( 1 ) THIS revision petition is tiled against the order dt. 22-6-1976 passed in lac. 349 of 1975 on the file of the Addl Civil Judge, Bangalore Dist, Bangalore, on an application filed by the respondents under S. l8 (3) (b) of the land Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894) as amended by the Land acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act, Karnataka Act, 17 of 1961. An extent of 2 acres 37 guntas or land situated at Binnamangala manavarthakaval village and belonging to the respondents was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act under a notification issued on 27-8-1964. Respondents were served with the notice under sub-sec (2) of S. 12 of the Land Acquisition Act on 2-8-1970 infroming them that an award had been passed in respect of the land that had been acquired. The case of the respondents before the Court below was that they had filed an application under sub-sec (1) of S. 18 of the Land acquisition Act requesting the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the case to the Court for the determination of proper compensation payable to them within the prescribed time and that the Land Acquisition Officer had not referred the case accordingly. The Court should therefore direct the Land acquisition Officer to refer tne case to it under Cl (b) of sub-sec (3) off S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The application under Sec. 18 (3) (b) of the land Acquisition Act wasfiled by the respondents in the year 1975, beyond three years from the expiry of 90 days from the date on which the respondents claimed to have made the application. According to them the application had been filed before the Land Acquisition Officer on 1-9-1970. The land Acquisition Officer denied that such an application had been filed by the respondents within the prescribed time and also, contended that the application made under S. 18 (3) (b) beyond three years from the last date on which the Land Acquisition Officer should have referred the case to the court under clause (a) of sub-sec (3) of S. 18 was barred by time in view of article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. ( 2 ) THE learned Additional Civil Judge before whom the said application came up for hearing held that the respondents had established that they had filed the application before the Land Acquisition Officer seeking a reference to the court under S. 18 (1) within the prescribed time and that the application made to the Court under S. 18 (3) (b) was not barred by time as Art. 137 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable. Accordingly he allowed the application filed under S. 18 (3) (b) and directed the Land Acquisition officer to refer the case to the court for the determination of the compensation payable to the respondents. Aggrieved by the said order of the court below the Land Acquisition Officer has filed this revision petition. ( 3 ) THE respondents relied upon Ex. P-2 which was a copy of the application filed by them under S. 18 (1) before the Land Acquisition Officer to establish that they had applied under S. 18 (1) within the prescribed time. The said copy contained the seal of the office of the Land Acquisition Officer and also the initials of an official of his office with the date 1-9-1970. Admittedly the notice under sub-Sec. (2) of S. 12 of the Act had been served on the respondents on 2-8-1970. After taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence the court below was of the opinion that the respondents had proved that they had filed the application under S. 18 (1) on 1-9-1970 within the prescribed time. There is no ground to interfere with the said finding of the court below under S. 115 of the C. P. C. It is held that the respondents had filed an application under S. 18 (1) within the prescribed time. ( 4 ) THE next question which arises for consideration is: whether the application filed u S. 18 (3) (b)before the Court was barred by the law of limitation ? It is not disputed that the Land Acquisition Act does not provide for any period of limitation for filing of application under S. 18 (3) (b ). ( 4 ) THE next question which arises for consideration is: whether the application filed u S. 18 (3) (b)before the Court was barred by the law of limitation ? It is not disputed that the Land Acquisition Act does not provide for any period of limitation for filing of application under S. 18 (3) (b ). The relevant part of S. 18 reads :s. 18 (3) (b) : "if the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the Court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application, the applicant may apply to the Court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference, and the Court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the Court may fix". It is also not disputed that there is no provision in the C. P. C. under which an application can be made for a similar relief. S. 18 (3) (b) was introduced into the Land Acquisition Act for the first time under the Karnataka act 17 of 1961 providing a statutory remedy to an applicant under s. 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act whose application had not been referred to the court by the Land Acquisition Officer within the period of ninety days from the date of its receipt. It was argued by Sri K. Gopalakrishna, learned counsel for the petitioner, that since the court before which their application was filed under S. 18 (3) (b) was under S. 53 of the Land Acquisition act required to follow the C. P. C. while disposing of matters arising under the Land Acquisition Act. the application filed under S. 18 (3) (b) wag governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act and that any such application filed beyond three years from the expiry of the period of ninety days from the date on which the application under S. 18 (1) was filed was barred by time. He contended that the lower court was wrong in holding that Art. 137 was not applicable to applications made under laws other than the c. P C. I am of the view that the court below was right in rejecting this contention. The view adopted by the court below is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality vs. Labour Court, hubli, AIR 1969 SC. 1335 . The view adopted by the court below is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality vs. Labour Court, hubli, AIR 1969 SC. 1335 . In that case the Supreme Court was considering the applicability of Art. 137 of the Limitatoin Act to an application filed under S. 33 (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act made before a Labour Court. Dealing with the said question the Supreme Court observed as follows :"9 : This earlier decision was relied upon by this Court in Bombay gas Co Ltd v. Gopal Bhiva (1964-3 SCR 709 at pp. 722-23=air 1964 9c 752 at p. 758), where the Court had to deal with the argument that applications under S. 33c of the Act will be governed by three years' limitation provided by Art. 181 of the Limitation Act. The court in dealing with this argument held,-"in our opinion, this argument is one of desperation. It is well settled that Arti 181 applies only to applications which are made under the C. P. C. , and so, its extension to applications made under S. 33c (2) of the Act would not be justified. As early as 1880, the Bombay High court had held in Bai Manekbai v. Manekji, Kavasji that Article 181 only relates to arpplications under the CPC in which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application, and the consensus of judicial opinion on this point had been noticed by the privy Council in Hansraj Gupta vs. Official Liquidators, Dehra Dun mussoorie, Electric Tramway Co. , Ltd. An attempt was no doubt made in the case of 1953 SCR 351 ( AIR 1953 SC 98 ) to suggest that the amendment of Arts. 158 and 178 ipso facto altered the meaning which had been attached to the words in Arti. 181 by judicial decisions, but this attempt failed, because this court held "that the long catena of decisions under Arti. 181 may well be said to have, as it were, added the words 'under the Code' in the first column of that article. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by Art. 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications under s. 33c (2) of the Act". 10. 181 may well be said to have, as it were, added the words 'under the Code' in the first column of that article. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by Art. 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications under s. 33c (2) of the Act". 10. It appears to us that the view expressed by this Court in those case must be held to be applicable, even when considering the scope ana applicability of Art. 137 in the Lim. Act of 1963. The language of art. 137 is only slightly different from that of the earlier Art. 181 in as much as when prescribing the 3 years' period of limitation, the 1st col. giving the description of the application reads as "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division". In fact, the addition of the word "other" between the words "any" and "application" would indicate that the legislature wanted to make it clear that the principle of interpretation of Arti. 181 on the basis of ejusdem generis should be applied when interpreting the new Arti. 137. This word "other" implies a reference to earlier articles, and, consequently, in interpreting this article regard must be had to be provisions contained in all the earlier articles. The other articles in the third division to the schedule refer to applications under the C. P. C. , with the exception of applications under the Arbitration Act and also in two cases applications under the Crlpc. The effect of introduction in the third division of the schedule of reference to applications under the arbitration Act in the old Limitation Act has already been considered by this Court in the case of Sha Mulchand and Co. Ltd. , (5) (supra ). We think that, on the same principle, it must be held that even the further alteration made in the articles contained in the third division of the schedule to the new Limitation Act containing references to applications under the Crl. P. C. cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary Arti. 137 which deals with other applications. P. C. cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary Arti. 137 which deals with other applications. It is not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it all applications, irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the C. P. C. " it is argued by Sri K. Gopalakrishna, the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the last sentence in the portion of the decision of the supreme Court extracted above, that the application under S. 18 (3) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act should be construed as an application made under an Act which made C. P. C. applicable to the Court and was therefore governed by Arti. 137. It may be that the court has to follow the procedure prescribed in the C. P. C. for the purposes of deciding the applications and leferences made to it under the Land Acquisition Act. But certainly an application under S. 18 (3) (b) cannot be construed as an application under the C. P. C. It is an application made to a Civil Court under the L. A. Act, we have to bear in mind the distinction between an application under the c. P. C. and an application made under other laws to a court which follows c. P. C. to dispose of such application. In the decision referred to above the supreme Court has clearly stated following its earlier decisions that Arti. 381 of the Limitation Act. 1908 and Art. 137 of the Limitation act 1963 applied only to applications made under the C. P. C. , but not to those applications which are made under the provisions of other laws. As long as the above view of the Supreme Court is prevailing and the Supreme Court has not expressed to the contrary in any subsequent case, it is not open to this court to take the view that Arti. 137 would apply to applications under laws other than the C. P. C. No decision of the supreme Court where a contrary view is expressly taken is brought to my notice. 137 would apply to applications under laws other than the C. P. C. No decision of the supreme Court where a contrary view is expressly taken is brought to my notice. I may add here that the observations made in para 11 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Athani Municipality's case (1) only constituted another ground to reject the contenlicn urged in that case but they do not in any way affect the clear statement of the law in the earlier paragraphs 9 and 10 which are extracted above. It has, therefore, to be held that an application made under S. 18 (3) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act is not governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. Since no period of limitation is prescribed under any law the application filed by the respondents before the Court below cannot be rejected on the ground that it is barred by time. ( 5 ) THERE is no ground to interfere with the order of the Court below the revision petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .