K. C. AGRAWAL, J. This application by Shaukat Ali under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated November 7, 1975 (Annexure i) passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Robertsganj, district Mirzapur retiring the petitioner compul-sorily under Fundamental Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book (briefly stated as F. R. 56 ). In order to appreciate the point involved in this case it is necessary to state the facts very briefly. The petitioner was appointed as Lekhpal in this state in the year 1966. He was subsequently confirmed on this post in May 1957. On November 7, 1975 he received a notice from Sub-Divisional Officer, Robertsganj district Mirzapur informing him that he had been compulsorily retired from service and that he would receive three months salary in lieu of notice. Feeling aggrieved by the said order he has filed the present writ petition. At the time of admission of this petition, the court was not inclined to admit this petition on the ground that he has an alternative remedy available to him under the provisions of Section 4 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Ordinance, 1975. But as counsel appearing for the petitioner challenged the validity of Section 5 (8) of the ordinance of the ground of the same was in conflict with Section 30, of the Advocates Act, the Bench admitted the petition and directed the case to be listed before the appropriate Bench. It is settled that power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary one in the exercise of which it can take into consideration the availability of an adequate alternative legal remedy to the applicant. If it finds that such an applicant can have adequate and suitable relief elsewhere it has the discretion to refuse to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. This Article is not intended to provide additional or alternative remedy where another effective remedy can be had. In order to find whether adequate and effective relief is available to the petitioner under the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Ordinance, 1975 (briefly stated) as the Services (Tribunal) Ordinance, we may now read some of its provisions. This Ordinance was promulgated with a view to provide for the Constitution of Tribunals to adjudicate disputes in respect of matters relating to employment of all public servants of the State. This Ordinance was promulgated with a view to provide for the Constitution of Tribunals to adjudicate disputes in respect of matters relating to employment of all public servants of the State. Section 3 provides for the constitution of the Tribunal laying down that each tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. The Judicial Member shall be a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, whereas qualificationp required to be become an Administrative Member is that he holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, Commissioner of a Division. Section 4 details the types of the cases which can be taken before a tribunal by way of a reference. Section 5 deals with powers and procedure of tribunal. It casts a duty on a tribunal to decide every reference expeditiously and for that purpose has simplified the procedure laying down that ordinarily every reference shall be decided en the basis of perusal of documents, representations and oral arguments, if any. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of this section have done away with the technicalities of the Evidence Act by providing that an attested copy of any document can be taken in evidence and that ordinarily no oral evidence shall be allowed to be adduced. The decision given by a tribunal has the same effect as declaration made by a court of law and is capable of execution. Sub-section (8) of Section 5 which deals with the appearance of legal practitioner before the trial is as under: - " 8 (a) The employer may appoint a public servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the Presiding Officer, to present its case before the Tribunal. (b) The public servant may take the assistance of any other public servant to present his case before the Tribunal on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless either (i) the Presenting Officer appointed by the employer is a legal practitioner or (ii) the Tribunal, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. " Section 6 provides for bar of suits, while Section 7 confers rule making power on the State Government. A review of the provisions of the Ordinance would show that it provides a complete and wholesome machinery for the vindication of grievance of a Government servant. " Section 6 provides for bar of suits, while Section 7 confers rule making power on the State Government. A review of the provisions of the Ordinance would show that it provides a complete and wholesome machinery for the vindication of grievance of a Government servant. The powers conferred on a tribunal cover a wide amplitude and not only entitle it to grant the reliefs sought, but also to enforce the same, if necessary. It is less expensive as the procedure provided is simple, hence heavy expenses would not be required to be made. The procedure provided is simple and not cumbersome. It does not require certified copies to be filed and has further done away with the necessity of giving of formal proof cf the papers filed. It also entitles the tribunal to pass interim orders. Most of the questions which may be raised in a writ petition, can be considered by the Tribunal. Often petitions filed under Article 226 are dismissed as this court finds itself unable to decide questions of facts on the basis of affidavits exchanged between the parties. Furthermore, as ordinance provides for expeditious disposal of the cases, a government servant is also likely to get relief without loss of much time. For these reasons I find that since no hardship is likely to be caused to the petitioner by pursuing the statutory remedy, a writ against the order retiring him from the service cannot issue. I, however, wish to make it clear that as ayailability of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Every petition filed by a government servant cannot be rejected on this ground irrespective of the points involved for decision by the High Court. For instance if an order passed by an authority is without jurisdiction or patently in excess of its jurisdiction it may be possible to entertain the petition and decide it on merits. Even this depends on facts. The general principles on which the court should act have been laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases, their application to each particular case would depend on a variety of inn dividual facts. Even this depends on facts. The general principles on which the court should act have been laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases, their application to each particular case would depend on a variety of inn dividual facts. So far as the present petition is concerned it may be pointed out that this does not fall in the category where the authority had no jurisdiction to retire the petitioner or it has committed an apparent error requiring interference by this court in these proceedings. The remedy provided by the Ordinance is more efficacious. Counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that the remedy provided by the Act is not effective inasmuch as under the ordinance he does not have the right of representation through counsel. He urged that in the absence of the help from a lawyer the petitioner will not be able to plead his case on his own, and this might result in denying the right to get relief in the reference filed before the Tribunal. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted in the alternative that sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the service (Tribunal) Ordinance, taking away the right of an advocate to appear before service Tribunals, being in conflict with Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 14 of the Bar Councils Act, is invalid. Invalidity alleged by him is on the ground of repugnancy. I propose to consider the question of repugnancy first. Article 254 of the Constitution deals with inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislature of states. Clause (1) of Article 254 provides that if any provision of a law made by a legislature of a state is repugnant to any provision of- law made by Parliament with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy be void, clause (2) of Article 254, however, engrafts an exception to the general law. It provides that the repugnancy of a State law, whether it is the law made by Parliament or existing law, can be cured provided that the State legislation has been reserved for consideration by the President and has received his assent. This article deals with the repugnancy of acts alone. It provides that the repugnancy of a State law, whether it is the law made by Parliament or existing law, can be cured provided that the State legislation has been reserved for consideration by the President and has received his assent. This article deals with the repugnancy of acts alone. Article 213 of the Constitution deals with power of Governor to promulgate ordinances during recess of legislature. An ordinance promulgated by a Government during the recess of the legislature, has the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State. Accordingly Article 213 (1) proviso (c) requires that the Governor, shall not, without instructions from President, promulgate any Ordinance if an Act of legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under the Constitution, have been invalid unless, having been reserved for consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President. Controverting the allegations that the provisions of the Services (Tribunals) Ordinance the State Government has stated in the counter-affidavit that the aforesaid Ordinance has been promulgated with prior instructions of the President. The original letter dated August 6, 1975, sent by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, according approval for promulgation by the Governor of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Ordinance was also produced before me. This letter is decisive of the controversy and assuming that there is a conflict as urged by the petitioner, the defect stands cured. Having found that prior instructions had been by the Governor it is not necessary to consider the submission of the State counsel that in fact there is no repugnancy. But considering the importance of the question I proceed to do so. Challenging the validity of Section 30 of the Advocates Act the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that this section does not only entitle an advocate to practice as of right but confers a right on a litigant to be represented by an Advocate, in all proceedings and this right has been taken away by Section 5 (8), the same is invalid. For accepting this argument it is necessary to find out whether Section 30 of the said Act has been brought into force. For accepting this argument it is necessary to find out whether Section 30 of the said Act has been brought into force. Section 1 (3) of the Advocates Act provides that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may chose to appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act. I have not been shown any notification enforcing this section. Accordingly as Section 30 has not been enforced, the question of sub-section (8) of Section 5 being repugnant to this section does not arise. It is settled law that repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend on a possibility. Section 30 of the Advocates Act having not been enforced it is not possible to find that Section 5 (8) conflicts with it. In Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, the validity of a provincial law of Ontario, was challenged on the ground that the same repugnant to the Temperance Act of Canada, a dominion law, which, extending to the province, had not been enforced there. Refusing the argument of a repugnancy the Privy Council observed: - " Their Lordships can discover no adequate grounds for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in-districts of the province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the Canadian, Act are not and never be in force. " In Shazawa Kant v. Ramhan Singh A. I. R. 1939 F. C. 74 (83) these observations have been approved and followed. On the basis of the above I find that so long as Section 30 has not been enforced the question of repugnancy cannot arise. The challenge to the validity of Section 14 of the Bar Councils Act is liable to fail on another ground also. Counsel for the petitioner mainly relied upon Section 14 (1) (b) in support of his submission. Even this section is limited by a saving clause save as otherwise provided by or under any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, his right to practise is controlled by this important provision that any other law for the time being in force may restrict or take away. Therefore if the Services (Tribunals) Ordinance provides that an Advocate has no right to practise before the Tribunal then the right of the Advocate would be deemed to have been circum scribed by the provisions of this Ordinance. Therefore if the Services (Tribunals) Ordinance provides that an Advocate has no right to practise before the Tribunal then the right of the Advocate would be deemed to have been circum scribed by the provisions of this Ordinance. It was next argued that a government servant has a right of representation and to appear through a lawyer in the proceedings like those contemplated by the ordinance, therefore, the provisions curtailing that right deprives him of his well recognised rights. Sri A. P Singh has attempted to support his submission with the help of cases decided under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. As the law laid down by the Supreme Court in interpreting the phrase reasonable opportunity is of no assistance to the petitioner, it is not necessary for me to deal with these cases. It may be worthy of being mentioned that the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Chandra v. Union of India A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1589 shows that it did not recognise the absolute right of Government servant of assistance of an Advocate during the course of enquiry. In that the appellant of that appeal was although refused the permission to engage a lawyer, the Supreme Court held that the absence of a lawyer could not be held to have deprived him of reasonable opportunity. Furthermore, the question in this case is altogether different. As the State legislature is competent to make a law on this subject it could lawfully provide for the exclusion of lawyers from these proceedings. The validity of the impugned provision cannot be judged from the stand point that the same is against the common right or reason, as this would be against the principles of parliamentary sovereignty. It cannot be forgotten that the doctrine of due process is not applicable in our country, hence it is not open to strike down the impugned provision on the ground suggested. The validity of a similar nature made in Section 36 (4) of the Industrial Act was challenged on several occasions before various courts but each time the challenge was repelled. In this connection reference may be made to a division bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Rangaswami (A. N.) v. Industrial Tribunal A. I. R. 1954 Mad. The validity of a similar nature made in Section 36 (4) of the Industrial Act was challenged on several occasions before various courts but each time the challenge was repelled. In this connection reference may be made to a division bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Rangaswami (A. N.) v. Industrial Tribunal A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 553 in which case the court held Section 36 (4) is not open to attack as discriminatory under Article 14 on the ground that while a litigant before a civil court has a right to be represented by a counsel, a party to a proceeding before a tribunal is denied that right. The attempt of the learned counsel equalting the tribunals created under the Services (Tribunals Ordinance with the civil courts also cannot succeed. It is true that these tribunals have been created to try and decide those very cases which used to be filed previously in the civil courts, but that fact by itself has no relevance. The legislature creating Services Tribunal has a right to lay down the procedure to be followed by these tribunals. Hence I am not prepared to accept the submission and to hold that Section 5 (8) is invalid. Linked with the above, the next point that needs determination is whether Section 5 (8) having denied the right of representation can be held to be invalid on the ground of its being opposed to the principles of natural justice. This argument is fully answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 40 when it observed: - " Kules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. " This point also fails and is thus rejected. As regards the contention that sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the Services (Tribunals) Ordinance absolutely prohibits a Government servant from taking assistance of a lawyer, and does not leave any scope whatsoever for such representation in appropriate cases, it may be pointed that the submission made is against the language of the aforesaid provision. As regards the contention that sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the Services (Tribunals) Ordinance absolutely prohibits a Government servant from taking assistance of a lawyer, and does not leave any scope whatsoever for such representation in appropriate cases, it may be pointed that the submission made is against the language of the aforesaid provision. In cases where the Government engages counsel for appearing on its behalf, it is open to all Government servants to take assistance of lawyers, as of right. In other cases a Government servant cannot engage a legal practitioner as of right but can have his assistance if permitted by the tribunal. It is true that power conferred is discretionary. But discretion conferred on the tribunal by this provision is not unfettered. It has to be exercised with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. A tribunal is not at liberty to reject it on grounds which are arbitrary or capricious, nor on any other irrelevant ground. It is the settled law that discretion has to be exercised in these matters according to the rules, reason and justice. In case, however, if the tribunal fails to take into account considerations which ought to have been taken, this court has ample power to interfere. This was said by Lord Eshr M. C. in Rey v. Vastry of St. Pancras of a body entrusted with a discretion: - ". . . . they must fairly consider the application and exercise their discretion on it fairly, and not take into account any reason for their decision which is not legal one. If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account matters which the courts consider not to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the law they have not exercised their discretion. " Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. "wdnesbury Corporation said: - ". . . . a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. . . . a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. " As said by Lord Denning in Pett v. Greyhood (6) the tribunal in dealing with applications to obtain legal assistance would also not forget that it is dealing with matters affecting a mans reputation and livelihood. For these reasons I am unable to find any substance in the submission of the petitioners counsel that Section 5 (a) confers discretion on a tribunal. Accordingly I find that sub-section (8) of Section 5 is not invalid and that this petition is liable to fail on the preliminary objection of alternatve remedy. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. .