K. C. AGARWAL, J. This petition is directed against the judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge, Kanpur dated September 9, 1975 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 22 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The dispute is with regard to a shop situated in Kanpur. This shop was in the tenancy of one Ahmad Hasan. An application under Section 21 of the Act was filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 for release of the said shop on the ground that the same was required by them for their use and occupation. After written statement was filed by Ahmad Hasan contesting the application, he died. Thereafter an application was filed by one Mohd. Ayub for being impleaded in place of Ahmad Hasan on the ground that he was the heir and legal representative of the deceased. Another application was filed on March 25. 1974 by Abdul Hameed, the petitioner, for being substituted in place of the deceased Ahmad Hasan on the ground that he was in fact the heir of the deceased. Before this application was decided Abdul Hameed, the petitioner, filed another application on July 24, 1974 for withdrawal of his earlier application dated March 25, 1974. He thereafter filed an application on September 30, 1974 admitting the claim of the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 for the release of the shop in their favour. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 on October 17, 1974 and directed for the release of the shop. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge on the ground that he had neither filed any application on July 24, 1974 nor on September 30, 1974 withdrawing his claim for being substituted as an heir in place of the deceased Ahmad Hasan and admitting that the need of the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 was bona fide. The learned District Judge did not find any substance in these grounds and dismissed the appeal. He has now filed the present writ petition in this court. 4 to 6 was bona fide. The learned District Judge did not find any substance in these grounds and dismissed the appeal. He has now filed the present writ petition in this court. Sri S. N. Verma, counsel for the petitioner, urged that the learned District Judge, committed an error of law in recording an erroneous finding that the applications dated July 24, 1974 and September 30, 1974 had in fact been filed by the petitioner. He urged that the probabilities and the circumstances of the above case would show that the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 managed to get these applications filed to get the rightful claim of the petitioner defeated. The submission made cannot be accepted in the present proceedings inasmuch as the District Judge has recorded the finding against the petitioner on examination of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence adduced by the petitioner could not establish that any fraud was exercised on him in getting these two applications filed in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. The finding of the learned District Judge on the aforesaid question is one of fact and it is not possible to interfere with the same in the present proceedings, even if it is erroneous. It is indisputable that an error of fact howsoever erroneous cannot be corrected in writ proceedings. High Court does not review or reweigh evidence nor does it substitute its own views for those of the inferior court. Hence the first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner fails. The second argument advanced by the petitioners counsel was that Sri C. B. Singh, who decided the application under S. 21 of the Act as the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the application as he was not the Prescribed Authority appointed for the area in which the shop in question was situated. On this basis the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as the order of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction the entire proceedings are illegal and both the judgments given against the petitioner are liable to be set aside. In order to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to refer to the definition of the words prescribed Authority as defined in the original Act and that which has now been submitted after amendment. In order to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to refer to the definition of the words prescribed Authority as defined in the original Act and that which has now been submitted after amendment. The definition given in the original Act was as under: - " prescribed authority means a Magistrate of the first class having experience as such of not less than three years, authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under this Act, and different Magistrate may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases or classes of cases, and the District Magistrate may recall any case from any such Magistrate and may either dispose of it himself or transfer it for disposal to any other such Magistrate. " After the new Code of Criminal Procedure was enforced on April 1, 1974 the designation of the Magistrate was changed. The new Code does not provide for three categories of Magistrates, viz. , Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Judicial Magistrate of the second class, and Executive Magistrate. On the enforcement of the new Code of Original Procedure the old Code was repealed hence it became necessary to modify the definition of the word prescribed Authority as originally given in order to bring the same in conformity with the new Code, hence the U. P. Legislature substituted the definition by U. P. Act No. 19 of 1974. The same is as under:- " (c) prescribed Authority means any officer having not less than three years experience as Munsif or as Magistrate of the First Class or an Executive Magistrate authorised by general or special order of the State Government to exercise, perform and discharge of or any of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act, and different officers may be so authorised in respect of the different areas or cases, or classes of cases. " This U. . P. Act No. 19 of 1974 was enforced with effect from September 1, 1974. As a result now a Prescribed Authority has to be authorised by general or special order of the State Government to exercise, perform and discharge any of the powers and functions of the Prescribed Authority. " This U. . P. Act No. 19 of 1974 was enforced with effect from September 1, 1974. As a result now a Prescribed Authority has to be authorised by general or special order of the State Government to exercise, perform and discharge any of the powers and functions of the Prescribed Authority. Due to this change the power of the District Magistrate to transfer cases from one Magistrate to another was taken away. In the absence of any general or special order no person could either work or function as Prescribed Authority. In the instant case we find that the shop in dispute was situated in the police circle Colonganj, Kanpur. By the order passed after the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 19 of 1972 the State Government appointed the City Magistrate, Kanpur for the area where the disputed building is situated. It, however, appears that the application was not decided by the City Magistrate but by Sri C. B. Singh, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ghatampur, to whom the same has been transferred earlier by the District Magistrate, Kanpur. Sri C. B. Singh was admittedly not the City Magistrate and hence had no jurisdiction to decide the application in the instant case. The jurisdiction means authority to decide. A tribunal or an authority may lack power or jurisdiction to decide a case if power has not been so conferred on him by the authority entitled to do so. Any decision of a case which it is not entitled to decide would be without jurisdiction, hence a nullity. In Karan Singh v. Chawan Paswan A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 340, the Supreme Court held: " It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is ought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter strikes at the very authority of the court and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties. Hence when the court having no jurisdiction decides any case the decision given by it is a nullity and void. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter strikes at the very authority of the court and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties. Hence when the court having no jurisdiction decides any case the decision given by it is a nullity and void. Accordingly the argument of Sri S. N. Verma that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction has to be accepted. The question, however, is whether the defect in the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was cured by the fact that the same had been taken up in appeal and the appellate court decided the same on merits. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Jagannath Reddy v. State of Hyderabad A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 217. In this case a criminal case was tried by a court which had no jurisdiction to do so. Against the order of that court an appeal was filed to the High Court. , The High Court admittedly had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction was upheld. After sometime conviction was challenged by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that as the order of conviction made by the initial court was without jurisdiction, therefore, the judgment of the appellate court was also inoperative. The Supreme Court repelled the argument advanced on behalf of the accused and held that the mere fact that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction did not mean that the judgment given by the appellate court which was competent to decide the appeal was also rendered as a nullity. Speaking further on this point it laid down the law in the following words: evidently, the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide the matter rightly as well as wrongly. If it affirms the conviction and thereby decides wrongly that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try and convict it, it cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction and its order cannot be treated as a nullity. If it affirms the conviction and thereby decides wrongly that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try and convict it, it cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction and its order cannot be treated as a nullity. This judgment of the Supreme Court lays down in clear terms that the judgment of the appellate court in a case like the present would be binding on the parties. This case was subsequently followed by a Division Bench of our Court in Purshottam v. Shiv Prasad 1972 A. L. J. 742. 42. In this case the Division Bench found that the order of cancellation of Bhumidhari Sanad was passed by an officer who had no jurisdiction to do so but as the appeal was taken to the Additional Commissioner, who was a competent authority, the judgment of the Addl. Commissioner could, not be held to be void for want of jurisdictional defect. Applying the law in the instant case it appears to me that although the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction but as the District Judge to whom the appeal was filed was competent to decide the same, the judgment given by the appellate court is binding. It would have altogether been different if the learned District Judge would have allowed the appeal filed against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority on the ground that the judgment rendered by it was without jurisdiction and would have thereafter directed for the case to be decided by a proper authority. But where, as here, the appellate court does not chose the course mentioned above and adjudicates on merits, the finding recorded by the appellate court could not be said to be without jurisdiction. The infirmity in the order of the Prescribed Authority was cured and can no longer be a ground for setting aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority as well as that of the appellate authority. Hence the submission of Sri S. N. Verma, counsel for the petitioner, that when the order of the Prescribed Authority was a nullity, the order of appeal therefore could not be of greater validity must be held as unsound. Sri S. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction and was a nullity, therefore, the same would not merge with that of the appellate court. Sri S. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction and was a nullity, therefore, the same would not merge with that of the appellate court. Reliance was placed by him on a case of Supreme Court reported in State of U. P. v. Mohd. Nooh 1958 S. C. R. 86, in support of his-proposition. This decision of State of U. P. v. Mohd. Nooh 1958 S. C. R. 86, was considered by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases and was not followed on the point of merger decided in it. The Supreme Court in Gojer Brothers v. Fatan Lal A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1380, remarked that: " This passage leaves no doubt that the judgment is based on the promise that the original order of dismissal was operative or its own strength and that since that order was passed prior to the Constitution the High Court had no jurisdiction to set it aside under Article 226. In (1962) Supp. 3 S. C. R. 906=:a. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1513 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the facts in Mohammad Noohs case were of a special kind and therefore the reasoning in that case would not apply to the facts of the case before the Constitution Bench to which we have already made a reference. In (1963) 2 S. C. R. 563=a. I. R. 1963 S. C. il24, the same Constitution. Bench reiterated that "mohammad Noohs case was a special case which stands on its own facts. " Hence the law laid down in State of U. P. v. Mohd. Nooh would not come to the help of the petitioner. Reliance was also placed on an other case of this court reported in Paras Nath Shukla v. District Magistrate, Unnao 1966 A. L. J. 696, in support of the above proposition. In this case an application under the Panchayat Raj Act was decided by the Addl, Sub-Divisional Officer, who was held to have no jurisdiction to decide the same. The appeal was thereafter filed to the Deputy Commissioner who had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal against orders passed under Section 95 (1) (g) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. The learned Single Judge held that as the order of the Addl. The appeal was thereafter filed to the Deputy Commissioner who had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal against orders passed under Section 95 (1) (g) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. The learned Single Judge held that as the order of the Addl. Sub-Divisional Officer was a nullity-the principle of merger in the order will not lend validity to it. With great respect I am unable to share the opinion of the learned Judge, who has decided the aforesaid case. It may be pointed out in taking the above view Honble B. N. Nigam, J. relied on State of U. P. v. Mohd. Nooh (supra) but the law laid, down by the Supreme Court in this case on the question of merger was not approved in subsequent cases. Further later decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Madan Gopal Roongta v. Secretary (7) in which State of 17. P. v. Mohd. Nooh was not followed had not been cited before Honble B. N. Nigam, J. It is possible that he would not have taken the same view in case the later decisions of the Supreme Court would have been cited before him. Furthermore the decision of the Division Bench in Purshottam v. Sheo Prasad (supra) is contrary to the view taken in this case. The same view has been taken by another Division Bench in Man Singh v. Bir Sahai (8 ). It has been held in this case that jurisdictional defect stands cured even if the appellate court decided wrongly that the trial court had jurisdiction. The decision of the appellate court not being a nullity, is binding on the parties in subsequent litigation as res judicata. These decisions are binding on me. I accordingly find that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the defect in the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was not cured by the decision of the appellate court on merits has no substance. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited several other cases to show that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. As this proposition is not in dispute it is not necessary to consider these cases in this judgment. Another submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, being without, jurisdiction was not appealable before the District Judge. As this proposition is not in dispute it is not necessary to consider these cases in this judgment. Another submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, being without, jurisdiction was not appealable before the District Judge. It is not necessary to deal with this point at length inasmuch as the saul point is not res Integra and stands concluded against the petitioner by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad (supra) where the Supreme Court held that it is well settled that if a court acts without jurisdiction its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted within jurisdiction. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs payable by the petitioners to the respondent Nos. 2 to 4. .