Short Note : 1. In the claim petition, filed by the appellants the assertion was that the deceased Dr. Bhatnagar was driving his cycle steadily and cautiously owing to slope of the Road on the correct side. Further allegation was that the Ambassador Car No. MPZ 5067 which was coming up the slope from the opposite direction was being driven very rashly, negligently, and at a very high speed and was being driven on its wrong side. It is said that the car hit Dr. Bhatnagar on his cycle and the impact was so forceful that he was thrown on the bonnet of the car hitting its wind screen (front glass). Dr. Bhatnagar was then taken to a Government hospital in the same car and was later removed to the Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal where he succumbed to his injuries on 1-9-1971. 2. The Claims Tribunal, Bhopal held that the appellants were the legal representatives of the deceased. On the question whether the accident was caused due to negligence of respondent No. 2 it found that the deceased was driving the cycle down the slope at an excessive speed and for that reason dismissed the claim of the appellants. Held : However, it was equally the duty of the deceased to control the speed by applying brakes so that it could be stopped in times of emergencies. As is the evidence of both these witnesses, the cyclist was visible to them flam quite some distance as the road there is a straight one. Thus, the deceased also must have been in a position to see the car from some distance. If he felt that there was no sufficient space on the tar road for him to pass, he should have not only stopped the cycle but could have equally taken it aside to his left instead of getting dashed against the car. 3. It is a salutary rule of the road that whenever there is an on-coming traffic from the opposite direction, one should drive to his left so as to leave the road for the others coming from the opposite direction to pass. In the instant case, from the facts, as we have found above, it is clear that both i.e. the driver of the car as the deceased, are responsible for the accident which resulted in the death of the cyclist. In the instant case, from the facts, as we have found above, it is clear that both i.e. the driver of the car as the deceased, are responsible for the accident which resulted in the death of the cyclist. In Lang v. London Transport Executive [(1059) I WLR 1168], Havers, J. had held that the driver of the bus and the motor-cyclist were both responsible for the accident. But he held that the motor-cyclist was far more to blame than the bus-driver and so the blame was apportioned in the proportion of two-third and one-third. This view has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Devi v. MPSRT Corporation, 1974 JLJ 483 . 4. In Vidya Devi's Case (supra) the question of the defence of contributory negligence was also considered. Their Lordships of the Division Bench after considering the various principles, their original and the relevant decisions, as have been referred to therein, came to a conclusion that the defence of contributory negligence that a plaintiff who is only partly to blame for the accident cannot recover any damages is, on the face of it, illogical. That being so, the claim of the legal representatives of the deceased cannot be defeated merely because fault, resulting in the accident, could be attributed to the deceased also in some proportion. 5. From the evidence and the circumstances that we have discussed above it is clear that the driver of the car as also the deceased were equally responsible for the accident which resulted in the death of the cyclist, and we would, therefore, apportion the blame on both equally, i.e., half and half. In the instant case, the total amount of compensation, as has been arrived at by the Tribunal, is Rs. 86,000. The manner of arriving at this figure has not been challenged or disputed by either side. 6. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant very fairly agreed that he is prepared to reduce the amount of compensation, if any, that may be awarded to the appellants, by such amounts as have been or may be received by the appellants by way of gratuity and insurance. Learned counsel submitted such amounts by way of an application in writing which are as follows :- (i) Gratuity Rs. 7,975 (ii) Insurance Rs. 1,756 Rs. 1,542 Rs. 22,176 (Amount to be received) Total Rs. Learned counsel submitted such amounts by way of an application in writing which are as follows :- (i) Gratuity Rs. 7,975 (ii) Insurance Rs. 1,756 Rs. 1,542 Rs. 22,176 (Amount to be received) Total Rs. 33.449 Only 7. It is further stated in that application that the appellants have been granted family pension of Rs. 192 per month. Thus, in view of our findings above, the appellants would be entitled to half the amount of total damages awarded by the Tribunal, i.e., Rs. 43,000, out of which an amount of Rs. 33.449 received or to be received by them by way of gratuity and insurance as has been admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, shall be deducted. As a result of this deduction, we would fix the amount of compensation payable to the appellants at the round figure of Rs. 10,000. 8. In view of the admission of the learned counsel for the appel1ants, as aforesaid, we need not enter into the question about the deductibility of the aforesaid amounts of gratuity and insurance. However, a Division Bench of this Court in Mrs. Milandas Hiranand, (A Firm) v. Fatma Bi and others. (Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 90 of 1967, decided on 12-9-1968) also took the view that the amount of insurance policy should be deducted from the amount of compensation that may be determined. 9. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, the award of the Tribunal is set aside and an award of Rs. 10,000 is given in favour of the appellants (1959) 1 WLR 1168, 1964 JLJ 483, relied on. Appeal allowed.