JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows : These 104 Rules were obtained by the petitioners who are squatters and have erected temporary huts on the metalled portions of the public street known as "Arobinda Road" at Naihati. They challenged a notice dated 31.10.75 issued by the Administrator, Naihati Municipality, by which the petitioners were asked to remove the obstructions on the two sides of the road within 30 days from the date of that notice, in default, the authorities would take action in accordance with law. It is the case of the petitioners that they were refugees and they were forced to leave East Pakistan. From Sealdah Station they shifted to Naihati. By erecting shops on the land situated by the side of Arobinda Road within Naihati Municipality, they started business. It is alleged that the petitioners have been carrying on business since last 28 years. Sometime in 1953 the local police tried to disturb their peaceful possession but at the instance of the union known as Naihati Hawhrs' Union formed in 1950, the S.D.O., Barracpore, sent a note to the Officer-in-charge, Naihati Police Station, that so long as alternative arrangements were not made, these poor hawkers should not be disturbed. The petitioners approached the Minister, Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, Union of India through their Union. The said Union was informed that the allotment of land for rehabilitation was within the purview of the State Government. Ultimately the Commissioner, Refugee and Rehabilitation Department, informed the said union by his letter dated 30.7.58. that steps for earlier acquisition of land were being taken by the Directorate. Sometime in 17.11.75 there was an announcement by beating of drum, by the Administrator of the Naibati Municipality whereby the petitioners were informed that they had to remove their shops within 30 days from the date of the announcement. Thereafter the petitioners went to the office of the respondent no. 3 wherein they collector the impugned notice dated 31.10.75 directing the shop-keepers to remove their structures. The petitioners being aggrieved, moved this Court and obtained these Rules as also the interim in junction. 2. Thereafter the petitioners went to the office of the respondent no. 3 wherein they collector the impugned notice dated 31.10.75 directing the shop-keepers to remove their structures. The petitioners being aggrieved, moved this Court and obtained these Rules as also the interim in junction. 2. Affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of respondent no 3 and affirmed by Kartick Chandra Mallick, Acting Executive Officer Naihati Municipality, wherein it has been denied that the petitioners had been carrying on business at the side for the last 28 years or that they possessed any trade licence from the Municipality. It bas also been denied that the Municipality gave its consent, express or implied, or permission, to construct the shops or made any promise to the petitioners The Municipality never gave any assurance to any of the hawkers to construct the shops. Another affidavit-in-opposition bas been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2 and affirmed by Dipak Kumar Das Gupta, Assistant Secretary, Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department, Government of West Bengal, wherein it is stated that one Sri Nityanandi Ghosh and 5 others of Naihati submitted a petition dated 25.5.56 to the Minister-in-Charge. Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department stating therein that 200 hawkers, stated to be in unauthorised occupation on both sides of Arobinda Road, Naibati had been directed by the local police to remove their shops in pursuance of the order of the SDO. Barrackpare, They prayed for requisition of an adjacent land of a local Zaminder for alternative accommodation for their business The Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department after enquiry considered it expedient to acquire the said land under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, with a view to remove the encroachers from the vital through-fare of Naihati. Accordingly a notification under section 4 of the said Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette. The Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas (North), enquired into the matter• and submitted his report under section 44(2) of the said Act recommending that the scheme of acquisition of the proposed land be dropped the Refugee Rehabilitation Commissioner could not inform the hawkers that the matter of acquisition had been dropped till the letter from the Land Planning Committee was received in January 1959. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Banerjee, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contented that the petitioners were enjoying possession of the land of the Municipality for the last 28 years and as such they could not be evicted by any executive order without taking recourse to law. Mr. Banerjee further contended that the petitioners bad been in possession with the knowledge and implied consent of the respondents and as such the respondents were estopped by the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel from evicting the petitioners. In support of his first point Mr. Banerjee relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of (1)Yeshwant Singh v Jagdish Singh, ( AIR 1968 SC 620 ), (2) Virendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1954 SC 447 ), (3) Bishan Das and ors v. State of Punjab (AIR 1961 SC 1571) and also the decision of the Romania in (4) Midnapore Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51 Ind. App. 293. 4. Mr. Roy Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the Municipality contended that the petitioners had got no legal right and as such the present applications under Article 226 of the Constitution were not maintainable. In support of his contentions Mr. Roy Mukherjee relied upon that decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (5) Corporation of Calcutta v. D. N. Sen reported in 78 CWN 183. 5. It appears that all the decisions referred to by Mr. Banerjee have been considered in the Corporation of Calcutta's case. At page 198 of the Report Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. observed that the ratio of the aforesaid decisions seems to be that in order to be entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent interference with his property the petitioner must establish a legal right to the property in question. If the petitioner asserts a right which prima facie establishes a legal right and which requires adjudication then the court must enquire into that right and if that right is establis3ed then interference with that right in appropriate cases, subject to other conditions regarding Article 226 of the Constitution, should be prevented by appropriate orders. If however, the petitioner's right is not established or is not found to be tenable then the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 6. If however, the petitioner's right is not established or is not found to be tenable then the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 6. It is further observed that where State or local authorities by executive fait without the sanction of the law or the authority of any judicial authority interferes with the right or possession of a person, such interference will be prevented by appropriate order under Article 226 of the Constitution but where a local authority or State or statutory body interferes with the possession, in assertion of its property rights and dispossesses a person of his possession in which he has no right to be in possession under the law, even without any of the process of the Court of law, such a person is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution to be put in possession; he may be entitled to other reliefs in other proceedings" 7. Mr. Banerjee sought to distinguish that case and contended that in that case the Corporation of Ca1cutta were asserting their rights by virtue of the proviso to section 6(1)(h) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and the Court found that the respondents had no right to be in possession of the land after the notice had been given by the Corporation. 8. In the instant case under section 240(1) (a) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, the Commissioners may, without notice, themselves or by any other officer authorised by them in writing, remove or alter or otherwise deal with any hut, scaffolding, fence, post rail, platform or other obstruction or encroachment which has, without first obtaining their written permission, been erected or set up in, over, above or upon any house, Gulli or public street, sewer, drain, aqueduct, water house or ghat. It is not disputed that no sanction was obtained by the petitioners for erecting these temporary structures on the public street. So, it is abundantly clear that under section 240(1)(a) of the Bengal Municipal Act the Municipality has got the power to remove the obstruction or encroachment. 9. It is contended by Mr. Banerjee that powers could not be exercised under section 240(1) (a) of the Act for the purpose of demolishing or removing a building inasmuch as for the demolition of a portion of a building provisions have been made in section 241 of the Act. 9. It is contended by Mr. Banerjee that powers could not be exercised under section 240(1) (a) of the Act for the purpose of demolishing or removing a building inasmuch as for the demolition of a portion of a building provisions have been made in section 241 of the Act. It is also contended that under section 330 of the Act the Municipality can demolish any structure, but certain proceedings have been laid down in that section and without complying with those procedures, powers cannot be exercised by the Municipality. 10. In my view under section 240(1) (a) of the Act the Municipality has got ample power to remove any encroachment on the public street. The word 'encroachment' used in that section means the act of wrongfully trespassing upon or interfering with the rights, property and privilege of the Municipality. Demolition of part of the building or verandah as referred to in section 241 contemplates that a particular part of the building or verandah has been constructed in violation of the municipal rules inasmuch as in section 240 (1) (a) itself exemptions have been made by referring to section 241. So neither section 241 nor section 340 of the Bengal Municipal Act has any application to demolition of a structure constructed in complete disregard of the Municipal law and without obtaining a sanction from the Municipality. No legal action has yet been taken by the Municipality; only a notice has been issued. So, in my opinion, these applications are also premature. 11. In (6) Falta Fort Refugee Fishermen's Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Additional District Magistrate (E.A.). 24-Parganas and ors., reported in 1975 (1) CLJ 117 , it has been held that in order that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may apply it has to be established not only that a promise was made but also that the petitioner acted to his detriment on the faith of the promise. 12. In the petition, nowhere it is stated how the promise had been held out by the Municipality that unless the petitioners were rehabilitated in the adjacent land which was going to be requisitioned by the State Government, the petitioners would be allowed to remain in occupation of the public streets of the Municipality. In (7) Scotts (P)' Ltd. & ors. v, Corporation of Calcutta & ors., reported in 79 CWN 883. In (7) Scotts (P)' Ltd. & ors. v, Corporation of Calcutta & ors., reported in 79 CWN 883. it has been held by this Court that public streets are vested on the Corporation of Calcutta for the purpose of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, for seeing that such streets are maintained and can be properly used as thoroughfares. The Corporation does not become the owner of the public streets in the sense that it can do whatever it chooses with such streets as a private owner can do with regard to the property owned by him. It is the clear duty of the Corporation to see that a public street can be properly used as a public street and is properly maintained as a public thoroughfare. 13. The encroachment made by the petitioners on the metalled portions of the road on the flanks of the central tarred portion has caused great inconvenience to the public of the locality. It has also been disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the acting Executive Officer that the road became over-congested even for pedestrains and almost impossible for cars. The electric cables and water pipes lying under the road cannot be repaired due to the Structures of the shop rooms. Even municipal drains cannot be cleansed because of the structures of the petitioners. 14. It is not disputed that the petitioners are squatters. In the case of (8) Ram Singh Paritam Singh and Ors. v. Chief Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, (AIR 1968 Punj., 470), a "squatter" has been defined as a person who settles or locates on land enclosed or unenclosed with no bona fide claim or colour of title and without the consent of the owner. Such a person is merely an intruder; and no matter how long he may continue there, no right in law vests in him. 15. It appears that the petitioners have got no legal right to occupy the land belonging to the Municipality. In order to be entitled to get relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, a petitioner must establish a legal right to the property in question. As the petitioners fail to establish such legal right, in my opinion, these applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are not maintainable. 16. In the result, these Rules are discharged. All interim orders are vacated. 17. There will be no order for costs. 18. As the petitioners fail to establish such legal right, in my opinion, these applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are not maintainable. 16. In the result, these Rules are discharged. All interim orders are vacated. 17. There will be no order for costs. 18. Let the operation of the order be stayed for a period of two weeks from date, as prayed for.