M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) TWO questions pertaining to interpretation of sec. 32 (1b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) are raised in this petition by a tenant from whom possession was obtained between the appointed day (June 15 1955 and the specified day (March 3 1973 within the meaning of sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act by the respondent-landlord otherwise than under sec. 29 or any other provisions of the Tenancy Act. ( 2 ) THE two questions are; (i) whether it is necessary for the tenant to establish that violence or threat was employed in dispossessing him of the land in question and (ii) whether the successor-in-interest of the tenant can claim the right of restoration envisaged by sec. 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act. ( 3 ) THE facts are not in dispute. The father of the petitioner deceased Govindbhai was a tenant in respect of the disputed land belonging to the respondent on the appointed day within the meaning of the Act that is to say on the 15 1955 It is also not in dispute that on the specified day as defined by sec 2 (16c) that is to say on March 3 1973 the tenant was not in possession but the landlord was in possession. On these facts the Mamlatdar issued a suo motu notice and called upon the respondent- landlord to show cause why an order directing the landlord to hand over possession to the 8 ant should not be made under sec. 3z (\b) of the Tenancy Act as the tenant wanted to cultivate the land personally. The respondent-landlord raised only one contention viz. that the landlord had terminated the tenancy of the tenant and that the tenant had surrendered possession of the land voluntarily and that under the circumstances even though possession was not obtained by filing a suit under sec. 29 or in pursuance of any provisions of the Tenancy Act the tenant was not enti- tled to possession. that the landlord had terminated the tenancy of the tenant and that the tenant had surrendered possession of the land voluntarily and that under the circumstances even though possession was not obtained by filing a suit under sec. 29 or in pursuance of any provisions of the Tenancy Act the tenant was not enti- tled to possession. This contention was upheld by the Mamlatdar by his order at Annexure A dated November 28 1974 His order was however reversed in appeal by the Deputy Collector Rajpipla by his order at Annexure B dated January 3 1976 The landlord however invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which reversed the decision of the Deputy Collector and restored the decision of the Mamlatdar. Thereupon the tenant has invoked the powers of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India ( 4 ) BEFORE discussing the question of interpretation indicated in the opening para of this judgment it will be useful to reproduce the provis- ion embodied in sec. 32 (1b) in so far as it is material : where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. 29 or any other provision of this Act is not in possession of such land or any part thereof and such land or part thereof is in the possession of the landlord or his successor in interest on the said date and such land or part thereof is not put to a non-agricultural use on or before the said date then the Mamlatdar shall not- withstanding anything contained in the said sec. 29 or any other provision of this Act either suo motu or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or as the case may be his successor in interest and shall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter the provisions of this section and secs. 32a to 32r (both inclusive) shall so far as they may be applicable apply thereto subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part thereof on the date on which such land or. as the case may be part thereof is restored to him:provided that the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of land or part thereof as the case may be under this sub-section only if he undertakes to cultivate it personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area. ( 5 ) NOW on an analysis of the aforesaid provision it is evident that all that the tenant has to establish in order to secure possession of the land in question is to establish (i) that he was in possession on the appo- inted day; (ii) that he was not in possession on the specified day (March 3 1973 and (iii) that he was dispossessed before the specified date March 3 1973 otherwise than in the manner provided in sec. 29 or any other provision of the Tenancy Act. ( 6 ) IN the present case the first two ingredients are fulfilled by the petitioner inasmuch as it is an admitted position that on the appoin- ted day (June 15 1955 the tenant was in possession and that on the specified day (March 3 1973 the tenant was not in possession. The only question then is whether he was dispossessed otherwise than in accord- ance with the manner provided in sec. 29 or any other provision of the Tenancy Act. Here again it is an admitted position on the part of the respondent that possession was not obtained either under sec. 29 or any other provision of the Tenancy Act. In view of these facts there is no escape from the conclusion that the tenant was entitled to restoration of possession under sec 32 (1b) of the Tenancy Act as held by the Deputy Collector. It is difficult to comprehend how any other question can arise in the context of these admitted facts. It was however argued before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal that the tenant had made over possession after his tenancy was terminated voluntarily and that in view of his surrender it cannot be said that the tenant had been dispossessed. It is difficult to comprehend how any other question can arise in the context of these admitted facts. It was however argued before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal that the tenant had made over possession after his tenancy was terminated voluntarily and that in view of his surrender it cannot be said that the tenant had been dispossessed. In the first place this argument is totally misconceived for a finding of fact has been recorded by the Deputy Collector that the tenant was disposse- ssed under threats. Even assuming however that the tenant was persua- ded to surrender his tenancy inasmuch as it is an admitted position that surrender is not in accordance with the provision of the Tenancy Act and that possession has not been obtained either under sec. 29 or any other provision of the Tenancy Act the respondent cannot succeed. In the context of this provision which is a benevolent piece of legislation designed in order to protect innocent and illiterate tenants the expression dispossession must apply in any case where a tenant who was previously in possession is not in possession any more. It is not necessary to equate dispossession with violent dispossession as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. If the tenant was in possession on the appo- inted day and if he is not in possession on the specified day it means that possession of the tenant has been replaced by possession of the landlord. Of necessity therefore it would follow that the tenant has been dispossessed. It is in this sense that the expression dispossessed has been employed. If the tenant who was previously in possession was no more in possession it would mean that he was dispossessed. Turning now to the second dimension sec. 32 (1b) requires that dispossession must be either under sec. 29 or under any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. In other words the transaction by which the tenant lost possession and the land- lord obtained possession must be one which must be supported by an order passed by the tenancy court either under sec. 29 or under some other provision of the Tenancy Act. The learned counsel for the respon- dent is unable to contend that the respondent had obtained possession under any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. 29 or under some other provision of the Tenancy Act. The learned counsel for the respon- dent is unable to contend that the respondent had obtained possession under any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Under the circumstances the view taken by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which is based on a total misreading and a distorted reading of sec. 32 (1b) cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent then contended that the petitioner was the son of the deceased tenant and that under the circum- stances he was not entitled to claim the benefit of sec 32 (1b ). Now no such contention was raised either before the Mamlatdar or before the Deputy Collector or before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. It is therefore not open to the respondent landlord to raise such a contention for the first time in this Court which is exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Assuming however that it was so open the expression tenant must be construed as being applicable to the original tenant as also to his successor-in-interest. ( 8 ) THE petition must therefore succeed. The order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal on 26th March 1976 Annexure C is quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Deputy Collector on January 3 1976 Annexure B is restored. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. There will be no order regarding costs petition allowed. .