Judgment :- 1. These appeals are against the judgment of a learned judge of this Court who dismissed a series of writ petitions by private operators who complained about the actions taken in pursuance of the scheme for nationalising the routes over portions of which the vehicles were operating and consequential proceedings for the elimination or the private operators. The scheme in question was published on 4-6-1971 by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (2nd Respondent) under S.68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, to take over thirteen routes in the Trivandrum District for exclusive use by the said Corporation. Objections to the Scheme were heard by the Chief Minister in 1973. Ext P3 notice dated 12th December, 1975 was issued approving the said Scheme under sub-section (2) of S.68-D of the Act. Eighteen buses of the writ petitioners - appellants were plying on the nationalised route. The petitioners were given notice Ext P4 dated 611976 under Sub-section (2) of S.63-F of the Act, indicating that it was proposed to cancel the existing transport permits of the petitioners and to reject their application for renewal of the pucca permit. Ex. P4 indicated that the objections would be heard by the Regional Transport Authority before passing the final orders. The petitioners moved the writ petitions for a mandamus not to proceed further with Ext. P4 and to renew the stage carriage permit of the petitioners. 2. The complaint made in these appeals is that the vehicles of the appellants are operating only on a portion of the nationalised route and that unless the services are co-terminous with the notified route the elimination of the services would not be justified and proper. The learned judge rejected the contention. For the appellants reliance was placed on the unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1755 and 1756 of 1968 dated 17 5 1974. Reference was made to Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (AIR. 1974 SC 1940) decided on 8 81974 and to the later judgment of that Court dated 5 91974 (reported earlier) in C. P Sikh Regular Motor Service etc. v. The State of Maharashtra (MR. 1974 SC. 1905). Reference was made to Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (AIR. 1974 SC 1940) decided on 8 81974 and to the later judgment of that Court dated 5 91974 (reported earlier) in C. P Sikh Regular Motor Service etc. v. The State of Maharashtra (MR. 1974 SC. 1905). The subtle point stressed was that unless the termini are formed there is no route, and therefore in this particular case, so long as the termini of the routes of (he petitioners are not shown to be the same as the termini of the nationalised route there can be no exclusion of the petitioners. The argument was spun out of the distinction between the concepts of "route" and "highway"' and the observations explaining these, in some of the decisions. We shall consider this argument briefly in the course of the judgment. But before we do so, as rightly pointed out by Counsel for the Respondents we wish to emphasise that the Scheme in question is essentially a route scheme, confined to specified routes indicated therein. The question of the area covered by the Scheme, does not really arise. The routs covered by the Scheme are mentioned in Annexure A to Ext. P3, the approved Scheme. The said annexure again clearly brines out that the Scheme was essentially a route-scheme, that there is no question of denning the area covered by the Scheme and that the intention was to exclude not only any operators plying on the entirety of the thirteen routes covered by the Scheme, but even in any portion of the said routes. This is seen from the Annexure to Ext. P1 notification issued under R.3 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles (State Transport Undertakings) R.1971, read with S.68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. The said notification unmistakably indicated that the Corporation proposed to take over the specified route "in complete exclusion of the existing passenger transport service on the routes as such or any portion thereof". Mark that even vehicles plying on any portion of the route or routes were proposed to be taken over. On the terms of the Scheme therefore there can be little doubt that even if the routes of the private operators were not coterminous with the nationalised route, they were to be taken over by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. Mark that even vehicles plying on any portion of the route or routes were proposed to be taken over. On the terms of the Scheme therefore there can be little doubt that even if the routes of the private operators were not coterminous with the nationalised route, they were to be taken over by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. Once a draft scheme of nationalisation is published under S.68C, it it in itself a'law' for the purpose of Art.19 (6) of the Constitution. Ext. P1 is in the form prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act and the Kerala Motor Vehicles (State Transport Undertaking) Rules. Form I of the earlier Rules was to be for a complete exclusion scheme, Form II for a partial exclusion scheme, and Form III for a scheme in supplementation. Ext. P1 is in Form I. By the time the scheme was approved and Ext. P3 issued, new Rules had come into force. The distinction between complete exclusion scheme and partial exclusion scheme had ceased to be operative. Therefore it was that Annexure A to Ext. P3 mentioned only the routes without mentioning the area and clearly evidenced the intention to exclude not merely from the thirteen specified routes but even from any portion thereof Ext. P4 notice dated 611976 proposing to cancel the existing transport permit and to reject the application for removal was strictly in accordance with S.60 (1) (f) of the Act and no objection could be raised against the same. 3. Now to the question of law debated. The decision of the Privy Council in Kalani Valley Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. Colombo Retnapur Omnibus Co. Ltd. (1946 AC 338: AIR. 1946 PC. 137) appeared to be fountain source of the argument based on the distinction between "route" and "highway". Sir John Beaumont who gave the opinion of the Board observed: It "if "route" has the same meaning as "highway" in the Ordinance this argument must prevail since admittedly an omnibus running on the highway from Panadura to Badulla will past over the whole of the highway between Colombo and Ratnapura, but in their Lordships'opinion it is impossible to say that "route" and "highway" in the two Ordinances are synonymous terms. In both Ordinances the two words are used, and certainly not interchangeably. In both Ordinances the two words are used, and certainly not interchangeably. A "highway" is the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a "route" appears to their Lordships to be an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and another, and to he something distinct from the highway traversed there may be alternative roads leading from one terminus to another but that does not make the route and highway the same". In Kondala Rao's case (AIR. 1961 S. C. 82) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act provides a complete and satisfactory machinery for regulating the exclusion for all or some of the operators in the notified area of the route. The argument was advanced that the expression "route" of portion thereof" in S.68C indicated that the route is an existing route as no scheme could be framed in respect of a portion of the proposed route. This contention was rejected by the Court. I t was observed that there was no inherent inconsistency between an area and the route and that the proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed. The scheme proposed to operate a service in respect of the route from point A to point B which will be an area under S.68C. It was therefore ruled that S.68C empowered the State Transport Undertaking to propose the Scheme to include new routes. In Abdul Gafoor v State of Mysore (AIR. 1961 S. C.1556) another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court emphasised that the question for consideration would be whether the Scheme represented as a whole, preven-t.d the private owners from operating from any of the notified routes. In Nil-kanth Prasad v State of Bihar (AIR. 1962 SC 1135) Hidayatullah J. who delivered the judgment specifically observed that the distinction made by the Privy Council in Kalani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd's case (1946 P. C. 137) between "route and highway" had to be understood in connection with the words used in the Ordinance, which were "such route or on a route substantially the same as such route". It was observed that this argument had been negatived in Kondala Rao's case (AIR. 1961 S. C 82). Following the said decision, the argument was again rejected in Nilkanth Prasad's case (AIR. 1962 S. C. 1135). It was observed that this argument had been negatived in Kondala Rao's case (AIR. 1961 S. C 82). Following the said decision, the argument was again rejected in Nilkanth Prasad's case (AIR. 1962 S. C. 1135). These and other decisions were all surveyed in Mysore State R. T. C. v. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR. 1974 SC. 1940) and it was pointed out that the Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route no licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part or whole of that notified route. The same view was also taken in C. P. Sikh Regular Motor Service etc. v. The State of Maharashtra & Others (AIR. 1974 S. C. 1905 decided on 5 91974). A discordant note was struck in the unreported cases, Civil Appeals Nos. 1755 & 1756 dated 17 51974. The said case seems to have thrown some doubt on the decision in Nilkanth Prasad's case and followed the principle in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Lid's case (AIR. 1946 P. C. 137). But in the Mysore case (AIR. 1974 S. C. 1940 decided on 8 81974), Nilkanth Prasad's case was vindicated. Adverting to the decision in Civil Appeal Nos 1755 and 1756 of 1969 it was observed that there is no justification for holding that the integrity of the notified scheme is not affected if the overlapping is under five miles or because of a condition stipulated in the permit that the operators will not pick up or set down any passengers on the overlapped route. Observed the Court: "To our mind the decision in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd.'s case (1946 AC-338) lends no assistance to the basic concept of a "route", a line of travel between two points which can be traversed by different roads as was pointed out in that decision itself. A route between Delhi to Bombay can be traversed via Agra, Gwalior, Indore etc. Ltd.'s case (1946 AC-338) lends no assistance to the basic concept of a "route", a line of travel between two points which can be traversed by different roads as was pointed out in that decision itself. A route between Delhi to Bombay can be traversed via Agra, Gwalior, Indore etc. or by some other road say via Nagpur, but where the road of the route is specified in a scheme and private operators are prohibited to traverse on that route between the two termini, any overlapping of that route would transgress the provisions of the notified route and the Regional Transport Authority cannot but reject an application for a permit to traverse that overlapping In any case under S.2 (28-A) Inserted by S.2 of Act 56 of 1969 the word "route" has been defined as meaning: "A line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by motor vehicle between one terminus and another". This definition correlates the notional line of travel between two termini with the portion of the highway which has to be traversed on that route. It is therefore, apparant that where a private transport owner makes an application to operate on a route which overlaps even a portion of the notified route i.e. where the part of the highway to be used by the private transport owner traverses on a line on the same highway on the notified route, then that application has to be considered only in the light of the Scheme as notified. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected". The Mysore case (AIR. 1974 SC. 1940) referred to the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 1755 and 1756 dated 17-5-1974. The Supreme Court observed that it did not doubt the correctness of the decision in Nilkanth Prasad's case which was followed in several decisions of different constitutional benches of the Court, and that if the decision had to be dissented from, it could only be done by a larger bench of the Court. Till that happens, this Court is all the more bound to follow the decision in Nilkanth Prasad's case and the explanation offered in the Mysore case and the cases referred to therein. Till that happens, this Court is all the more bound to follow the decision in Nilkanth Prasad's case and the explanation offered in the Mysore case and the cases referred to therein. Following the said principle and the said decisions, we are unable to see any patent error of law which would vitiate Ext. P3, or the consequential action thereafter. We would dismiss Writ Appeal No. 111 of 1976. 4. No specific arguments were advanced in the remaining Writ Appeals. Counsel for the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos. 123,130 and 142 of 1976 adopted the arguments of Counsel for Writ Appeal No. 111 of 1976. Writ Appeal Nos. 118 and 124 of 1976 were by the same Counsel as in Writ Appeal No. 111 of 1976 and the arguments were the same. 5. We dismiss all these Writ Appeals, but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.