ORDER : 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Gwalior, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Samiti’) through its Secretary for issue of an appropriate writ, direction or order striking down the levy of property tax on it by the property Tax Officer, Guna, under the M.P. Nagariya Sampatti Kar Adhiniyam, 1964 (Act No. 14 of 1964) (which will hereinafter for the sake of brevity be referred to as ‘Act of 1964’). The Property Tax Officer, Guna, issued a notice dated 4-4-1972 imposing property tax on the lands and buildings possessed by or vested in the Samiti. On receipt of the notice, the Samiti raised an objection to the levy of the tax on the ground that it was exempt from the levy in question. The Property Tax Officer, however, rejected the petitioner’s objection and initiated proceedings for recovery of the tax from the petitioner for the years 1970-71 to 1973-74. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present petition. 2. The petitioner’s contention is that property tax is not leviable on it by virtue of exemption granted under section 6 (a)(iii) of the Act of 1964. The petition has been opposed by the Property Tax Officer as well as the State of Madhya Pradesh, both of whom have filed a joint return. 3. The short question arising for our decision is whether the petitioner is exempt from payment of property tax. 4. The Samiti is no doubt a market committee duly constituted under the provisions of the M.P. Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 (Act No. 19 of 1960). Section 12 (1) of the Act of 1960 provides as follows:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time being in force, every Market Committee for all purposes, be deemed to be a local authority.” The Act of 1960 was repealed by M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (Act No. 24 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973) though the provision contained in section 12 (1) of the Act of 1960 was repeated verbatim in section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973. We, therefore, need not reproduced section 7(3) which is exactly the same as section 12 (1) of the Act of 1960 extracted above. 5. We, therefore, need not reproduced section 7(3) which is exactly the same as section 12 (1) of the Act of 1960 extracted above. 5. Now we may refer to the provision granting exemption from the property tax i.e. section 6 (a)(iii) of the Act of 1964 which reads as below:- “Exemptions - Tax shall not be leviable in respect of the following properties, namely: (a) Buildings and land owned by or vesting in (i) Union Government, (ii) State Government and (iii) Local Authority.” Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid provision that buildings and lands vesting in a local authority are exempt from payment of property tax. There is also no doubt that the Samiti is a local authority under the provisions of the Act of 1973. So far, there is no difficulty. But the difficulty is created on account of the definition of “Local authority” given in section 2 of the Act of 1964, which is as below:- “Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (e) “Local Authority” means Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Notified Area Committee, Town Area Committee or Cantonment Board as the case may be; constituted under the law relating to local authority concerned.” 6. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners has laid much emphasis on the above definition and has submitted that since the Samiti does not fall within the definition of Local Authority as provided in the Act of 1964, it cannot claim exemption under section 6 of the said Act. It is argued that the words “all purposes” contained in section 7 (3) of the 1973 Act do not include the matter of taxation and that, in any case, the Act of 1964 is a special law pertaining to taxation and consequently its provisions cannot be governed by the Act of 1973. 7. After having given our careful consideration to the matter, we have come to the conclusion that the non-obstante clause contained in section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 clinches the issue. Both the laws, that is, Act of 1964 and the Act of 1973 have been made by the State Legislature. Section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 has, in our opinion, the over-riding effect over the provisions of Act of 1964. 8. Both the laws, that is, Act of 1964 and the Act of 1973 have been made by the State Legislature. Section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 has, in our opinion, the over-riding effect over the provisions of Act of 1964. 8. In South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary Board of Revenue, Triverdrum, AIR 1964 SC 207 while dealing with conflict between Article 278 and Article 372 of the Constitution their Lordships observed as follows:- “That apart, even if Article 372 continues the Pre-Constitution laws of taxation, that provision is expressly made subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. The expression “subject to conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject Further Article 278 opens out with a non-obstante clause. The phrase “notwithstanding anything in the Constitution” is equivalent to saying that in spite of the other articles of the Constitution, or that the other articles shall not be an impediment to the operation of Article 278. While Article 372 is subject to Article 278, Article 278 operates in its own sphere in spite of Article 372 The result is that Article 278 over- rides Article 372; that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that a pre-Constitution taxation law continues in force under Article 372, the Union and the State Governments can enter into an agreement in terms of Article 278 in respect of Part B States depriving the State law of its efficacy. In one view Article 277 excludes the operation of Article 372 and in the other view, an agreement in terms of Article 278 overrides Article 372. In either view, the result is the same, namely, that at any rate during the period covered by the agreement the States ceased to have any power to impose the tax in respect of “works contracts.” 9. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the passage extracted above, the conclusion is irresistible that the non-obstante clause in section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 will have an overriding effect on the provisions of Act of 1964. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the passage extracted above, the conclusion is irresistible that the non-obstante clause in section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 will have an overriding effect on the provisions of Act of 1964. No doubt, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samities are not included in the definition of “local authority” given in section 2 (e) of the Act of 1964, but the non-obstante clause of section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 specifically provides that “notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force” that is, inspite of the definition of “local authority” to the contrary contained in the Act of 1964, the definition of local authority as provided in that clause would prevail. If that is so, as we think it is, then the Samiti will be deemed to be a “local authority” for all purposes including the purpose of imposition of property tax. In other words, the idea behind introducing this deeming provision is that irrespective of the fact whether any particular law includes Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti within the definition of “local authority” such a Samiti would by legal fiction be considered as a “local authority.” 10. Section 7 (3) of the Act of 1973 enacts that every Market Committee shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local authority. It appears to us that the intention of the Legislature was to create this legal fiction “for all purposes” including the purpose of taxes to be levied by the State. Thus, it is a command of the statute that every market committee shall be deemed to be a local authority. Full effect should be given to this statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. The purpose for which this statutory fiction has been created is not a limited one. It is, therefore, not open to us to hold that this legal fiction must not be extended to the purpose of levying property tax. In our opinion, it will extend to all purposes whatever. The inevitable corollary, therefore, is that the property tax shall not be leviable on the buildings and lands owned by the petitioner Samiti. 11. Consequently, we allow this petition and declare that the petitioner is not liable to pay property tax on the buildings and land owned by or vesting in it. The inevitable corollary, therefore, is that the property tax shall not be leviable on the buildings and lands owned by the petitioner Samiti. 11. Consequently, we allow this petition and declare that the petitioner is not liable to pay property tax on the buildings and land owned by or vesting in it. Demand notices as well as the recovery proceedings for realization of the tax in question from the petitioner are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs...