Judgment Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha, J. This is an application for quashing the proceedings under section 145 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') on the ground that if the importance is attached to the past proceedings concerning possession over the disputed land, it would only be just and proper to quash the present proceeding relating to the very same land. 2. It may briefly be indicated that the plots in dispute appertain to khata Nos. 115, 116 and 32 of village Tetaria tola Fakirabigha, Police Station and district Nawada and measure a total area of 2.25 acres. The petitioners hive purchased this property on the 19th of September. 1973 and the opposite party claimed to have purchased the property on the 5th of February, 1974, prior to the purchases made by them, their respective vendors bad also clashed for possession over the very same land. One of the proceedings which was a proceeding under section 145 of the Code was decided in favour of the petitioners' vendor on the 30th of May, 1960. The opposite party's vendors moved for getting the said order set aside but that move was also rejected, on the 26th of June, 1968. Thereafter the said vendors filed a title suit on the 21st of September, 1968. As to whether the title suit was merely for declaration of title or also for confirmation or recovery of possession is not known. Be that as it may, the said title suit was also dismissed for default on 30th April, 1973. It appears that after the two parties made their respective purchases, clash now started between them. A section 144 proceeding was started relating to the very same lands on the 31st October, 1973 which was converted into a proceeding under section 145 of the Code on the 29th December, 1973. In this proceeding the petitioners filed an application for deleting the lands of khata nos. 115, 116 and 32, that is to say, the lands in dispute, from the said proceeding. The application was considered by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, Nawada, who accepted the prayer of the petitioners. In this proceeding the petitioners filed an application for deleting the lands of khata nos. 115, 116 and 32, that is to say, the lands in dispute, from the said proceeding. The application was considered by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, Nawada, who accepted the prayer of the petitioners. The reasons why he accepted the prayer was, to quote his own words, -No doubt in the instant case, the decision passed under section 145 Cr.P.C. is quite old relating to the year 1966 ; whereas in the cited ,case, the decision passed was a recent one and only 18 months old (1968 P.L.J.R. 165) but the decision passed in the instant case was upheld in revision in the year 1968 and the entire matter got the shape of finality by virtue of dismissal of a title suit concerning these lands" . Soon after passing of this order a proceeding under section 144 was started between the parties with regard to the very same plots on the 9th August, 1974. This was converted into a proceeding under section 145 on 1st October, 1974. The petitioners have come up against the order of proceeding with the case under section 145 of the Code. 3. It may be mentioned that the petitioners had filed an application before the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate for dropping the proceeding on the same grounds which had been accepted in an immediately earlier proceeding but the prayer has been rejected by the order dated 2nd July, 1975. 4. In fact, a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents that since the order dated 1st October, 1974 drawing up the proceeding under section 145 of the Code got merged in the order dated 2nd July, 1975 rejecting the petitioners' prayer for dropping the proceeding and since the petitioners had not moved this Court against the order dated 2nd July, 1975, the application for quashing of the proceeding under section 145 was not maintainable. 5. In my opinion, the preliminary objection has no substance. The petition is one for quashing the entire proceeding under section 145 which goes to the very root of the proceeding itself and which will necessarily involve whatever orders are passed rejecting or not accepting the petitioners' plea. 5. In my opinion, the preliminary objection has no substance. The petition is one for quashing the entire proceeding under section 145 which goes to the very root of the proceeding itself and which will necessarily involve whatever orders are passed rejecting or not accepting the petitioners' plea. Although I reject the preliminary objection, yet the question still remains as to whether the proceeding under section 145 of the Code should be quashed on the ground urged by the petitioners. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Radhakrishna Prasad Sao V. Lalgopal Babel for the proposition that due importance should be attached to the proceeding orders passed in relation to the proceeding under section 145 and if that is done, litigation in the shape of 145 proceedings must end. In that case an earlier proceeding under section 145 between the petitioner and the vendor of the opposite party was disposed of in favour of the opposite party's vendor. Just within 18 months of that order another proceeding under section 145 was initiated in respect of the same subject matter and in that context it was observed that "if no importance is attached to orders in proceedings under section 145 of the Code, which had taken place in recent past, there will be no end of criminal litigation and disturbance of place, because soon after the order the unsuccessful party will start disturbing the possession of the successful party". 7. I think, the learned counsel for the petitioners has read in this decision something which is not contained in it. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, once a decision bas been made concerning possession in a proceeding under section 145, that decision was always to be followed and obeyed whenever a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is started in respect of the same subject matter. I do not think that is the import of this decision. As a matter of fact, the earlier decision of this Court; one a Full Bench decision in the case of Parmeshwar Singh V. Kailashpati and others the other a single Judge decision in the case of Gaya Prasad Singh and others V. Ram Sarobar Saran Singh and others as also another single Judge decision in the case of Syed Zafar Ahsan and others Vs. Babu Jugeshwar Bux Roy and another have laid the view that no hard and fast rule can be laid down that a Magistrate in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code must give effect to recent decision or proceeding of civil or criminal court. The utmost that, therefore, can be said about the past decision or even a recent past decision in a 145 matter is that it is a piece of evidence which the court in seisin of 145 matter has to appraise. As to what weight is to be attached to that piece of evidence has to be left to the care and caution of the Magistrate in seisin. At east the Magistrate's jurisdiction to deal with the dispute relating to possession, on the ground that a decision of recent past must prevail, cannot be ousted. In the instant case, the one recent past decision in which the plots in dispute were deleted out of the proceedings is dated 5th August, 1974 but this decision does not do anything further than rely upon a decision which was given in the year 1966-on the 30th of May, 1966. It is this decision of the 5th of August; 1974 based on the decision not of the recent past, but of old past which has therefore, to be appraised. On that ground alone I do not think it can be said that the present proceedings must be dropped. 8. I do not find any merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.