Judgment LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J. 1. This second appeal by the plaintiffs is directed against the decision of the lower appellate Court dismissing the suit. In the plaint, they prayed for declaration of their title to and recovery of possession of more than 2 acres of land appertaining to Plot No. 807 of Khata No. 35 in village Daulatpur Adluchak in the District of Gaya and for mesne profits. 2. The land of Khata Nos. 35 and 36 belonged to Most. Zubaida Khatoon and Tabrakullah. The total area of khata No. 35 is 3.35 acres. According to the plaintiffs, Zubaida Khatoon and Tabrakullah sold the lands of khata Nos. 35 and 36 measuring 4.40 acres to Mullick Abul Heyat (defendant No. 11 in the suit) under a registered sale deed dated 12-9-1922, which has been marked as Ext. 4 in the case. In 1933, Abul Heyat orally gave the land to his wife Mst. Zakia in lieu of dower debt and on the 6th December, 1958, plaintiff No. 1 purchased the same from Mst. Zakia for a sum of Rs. 2000.00 in the name of his wife, plaintiff No. 2. 3. In the year 1950, a proceeding under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 had been started in respect of these lands and the custodian was in possession through temporary settlees. Both Abul Heyat and Mst. Zakia had gone to Pakistan when the proceeding had been started. Mst. Zakia returned back to Patna and made an application for release of the property which was done. Again in the year 1956, a fresh proceeding was started and the custodian attached the lands on the assumption that they belonged to Abul Heyat. Mst. Zakia once mare moved the authority for release of the lands and ultimately that was done on 24-4-1958. Soon thereafter the plaintiffs got the transfer in their favour. Defendants 1 to 6, who are said to be litigants, raised unfounded claims and a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started. It was converted into a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was decided against the plaintiffs. 4. According to the defence case, the sale deed (Ext. 4) dated 12-9-1922 was a sham document and Abul Heyat did not get possession of the lands. Tabrakullah died and thereafter Most. It was converted into a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was decided against the plaintiffs. 4. According to the defence case, the sale deed (Ext. 4) dated 12-9-1922 was a sham document and Abul Heyat did not get possession of the lands. Tabrakullah died and thereafter Most. Zubaida Khatoon, who was his heir, got complete title over the lands of khata No. 35. She did not maintain any arrangement for agriculture and settled the lands with the contesting defendants on batai system. After her death, her daughters daughters Amna Khatoon and Basra Khatoon (defendants 12 and 13) who were her sole heirs and legal representatives inherited the property and accepted the defendants as her tenants and granted a hukumnama on the 25th June, 1947, in the name of the mother of defendant No. 1 in respect of certain plots of Plot No. 35 and another hukumnama on the 15th July, 1947, in regard to Plot No. 807. The defendants claimed to be coming in possession since then. The gift by Abul Heyat in favour of his wife Mst. Zakia was also challenged. 5. The trial Court accepted the sale deed (Ext. 4) as a valid and effective document and rejected the case of farzi. It, however, further held that the oral gift pleaded in the plaint by Abul Heyat in favour of his wife being in lieu of dower debt was not a Heba and was, therefore, not legal in absence of a registered document. Mst. Zakia as a result did not get any title to the land and could not, therefore, make an effective transfer in favour of the plaintiffs. Proceeding further, the court held that the defendants case of their title and possession was not correct; and inasmuch as the plaintiffs case of possession of Mst. Zakia since 1933 and their own possession since 1958 was correct, they were entitled to a decree. The suit was accordingly decreed. 6. On appeal, the lower appellate Court concurred with the finding of the trial Court about the sale deed (Ext. 4) being not farzi. It was further held that Mst. Zakia did neither acquire any title to nor possession of the lands in question and the plaintiffs claim therefore, had to be negatived. The suit was accordingly decreed. 6. On appeal, the lower appellate Court concurred with the finding of the trial Court about the sale deed (Ext. 4) being not farzi. It was further held that Mst. Zakia did neither acquire any title to nor possession of the lands in question and the plaintiffs claim therefore, had to be negatived. A plea based on Sec. 41 of the T. P. Act was raised before it, but was rejected on the ground that the same had not been pleaded. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit dismissed. 7. Mr. J. C. Sinha, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, first, contended that the possession of Mst. Zakia should have been held by the lower appellate Court and the finding to the contrary is illegal. Reliance was placed on the case of Ma Mi V/s. Kallander Ammal, (AIR 1927 PC 22) and Kanakarathanammal V/s. V. S. Loganatha Mudahar, ( AIR 1965 SC 271 ). In the case of Ma Mi, a gift was made by a Mohammadan husband to his wife and by mutation the donees name was entered. The evidence of possession indicated possession of the husband. In this context, it was said that having regard to the relationship of husband and wife existing between the parties and the husbands subsequent acts with reference to the property done on behalf of his wife, the natural presumption arose in favour of the possession of the wife. The presumption in favour of the wife was raised after her title had been established. In the present case, the finding regarding title is against Mst. Zakia and is supported by the case reported in AIR 1949 Pat 237 (Mohammad Usman Khan V/s. Amir Mian) and has not been challenged in this appeal. The decision in Ma Mi V/s. Kallander Ammal, therefore, is of no help to the plaintiffs. In the case of Kanakarathanammal V/s. Loganatha also, the finding of title was in favour of the wife in whose name the property in question had been acquired. The parties to the case were Hindus and it has been said that in view of the fact that in ordinary Hindu families, the property exclusively belonging to a female member is normally managed by the Manager of the family, the actual management of the property by the karta could not disprove the ladys title. The parties to the case were Hindus and it has been said that in view of the fact that in ordinary Hindu families, the property exclusively belonging to a female member is normally managed by the Manager of the family, the actual management of the property by the karta could not disprove the ladys title. A question of fact had been raised in that case and the finding thereupon was recorded in favour of the wife. No rule of law had been laid down that even in absence of title in the wife of the owner of a property, the possession of the husband would be tantamount to the wifes possession. Such a proposition would be preposterous and cannot be countenanced. In the present case, a finding of fact has been recorded by the final court of fact that Mst. Zakia was never in possession of the disputed land and this finding cannot be challenged in second appeal. The ground urged, there-fore, fails. 8. The next argument addressed on behalf of the appellants is that in view of the order passed in the proceedings under the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act, the title of Mst. Zakia has become final and cannot be now challeng-ed in the present suit. Reliance was placed on Sec. 46 of the aforesaid Act, which reads as follows: "46. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts bar-red in certain Matters - Save as other-wise expressly provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property; or (b) x x x x x (c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian under this Act; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to de-termine." 9. Steps were taken under the provisions of the Act on the assumption that the land belonged to Abul Heyat and Mst. Zakia on her return from Pakistan claimed the property as hers and prayed for its release. The District Assistant Custodian, Gaya the authority under the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act rejected the prayer. Mst. Steps were taken under the provisions of the Act on the assumption that the land belonged to Abul Heyat and Mst. Zakia on her return from Pakistan claimed the property as hers and prayed for its release. The District Assistant Custodian, Gaya the authority under the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act rejected the prayer. Mst. Zakia filed an appeal under the provisions of the Act which was allowed by the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property by the order in Ext. 8. Great reliance was plac-ed by Mr. J. C. Sinha on this document. He urged that the judgment indicates that the property which was attached on the basis of its belonging to Abul Heyat was held to be the property of the lady and on that basis it was released. In view of this decision, the Court has no jurisdiction to reject the title of Mst. Zakia, the vendor of the plaintiffs Mr. J.C. Sinha relied upon the decision in Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, Gaya V/s. Mt. Nasiban, 1969 BLJR 637 = ( AIR 1969 Pat 272 ). 10. The Evacuee Act was enacted to provide for the administration of the evacuee property and for certain matters connected therewith as is indicated in the preamble. The word evacuee has been defined in Sec.2 (d) of the Act and the term evacuee property in Sec-tion 2 (f). Section 7 laid down that where the custodian was of opinion that any property was evacuee property within the meaning of the Act, he should pass an order declaring the property as evacuee property. Some further steps to be taken thereafter are included in the section. Section 8 said that any property declared to be evacuee property under Section 7 would be deemed to have vest-ed in the custodian. The Custodian was also authorised to take possession. The jurisdiction of the authority, therefore, clearly depended on the property being evacuee property. The Act authorises the Custodian to determine what proper-ties are evacuee properties and this ques-tion can be answered by deciding whe-ther a particular person did or did not become an evacuee and whether the pro-perty in question belonged to him. (See Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab V/s. Jafran Begum, AIR 1968 SC 169 ). The Act authorises the Custodian to determine what proper-ties are evacuee properties and this ques-tion can be answered by deciding whe-ther a particular person did or did not become an evacuee and whether the pro-perty in question belonged to him. (See Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab V/s. Jafran Begum, AIR 1968 SC 169 ). If the authority comes to the conclusion that a particular property belonged to a person who was an evacuee and, therefore, the property was an evacuee property within the meaning of the Act, he has power to act under the statute and in that event a Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to question the legality of any action of the authority or to adjudicate upon the question that the property is or is not evacuee property. This is the effect of Sec. 46 the Act. If, on the other hand, the au-thority decides that the property in ques-tion was not an evacuee property it has no further jurisdiction to act under the provisions of the Act. Any observation made by the Custodian or any finding recorded on the question of title in such an eventuality, has no binding force, be-cause the custodian has no right to ad-judicate upon the title of the property which is not an evacuee property. Sec-tion 46 of the Act creates a bar to the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court and must be strictly construed. As soon as the property in question is held not to be an evacuee property, it goes beyond the ambit of the Act and any finding recorded in the proceeding, therefore, cannot attract Sec. 46. In managing Officer, Evacuee Property, Gaya V/s. Mossammat Nasiban ( 1969 BLJR 637 ) relied upon on behalf of the appellants, the custodian had declared the property in question an evacuee property and this order was challenged by the plaintiffs in the civil Court on the ground that they had not been served with notice. Such a suit is clearly barred by Sec. 46, as was held in that case. This case has no application to the case before us where the Additional Custodian released the land by his order as contained in Ext. 8, on a finding that the property was not an evacuee, property. For coming to that conclusion, the Additional Custodian observed that the documents filed in the proceeding "prima facie" indicated raiyati title of Zakia Khatoon. This case has no application to the case before us where the Additional Custodian released the land by his order as contained in Ext. 8, on a finding that the property was not an evacuee, property. For coming to that conclusion, the Additional Custodian observed that the documents filed in the proceeding "prima facie" indicated raiyati title of Zakia Khatoon. I am, therefore, of the view that this finding is not binding on the Civil Court and the judgment of the court below is not illegal on this ground. 11. The last point urged on behalf of the appellants, that the finding of fact recorded by the court below is viti-ated in law on account of non-consideration of Ext. 8 is also without any substance. The order Ext. 8 as also other connected documents were considered by the court below in paragraph 37 and other paragraph of the judgment. No other point has been urged by Mr. J. C. Sinha. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. BIRENDRA PRASAD SINHA, J. 13 I agree.