Mst. Saleha Khatun Bewa v. State of Assam and others
1976-03-22
D.PATHAK, K.LAHIRI
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement LAHIRI, J.:- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directed against an order passed by Shri N.G. Bannerjee, Drugs Controller, Assam, dated 7-1-1975 whereby the petitioners drug licences issued under form Nos. 20 and 21 were cancelled and also against the appellate order dated 21-7-1975. 2. The petitioner is a widow. Her husband served the state Government in the capacity of an Assistant Surgeon and died in March, 1963. After the death of the petitioners husband, it is stated in the petition, the widow applied for drug licences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and the Rules framed thereunder. On her application, two licences were granted by the Drugs Controller, Assam, the respondent No. 2, the licensing Authority under the State Govt. The first licence being numbered GPR/355 in form No. 20, that is, a licence to sell, stuck or exhibit for sale or distribute drugs by retail other than those specified in schedules C and C1 The petitioner was also granted another licence No. CPR/356 in form No. 21 to sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute drugs by retail as specified in schedules C and C1. It may be stated here that the petitioner made the application for getting the licences as proprietor of M/s. Pioneer Pharmacy and accordingly the licences were granted in the name of the said Pharmacy. 3. It is stated in the petition that the petitioner is an elderly lady and is running the pharmacy for the purpose of maintaining a large family under her. It is stated by the petitioner that she is a "pardanasin lady" and hails from a respectable Muslim family. According to the petitioner, she was running the pharmacy and the business with the help, aid and assistance of a qualified pharmacist and two other employees. According to her, the entire business was looked after and managed by the employees. The case of the petitioner is that she was maintaining and running the business to the best of her abilities. The petitioner received a notice from the Drugs Controller, Assam, the respondent No. 2 whereby she was asked to show cause as to why her drug licences should not be cancelled for violation of the provisions of the Drugs and cosmetics Rules, 1945. She was asked to submit her reply within 10 days from the date of issue of the notice.
She was asked to submit her reply within 10 days from the date of issue of the notice. The said notice is marked as Annexure-C to her application. The petitioner sent a reply denying the allegations. She stated that she did not know anything about the allegations as contained in Annexure C. The petitioner stated that she was a "pardanasin lady" and that the Pharmacy was run by her servants and employees and that the allegations as contained in Annexure C to the effect that some quantities of alcohol 90% I. P. (500 ml) (rectified spirit) manufactured by M/s. United colours and chemicals (P) Ltd. Gauhati were in fact not those of her pharmacy and they were not so purchased by the pharmacy. She also submitted that she was a widow with a large number of dependants and the source of the earning of the pharmacy was the only source of her income and if the licences are cancelled for no fault of hers then along with her, the dependants would have to face great hardships leading to starvation. Thereafter, the petitioner received a letter dated 19-7-1974 whereby the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller, Assam, communicated the following order to the petitioner:- "As you have failed to refute the charges against you for violation of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, I, Shri Dr. N.G. Banerjee, Drugs Controller, Assam and Licensing authority acting U/R 66 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 hereby cancel your Drugs Licence Nos. GPR/355 and 356 dated 9-2-1972 in form (s) 20 and 21 with immediate effect. You are hereby directed to stop dealing in drugs forthwith. Sd/- Illegible Drugs controller, Assam, Dispur, Ght. 6". On receipt of the said order purported to be made under Rule 66 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, which was wrongly quoted as Drugs and Cosmetics Act in the said letter, the petitioner preferred an appeal under the 66 (2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. The said rules shall hereinafter be referred to as the rules. In the said memorandum of appeal, the petitioner took up various questions of law as also facts and also made out a prima facie case attracting proviso to Rule 66 of the Rules. It is not necessary to deal with all the grounds.
The said rules shall hereinafter be referred to as the rules. In the said memorandum of appeal, the petitioner took up various questions of law as also facts and also made out a prima facie case attracting proviso to Rule 66 of the Rules. It is not necessary to deal with all the grounds. but in the said appeal, the petitioner complained of violation of natural justice and also the violation of her statutory rights under the said rules. The petitioner further made out a case that her claim squarely falls within the proviso to Rule 66 of the Rules. Thereafter, it is stated that the petitioner received an order dated 21-7-1975 from the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam stating that upon hearing the petitioner and also the Drugs Controller, the appellate authority did not find that there was any ground to allow the appeal and as such, the appeal was dismissed or rejected. In short the appellate authority confirmed the order of cancellation of both the licences of the petitioner. The said order dated 21-7-1975 is quoted herein below:- "GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM Health and Family Planning (A) Department No. HLA. 144/75/28 dated Dispur, the 21st July, 1975. From: Shri P.C. Nath, Under Secy. to the Govt. of Assam, To Smt. Saleha Khatoon Bewa, Prop. of M/s Pioneer Pharmacy, Mitchel Road, Dhubri, P.O. Dhubri, Dist-Goalpara. Sub: Your appeal petition dated 15-1-1975 to Minister Health, Assam against the order of Drugs Controller, Assam cancelling your drug licences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Madam, I am directed to invite a reference to your appeal petition quoted above submitted to the Minister Health, Assam, under R. 66 (2) of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1940 and to say that Govt. after hearing you and Drugs Controller find that there are no grounds to allow your appeal petition. The appeal petition is therefore rejected. The order of the Government for an interim stay of the cancellation of the Drugs Controller, Assam cancelling your drugs licence vide this Deptt. letter No. PLA. 114/75/4, dated 5th Feb., 1975 is hereby vacated and therefore your drug licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act/Rules 1940 stands hereby cancelled with immediate effect. You are directed to stop dealing in drugs forthwith. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illegible Under Secy. to the Govt. of Assam. Health and F.P (A) Deptt." 4.
letter No. PLA. 114/75/4, dated 5th Feb., 1975 is hereby vacated and therefore your drug licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act/Rules 1940 stands hereby cancelled with immediate effect. You are directed to stop dealing in drugs forthwith. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illegible Under Secy. to the Govt. of Assam. Health and F.P (A) Deptt." 4. It may be stated here, at this stage, that the present Rule came up for hearing on 24-11-1975 and on behalf of the petitioner, Shri J. P. Bhattacharjee, Senior Advocate argued the case and on behalf of the Respondents the Senior Govt. Advocate, Assam and also Shri J. Sarma appeared. On 24-11-1975, a question arose as to whether alcohol 90% I. P. (560 M1) (rectified spirit) which was said to have been stocked or exhibited for sale were drugs specified in schedules C and C1 or not. This was essentially necessary for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the terms and conditions of the licence in respect of Form No. 20 was violated or those of Form No. 21. After hearing the arguments of parties at a considerable length, the hearing of the matter had to be adjourned for ascertainment of the question as to whether the said "rectified spirit comes within the aforesaid schedules or not, on the prayer of the parties. 5. The learned counsel Shri J.P. Bhattacharjee argued the case at length on 24-11-1975 and thereafter on 8-3-1976, Shri P.C. Kataki, learned counsel summed up the argument. 6. On 8-3-1976, the Court desired to know from the counsel and particularly from the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents as to whether "rectified spirit" is a drug covered by Schedules C and C1 or not. Shri J. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Govt. submitted before us that he sought for a clarification from the State Govt. as to whether "rectified spirit" comes under the category of drugs described in Schedules C and C1 or not; but he was instructed by the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller, Assam, that it was a drug as contemplated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and that much and no further. He submitted even in spite of his specific instruction on the point the respondents have failed to instruct him as to the classification of the drug, namely as to whether it belongs to schedules C and C1 drug or not.
He submitted even in spite of his specific instruction on the point the respondents have failed to instruct him as to the classification of the drug, namely as to whether it belongs to schedules C and C1 drug or not. This clarification was particularly necessary for us as we have already stated, to ascertain whether the petitioner in fact violated the terms of licence issued to her under Form No. 20 or Form No. 21. Because, if it is a drug covered by Schedules C and C1, it must be held that the petitioner did violate the terms of Form No. 21 and if it be held that it was a drug other than those described in schedule C and C1, it must be treated, provided she had violated any term, that she did violate the terms and conditions of the licence issued to her in form No. 20. 7. Therefore, we are proceeding with the matter without being enlightened as to whether the alcohol 90%, the subject matter of the proceedings was in fact drug covered by schedules C and C1 or not. 8. Be that as it may, we may now proceed to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 9. The first ground that has been taken up on behalf of the petitioner is that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller, before cancelling the licence and as such, she was deprived of her right as contained in rule 66 of the rules. 10. The second ground is that apart from the petitioners right under Rule 66, in the proceedings before the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller, Assam, the principle of Natural Justice was violated inasmuch as the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove that there was no violation made by her in respect of any of the terms and conditions of the licence and/or the provisions of the Act or Rules. 11. The third contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the appellate authority exercising power under rule 66 (2) of the Rules acts quasi-judicially and as such was bound to make a speaking order and in the instant case, the impugned order of the appellate authority is liable to be struck down as being violative of Rule 66 (2). 12.
The third contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the appellate authority exercising power under rule 66 (2) of the Rules acts quasi-judicially and as such was bound to make a speaking order and in the instant case, the impugned order of the appellate authority is liable to be struck down as being violative of Rule 66 (2). 12. The fourth contention made on behalf of the petitioner is that on the face of the record, it is apparent that the petitioners case was covered by proviso to R.66 and even if there was any violation or contravention as contemplated under Rule 66 (1), the licensing authority had no jurisdiction vested in it by law to cancel both the licences issued to her under Forms 20 and 21. 13. Shri J. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent has submitted that the petitioners right under Rule 66 was not deprived of and she was given a clear chance to meet the allegations brought against her and there was no violation of the principle of Natural Justice in the instant case and that the question of applicability of proviso of Rule 66 does not arise on the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. It is desirable to take note of the fact that the Drugs Controller was made a party-respondent and the entire proceedings of cancellation was conducted by the Drugs Controller. He had the knowledge about the facts and circumstances of the case as be had to deal with the entire matter. But it is unfortunate that in spite of very many allegations made against the Drugs Controller he did not consider it to be at all necessary to file any affidavit in the instant case. 15. Before entering into the merits of the contention of the parties, certain statements on behalf of the respondents require special consideration as they go to the root of the merits of the case. In this case, on behalf of the respondents the. Under secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Health and Family Planning Department, filed the affidavit-in-opposition. In para.
15. Before entering into the merits of the contention of the parties, certain statements on behalf of the respondents require special consideration as they go to the root of the merits of the case. In this case, on behalf of the respondents the. Under secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Health and Family Planning Department, filed the affidavit-in-opposition. In para. 2 of the said affidavit-in-opposition, it has been admitted by the State as under:- "It is true neither the petitioner nor her agent or employee was guilty of any similar act within it months before the date of detection " In the said paragraph, the respondents stated that by virtue of the provisions under Sections 89 and 24 (2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the petitioner cannot take up any plea that she was ignorant of the nature and circumstances of the quality of the drugs and cosmetics and that her liability was very much there and that she was estopped from taking up any plea that she had no personal knowledge about the existence, non-purchase etc. in the matter. In para 4 of the said affidavit, on behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that the provisions of Rule 66 have been complied with; because she was served with a notice. It was also the ease of the State that no enquiry or hearing of the matter is envisaged under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. There was no denial made by the respondents regarding the assertions made by the petitioner that she was a pardanasin lady and that she comes from a very respectable family and that she was carrying on the business of the said pharmacy which was looked after, run and managed by her employees and servants. 16. The first question that crops up for consideration is as to whether the petitioner was served with a notice as required under rule 66 of the Rules. The rule as amended is quoted hereinafter:- 66.
16. The first question that crops up for consideration is as to whether the petitioner was served with a notice as required under rule 66 of the Rules. The rule as amended is quoted hereinafter:- 66. Cancellation and suspension of licence- (1) The licensing authority may, after giving the licensee an opportunity to show cause why such an order should not be passed, by an order in writing stating the reasons thereof, cancel a licence issued under this part or suspend it for such periods as he thinks fit either wholly or in respect of some of the substances to which it relates, if in his opinion, the licensee has failed to comply with any of the conditions of the licence or with any provisions of the Act or rules thereunder. Provided that, where such failure or contravention is the consequence of an act or omission on the part of an agent or employee, the licence shall not be cancelled or suspended if the licensee proves to the satisfaction of the licensing authority: (a) that the act or omission was not instigated or connived at by him or, if the licensee is a firm or company, by a partner of the firm or a director of the company, or (b) that he or his agent or employee had not been guilty of any similar act or omission within twelve months before the date on which the act or omission in question took place, or where his agent or employee had been guilty of any such act or omission the licensee had not or could nut reasonably have had knowledge of that previous act or omission, or (c) if the act or omission was a continuing act or omission, he had not or could not reasonably have had knowledge of the previous act or omission, or (d) that he hay used due diligence to ensure that the condition of lice licence or the provisions of the Act or the rules thereunder were observed. (2) A licensee whose licence has been suspended or cancelled may appeal to the State Government within three months of the date of the order." The rule provides that before cancelling a licence, an opportunity must be given to the licensee to show cause why an order of cancellation or suspension of the licence should not be made.
(2) A licensee whose licence has been suspended or cancelled may appeal to the State Government within three months of the date of the order." The rule provides that before cancelling a licence, an opportunity must be given to the licensee to show cause why an order of cancellation or suspension of the licence should not be made. In order to give the opportunity, in our opinion, it is absolutely essential that the licensee must be informed as to what are the real allegations made against the licensee and he should be furnished not only with the statements of allegation, but the nature of violation so that the licensee can show cause against them. From the show cause notice we find that an allegation was made against the petitioner that she "stocked and exhibited huge quantities of alcohol 90% I. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and she has failed to produce purchase records in respect of alcohol 90% . . . .. . . . . in violation of the drugs and cosmetics rules, 1945." Now the question arises as to whether she was asked to show came for violating the terms and conditions as contained in the conditions of licencee or she was asked to show in respect of the violation of the provisions contained in the Rules. On a true and correct interpretation of the show cause notice, it appears that she was asked to show cause as to why her licences should not be cancelled for violating the provisions of the Rules. Although allegations have been made that she did violate the rules, there is nothing in the notice to show as to which rule was violated by the petitioner. In the show cause notice also, no provision of the rule was quoted under which the action was taken. In our view, in a case of this nature, in order to enable a petitioner to show cause, it is the duty of the licensing authority to specify clearly the Rule or Rules said to have been violated by the licensee and also the provisions under which the Drugs Controller was acting. Unless the rules which me violated are quoted, it may very well be said that the petitioner did not get a real opportunity to show cause against the proposed action.
Unless the rules which me violated are quoted, it may very well be said that the petitioner did not get a real opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. If in such a show cause. notice, no provision is mentioned under which the action is proposed to be taken and the power is exercised, the licensee cannot satisfy the authority without knowing the provisions that his case is not covered by that provision under which the power is sought to be exercised. 17. During the course of the argument, it was specifically asked by us as to whether the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of Form No. 20 or 21 and for violating the terms of Form 20 or 21 whether both the licences of the petitioner could be cancelled by the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller. As we have already stated that even before us, the Drugs Controller could not satisfy as to whether the drug in question was drug covered by Schedule C and C-1 or other than those. If in fact, he has or had no knowledge as to whether it is a drug covered by Schedule C or C-1 or not, how he could proceed on to take action for cancellation of both the licences is beyond our comprehension. If it was a drug covered by licence in form No. 20, the question of cancellation of the petitioners licence in form No. 21 cannot arise, and vice versa, for violating the terms of form No. 21, the Drags Controller had no jurisdiction vested in it by law to cancel the other licence in respect of which there was no violation. Before us, on behalf of the state, nothing could be shown as to how and under what authority of law, the respondent No. 2 could cancel both the licences for violating the terms and conditions of one licence. The above facts indicate that the Drugs Controller himself did not know as to whether the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of form No. 20 or 21 and as such how can we expect the petitioner to know whether she was asked to show cause in respect of the cancellation of licence in form No.20 or 21?
The above facts indicate that the Drugs Controller himself did not know as to whether the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of form No. 20 or 21 and as such how can we expect the petitioner to know whether she was asked to show cause in respect of the cancellation of licence in form No.20 or 21? Even before us, on behalf of the State, the counsel appearing could not satisfy us that the respondents had jurisdiction to cancel both the licences for alleged violation of the terms and conditions of one licence. Apart from that, we find that there is nothing in the show cause notice to show the provisions under which the respondent No. 2, the Drugs Controller exercised his power and jurisdiction. This is essentially necessary to be quoted in the notice in view of the fact that if the powers are exercised under a Rule, the party showing cause can make out a case specifically in his show cause that the licensing authority had no jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the licence, because the case is covered by the proviso to the said rules, on the facts. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the petitioner did not get any reasonable opportunity to show cause as contemplated under Rule 66. It may be mentioned here that we are not questioning the power of the Drugs Controller to cancel the licence; but what we feel is that the petitioner was deprived of her right to bring her case within the purview of proviso to Rule 66. She has made a positive allegation to that effect. The submission on behalf of the State that she cannot take up the plea that she was ignorant about the transaction in question in view of the provisions contained in Sections 19 and 84 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 have no application in the present case, namely, the case of cancellation of the licences. The said provisions are clearly and specifically applicable in connection with criminal trials for violating the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Proviso to Rule 66 however makes it abundantly clear that the licensing authority cannot cancel the licence provided the clauses a, b, c and d of the proviso to Rule 66 (1) are attracted.
The said provisions are clearly and specifically applicable in connection with criminal trials for violating the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Proviso to Rule 66 however makes it abundantly clear that the licensing authority cannot cancel the licence provided the clauses a, b, c and d of the proviso to Rule 66 (1) are attracted. This rule itself is indicative of the fact that the petitioner is entitled to take up a "plea of ignorance". However, in view of the findings already arrived at by us we hold that the petitioner was deprived of her statutory right to show cause in the instant case and she was prejudiced in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, because it is never denied by the State that the petitioner is a pardanasin lady and that she is an elderly widow. These factors as stated above are prima facie indicative of the fact that it was not possible on her part to look after the day to-day transaction of the business in question. 18. The next contention that has been urged in the present case as to the violation of the principles of Natural Justice, requires no consideration in view of the fact that we have already arrived at the conclusion that the petitioners statutory right was violated. 19. In regard to the third submission made by the petitioner that the appellate order, namely the order passed by the Government under Rule 66 (2) of the Rules was not a speaking order has strong force. The petitioner in the memorandum of appeal took up all the pleas both legal and also the question of facts. On perusal of the memorandum of appeal, we find that all the points excepting the present point which we are dealing with were token up by the petitioner in her memorandum of appeal. The appellate authority disposed of the appeal by merely stating that "there are no grounds to allow your appeal petition." There is no discussion regarding the points, nor there is any indication to show that the appellate authority considered the questions raised by the petitioner and as to why the contentions had "no ground." It is undoubtedly true that it is not at all necessary for the appellate authority constituted Under Rule 66 of the Rules to write a judgment; but it must be a "speaking order".
In connection with this, the loomed counsel Sri P.C. Kataki relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 606 (Shivaji Nathubhai v. Union of India) in which the moot question that arose for their Lordships consideration was as to whether the authority constituted under Rule 44 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. It was held in that case that the said authority acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. It cannot be doubted that in the instant case, the petitioners licences were cancelled by the Drugs controller, the respondent No. 2 and the Present petitioner complained against the said order. It also appears from the order of the appellate authority, the State Government that it heard not only the petitioner, but also the respondent No. 2. It cannot be questioned that the State Government has been clothed with the powers to decide such appeals by virtue of the provisions contained in Rule 66 (2), Definitely there was a dispute which arose between the petitioner and the Drugs controller and that was in regard to the question of cancellation of the licences and that the State Government was the appellate authority to decide the question as to whether the Drugs controller was justified in cancelling the licences or not. There cannot be any question that the appellate authority in question was a statutory authority and the said authority had the power to do an act which may prejudicially affect the subject, namely the petitioner and that it had the power to finally determine the issue in question. It may be noted that before amendment of R.66 (2), the appellate powers therein was exercised by the District Judges. Taking into consideration all these factors, it cannot be doubted that the State Government was a quasi-judicial authority and it was required to make a speaking order. 20. In the present case, the communication of the State Government gave no reasons in support of the appellate order. The petitioner was merely communicated by the State Government that "there are no grounds to allow your appeal petition." The communication does not disclose the points which were considered and the reasons for rejecting them. In our view, this is an unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of quasi-judicial power vested in the State Government.
The petitioner was merely communicated by the State Government that "there are no grounds to allow your appeal petition." The communication does not disclose the points which were considered and the reasons for rejecting them. In our view, this is an unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of quasi-judicial power vested in the State Government. In the instant case, if the power which was exercised by the State Government, if not a judicial order, was undoubtedly a quasi-judicial order. In such orders, it is necessary to give sufficient reasons which disclosed proper appreciation of the problem to be solved and what was playing in the mind of the authority while exercising this power. 21. In such cases, we are of the view, that this Court would require satisfaction to the effect that the decision was reached by such quasi-judicial authority after due consideration of the merits of the disputes uninfluenced by any extraneous consideration or expediency. The reasons as to why it is necessary are two-told: Firstly, because in a proceeding before the High Court the petitioner has to get the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which prevailed with the authority to reject her case were erroneous and secondly the obligation to record reasons undoubtedly operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with quasi-judicial power. 22. The fourth submission made by the petitioner is that the petitioner has very well made out a case covered by the proviso to Rule 66. According to the petitioner, the respondents have admitted that the petitioner was at all relevant period a "pardanasin lady".
22. The fourth submission made by the petitioner is that the petitioner has very well made out a case covered by the proviso to Rule 66. According to the petitioner, the respondents have admitted that the petitioner was at all relevant period a "pardanasin lady". Neither in Annexure C, the show cause notice issued under the rules, nor in Annexure E dated 7-1-1974 passed by the respondent No. 2, nor in the appellate order, there is any allegation, to the effect that the act or omission complained of was instigated or connived at by the owner of the business and there is an admission that neither the owner of the business nor her agent nor her employee had been guilty of a similar act or omission within 12 months before the date on which the act or omission in question took place or that the petitioner had, or reasonably ought to have had knowledge that previous act or omission nor there is any material to attract the provisions of any of the clauses of proviso to Rule 66 (1) in the instant case. Under the circumstances, according to the petitioner, her case is fully covered by the proviso of Rule 66 and the licensing Authority had no power vested in it to cancel or even suspend the licences. 23. We have perused the entire records and find that there is enough materials to show that the case is covered by proviso to Rule 66, in view of the absence of any allegation or material to show that the acts or omission contained in clauses (a) to (b) of proviso to Rule 66 of the Rules were present in the present case. But, however, that is our tentative view and it should not be taken as final by the authorities concerned. We are of the view of the expression "satisfaction of licensing authority" as contained in proviso to Rule 66 means such satisfaction of the authority.
But, however, that is our tentative view and it should not be taken as final by the authorities concerned. We are of the view of the expression "satisfaction of licensing authority" as contained in proviso to Rule 66 means such satisfaction of the authority. We do not feel that it is fit case in which we should substitute the satisfaction of "the licensing authority", we are however confident that the licensing authority shall deal with the matter taking into consideration the allegations which were made by the petitioner and also consider the facts and circumstances of the case after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing or establishing her case to the satisfaction of the licensing authority that her case is covered by the proviso to Rule 66. It may further be stated here that though we wanted to know and be satisfied as to whether Alcohol 90% I. P. (rectified spirit) is a drug or not, but excepting a bare and bald submission coming from the learned Government Advocate that it is so, nothing could be pointed out from the said Act and the Rules from which we can definitely hold that it is a drug as contemplated under the Act or the Rules. 24. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, we quash the impugned notice dated 16-12-1974 as per Annexure C and the order dated 7-1-1974 passed by the respondent No. 2 cancelling the licences of the petitioner and also the appellate order dated 21-7-1975 marked as Annexure G and remit the matter to the Drugs Controller, Assam to consider as to whether in the instant case any proceedings is required to be taken against the petitioner under the provisions of the Act and the rules. If so, he should give reasonable opportunity to the petitioner as indicated above. He should consider as to whether the notice under Rule 66 should be issued in respect of form No. 20 or 21 and should detail carefully as to the nature of the violation and the exact provisions of rules said to have been violated by the petitioner and thereafter give the petitioner an opportunity to satisfy the licensing authority that her case is covered by the proviso and then and then only take such action as he may deem fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case. 25.
25. In the result, the petition is allowed, the rule is made absolute and the entire matter is remitted to the Drugs Controller, Assam Dispur for taking necessary action as it may deem fit and proper. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the parties should bear their own expenses. D. PATHAK, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.