D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) AS regards the first contention the provisions of sec. 150 (9) of the Act (Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act) confers power on the Tribunal to call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it. . . . . . It is not in dispute before this Court that the words in which an appeal lies to it are descriptive of the proceedings whose record the Tribunal is empowered to Court and examine. Now the proceeding which went to the Tribunal in revision in the present case was a proceeding under sec. 97 (3) of the Act. As stated earlier the matter was already referred to the arbitrator and was pending; and in the meanwhile on December 22 1969 the application for condonation of delay was given to the Registrar under sec. 97 (3 ). The question which arose for determination in this proceeding was whether the Registrar was right an admitting the dispute after expiry of the period on limitation because the applicant satisfied him that the applicant had sufficient ground for not referring the dispute within the prescribed period. The enquiry in such a proceeding is limited to the satisfaction of the Registrar on the question whether the applicant had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within the prescribed period. If the Registrar is satisfied he would pass an order admitting the dispute even though the prescribed period has experiod; if he is not satisfied he would reject the application. The question is whether an appeal would lie to the Tribunal against such an order; and the answer to this question is obvious. There is no provision in the Act conferring a right of appeal against a decision of the Registrar under sec. 97 (3) on the aggrieved party. The provision of the Act conferring a right of appeal under sec. 153 does not include an order under sec. 97 (3 ). A faint attempt was however made on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 to spell out a right of appeal to the Tribunal against an order under sec. 97 (3) by reference to sec. 101 of the Act. 153 does not include an order under sec. 97 (3 ). A faint attempt was however made on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 to spell out a right of appeal to the Tribunal against an order under sec. 97 (3) by reference to sec. 101 of the Act. That section provides for making of an award on the dispute referred to the Registrar and the award can be made by the Registrar or his nominee or the Board of Nominees. Similarly that provision also empowers the Registrar his nominee or board of nominees to make an award on the expenses incurred by the parties to the dispute in connection with the proceeding and the fees and expenses payable to the Registrar or his nominee or as the case may be board of nominees. It is quite clear that sec. 101 provides for making of an award in a dispute which is admitted to arbitration under sec. 96 of the Act. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the dispute as to whether there was sufficient cause for not making an application for reference to the Registrar under sec. 97 within the prescribed period would be a dispute falling under sec. 96 of the Act. Therefore reference to sec. 101 is altogether irrelevant. No other provision was pointed out showing that against an order made under sec. 97 (3) an appeal would lie to the Tribunal The power of revision conferred on the Tribunal under sec. 150 (9) is limited to the proceedings in which an appeal lies to it. That condition being absent in the present case it is clear that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a revisional application and pass the impugned order whereby the order of the Registrar condoning delay was set aside and the dispute raised by the petitioners was held to be timebarred. ( 3 ) THE next question is whether the petitioners should be given the reliefs to the extent claimed by them in the petition so that two types of disputes referred to arbitration should go on. It may be recalled at this stage that mainly two disputes were raised in the present case viz. ( 3 ) THE next question is whether the petitioners should be given the reliefs to the extent claimed by them in the petition so that two types of disputes referred to arbitration should go on. It may be recalled at this stage that mainly two disputes were raised in the present case viz. (1) dispute challenging the expulsion of the deceased father of the petitioners from membership of the society and (2) in the alternative claim for refund of certain amounts paid by the deceased member as well as share of profits realised by the auction sale of the bungalow allotted to the deceased member. So tar as the first dispute is concerned the question arose whether the dispute as expiation or answer falling under sec. 36 of the Act could be referred to arbitration under sec. 96 in view of machinery provided for resolution of that specific dispute provision for appeal against the decision upon that dispute making of the decision as expulsion final. In this connection relevant provisions will be found in sec. 36 (1) and 153 (1) and (6) of the Act. They read as under:36 A society may by resolution passed by three fourths majority of all the members present and voting at a generally meeting of members held for the purpose extra member for acts which are detrimental to the proper working of the societyprovided that no resolution shall be valid unless the member concerned is given an opportunity of representing his case to the general body and no resolution shall be effective unless it is submitted to the Registrar for his approval and approved by him;provided further that the approval or disapproval of the Registrar shall be communicated that the society within a period of three months from the date of such submissions and in the absence of such communication the resolution shall be effective153 (1) An appeal against an order or decision under secs. 4 9 11 13 17 19 36 81 and 160 shall lie; (A) if made or sanctioned or approved by the Registrar or an Additional or Joint Registrar on whom powers of the Registrar are concerned to the State Government (B) if made or sanctioned by any person other than the Registrar or an Additional or Joint Registrar on whom the powers of the Registrar are conferred to the Registrar x x x x x x (6) Save as Provided in this Act no appeal shall lie against any order decision or award passed in accordion with this Act; and every such order decision or award shall be final and where any appeal has been provided for any order passed on appeal shall be final and no further appeal shall lie against it sec 153 (1) makes certain orders passed by the Registrar appealable. Thus refuse to register a society on certain grounds under sec. 4 and on other grounds under sec. 9 as well as under sec. 13 is appealable. Similarly decision on certain questions required to be decided by the Registrar under sec. 11 the order as to amalgamation with another society under sec. 17 supersession of managing committed under sec. 81 and the issue of directions under sec. 160 are all made appealable. The order or decision under sec. 36 is also made in learned appealable by the aforesaid provisions. It is clear therefore that while conferring power on the society in respect of expulsion of its members certain safeguards were provided; and the power was subject firstly to the safeguards to be found in sec. 36 (1) itself. The first safeguard was the requisite 3/4th majority for the purpose of passing of the resolution. The second safeguard was the obligation on the society to give the concerned member an opportunity of representing his case. The third safeguard was that the resolution passed after complying with the aforesaid formalities would still not be effective unless it is submitted to the Registrar for his approval and is approved by the Registrar. Of course an obligation was squarely laid on the Registrar to communicate the approval or disapproval of the resolution to the society within a period of three months from the date of the submission of the resolution for approval. It was provided that in the absence of such communication the resolution would be effective. Of course an obligation was squarely laid on the Registrar to communicate the approval or disapproval of the resolution to the society within a period of three months from the date of the submission of the resolution for approval. It was provided that in the absence of such communication the resolution would be effective. Apart from these in built safeguards to be found in sec. 36 a further safeguard by way of an appeal against the decision of the society contained in the resolution which has been approved by the Registrar was provided under sec. 153 (1 ). Another futile attempt was made and this time on behalf of the petitioner to submit to the Court that the right of appeal under sec. 153 (1) is conferred all the society and not on the expelled member. This contention is against the express terms of sec. 153 (1 ). Having regard to the aforesaid provisions one thing is clear. But for the provisions of sec. 36 the dispute raised by a member as to his expulsion from the society would have been covered by sec. 96 of the Act. It is significant to find that in the Bombay Act of 1925 there was no provision similar to sec. 36. Therefore it is quite likely that the dispute of the present nature under that Act would have been covered by the provisions relating to compulsory arbitration contained in sec. 54 of that Act. The point to be emphasised is that the question whether a member of a society should be expelled from the society may raise a dispute touching the constitution or in a case like the present where the society is a housing society the business of the society. Therefore a specific type of dispute which would clearly fall under the provision of sec. 96 of the Act is sought to be taken out by the Legislature for the purpose of making a special provision. This specific type of dispute as per the legislative intent is to be resolved by resort to sec. 36: and the decision of the society is made subject to the approval or disapproval of the Registrar. It is further made subject to an appeal. Therefore in case of a dispute of this type the Legislature has provided for machinery for its resolution. 36: and the decision of the society is made subject to the approval or disapproval of the Registrar. It is further made subject to an appeal. Therefore in case of a dispute of this type the Legislature has provided for machinery for its resolution. On this basis it can be said that the specific dispute for which a specific machinery has been provided including a right of appeal would not recovered by sec. 96 of the Act. Exfacie there could not be any escape from this conclusion. Mr. Zaveri for the petitioners therefore argued that notwithstanding the right of appeal and notwithstanding the decision of the appellate authority the dispute can still be referred under sec. 96 to the registrar or his nominee. For this he sought to derive support from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court rendered under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 (the Education Act) in Special Civil Application No. 1599 of 1975 with Special Civil Application No. 664 of 1976 decided by J. B. Mehta and P. D. Desai JJ. on 2/5/6-7-1976. (Satsangi S. K. Trust v. P. N. Patel XVIII G. L. R 615 ). The attempt was to show that the provisions of sec. 36 of the Education Act were similar to the provisions of sec. 36 of the present Act inasmuch as sec. 36 of the Education Act also provides for approval in writing by an authorised officer of the proposed action of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or termination of service of a head master a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school. It was further pointed out that a right of appeal against the action approved by the authorised officer was conferred by sub-sec. (5) of sec. 36 which is a right similar to that conferred by sec. 153 (1) in the present case. It was then pointed out that provision for determination of a dispute by the Tribunal was made under see. 38 of the Education Act which would in the submission of the learned advocate stand on parity with the provisions of sec. 96 of the present Act. The Division Bench in the aforesaid decision took the view that the nature of the proceeding contemplated under sec. 36 of the Education Act was summary and the proceedings before the Tribunal under sec. 38 would be fulfledged proceedings. 96 of the present Act. The Division Bench in the aforesaid decision took the view that the nature of the proceeding contemplated under sec. 36 of the Education Act was summary and the proceedings before the Tribunal under sec. 38 would be fulfledged proceedings. Therefore there was no bar to a person against whom order under sec. 36 has been passed and duly approved preventing him from approaching the Tribunal under sec. 38 of the Act. The question posed before this Court under the present Act cannot be decided on a priori grounds on the basis of the reasoning adopted in construing the provisions of another Act whose object and purpose was quite different. Therefore no assistance can be derived from the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in the present case. ( 4 ) IT was also urged that the Registrar in giving his approval under sec. 36 would be deciding the matter upon the materials supplied by the society. Of course the learned advocate was fair enough to concede that this did not debar the Registrar from calling for any other material from the society in deciding whether the approval should be given or not. The submission however was that the question of giving approval or otherwise was a matter between the society and the Registrar in which a member had no interest. On this line it was further submitted that if the afore said argument was correct the expelled member had no right of appeal under sec. 153 (1) against the order of expulsion. There is neither logic nor substance in this submission; and it has only to be stated for being rejected. It was also urged that in according his approval the Registrar has only to see whether the necessary procedure is followed; and the Registrar cannot go into the merits of the case. This submission is equally untenable. ( 5 ) THE decision of the opposite party No. 1 society to expel the deceased member which has been duly approved by the Register would become final under sub-sec. (6) of sec 153. If an appeal is preferred the order passed in appeal would become final. Such a final decision cannot be a subject matter of dispute under sec. 96 of the Act. It is therefore clear that the present dispute as to expulsion of a member did not fall under sec. 96 of the Act. (6) of sec 153. If an appeal is preferred the order passed in appeal would become final. Such a final decision cannot be a subject matter of dispute under sec. 96 of the Act. It is therefore clear that the present dispute as to expulsion of a member did not fall under sec. 96 of the Act. If this is the correct position no useful purpose will be served in granting relief to the petitioners in such a manner that the board of nominee is called upon to carry out an exercise in futility. On this ground therefore this Court will not interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal in 80 far as it pertains to the expulsion of the deceased father of the petitioners from the society. The effect of the order would be that the dispute raised with regard to the expulsion of the deceased father of the petitioners will no longer be enquired into by the arbitrator or the nominee or board of nominees. ( 6 ) WITH regard to the money claim however it is conceded on both hands that the same would amount to a dispute falling under sec 96. Therefore the impugned order of the Tribunal in so far as it purports to throw out that dispute will have to be quashed. The result would be that the money claim made by the petitioners will have to be enquired into by the Registrar or the arbitrator or nominee or the board of nominees appointed by him. As regards the money claim opposite party No. 2 it is conceded on his behalf would not be interested because that claim has been made against the society and the dispute would be between the society and the petitioners. Therefore the objection that the order condoning delay was passed by the Registrar in respect of that dispute in the absence of opposite party No. 2 will not survive. .