ORDER V. Khalid, J. 1. This application, at the instance of the 2nd defendant in O.S. No. 69 of 1124 of the District Court, Kottayam, is made under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rule 7 of the Company (Court) Rules and section 45 (O) (8) of the Banking; Regulations Act, 1949. The facts necessary for disposal of this application are as hereunder. The Catholic Bank of India Limited (in liquidation) obtained a decree against the applicant and five others in O. S. No. 69 of 1124 of the District Court. Kottayam on 1st March 1952 for an amount of Rs. 27,085 As. 1 Ps. 7. In execution of the decree, the properties were sold on 24th September 1957 for Rs. 55,703.42. The 2nd defendant filed an application under Order XXI, rule 90 C. P. C. on 23rd October 1957 to set aside the sale on grounds of gross under-valuation and other irregularities. A commission was issued to value the property also. 2. In the meantime, at the instance of the Reserve Bank of India, the Catholic Bank of India went into liquidation on 3rd October 1961. All records connected with the suit and execution petition were transferred consequently to this Court as per order dated 3rd June 1970. The application under Order XXI, rule 90 was dismissed by this Court on 5th March 1971. Since application No. 33 of 1971 filed by the applicant under section 28 of Act 11 of 1972 to set aside the sale was pending, this Court adjourned the matter to 12th March 1971. That application was heard on 12th March 1971. The same was dismissed and the sale was confirmed. The properties were delivered on 16th March 1972. 3. The applicant filed an appeal, A. S. No. 131 of 1971, against the order passed by the learned Company Judge in Application No. 33 of 1971. The Division Bench gave time to the applicant to deposit the decree amount, less Rs. 11,000 to avert the sale, which time, on a review petition was extended finally to 30th August 1971. Since no deposit was made, the appeal was dismissed. In the meantime, the applicant filed an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 before the Sub Court, Kottayam, for settlement of his debts and another application for stay of all further proceedings. The Subordinate Judge allowed the application for stay. Since no deposit was made, the appeal was dismissed. In the meantime, the applicant filed an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 before the Sub Court, Kottayam, for settlement of his debts and another application for stay of all further proceedings. The Subordinate Judge allowed the application for stay. That order of the Sub Court was stayed by this Court on an application by the Official Liquidator. 4. The short point for consideration in this case is whether the petition as presented is maintainable. Counsel for the Official Liquidator raised a preliminary objection that the petition is not maintainable since section 144 C.P.C. is not attracted in this case and that rule 7 of the Company (Court) Rules and section 45 (D) (8) of the Banking Regulations Act are also not applicable. Counsel for the applicant on the other hand took the position that the filing of an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 varied the decree and therefore the application is maintainable. 5. I will dispose of the objection based on rule 7 of the Company (Court) Rules and section 45 (D) (8) of the Banking Regulations Act. A mere reading of the rule and the provision in the Act would make it clear that those provisions are not applicable so far as the prayer in the present application is concerned. Rule 7 of the Company (Court) Rules reads thus: "7. Power of Court to enlarge or abridge time. ” The Court may, in any case in which it shall deem fit, extend or a bridge the time appointed by these rules, or fixed by an order of the Court for doing any act or taking any proceeding, upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require and any such enlargement may be ordered although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed."� Section 45 (D) (8) reads thus: "(8) The High Court shall have power to sanction a compromise in respect of any debt and to order the payment of any debt by instalments."� It is clear that neither rule 7 of the Company (Court) Rules nor section 45 (D) (8) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 is applicable to this case. 6. 6. The only question that survives for consideration is, whether the applicant is entitled to the benefit of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before adverting to the question of law agitated before me, I will read the section for a better appreciation of the question involved. Section 144 C.P.C, reads: "144. Application for restitution." (1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof, as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section(1)."� The section clearly says that restitution can be ordered only if there is variation or reversal of a decree or order. The original decree, in this case, has in no manner been varied. Therefore, without getting into other complications, it can be straightaway held that section 144 Civil Procedure Code is not attracted so far as this case is concerned. Counsel for the applicant has not brought to my notice any material to satisfy me that there has been a variation or reversal of the decree or order passed. However, he relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in Sankaran v. Kochukutty, 1953 K.L.T. 883 to contend that there was variation of the decree passed. The contention based on this decision is to the effect that once an application under section 15 of the Act, Act 11 of 1970, is presented before the competent court, there is an automatic variation of the decree, since according to him, all his creditors become co-owners with him of the properties to which he is entitled. Based on this principle it is contended that there is a variation of the original decree passed by the Court. 7. Based on this principle it is contended that there is a variation of the original decree passed by the Court. 7. In 1953 K.L.T. 883, the question that arose for decision related to the right of appeal from proceedings under section 16 of the Debt Relief Act (Travancore) and section 77 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Subramonia Iyer, J. held that the provision for the application of the procedure for the trials in insolvency will not attract the provision for appeals because appeal is not part of the trial of proceedings in insolvency. Govinda Pillai, J. agreed. Sankaran, J., as he then was, dissented. In the course of the judgment, Subramonia Iyer, J. observed that the consequence of a proper presentation of an application by a debtor under section 16 being, as already stated, to statutorily convert the assets of the debtor into co-ownership property of himself and of all his unsecured creditors, the rights of the latter under the ordinary law to pursue their remedies by a suit and or execution of a decree and recover the moneys due are extinguished and in their stead is substituted a right to get a distributive share in the assets of the debtor'. Sankaran, J., observed thus regarding this aspect of the case: "With all respect to my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J., I feel that in the course of his judgment he has dealt with certain other questions, which, according to me, are not strictly relevant to the question before the Full Bench. I do not wish to commit myself to the opinion expressed by him on such questions. I reserve my opinion on those questions for a more appropriate occasion"�. 8. Strictly therefore the Full Bench is no authority for the question that was canvassed before me by counsel for the applicant that the mere filing of an application will statutorily convert the assets of the debtor into that of co-ownership of himself and of his unsecured creditors. Nor is the proposition of law as laid down by Subramonia Iyer, J., to this effect, with great respect, sound. 9. My learned brother Poti, J., had occasion to consider the effect of this Full Bench decision in A.S. Nos. 307 and 291 of 1971, which is reported in 1971 K.L.T. Short Notes 48. Nor is the proposition of law as laid down by Subramonia Iyer, J., to this effect, with great respect, sound. 9. My learned brother Poti, J., had occasion to consider the effect of this Full Bench decision in A.S. Nos. 307 and 291 of 1971, which is reported in 1971 K.L.T. Short Notes 48. The concept of divesting of the right and creation of a co-ownership right in the creditors did not find favour with the learned Judge. I have gone through the judgment in those two appeals. At paragraph 14 of the judgment, the learned Judge discusses the above point and observes that "there is absolutely no warrant for reading into the provisions of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, Act 11 of 1116, any concept of vesting much less any idea of co-ownership". With great respect, I am in agreement with the principle of law laid down in the said judgment, dissenting from the observations of Subramonia Iyer, J., in the Full Bench decision referred to above. It cannot be said that the mere presentation of an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 or under the corresponding provisions of the earlier Acts would automatically create divesting of the right in the judgment-debtor and the vesting of the rights in him and his creditors. The section only lays down the method for working out the remedies to distribute the assets of a debtor. There is no automatic vesting of the assets in the creditors in co-ownership with the debtor. Therefore, the argument that the presentation of an application before the Sub Court, Kottayam, varied the decree to attract the provisions of section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code has only to be rejected. 10. A formidable difficulty for the applicant is the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court under the Companies Act and the Rules. It cannot be disputed and no authority is necessary for the position, that this Court has got ample jurisdiction to stay all proceedings by which another Court has stayed the execution of the decrees, in so far as they relate to a company in liquidation. This Court stayed the order of stay passed by the Sub Court, Kottayam, when an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 was presented before that Court. 11. This Court stayed the order of stay passed by the Sub Court, Kottayam, when an application under section 15 of Act 11 of 1970 was presented before that Court. 11. I may in passing refer to the decision reported in Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Abraham, 1965 K.L.T. 1228 as one of the many decisions where this point has been highlighted. Raman Nayar, J., as he then was, has clearly laid down that the jurisdiction of this Court under the Companies Act (section 446) is wide enough to set aside the orders of stay passed by the Subordinate Courts in proceedings like the one we have in this case. That was a case under section 15 of Act 31 of 1958, the predecessor-enactment of Act 11 of 1970. The learned Judge set aside the interim stay granted in respect of all further proceedings in A.D.R.P. No. 1 of 1965 of the Sub Court, Meenachil. 12. The applicant's counsel submitted that this was a hard case. But he has to thank himself because he did not make use of the indulgence given to him by this Court in A.S. No. 131 of 1971 filed against the order in Application No. 33 of 1971 and make the deposit. In the result, the preliminary objection raised by counsel for the Official Liquidator is upheld and the application No. 119 of 1975 in Application Nos. 141, 142 and 143 of 1970 in B.C.P. No. 4 of 1961 is dismissed. I direct the parties to bear their costs.