B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are directed against the order of conviction and sentence passed by Additional City Sessions Judge Ahme- dabad in Sessions Case No. 23 of 1976 convicting original accused No. 1 who is the appellant before us in Criminal Appeal No. 456 of 1976 of the offence of kidnaping punishable under sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer R. I. for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00 in default to suffer one years R-I and also convicting original accused Nos. 2 and 3 who are the appellants before us in Cri- minal Appeal No. 534 of 1976 of the offence punishable under sec. 366a of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of them to suffer R. I. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 0 in default of which to further undergo R. I. for six months. ( 2 ) SO far as the appeal of accused Nos. 2 and 3 is concerned Mr. D. K. Shah learned Advocate appearing on behalf of them very fairly put his case on the footing that assuming that what the prosecutrix Usha has said in and his parents place at village Chikhodra and his in-laws place at village Salpura and also her stay with accused No. 1 at the place of accused No. 2 at Ahmedabad in the second instance and thereafter at village Mokhadta at the in-laws place of accused No. 2 to be true even then the offence punishable under sec. 366a of the Indian Penal Code for which they have been convicted is not established inasmuch as on the own say- ing of prosecutrix there was no overtact so as to constitute inducement within meaning of sec. 366a. In submission of Mr. Shah on the own showing of Usha it was at the instance of accused No. 1 that she was required to go with accused Nos. 2 and 3 and they did not in any way induce her to accompany them to go to different places. We must admit that on the face of it the contention appears to be attractive. But on the close scrutiny we find that the meaning which Mr. Shah wants to ascribe to the term inducement does not appear to be well founded. We must admit that on the face of it the contention appears to be attractive. But on the close scrutiny we find that the meaning which Mr. Shah wants to ascribe to the term inducement does not appear to be well founded. The Dictio- nary meaning of word inducement is to lead into a situation. For any reason if a victim is led into a situation by a person by his overt act or a representation or innocuous conduct which may be merely in nature of accompaniment it would in our opinion constitute inducement so as to be within the terms of sec. 366a- The learned advocate for accused Nos. 2 and 3 invited our attention to a decision of Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in KESUR MAL AND OTHERS V. EMPEROR A. I. R. 1932 LAHORE 555 where seven persons were placed before a First Class Magistrate to take their trial under secs. 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge under sec. 366 was not established and the Magistrate altered the charge under sec. 366 to one under sec 366a of the Indian Penal Code. One of the accused persons viz. Mt. Barakat Bibi was sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment while the remaining five accused were sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment. Accused Khushi was found absconding. The case against Mt. Barakat Bibi was that Mt. Saidan who was sitting in. third class passenger-shed at Waxirabad railway station met her and another accused Kesra. They induced her to go with them offering her to take her to her destination and their object was to sell her to some one for a money consideration for purposes of illicit intercourse. As regards the other five accused the abducted person Mt. Saidans say was that they took her from one place to another with the object of selling her at a suitable place. In that set up of the facts the learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court observed-I do not find anything in the evidence of Mt Saidan that any accused person besides Mt. Saidans say was that they took her from one place to another with the object of selling her at a suitable place. In that set up of the facts the learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court observed-I do not find anything in the evidence of Mt Saidan that any accused person besides Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra offered any inducement to her to go from one place to another or to do any act with the intention that she may he Or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse All that I find is that Mr. Saidan went with the various accused persons from one place to another and was being hawked about for immoral purposes. The offence under see 366 I. P. C. was complete when Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra induced Saidan to leave the passenger-shed at Wazirabad railway station and what happened afterwards did not constitute a fresh offence under sec 366 either against Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra or against any other accused who just took her m one place to another and passed her on from hand to hand. The argument of the trial Magistrate that there was a conspiracy between all the accused persons is not borne out by any evidence and need not be considered in detail. We do not appreciate how this case can be pressed into service successfully to the cause of accused Nos. 2 and 3. The learned Single Judge took the view in the evidence of the prosecutrix before him that it was Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra who induced her to go with them on the promise to take her to her destination and that the learned Single Judge also found from the evidence that their object was to sell her to someone for a money consi- deration for purposes of illicit intercourse. The learned Single Judge therefore took the view that if that was the case of the prosecutrix the offence under sec. 366-A was complete the moment she accompanied Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra and therefore her subsequent movement with the other accused was not of much importance since offence under sec. 366 was complete. We do not think that this case throws any light on the problem which arises before us. Mr. Shah learned Advocate for accused Nos. 366-A was complete the moment she accompanied Mt. Barakat Bibi and Kesra and therefore her subsequent movement with the other accused was not of much importance since offence under sec. 366 was complete. We do not think that this case throws any light on the problem which arises before us. Mr. Shah learned Advocate for accused Nos. 2 and 3 however fairly pointed out to us another decision of a Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in BHAGWATI PRASAD AND ANOTHER V. EMPEROR AIR 1929 ALLAHABAD 709 which decision fortifies the view which we are taking on the meaning of term inducement in this case. The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case before him rejected the contention urged on behalf of the accused before him that the abducted person was a consenting party and therefore no offence was committed under sec. 366-A. He thereafter observed as under:the aim as I have been stating from this Bench of the provisions of sec. 366-A is to prevent immorality and the provisions are framed more with the desire of safe- guarding the public interest of morality than the chastity of one particular woman. Often it may happen that a girl under 18 may desire to leave her husband to better her prospects elsewhere Such a desire would not save her helper from a conviction under sec. 366-A. Any reason given by the appellants to move the girl from one place to another is sufficient for inducement. In the present case it appears that the appellants first put forward the story that the girl was to be taken to her sister Even after the girl discovered that she was not being so taken she fell in with the plan of the appellants. The offence however of inducement had been committed and the girls subsequent willingness will neither prevent the offence nor reduce the gravity of the offence of the appellants. In other words the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that any reason given by the accused to move the girl from one place to another is sufficient for amounting to inducement. Mr. Shah may be right when he submitted that Usha stated in her evidence that it was at the instance of accused No. 1 that she accompanied accused Nos. Mr. Shah may be right when he submitted that Usha stated in her evidence that it was at the instance of accused No. 1 that she accompanied accused Nos. 2 and 3 and went with accused No. 3 and his wife to Chikhodra and Salpura. It is also true that she went again at the instance of accused No. 1 with accused No. 2 to Mokhadta in Palitana Taluka. In our opinion however that would not make any difference so far as the question of the offence under sec. 366a is concerned. Usha would not have gone to these places but for the important fact that accused Nos. 2 and 3 agreed to take her to the respective places. The reasons for taking her may be that they were so instructed ny accused No. 1. None-the-less the fact remains that but for their agreeing to accom- pany and to take her to the respective places Usha would not have agreed to go with them. It cannot be gainsaid that both these accused knew that their act was likely and was such that Usha would be seduced to illicit intercourse with accused No. 1 because accused No. 1 had always an access to her because he knew very well that where she was being kept. As a matter of fact it has been brought out in the evidence that at the instance of accused No. 1 Ashok brother-in-law of accused No. 3 went to Salpura and brought her back to accused No. 3s place. It has also been brought in evidence of Usha that accused No. 1 could bring her back from the father-in-laws place of accused No. 2 from Mokhadta village only under the advise sent by accused No. 2 in the letter addressed to his father-in-law. Having regard to the object of sec. 366 we are not inclined to agree with the meaning which has been canvassed before us by Mr. Shah on behalf of accused Nos. 2 and 3 that we must restrict the term inducement to overtact only or to clear and specific representation. To accept that interpretation may result not only in stifling the object underlying the section but may result into an artificial meaning of term inducement. Shah on behalf of accused Nos. 2 and 3 that we must restrict the term inducement to overtact only or to clear and specific representation. To accept that interpretation may result not only in stifling the object underlying the section but may result into an artificial meaning of term inducement. The reason or the cause of the movement of the victim is not so much material as the fact that but for the complicity the victim would not have gone. In the circumstances and in the facts of this case we do not agree with Mr. Shah that there was no inducement from accused Nos. 2 and 3 which led Usha to move from place to place. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore right when he held that but for the fact of accused Nos. 2 and 3 agreeing to accom- pany the victim Usha she would not have moved from place to place. It can- not be gainsaid that accused Nos. 2 and 3 could not have any comprehen- sion of the consequences which were likely to ensue from such act. The only consequence which can be inferred is that not only this would serve the purpose for keeping her away from her parents place but it may also afford an opportunity to accused No. 1 to carry on illicit connection with her. The Order of conviction of accused Nos. 2 and 3 has therefore got to be sustained. Cr. A. 534/76 partly allowed. .