JUDGMENT - M.S. APTE, J.:---This is an appeal by the original plaintiff against the order passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kolhapur vacating the ad interim injunction granted against the respondent-defendant on 23-1-1976. The suit in which the temporary injunction was prayed for has been filed by the present appellant for specific performance of an agreement of sale which has been executed by the respondent in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to sell a piece of land bearing Survey No. 134/2 admeasuring 90 acres situate at Udgaon in Taluka Shirol, District Kolhapur. The parties are closely related. Respondent defendant is the paternal uncle of the appellant and ordinarily he resides at Poona where he practices in medicine. It appears that the respondent has become owner of the aforesaid land under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter called "the Bombay Tenancy Act") perhaps because he was in possession of that lands as a tenant of the original owner. This land is surrounded on all sides by the land belonging to the appellant. On August 22, 1974 the respondent executed an agreement by which he agreed to sell this property to the appellant for a total consideration of Rs. 25,000/- out of which Rs. 5,000/- were received by him from the appellant by way of earnest. A formal deed of conveyance was agreed to be executed by the respondent before May 1975 and the balance of consideration was to be paid to him by the appellant on execution of the deed of conveyance. Although the agreement stated that the possession was to be handed over the execution of the document, separate document was executed on the same day by the respondent by whcih he acknowledge that actual physical possession of the property was handed over to the appellant pursuant to the agreement. It appears that even before this agreement was executed, the respondent had agreed to sell this piece of land to the appellant and had made an application to the competent authority under section 27(b) of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Fragmentation Act") inasmuch as the scheme of consolidated was introduced in the village. This application was made on November 24, 1972 and in that proceedings the respondent also made a statement before the competent authority on December 27, 1972 to that effect. This application was made on November 24, 1972 and in that proceedings the respondent also made a statement before the competent authority on December 27, 1972 to that effect. Ultimately permission was granted by the competent authority. In that permission, however, it was stated that the transaction of sale should be completed by execution of the document before the expiry of 30 days after this consolidation scheme was finalised. The scheme was finalised on March 31, 1973 but for some reason, which is not disclosed on the record, the transaction of sale was not completed by execution of the deed of conveyance before the period prescribed in the permission. The agreement on the basis of which the present suit was filed was thereafter afresh as already stated on August 22, 1974. It was alleged by the appellant plaintiff that inspite of repeated reminders the respondent failed to execute the agreement before May 1975 and, therefore, he served a notice on him ultimately on December 1, 1975 and filed the present suit on or about January 17, 1976 praying for specific performance of the agreement. It seems that defendant sent a reply to the aforesaid notice of the plaintiff on January 16, 1975 refusing to execute the sale deed; but it is not clear whether this reply was received by the appellant before he filed the suit. That fact, however, is not very material. Soon after filing the suit, by a separate application the appellant prayed for temporary injunction against the defendant restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession because the plaintiff alleged that he was in actual physical possession of the land in dispute and had raised sugarcane crop and part of the crop had even been sold by him to Panchganga Sugar Mill but the respondent was raising objections to the payment of the price of the sugarcane to the appellant. On this application ad interim injunction was issued and a notice was also served on the respondent. The respondent appeared and hotly contested the application. He contended that since he had become purchaser of this land under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Act, he had no right to transfer the same without the permission of the Collector under section 43 of the Tenancy Act. The respondent appeared and hotly contested the application. He contended that since he had become purchaser of this land under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Act, he had no right to transfer the same without the permission of the Collector under section 43 of the Tenancy Act. Besides, he also contended that even under section 31 of the Fragmentation Act, permission of the competent authority was necessary for the transfer of this land and such permission not having been granted the agreement of sale was unenforceable. He also denied to have delivered actual possession of the land to the plaintiff. According to him, plaintiff being his nephew, he sent the sugarcane to Panchaganga Sugar Mill in his name and when he came to know about it, he objected to it. According to him in face he himself had actually cultivated the land by engaging hired labour and denied that the plaintiff was in possession. The learned Judge has found that the agreement of sale being in contravention of both section 43 of the Tenancy Act and section 31 of the Fragmentation Act was unenforceable and hence even if the plaintiff was assumed to be in possession, this possession was wrongful or unlawful and, therefore, it could not be protected by the Court. Incidentally he had also in one line observed that plaintiff neither in possession of the suit land. Consequently the learned Judge passed an order vacating the ex parte injunction already granted by him. Hence the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. On this appeal Mr. Pendse for the appellant argued that the view taken by the Lower Court that the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the property and that even if he was in possession his possession was wrongful or unlawful is not correct. It was submitted by him that although in the original agreement of sale it was stated that possession would be handed over to the plaintiff on execution of formal deed of conveyance, by a subsequent agreement executed on the same day the defendant acknowledge that he had handed over possession of the property to the plaintiff and that the same possession would be confirmed as owner on execution of a formal deed of conveyance as agreed upon by the parties under the agreement of sale. There is considerable substance in this submission of Mr. Pendse. There is considerable substance in this submission of Mr. Pendse. The agreement which was subsequently executed on the day on which the initial agreement of sale was executed, has been produced on record. It states that the land in dispute was agreed to be sold by the defendant to the plaintiff and the former had even executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff. However, for the conveyance of both sides and to facilitate cultivation of the land, the defendant had handed over actual possession of the land to the plaintiff and the possession of the plaintiff would be confirmed as owner of execution of the sale-deed. Thus, this document executed by the defendants himself goes to show that possession of the land in dispute was actually handed over by the defendant to the plaintiff since 22-8-1974 on which date the aforesaid agreement was executed. There is also ample evidence on record to show that subsequent to this, it was the plaintiff who actually cultivated sugarcane crop in this land. Documentary evidence has been produced on record to show that on the application of the plaintiff water to water, the sugarcane crop in this land was supplied by the Lift Irrigation Co-operative Society to the plaintiff. The assessment for the land was also paid by the plaintiff. The receipts for the payment of assessment are coming forth for the period subsequent to the execution of the agreement from the custody of the plaintiff. Then it appears that even sugarcane that was grown in this land was out and sold by the plaintiffs to the Panchaganga Sugar Mill and the bills for the price thereof were issued in the name of the plaintiff. Not only this, but even part of the price was received by the plaintiff from the Panchganga Sugar Mill. It was thereafter that the defendant appears to have written a letter to the Panchganga Sugar Mill on 26-4-1975 not to pay the final bill to the plaintiff. Not only this, but even part of the price was received by the plaintiff from the Panchganga Sugar Mill. It was thereafter that the defendant appears to have written a letter to the Panchganga Sugar Mill on 26-4-1975 not to pay the final bill to the plaintiff. But thereafter he wrote a subsequent letter on May 16, 1975 to the Managing Director of the Panchganga Sugar Mill that although he had written by a letter dated April 26, 1975 to suspend payment of final bill for the sugarcane to the plaintiff, it had been decided by him the plaintiff and plaintiffs father Baburao that the matter should be amicably settled and hence he had no objection to pay the bill to the plaintiff. A commissioner was also appointed by the trial Court to ascertain the condition of the sugarcane crop and it appeared that the sugarcane crop raised in the land in dispute as also in the surrounding lands which belonged to the plaintiff were cultivated by one and the same person by one and the same water course. All this evidence, is therefore, sufficient to establish prima facie that plaintiff was in physical possession of the land in dispute at the time the suit was filed. The learned Judge observes that if at all plaintiff was in possession, his possession was wrongful or unlawful. But indeed one fails to see how plaintiffs possession can be said to be wrongful or unlawful. There is nothing to show that plaintiff committed any wrongful act in obtaining possession. He did not forcibly enter into possession of the land. It was by virtue of the agreement executed by the defendant that the plaintiff was put into possession by the defendant himself and cultivated the land. Plaintiffs possession of the suit property, therefore, can in no sense be said to be wrongful or unlawful. Mr. Abhyankar for the respondent argued that since the defendant had become purchaser of this land under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Act, he could not transfer the land in any way without the previous sanction of the Collector in view of the provisions of section 43 of the said Act. Mr. Abhyankar for the respondent argued that since the defendant had become purchaser of this land under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Act, he could not transfer the land in any way without the previous sanction of the Collector in view of the provisions of section 43 of the said Act. Similarly he also submitted that since the consolidation scheme was introduced and finalised by March 31, 1973 in this village, section 31 of the Fragmentation Act also prohibited transfer of a holding except in accordance with such condition as may be prescribed. It was pointed out that under Rule 27 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidated of Holdings Rules, 1959, a person desiring to transfer a holding allotted to him under the Tenancy Act was required to make an application to the Collector and on such an application being made, the Collector was authorised to grant permission to transfer the holding under certain circumstances set out in Clauses (a) to (i) of that rule. Similarly under Rule 25-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules set out the circumstances in which and conditions subject to which sanction shall be given by the Collector under section 43 for transfer and Rule 36 set out conditions on which permission for sale of land can be granted under section 63 of the Tenancy Act. According to Mr. Abhyankar, therefore, unless such permission was obtained, even an agreement of sale of transfer cannot be entered into and in case the possession cannot be transferred to the transferee. It was argued by him that if transfer of possession under an agreement of sale was permitted, the provisions prohibiting sale under the aforesaid provisions can conveniently be passed by the parties. My attention was invited in this connection to a decision of a Division Bench at Nagpur in (Vinayakrao v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1975 Mh.L.J. 566. That was a case arising under section 31 of the Fragmntation Act and the facts were that after the consolidation of holdings under the Act had been finalised, the petitioner had transferred possession of the holding on receiving full consideration under an agreement of sale. The agreement provided that permission of the Collector as required would be obtained before executing the sale deed and if the same was refused, the amount would be refunded and possession would be handed back to the petitioner. The agreement provided that permission of the Collector as required would be obtained before executing the sale deed and if the same was refused, the amount would be refunded and possession would be handed back to the petitioner. An application was thereafter made by the transfer petitioner for permission under Rule 27 of the rules framed under the Act. The Collector, however, rejected that the application and imposed a fine of Rs. 200/- on the petitioner. The revision application also having been dismissed by the Commissioner, the petitioner filed a special civil application in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution against the refusal of permission to transfer. While dismissing the special civil application it was held that the transaction of the kind was covered by the word "otherwise" in section 31 of the Act and was void and the instances of transfer mentioned in section 31 were not exhaustive. Mr. Pendse distinguished that ruling on facts. He submitted that in the first instance, that was a petition against refusal of permission on the application made by the transfer and secondly, in that case the entire consideration was paid by the transfer to the transferror who had also parted with possession and, therefore, nothing further except execution of a formal dead of conveyance had remained to be done. It was pointed out by him that in our case, however, that is not the case. Here, only a small part of the consideration for sale had been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and possession was handed over and the same was to be confirmed as owner on execution of the sale deed after obtaining permission from the Competent Authorities. Mr. Pendse also invited my attention in this respect to an earlier division bench ruling of this High Court in (Shiva v. Arun)2, A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 93, and submitted that until the transfer is completed by execution of the dead of conveyance, the transfer is not complete and mere agreements of sale does not create any interest in the transferee. In the case relied upon by Mr. 93, and submitted that until the transfer is completed by execution of the dead of conveyance, the transfer is not complete and mere agreements of sale does not create any interest in the transferee. In the case relied upon by Mr. Pendse the sale was held under the Land Revenue Code in execution of an award which had been passed against the petitioner who had applied under section 178 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code for setting aside that sale, his contention being that the sale was held in contravention of section 31 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidated of Holdings Act, 1947 and that the bid having been offered by the minor the auction was vitiated. It was held in that case that since the transfer had not been completed by confirmation of sale, the auction sale could not be said to have been contravened section 31(1) of the Fragmentation Act. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is very clear in this respect inasmuch as it provides inter alia that the contract of sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties and it does not of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. It appears that before the Nagpur Bench which decided Vinayakraos case, the earlier division bench ruling of this Court and th provisions of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act were not pointed out. Mr. Pendse also invited my attention to (Ramulu v. Anantha)3, A.I.R. 1966 A.P. 70. It was case arising under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act which are analogous to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act in this respect. It is, however, not necessary for me to consider this question in this appeal which arises on an application for temporary injunction filed in the suit. The question will have to be considered by the learned Judge in the suit itself. For the purposes of the application made by the plaintiff for temporary injunction, all that has got to be seen is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of injunction in his favour, viz. The question will have to be considered by the learned Judge in the suit itself. For the purposes of the application made by the plaintiff for temporary injunction, all that has got to be seen is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of injunction in his favour, viz. whether he has proved that he has been in actual lawful possession of the property and that his possession is threatened by the act of the defendant. As already discussed above, on evidence there can be no doubt that the plaintiff has been in actual possession of the property and it is also established by the acts of the defendant that he has threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the possession of the land which he had voluntarily delivered to the plaintiff under the agreement executed on the very day on which the agreement of sale was executed by him. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to have his possession protected till the decision of the suit. The Lower Court was, therefore, wrong in refusing to grant injunction in his favour. The appeal succeeds and is, therefore, allowed, the order passed by the Lower Court is set aside and the respondent defendant is by a temporary injunction restrained from interfering with plaintiffs possessions of the suit property till the final disposal of the suit. Costs of this appeal would abide by the final result of the suit. Since the appeal has been allowed, no order is necessary on the companion civil application. -----