to Sandur Taluk with effect from 2-8-1949 did not contain provisions corresponding to S. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943. It is also not disputed that though the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, which was extended to the areas of the former Sandur State with effect from 1-4-1956 did contain in ss. It is also not disputed that though the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, which was extended to the areas of the former Sandur State with effect from 1-4-1956 did contain in ss. 69 to 75 provisions analogous to Ss. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act, the said S. 69 to 75 were, however, excluded from application to the said areas. ( 18 ) THE proposition that after the merger of the territories of the sandur State in the dominion of India, the dominion of India became the full and exclusive authority for the governance of the merged territories is not disputed. Referring to an analogous position, the Supreme Court observed :"___all authorities are agreed that it is within the competence of new soverign to accord recognition to existing rights in the conquered or ceded territories and, by legislation or otherwise, to apply its qwn laws to them; and these laws can, and indeed when the occasion arises must, be examined and interpreted by the municipal Courts of the absorbing State. " (See Virendra Smgh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1954 SC 447 , para 23) ( 19 ) THE argument of the learned Government Advocate in support of the right of the State to the sandalwood rests mainly upon what, according to him, is the import and effect of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act on the rights of the Sandur State to the sandalwood under S. 49 of the Sandur forest Act, 1943. His argument is that by virtue of the said S. 6 of the general Clauses Act, the rights vested in the Sandur State under S. 49 and 50 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, were saved and became vested in and exercisable by the successor State. This argument requires to be examined from two points of view : The first is the effect of the said repeal on the right to sandalwood trees in private lands vested in Sandur State under S. 49 of the Sandur Forest Act. The second is the obligation of the owners of said private lands to preserve these trees and to allow them to draw nourfsh- ment and sustenance from the soil. S. 6 of the General Clauses Act lays down the effect of the repeal of an enactment. The said S. 6 runs Thus"6. The second is the obligation of the owners of said private lands to preserve these trees and to allow them to draw nourfsh- ment and sustenance from the soil. S. 6 of the General Clauses Act lays down the effect of the repeal of an enactment. The said S. 6 runs Thus"6. Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) * * * (b) * * * (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) * * * (e) * * * " the consequences that ensue a repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject are stated as follows : " Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we wquld undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they Indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. S. 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case. " (vide State of Punjab v. Mahar Singh Pratap Singh atr 1955 SC 84, para 8 ). It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case. " (vide State of Punjab v. Mahar Singh Pratap Singh atr 1955 SC 84, para 8 ). ( 20 ) IN Jayantilal Amaratlal v. Union of India, the above proposition was reiterated in the following terms :". . . . In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put an end to by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those lights and liabilities. The absence of a saving clause in a new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question-see State of Punjab v. Mahar Singh ( (1955) 1 SCR 893 ^ air 1955 SC 84 and T. S. Baliah v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras (1969) 72 ITR 787= air 1969 SC 701 )". ( 21 ) IN the light of the above enunciations, from the absence of provisions corresponding to S. 49 of the Sandur Act in the Madras Forest Act, which was extended to the erstwhile Sandur State following the repeal of the sandur Fores! Act. 1943, an argument becomes available to the defendants * that the fresh legislation manifests a contrary intenton so as to exclude so far as the rights under the sections are concerned, the operation of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. The continuance of the obligations of the owners of the private lands contemplated by S. 50 of the Sandur Forest act, 1943, depends upon the continued operation of the provisions in S. 50, as the said obligations cannot be said and be of such nature as can adroit of or are susceptible of being saved by S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. Such obligations must necessarily stem out of the provisions of the fresh jegislation which is not the position here. Such obligations must necessarily stem out of the provisions of the fresh jegislation which is not the position here. ( 22 ) HOWEVER, even assuming without deciding that the right of the sandur State under S. 49 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, with respect to standing sandalwood trees was a vested right and that that right stood saved and that the fresh legislation on the same subject did not make manifest a contrary intention, the plaintiff cannot succeed in the suits on this ground alone, as we shall see presently. ( 23 ) WHAT emerges from the combined effect of the assumption that the right to the sandalwood trees under the said S. 49 was a vested right and was saved and of the clear legal position that the owners of private lands were under no surviving or continuing legal obligation in the matter of preservation of and of affording sustenance and nourishment from their soil to the said trees, is that the Sandur State or its successor, in respect of the sandalwood trees that existed on the private lands at the time of the repeal of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, is in the same position as and has the same rights of one who transplants his trees on the land of others and without a contractual or statutory right so to dc allows such trees, to nourish themselves and grow on and draw nutrients from the soil of others. ( 24 ) IN the Roman Private Law 'accessio' was the process whereby one thing becomes attachable to and inseparable from another. The rule was that when once a plant took root in the soil and once the seed was in the ground they acceded to the land and became irrevocably the landowner's property. Amongst the rules justifying this legal consequence are those that say that " separation is only periodically possible and so a landowner might have to see his land taken up by another's trees or crops and useless to himself for months". (See Roman Private Law-R. W. Leage, p. 181 ). ( 25 ) EVEN in cases of a tenant planting trees on the demised land, there is eminent judicial authority for the view that when trees are so planted the property in such trees attaches, in the absence of a contract or custom to the contrary, to the land and passes with it. ( 25 ) EVEN in cases of a tenant planting trees on the demised land, there is eminent judicial authority for the view that when trees are so planted the property in such trees attaches, in the absence of a contract or custom to the contrary, to the land and passes with it. The proposition which is valid in the context of permissive occupation becomes valid a forttori in regard to a person who without any right either under law or contract, plants his trees on another's land. In like manner, 'if trees were planted or seed sown in the land of another, the owner of the soil became owner also of the tree, the plant, or the seed, as scon as it had taken root'. (See broom's Legal Maxims, page 262 ). ( 26 ) IN Raghunath Painandik v. Dullabha Behera, AIR 1951 Orissa 181. Panigrahi, J. stated a corollary of this principle in stating that the law appears to be well settled that where the roots of a tree extend into the lands of the two parties and derive nourishment from both, it should be held to be the common property of both. In Shanta Bai v. State of Bom, AIR 1958 SC, 332, in examining in a different context however, the distinction between 'standing timber' on the one hand and 'trees' as immoveable property on the other, emphasised the essence of the distinction as resting upon the criterion that the latter continued to draw sustenance from the soil and observed " that the legal basis for the rule is that trees that are not cut continue to draw nourishment from the soil and that the benefit of this goes to the grantee. " ( 27 ) WHAT emerges from the aforesaid enunciations is that even if the right to the trees under Sec. 49 of the Eepealed Act survived and the corresponding obligations on the part of the owners of the lands to provide sustenance and nourishment to\ the trees do not exist, the trees in question rooted in the soil of others and haying grown and enriched themselves for years drawing nourishment and sustenance there-from, must on the basis of the said rule of ' quic quid plantature solo solo cedit' be held to belong to the owners of the soil. Indeed the word 'land' which is 'nomen genere- lissimum, includes not o,nly the faces of the earth, but has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward, giving rise to, the maxim Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. "whatever is- in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth by the common law belongs to the owner of the surface". (Vide Anat Mills Co ltd v. State of Gujarat AIR 1976 SC. 888 , ( 28 ) THE letter No. AFD-38-SDL 57 dt. 29-4-1958 from the plaintiff to the Chief Conservator of Forests, a copy of which was produced before us by the learned Govt Advocate along with his memo dt. 15-7-1976 is to the effect that " the right of pattadars to the sandal trees on their land vests with the pattadars as the Bellary Dist was excluded from the operation of the statutory provision " indeed it appears to us that the extension OF the provisions of the mysore Forest Act, 1900, without its S. 69 to 75, to Bellary Dist was significant and was in recognition of the true legal position then obtaining as to the ownership of sandalwood trees on private lands in Sandur and must be taken to be declaratory of the law as to the matter. ( 29 ) THAT apart, the question arises whether in these circumstances, even on the basis of the original ownership of the Sandur Sarkar of the said trees in 1949, a declaration as to that ownership could be sought. A declaratory decree is discretionary and should be made in exercise of the court's discretion depending upon the facts of each case. The observations of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, shamli v. Lakshmi Varain are worth recalling:". . . The relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary- and the plaintiff cannot claim it as of right. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound legal principles and ex-debito justitiae, The Court has to administer justice between the parties and cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or an engine of oppression. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound legal principles and ex-debito justitiae, The Court has to administer justice between the parties and cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or an engine of oppression. In these circumstances, while exercising its discretionary powers the Court must keep in mind the well settled principles of justice and fair play and shquld exercise the discretion only if the ends of justice require it, for justice is not an object which can be administered in vaccum. " ( 30 ) IN the. present case, after the repeal of the said Act in 1949, the trees which were then the property of Sandur State continued, without a contractual or statutory right to do so, to draw nourishment from and enrich themselves on the soil of the private owners from whom the defendants derive their title. The trees have not been static; they have grown substantially. Trees as they existed in the year 1949, when they were the exclusive property of the Sandur State, were no longer there in that 8. 38 :;r condition. They had undergone changes by growth". They were not the same trees in-specie. The letter dt. 29th April 1958 issued by the plaintiff had declared that the sandalwood trees standing on private lands of Sandur taluk are the property of the owners of the lands. Rights of innocent 3rd parties have intervened. In these circumstances, we do not think that it will be a sound exercise of discretion to grant the relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff even if it is possible to take the view that the rights under S. 49 of the Sandur Forest Act, 1943, aro vested and accrued right and were saved by S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. ( 31 ) WE, therefore, hold and answer Point No. (i) against the plaintiff. ( 32 ) POINT Wo. (ii): It is common ground thet the extraction and transportation of sandalwood, at the material time, was regulated by statutory rules known as ' Sandalwood Transit Rules for the Dists of Anantpur, bellary etc. The learned Counsel for the appellant has filed a typed copy of the said rules, which were stated to be in force during the material time. (ii): It is common ground thet the extraction and transportation of sandalwood, at the material time, was regulated by statutory rules known as ' Sandalwood Transit Rules for the Dists of Anantpur, bellary etc. The learned Counsel for the appellant has filed a typed copy of the said rules, which were stated to be in force during the material time. The applicability of the said rules was not disputed, and accordingly we proceed on the premise that the rules, as per the copy thereof filed before US were in force at the material time. Rule 3 thereof prescribes conditions for Import, Export and movement of sandalwood. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 stipulates procedure to be followed when an application for the registration of the 'pass hammer mark' is made. The said sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 reads as follows :" 9 (6 ). After the "pplication, with the statement in Form IV containing all the particulars therein prescribed, is received, the Dist forest Officer or an Officer subordinate to the Dist Forest Officer who is authorised by him in that behalf shall, as soon as possible, inspect the locality of extraction and identify the smndalwod by verifying the girth and assembling all the parts of each tree and satisfy himself about the accuracy of the details furnished by the applicant and thereafter mark all the sandalwood with the district pass hammer. If the result of such inspection is satisfactory, the Dist Forest Officer shall subject to the provisions of CL (B) of this sub-rule grant a certificate of registration in Form V with as little delay as possible. "the above rules provide for rn. inspection of the locality of extraction; identification of the sandalwood and an examination of the accuracy of the details furnished by the applicant as preconditions before the sandalwood is marked by 'pass hammer'. It is on the basis of this alone that sandalwood is permitted to be transported. Cl (b) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 provides, inter alia, for cancellation of registration of any property mark in certain cases. It is not disputed that the sandalwood constituting the subject matter of these suits were so marked and permission for their transportation issued thereafter. The eeriiirate issued and permits granted are, admittedly, not revoked or cancelled in a manner provided for in the said rules. 32a. It is not disputed that the sandalwood constituting the subject matter of these suits were so marked and permission for their transportation issued thereafter. The eeriiirate issued and permits granted are, admittedly, not revoked or cancelled in a manner provided for in the said rules. 32a. It is contended for the defendants that consistently with the finality imparted to the statutory procedure in the matter of grant of the certificate of registration and of transport permits, which are not cancelled or revoked, the relief prayed for by the plaintiff in the suits cannot be granted. According to the argument, any relief that the plaintiff seeks in these proceedings will be in defeasance and detract from the finality of the statutory proceedings in this behalf. In our opinion, this argument is not without merit. In Secty of Siate v. Kasturi Reddi, ILR 26 Mad. 268, the Madras High court dealing with the finality of assignments of waste lan-ds duly made in accordance with Dharkast Rules observed as follows :" The Civil Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a, grant of land, alleged to have been made by an officer on behalf of the Crown, is binding on the Crown or persons claiming under it subsequent to the grant; and the mere fact that the alleged grant purports to have been made under the Dharkast Rules does not affect that jurisdiction. A grant which purports to have been made under the Dharkast rules by an officer empowered by them to make it is a grant made by a person authorised in that behalf and has the validity of a grant made by the Governor in Council. Such an officer is an agent generally or specially appointed by the Governor in Council in that behalf and his acts, if within the scope of his authority, are as binding on the Crown as if they had been done by the Governor in Council. Where such a grant has been made, the action ef the officer to whom an appeal lies with reference to it is final and binding on government, if his act was within the scope of his authority. His action is not subject to any other control. Where such a grant has been made, the action ef the officer to whom an appeal lies with reference to it is final and binding on government, if his act was within the scope of his authority. His action is not subject to any other control. And when the proposal of an Applicant is accepted by an officer duly authorised in that behalf by the Dharkast Rules, and the acceptance is communicated to the applicant, there is a Valid contract and disposal of the land (unless the grant was procured by fraud, mis-representation or mutual mistake as to any matter of fact essential to the agreement ). Such a grant cannot, therefore, be annulled or revoked by the' officer who made the grant, his successor in office, or even by the Governor in Council. Such a grant is subject under the rules only to one condition, namely, it may be revoked or annulled by an officer of a higher grade, on an appeal being preferred to him. "on the same principle, it must be held that so long as the statutory certificate of registration and the permits for transportation issued under the rules are not revoktd in a manner recognised by or known to law, the same cannot be sought to be nullified in independent proceedings, inasmuch a, the grant of relief in these suits, would have the effect of nullifying or revoking the finality of the statutory certificates and permits. y2b. We, accordingly, hold on Point No. (ii) that the proceedings taken under the statutory rules for the grant of certificate of registration and the permit for transport, not having been revoked by the procedure contemplated under the said rules, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff in the suits which would have the effect of revoking or nullifying the said certificates and permissions. ( 33 ) THIS relates to plea of estoppel. We are of the view that except in the facts of the proceedings concerned in RFA-9 of 1973, no plea, of estoppel could really arise on the facts of the case. The facts in OS. 21/69 from which RFA. ( 33 ) THIS relates to plea of estoppel. We are of the view that except in the facts of the proceedings concerned in RFA-9 of 1973, no plea, of estoppel could really arise on the facts of the case. The facts in OS. 21/69 from which RFA. 9 1973 arises, however, bare out that after the award of the 'pass hammer mark' and permission to transport the sandalwood in question in favour of the 1st defendant who claimed to have purchased the sandalwood from owners of patta lands, the same was, in turn, purchased by the fifth defendant and thereafter pledged by it in favour of the 8th defendant. The plaintiff's case is that the extraction of sandalwood trees from patta lands in Sandur Taluk was permitted by the forest Dept "inadvertently and on the misconception that the sandal wood trees in patta lands of Sandur Taluk did not belong to the plaintiff-Govt". ( 34 ) IT is on the basis of the representation implicit in the grant of the said permits that the first defendant claimed to have changed its position to its detriment by paying the price for the sandalwcod in question. Sri Shiva- swamy, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent in RFA. 9 73 contends that in these circumstances the plaintiff must be held to be estopped from asserting its title in respect of the goods. He invited our attention to the following passage in Charles Worth on Negligence :" Another illustration emerges sometimes from cases concerning the doctrine of estoppel by negligence. Lord Denman CJ in Pickard v. Sears ( (1837) 6 A and E 469, 474) stated the proposition that the rule of law is clear where one by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to belive the existence of a certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. "this aspect of the principle of estoppel has been considered in a recent decision of the Court -of Appeal in Moor gate in which, Lord Denning MR stated the principle thus :" The phrase "estoppel by negligence" is misleading. II is only one aspect of "estoppel by conduct". Negligence itself is nc ground for depriving an owner of his goods. "this aspect of the principle of estoppel has been considered in a recent decision of the Court -of Appeal in Moor gate in which, Lord Denning MR stated the principle thus :" The phrase "estoppel by negligence" is misleading. II is only one aspect of "estoppel by conduct". Negligence itself is nc ground for depriving an owner of his goods. If an owner leaves his hquse wide open, so that thieves enter and steal his goods, he can recover them from any person into whose hand they come, unless they have been sold meanwhile in market overt. . . There is no doubt that a buyer of goods can acquire a title by estoppel. . . . . . Estoppel is not a rule of evidence. It is not a cause d action. It is a principle of justice and of equity. It comes to this: when a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to, go back on it when it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so. Dixon J, put it in these words: ' The principle upon which estoppel in pais is founded is that the law should not permit an unjust departure by a party from an assumption of fact which he has caused another party to adopt or accept for the purpose of their legal relations another is when a man, by his words or by his silence, or acquiscence, leads another to believe that he is not the. owner and has no interest in the goods, whereupon the other buys them or sells them to an innor cent purchaser. It is held that the true owner cannot afterwards assert that they were his. The title to the goods is transferred to the buyer: see Pickard v. Sears ( (1837) 6 Ad and El 469 and Eastern Distributors ltd v. Goldring (1975) 2 QB 600 ). Then there are the so-called cases of estoppel by negligence. These do not apply to negligence in the air but only to negligence when there is a duty to take care owed to a particular person or one of a group of persons. Then there are the so-called cases of estoppel by negligence. These do not apply to negligence in the air but only to negligence when there is a duty to take care owed to a particular person or one of a group of persons. If the negligence amounts to conduct leading another to believe that the true owner has no title to the goods, oor has authorised another to deal with them (as by giving him the indica of title) and thus causes an innocent person to buy them, then the true owner will not afterwards b allowed to assert his title so as to deprive the innocent purchaser of them. The title is transferred to the innocent buyer; see the principles discussed in Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v. Central bank of India Ltd (1938) AC 287 and Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v. Hamblin (1965) 2 QB 242 ). In applying these principles of proprietary estoppel, the Owner is estopped, not only by his own conduct, but also by the conduct of his agent or any one who is in privity with him: See Eastern Distributers ltd v. Goldring (1957) 2 QB 600 by Devlin, J. Or, as i would prefer to put it the owner is estopped by the conduct of anyone to whom he entrusts the task of looking after his property and interests: See Attorney-General to the Prince of Wales v. Collam (1916) 2 KB 193, 203) by Atkin J. Whenever the true o:wner puts someone in his place to answer questions as to his property, he must be bqund by his answers just as he gave them himself. " ( 35 ) ON the above principle, it must be held that so far as OS. 21 of 1969 is concerned, the plaintiff is clearly estopped by its conduct from asserting any claim to the goods in question. We hold on Point No. (iii) accordingly against the plaintiff. ( 36 ) NO other contentions are urged. ( 37 ) IN the result, these three appeals fail and are dismissed. In RFA 8 of 1973, respondent is entitled to its costs. In RFA. 9 of 1973, Respondents 1, 2 and 6 and 8, 9 and 10 shall be entitled to their costs. There will be no oider as tp costs in RFA. 7 of 1973. --- *** --- .