JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The appellant made an application to the Prescribed Authority on 18th November, 1972, for the allotment of a portion of house No. 23, Hamilton Road, Allahabad, on the allegation that he had been occupying it since November 1971, as a tenant, having been inducted in the accommodation by Sri Babu Ram Awasthi, who was its tenant. The appellant's case further was that the accommodation was let out to him with the consent of the land lady. This application was opposed both by the land lady, respondent No. 1, and Sri Babu Ram Awasthi, respondent No. 4. The case of the land lady was that she never gave any consent to Sri Babu Ram Awasthi to let out the accommodation to the appellant. The case of Sri Bahu Ram Awasthi on the other hand was that in the second week of November, 1971, the appellant approached him and expressed his difficulty, namely, that he was occupying an accommodation, which he had to vacate, and was in the circumstances likely to be thrown on the street. The case of Sri Awasthi in this behalf is to be found in the affidavit, which he filed before the Prescribed Authority and a copy of which was attached as Annexure 'N' to the writ petition. In this affidavit he has stated that due to his simple life and old age he gave shelter to the appellant, who belonged to the same profession to which he belonged, just to help the appellant in his distress. He allowed him to occupy a portion of the accommodation under his tenancy for the time being till he was able to find out some other accommodation. According to Sri Awasthi, the appellant took advantage of his old age and, at a time when he was admitted in the Hospital, he broke open a lock and occupied additional accommodation and thereafter even though be continued to promise to vacate it, but, in fact, never vacated it. In the proceedings before the prescribed Authority the appellant also filed an affidavit, which has been attached as Annexure "1" to the counter-affidavit to the writ petition, which gives out the case of the appellant referred to above. 2. In the proceedings before the prescribed Authority the appellant also filed an affidavit, which has been attached as Annexure "1" to the counter-affidavit to the writ petition, which gives out the case of the appellant referred to above. 2. The Prescribed Authority recorded a finding that one Maqbool Husain, who was an agent of the land-lady, was also residing in a portion of the same accommodation and that the appellant had been residing in another portion since 1971, but Maqbool Husain never took any objection to the occupation of the appellant, From this conduct of Maqbool Husain the Prescribed Authority drew an inference that the appellant was in occupation with the consent of Maqbool Hussain, who was an agent of the landlady. On this finding be took the view that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In other words the Prescribed Authority held that the possession of the appellant stood regularised under Section 14 aforesaid and, consequently, no further order of allotment was necessary to be passed. This order was challenged by the land lady in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court. The petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge on 10th July, 1975, whereby the order of the Prescribed Authority was quashed. The present appeal has been preferred against that order. 3. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the appellant was occupying the accommodation in dispute as a tenant since 1971 was a finding of fact and could not be challenged or set aside in a writ petition. We are, however, unable to agree with this submission. As seen above, the Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding that there was any privity of contract between the appellant and the landlord as a result of which the appellant became tenant of the accommodation in dispute. In fact, as already pointed out above, the only finding which the Prescribed Authority has recorded is that the appellant was in occupation of the accommodation in dispute since 1971 and it would be deemed to be with the consent of Maqbool Husain, who was residing in another portion of the same accommodation, inasmuch as he never objected to the occupation of the appellant. Even if this finding is accepted, it does not amount to a finding that the appellant was a tenant of the accommodation in dispute since 1971. The case of Sri Babu Ram Awasthi was that the appellant had been permitted to occupy the accommodation in dispute as a licensee for a short time. If so there was no occasion for Maqbool Husain to object to such an occupation by the appellant. As such the mere fact that Maqbool Husain did not object to the occupation of the appellant of the accommodation in dispute was of no consequence. 4. It would be seen that it was never the case of the appellant that Maqbool Husain had permitted him to occupy the accommodation as a tenant. In fact, a perusal of his affidavit, referred to above, which was filed before the Prescribed Authority, indicates that he did not even mention that he was occupying the accommodation in dispute with the consent of Maqbool Husain. His only case was that the accommodation had been let out to him by Sri Awasthi with the consent of the landlord. This fact was specifically disputed by the landlord as well as by Sri Awasthi. The Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding accepting the case of the appellant that the accommodation in dispute had been let out to him by Sri Awasthi with the consent of the landlord. In this view of the matter, it was apparent that the appellant could not be said to be a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of U.P., Act 13 of 1972 and was not entitled to its benefit. The order of the Prescribed Authority suffered with a manifest error of law and was rightly quashed by the learned Single Judge. 5. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly dismissed with costs.