JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, who was born on November 23,1922 was initially employed as a work charge Sub Overseer in the Public Works Department of the former State of Jodhpur on September 6, 1940. He was confirmed as Sub Overseer on July 1, 1944 and was thereafter promoted as an Overseer. The petitioner continued to hold the post of Overseer until April 7, 1949 when the princely State of Jodhpur integrated into the United State of Rajasthan. The petitioner was appointed as a Senior Overseer with effect from 7.4.1949 as a result of the integration of the services of the covenanting States. He was subsequently promoted as an officiating Assistant Engineer in the Public Works Department, Rajasthan with effect from December 11, 1959. On July 19, 1972 the petitioner was approved by the Departmental Promotion committee for appointment as a regular officiating Assistant Engineer in the Public Works Department, but before he could be so appointed, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from Government service by the order of the State Government dated September 2, 1972 with effect from the date of the expiry of three calendar months from the service of the aforesaid order upon him. The aforesaid order of his compulsory retirement has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised four submissions before me in this writ petition. The first submission made by learned counsel was that the petitioner was initially employed in the erstwhile State of Jodhpur and Regulation No. 8 of the Jodhpur State Service Regulations provided that the age of retirement in that State was 55 years extends able up to 60 years on public grounds. The contention of the learned counsel was that there was no rule or law authorising the compulsory retirement of a State employee in the former State of Jodhpur, when the aforesaid State merged with other Indian States to form the3 United State of Rajasthan and Article 16 of the Covenant, entered into by the Rules of the former Indian States and the Raj Pramukh of the new State of Rajasthan, guaranteed continuance of service of the permanent members of the public services of the covenanting States, on conditions which were to be not less advantageous to such employees than those which prevailed on November 1, 1948. Learned counsel urged that in view of the aforesaid provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, the service conditions of the petitioner could not be altered to his disadvantage in the new State of Rajasthan and as there was no provision of compulsory retirement in Jodhpur State Service Regulations, the petitioners was entitled to be retained in service in the State of Rajasthan also until he attained the age of 55 years. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanath J Thaker v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1954 SC 680 in support of his aforesaid submission. In that case a similar provision contained in the Covenant entered into at the time of formation of the United State of Maharashtra was under consideration. It was observed in the aforesaid case by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the service conditions which prevailed under the Wadhwan State Service Rules continued to hold the force of law when the Wardhwan State merged with the Maharashtra State and again the same merged with the Indian Dominion, as all the existing laws continued until repealed. Thereafter, those rights were carried over on the coming into force of the Constitution of India and the formation of the Indian Republic, with the important difference that the employee then became as Indian citizen and the only way to defeat his rights was by legislation, if that could be done under the Constitution. Their Lordships took note of the fact that there was no such legislation thereafter and in these circumstances it was held that the rights of the employee continued to be governed by the service conditions of the former State of Wadhwan and his contract of service. The reply of the learned Deputy Government Advocate is that the service conditions of the petitioner are now governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and that as the petitioner has received promotion and benefit of revised and increased salary in accordance with the Rajasthan Service Rules and the Rajasthan Revised Pay Scale Rules, the petitioner cannot submit that his service conditions should be governed even now by the Jodhpur State Service Regulations. 3. 3. However, in the present case after the formation of the new State of Rajasthan and after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the Raj Pramukh of Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, in exercise of the powers vested in him under the provisions of the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, Rule 2 (ii) of the Rajasthan Service Rules made those rules applicable to all persons appointed on or after the 7th day of April, 1949 to such posts or services, which were under the administrative control of the Government of Rajasthan or in connection with the affairs of the State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting States. It is admitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that he was appointed to the post of Senior Overseer in the service of the United State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting State and was thereafter promoted as officiating Assistant Engineer in the service of the State of Rajasthan. As such, the service of the petitioner was governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 and Rules 244 of the aforesaid Rules became applicable to the petitioner. 4. A similar argument was also raised before this Court in the case of Deepchand Jain v. The State of Rajasthan and others, 1972 WLN 1015 but the same was rejected by this Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shinghal (as he then was) with the following observations:- "The argument is however untenable because it is admitted before me that the petitioner accepted appointment in the service of the respondent State as a result of the integration of the service of the employees of the Covenanting States. He was therefore, governed by Rule 2 (ii) of the Rules, which provided that the Rules shall apply to all persons appointed on or after April 7, 1949 to posts in the service of the employees of the Covenanting States. He was therefore, governed by Rule 2 (ii) of the Rules, which provided that the Rules shall apply to all persons appointed on or after April 7, 1949 to posts in the service of the employees of the Covenanting States. Bholanath's case (22) was quite different for there old Dhara No. 29 Samwat 2004 continued to be in force." In view of the fact that the petitioner accepted appointment on the post of Senior Overseer in the service of the United State of Rajasthan, as a result of the integration of the services of the employees of the Covenanting States, the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 became applicable to him by virtue of the provisions of clause (ii) of Rule 2 of the aforesaid Rules. If the petitioner then did not desire to be governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules, then the first proviso to Rule 2 gave him the option to apply for retirement and for obtaining pension and gratuity in accordance with the Rules by which he was governed previously, provided he exercised such option within two months of the commencement of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 or of his appointment as a result of the integration of the Services of the Covenanting States, whichever was later. It is not the case of the petitioner that he applied for retirement in accordance with the aforesaid condition contained in the proviso to Rule 2 of the Rajasthan Service Rules and as such it will be presumed that the petitioner accepted service under the new State of Rajasthan as a result of the integration of services of the Covenanting States and agreed to be governed by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, repelled. 5. The second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the procedure prescribed by the State Government for compulsory retirement of its employees under Rule 244 (2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules does not appear to have been followed in the case of petitioner. No such averment was made by the petitioner in his rather longish writ petition and the respondents had no occasion to meet this contention. For the first time the petitioner appears to have taken this objection in para 4 of the rejoinder, filed by him to the reply to the writ petition submitted by the respondents. No such averment was made by the petitioner in his rather longish writ petition and the respondents had no occasion to meet this contention. For the first time the petitioner appears to have taken this objection in para 4 of the rejoinder, filed by him to the reply to the writ petition submitted by the respondents. Even at that stage what was averred by the petitioner in this respect was that as the petitioner was approved by the Departmental promotion Committee for regular officiating appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer in the Public Works Department on July 19, 1972 "it was not probable" that the procedure prescribed by the State Government in its circular dated February 19, 1972 could have been followed, in view of the fact that the petitioner was compulsorily retired soon after, by the order dated September 2, 1972. The petitioner has not supplied any basis for the bald assertion on his part in this respect. it has also been mentioned in para 5 of his rejoinder by petitioner that the objection about the non compliance of the procedure for compulsory retirement was raised in para 23 of the writ petition. But after having locked into the contents of para 23 of the writ petition, I am unable to discover any such averment in the aforesaid paragraph or anywhere else in the writ petition. Thus in the absence of any definite averment on the part of the petitioner that the procedure prescribed by the State Govt. for compulsory retirement under rule 244 (2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules was not followed in his case and in view of the fact that the respondents were not afforded any opportunity to meet this contention, it is not possible to entertain contention of the learned counsel and the same is, therefore, rejected. 6. The third submission of the learned counsel is that as the petitioner was approved for appointment as a regular officiating Assistant Engineer by the Departmental Promotion Committee which met on July 19, 1972 and as such all adverse entries made in the service rolls of the petitioner earlier thereto were completely wiped out and as there was no other adverse entry after July, 1972 till the petitioner was compulsorily retired by the order of the State Government dated September 2, 1972, the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was bad in law. It may be observed in this connection that compulsory retirement under Rule 244 (2) is not a punishment and the entire service record of the concerned employee has to be scrutinised for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether he should be compulsorily retired or not. In Deep Chand Jain's case (2) it was observed:- "........the entire record of service of the petitioner has been scrutinised for the purpose of examining their performance over a period of 25 years and then a decision has been taken to to retire them compulsorily." 7. This aspect of the matter has been default with by me at considerable length in Prem Chand Sanghi v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1975 WLN 891 and it was observed in that case:- "The matter of compulsory retirement cannot be considered on same basis as that of awarding punishment or making selection for promotion to higher posts on the basis of merit or seniority-cum-merit. It would be wholly unrealistic to hold that once an employee is allowed to cross the efficiency bar or is promoted to higher posts on an adhoc or officiating basis or is even confirmed on a particular post, all punishments awarded to him or adverse remarks made in his character rolls prior thereto are completely wiped out for 'all purposes'." In Dr. C.L. Pathak v. The State of Rajasthan, 1976 RLW 38 another learned Judge of this Court quoted with approval the aforesaid observations and added:- ".....the Courts cannot sit as a court of appeal over the decision of the Government which has been arrived at after taking into account over all picture of the officer." 8. In view of the aforesaid decision, I am of the view that the adverse entries made in the service rolls of the petitioner were not completely wiped out for all purposes, merely because the Departmental Promotion Committee, which met on July 19, 1972 approved the petitioner for appointment as a regular officiating Assistant Engineer in the Public Works Department, which post he was already holding in a temporary capacity since September 11, 1959. It is not denied that there were adverse entries contained in the service rolls of the petitioner, which related to the year 1960-61 to 1965-66. It is not denied that there were adverse entries contained in the service rolls of the petitioner, which related to the year 1960-61 to 1965-66. After taking into consideration the entire service record of the petitioner, extending over a period 25 years, if the State Government came to the conclusion that the efficiency of the petitioner was impaired or that he has ceased to be efficient, then it would not be for this court to interfere with the decision of the State Government in that matter. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 9. The last submission made by the learned counsel is that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was accused by mala-fides. Learned counsel argued that the adverse entries were made against the petitioner from the year 1960-61 to 1965-66, when Shri S.D. Mathur held the office of the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri B.D. Mathur and Shri K.N. Sharma, Additional Chief Engineer were biased against the petitioner and bore ill-will against him. 10. So far as Shri K.N. Sharma is concerned, it is admitted by the petitioner that he appreciated the petitioner's work in September, 1966 and, therefore, the contention that Shri Sharmka bore any ill-will against the petitioner is nullified by the petitioner's own averments. In respect of the adverse entries made against the petitioner by Shri B.D. Mathur, the then Chief Engineer, it would be sufficient to say that the petitioner preferred representations to the State Government against the aforesaid adverse entries made in his annual confidential rolls for the year 1960-61 to 1965-66 and all those representations made by the State Government. In these circumstances even if it be assumed that Shri B.D. Mathur waqs biased against the petitioner, yet after the State Government had approved the adverse entries made against the petitioner during the year 1960-61 to 1965-66 and rejected his representations in respect of such entries, it can be longer be said that the aforesaid adverse entries could not be taken into consideration by the State Government for the purposes of compulsory retirement of the petitioners. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the petitioner has not made any prayer in the writ petition for setting aside the orders passed by the State Government rejecting his representations regarding the aforesaid adverse entries. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the petitioner has not made any prayer in the writ petition for setting aside the orders passed by the State Government rejecting his representations regarding the aforesaid adverse entries. Thus the adverse entries in question, having become final after the rejection of the representation of the petitioner by the State Government, they could certainly be taken into consideration in deciding the question relating to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner and I do not find that the State Government either committed any irregularity or illegality in this respect. 11. No other point was argued before me. 12. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. *******