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1976 DIGILAW 149 (ALL)

S. P. Dharini v. State of Uttar Pradesh

1976-03-05

G.C.MATHUR, N.D.OJHA

body1976
JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - These two appeals raise identificial questions and hence are being decided by a common judgment. 2. The appellants are confirmed Sub-Inspectors in the Police department of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The next higher post to which a confirmed Sub-Inspector is entitled to be promoted is that of Circle Inspector. The procedure for such promotion is contained in the Police Regulations. The method of selection of Sub-Inspectors for promotion to the rank of Inspectors is provided in G.O. No. 6379 VIII-A dated November 5, 1965. Under the said G.O. a list is prepared by the Departmental Selection Committee of the candidates selected known as the Approved List. It is from this list that as and when necessity arises Sub-Inspectors are promoted either on officiating basis or in a substantive, capacity in the manner provided in the same G.O. The appellants were brought on the a foresaid approved list and subsequently were promoted in the year 1968 to officiate as Circle Inspectors. By an order dated 10th October, 1973. of the Departmental Selection Committee the names of the appellants were removed from the aforesaid list on the ground that they were found unsuitable. Subsequently by order dated 31st December, 1973, passed by the Superintendent of police concerned the appellants were reverted from the officiating post of Circle Inspector to that of Sub-Inspector. These two orders were challenged by the appellants in two writ petitions on the ground that their reversion amounts to reduction in rank and opportunity as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution of India not having been given to them the orders were liable to be quashed. The writ petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. These two appeals have been preferred against the said judgment. 3. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that since the names of the appellants had been removed from the approved list they ceased to be entitled to be considered for promotion as Circle Inspectors either in an officiating capacity or in a substantive capacity and the result of the order of reversion passed subsequently was that their chances of promotion stood postponed at any rate till their names were again brought back on the approved list. According to the learned counsel this amounted to reduction in rank and the opportunity contemplated by Article 311 not having been given to the appellants the order was vitiated. 4. Before dealing with the submissions it would be necessary to find out the effect of the name of Sub-Inspector being placed on the approved list as also of its being subsequently removed from the said list. G.O. No. 6379/VIII-A dated November 5, 1965, referred to above reads thus : "Subject:- Method of Selection of Sub-Inspectors for promotion to the Rank of Inspectors. With reference to Dy. Inspector General of Police, Head-quaters, letter No. V-500-61, dated August 18, 1964, on the subject noted above, I am directed to say "that after careful consideration of the recommendations contained in para 246 of the U.P. Police Commission Report, 1960, the Governor in supersession of the provisions in the Police Regulations and in modification of the present orders on the subject, has been pleased to order that the procedure for selecting Sub-Inspectors for their promotion to the cadre of Inspector shall henceforth be as follows:- A-The existing quota system by which a certain number of Sub-Inspectors are at present selected from each Range should be abolished. Sub-Inspector, Civil Police who have put in not less than 10 years service as such and the below 50 years of age on the 1st day of January of the year in which the selection is made will now be eligible for promotion to the post of Inspector. The Range Dy. Inspector General of Police will send to the Police Headquarters every year the following list :- (i) Lists of Sub-Inspectors, Civil Police considered suitable for officiating promotion as Inspector in order of seniority in a prescribed form, which may be laid down by the Police Headquarters. (ii) Lists of Sub-Inspectors, Civil Police, who are not considered fit for officiating promotion with brief reasons. The Departmental Selection Committee will thereafter have a final consolidated list prepared of Sub-Inspectors, Civil Police, considered suitable for officiating promotion arranged in the order of their seniority. From the final consolidated list, four times the number of Inspectors required to be approved for officiating promotion will be called for interview by the Departmental Selection Committee as constituted by Government, vide G. O. No. 4381-A/VIII A-288/1961, dated August 2, 1962. From the final consolidated list, four times the number of Inspectors required to be approved for officiating promotion will be called for interview by the Departmental Selection Committee as constituted by Government, vide G. O. No. 4381-A/VIII A-288/1961, dated August 2, 1962. The assessment made by the Committee will be done by selection on merit, and a list of approved candidates will be prepared on which the names of selected rand;dates will be arranged in order of their seniority. Those who are borne on the approved list of an earlier year will rank above those selected and brought on an approved list of a later year. B-On the occurrence of substantive vacancies appointment to them shall be made from amongst the candidates on the approved list prepared under para. A on the basis of suitability. The claims of the candidates passed over will be considered in the subsequent selection. The selection will be made by the Departmental Selection Committee and there will be no further interview of the candidates for filing in the substantive vacancies. C-Candidates selected for substantive appointment will be placed on two years probation in accordance with the provisions of para. 403 (3) of the Police Regulations. The period of service rendered by them as Inspector of Police in a temporary or officiating capacity will be counted towards the period of probation. 2-The above orders shall come into force with immediate effect." It was subsequently modified by another order dated March 5, 1974, whereby the second requirement for being eligible for selection, viz., that the Sub-Inspector should be below 50 years of age on the requisite date, was deleted. A perusal of the aforesaid G. O. indicates that the selection for purposes of Sub-Inspectors being brought on the approved list is made by the Departmental Selection Committee on the basis of merit and suitability. The list is prepared every year and those who are borne on the approved list of an earlier year rank above those selected and brought on the approved list of a later year. It is further apparent that it is only those Sub-Inspectors whose names appear on the approved list who can be considered for promotion to the rank of Inspectors. If the name of a particular Sub-Inspector does not appear on the approved list be cannot even be considered for such promotion. It is further apparent that it is only those Sub-Inspectors whose names appear on the approved list who can be considered for promotion to the rank of Inspectors. If the name of a particular Sub-Inspector does not appear on the approved list be cannot even be considered for such promotion. At the time when an appointment is to be made for substantive vacancy the period of service rendered as Inspector of Police in a temporary or officiating capacity is counted towards the period of probation. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt that if a persons name is removed from the approved list it does affect him adversely in various ways. Firstly, he ceases to have a right even for being considered for promotion to the rank of Inspector. Secondly, even if he is brought back on the list against his name will appear after the names of those who are on the approved list preparde earlier. Thirdly, at the time of appointment in a substantive vacancy, the period of service rendered by him at some earlier occasion in a temporary or officiating capacity may not be accounted towards the period of probation. 5. On this basis it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that an opportunity should be given to the person whose name is sought to be removed from the list even at the stage of passing an order for removal of his name. In support of this submission learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1224 . In that case also a list was maintained of Panchayat Secretaries for appointment as Panchayat Inspectors. The name of Jagdish Prasad was brought on that list and he was promoted as Panchayat Inspector. Subsequently he was reverted to the post of Panchayat Secretary and further a direction was issued that his name be struck off from the list of Panchayat Secretaries to be promoted to the post of Panchayat Inspectors. The order of reversion was challenged on the ground that it amounted to punishment as also on the ground that if was the result of ill-will and malice of the Director of Panchayat Raj. The writ petition was dismissed and so was dismissed the special appeal filed by Jagdish Prasad. The order of reversion was challenged on the ground that it amounted to punishment as also on the ground that if was the result of ill-will and malice of the Director of Panchayat Raj. The writ petition was dismissed and so was dismissed the special appeal filed by Jagdish Prasad. The Supreme Court took the view that a letter which had been filed in the Special Appeal before the High Court had a two fold significance- (i) it rendered some support to the plea of mala fides; (ii) it lent support to the claim of the appellant that the order involved evil consequences. The Supreme Court felt that the High Court was not right in not considering the effect of the said letter. The case was remanded for reconsideration and in that connection it was observed : - "The High Court apparently allowed the letter to be brought on the record, but thereafter declined to consider whether it pre-judicially affected the appellant. The direction that the appellants name be struck off from the list of Panchayat Secretaries eligible for promotion to the post of Panchayat Inspector involved very serious consequences to the appellant. Before such an order could be made it was obligatory upon the appropriate authority to give an opportunity to the appellant to explain his conduct which merited that punishment." For the respondents on the other hand reliance was placed on Shitla Sahai v. N. E. Railway, Gorakhpur, AIR 1966 SC 1197 and Union of India v. M.L. Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 . In Shitla Sahais, AIR 1966 SC 1197 case the appellant was in railway service as Travelling Ticket Examiner. The next higher post was Travelling Ticket Inspector which was a selection post. The selection was made by a selection Board in accordance with certain rules framed in this behalf. A provisional pass was prepared of candidates who were eligible for promotion and the name of the appellant found place in that panel. He was also subsequently promoted as Travelling Ticket Inspector. On a later date a final list replaced the provisional list. The name of the appellant did not find place in the replaced list and he was reverted to the post of Travelling Ticket Examiner. This order was challenged on the ground that it amounted to punishment. He was also subsequently promoted as Travelling Ticket Inspector. On a later date a final list replaced the provisional list. The name of the appellant did not find place in the replaced list and he was reverted to the post of Travelling Ticket Examiner. This order was challenged on the ground that it amounted to punishment. Reliance was placed before the Supreme Court on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dineshwar v. Chief Commercial Superintendent, E. Rlyd, AIR 1960 Cal. 209 . In the Calcutta case Dineshwar was occupying a Class III post. His name was brought on a list in pursuance of a selection from which promotions were to be made to a Class II Post. Dineshwar was also promoted to the Class II Post. Subsequently his name was removed from the list and he was also reverted. These orders were challenged. It was held that even though the order of reversion could not be held to be invalid in as much as Dineshwar was holding Class II Post not as a matter of right but in an officiating capacity. It was, however, held that the second contention of Dineshwar, viz., that striking off his name from the panel affected his chances of future promotion, was a point of substance and must be up held. It was held that what the authorities should have done before striking out the name of Dineshwar from the panel was to give him a show-cause notice as to why his name be not struck off from the panel and the order should have been passed after giving him an opportunity of being heard. The Supreme Court in Shitla Sahai's case took the view that what the Calcutta High Court held in Dineshwars case was not a correct statement of law. In view of Shitla Sahais case, therefore, it is not right to say that before striking out the name of a person from the approved list it is necessary to give the person concerned an opportunity to show-cause and of being heard. A similar view was taken in M.L. Capoor's case by Mr. Justice Mathew while rejecting an argument that before removing the name of a person from a select list he should be given a notice to show-cause why his name should not be removed. A similar view was taken in M.L. Capoor's case by Mr. Justice Mathew while rejecting an argument that before removing the name of a person from a select list he should be given a notice to show-cause why his name should not be removed. It was held : "I am not impressed by the argument that rules of natural justice require that when a senior is proposed to be superseded, he should be given notice and his explanation called.......................... I am not prepared to lay down as a general proposition that whenever a selection is made on the basis of merit and suitability with due regard to seniority, notice to a senior will be required if he is proposed to be passed over in favour of a junior on the ground of his greater merit and suitability." 6. The other learned Judge, viz., Mr. Justice Beg also in view of the authorities, as they stood, felt doubtful whether the expansion of the scope of natural justice, as was canvassed before him, was justified. In view of these two decisions of the Supreme Court and also in view of the circumstances and the context in which the observations relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in Jagdish Prasad's case was made we are of opinion that the view of the Supreme Court is that it is not necessary to give an opportunity of showing cause or of hearing to a person before removing his name from an approved list. In our opinion the decisions in Shitla Sahai's case and M.L. Capoors case on the one hand and the decision in Jagdish Prasad's case on the other on this point are not contradictory but even if they were contradictory, as submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, the decision in Shitla Sahais case, being of a larger Bench, is to be followed in view of the rule laid down in Mattu Lal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 . 7. Reliance for the appellants was i also placed on the decision in M. Ramnatha v. State of Kerala, 1974 (1) SLR 225 in paragraph 19 whereof it is held that striking out of a name from the panel has been held to affect future rights of promotion and to be a reduction in rank. 7. Reliance for the appellants was i also placed on the decision in M. Ramnatha v. State of Kerala, 1974 (1) SLR 225 in paragraph 19 whereof it is held that striking out of a name from the panel has been held to affect future rights of promotion and to be a reduction in rank. It is apparent that while making the aforesaid observation their Lordships had in view a case where the name of a person had been struck off from the panel and he had also been reverted. It cannot obviously relate to the striking out of a name simplicitor not accompanied with or followed by a reversion from a superior post to an inferior post for in that case no question of I reduction in rank could arise. 8. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that since after the names of the appellants had been removed from the approved list they were reverted from the higher post of Circle Inspector to their substantive post of Sub-Inspector and since on account of their names being removed from the approved list their right of even being considered for promotion to the higher post of Circle Inspector was postponed at any rate for the period till they were again brought back on the list and those whose names appeared above them were absorbed, it was a case of reduction in rank and Article 311 was attracted is, in our opinion, well founded. In P.L. Dhingra's v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 two tests have been laid down for determination whether a reversion amounted to reduction in rank (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, (2) whether he had been visited with evil consequences. It was held that if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances of the less of his seniority in a substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, the order would be one which visited the servant with evil consequences. It was held that if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances of the less of his seniority in a substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, the order would be one which visited the servant with evil consequences. In the case of M. Ramnatha the observations made in P. L. Dhingras case were held to mean that the test laid down in that case was whether the servant has the right to the post or the rank or whether the evil consequences such as forfeiture of pay or allowances, loss of seniority in a substantive rank, stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion followed as a result of the order. The word "entail" means "to bring on as an inevitable consequence". If, therefore, postponement of future chances of promotion follow as a result of the order of reversion or such an order brings on as an inevitable consequences postponement of future chances of promotion follow as a result of the order of reversion or such an order brings on as an inevitable consequence postponement of future chances of promotion if would amount to reduction in rank. Keeping in view the scheme contained in the G. O. dated November 5, 1965, referred to above, and the procedure for promotion from the post of a Sub-Inspector to that of a Circle Inspector we are of opinion that the order of re-version of the appellants has that effect. In R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 relying on its earlier decision in State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, Civil Appeal No. 2281 of 1965 D/d. 25.1.1967 it was held that it is now well settled that though a right to be considered for promotion is a term of service but mere chances of promotion are not. That distinction has to be kept in view while determining whether the postponement of chances of promotion amounts to a penalty or not. Normally in a case of reversion the Government servant who has been reverted does not lose his right to be considered for promotion again, such a case will stand on a different footing. But if in view of some service rules after a person has been reverted he loses even the right for being considered for promotion it would amount to a penalty. But if in view of some service rules after a person has been reverted he loses even the right for being considered for promotion it would amount to a penalty. In the instant case the appellants have lost their rights of being considered for promotion as Circle Inspectors in view of their names having been removed from the approved list. This right stands postponed at any rate till their names are again brought back on the list and till the persons appearing above in the list are absorbed. The order of reversion, therefore, clearly amounts to reduction in rank. 9. For the respondents reliance was placed on Ramaswamy v. I.G. of Police, AIR 1966 SC 175 and Shitla Sahai v. N.E. Rly., Gorakhpur, AIR 1966 SC 1197 and State v. Mulkh Raj, AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 415 (FB). 10. In Ramaswamys case the petitioners name appeared on the eligibility list for promotion to the post of the Circle Inspector. He had also been actually promoted and had also worked for some time as Circle Inspector when he was reverted. It was urged on his behalf that he had an indefeasible right for promotion on account of his name appearing in the eligibility list and that he having been actually promoted he had a right to continue in the post of the Circle Inspector and could not be reverted. This plea was negatived. It was held that he did not have any such right. The question as to whether the order of reversion amounted to reduction in rank in the circumstances as in the present cases did not arise for consideration in that case. 11. In Shitla Sahai's case emphasis was laid on the fact that the panel on which the name of Shitla Sahai appeared was only provisional. It was pointed out that the panel being provisional in the very nature of things Shitla Sahai by the mere fact of inclusion of his name in the list did not acquire a right to the post. The argument that the impugned order amounted to reduction in rank was negatived in this context. The approved lists which were prepared in the cases before us and in which the names of the appellants were included were not provisional lists. These were final lists prepared by the Departmental Selection Committee on the basis of merit and suitability. The argument that the impugned order amounted to reduction in rank was negatived in this context. The approved lists which were prepared in the cases before us and in which the names of the appellants were included were not provisional lists. These were final lists prepared by the Departmental Selection Committee on the basis of merit and suitability. Even if it may be accepted that the right of promotion is not a vested right and the inclusion of the name of a person on the approved list gives him only an inchoate right, it still entitles him to be considered for promotion. If his name is removed from the list even the entitlement for consideration is taken away. The same situation does not, however, obtain in the case of a provisional list. 12. In the case of Mulkh Raj the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court were also dealing with a case where the name of Police Officer had been removed from an approved list and he was reverted. Referencing to an earlier decision of the same Court it was held : - "The learned Judges in Rajinder Singhs case, rightly point out that if the reversion, coupled with removal of the name from. List `E', as in this case, debars future promotion or indefinitely postpones chances of future promotion, that is a penal consequence." They took the view that the order of reversion passed against Mulkh Raj did not amount to reduction in rank on the ground that Mulkh Raj had still the right in view of the service rules of being brought back on the fist again and once that was done he would become eligible for promotion. According to the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court since the chances of future promotion were not indefinitely postponed it could not be a case of reduction in rank. With greatest respect we are unable to subscribe to the view that if the chances of promotion are indefinitely postponed only then it would be a case of reduction in rank and not if they are postponed otherwise. In such cases, in our opinion, the cruck of the matter is whether the chances of promotion are postponed at the time when the order of reversion is passed. It would be immaterial whether the postponement is for an indefinite period or otherwise. In such cases, in our opinion, the cruck of the matter is whether the chances of promotion are postponed at the time when the order of reversion is passed. It would be immaterial whether the postponement is for an indefinite period or otherwise. There may be cases where before the occasion of the name of the officer concerned being brought back on the list arises he may retire or may die and that occasion may not at all rise in his case. Neither in the case of P.L. Dhingra nor in the case of M. Ramnatha the Supreme Court has laid down the test of chances of promotion being postponed indefinitely. 13. In view of the foregoing discussions we are of the opinion that even though it was not necessary for the Departmental Selection Committee to give to the appellants an opportunity for either showing cause or for being heard before removing their names from the approved list the orders passed subsequently by the Superintendent of Police concerned reverting the appellants from the Post of Circle Inspector to that of Sub-Inspector amounted to reduction in rank and the appellant not having been given the requisite opportunity contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution, the said orders are liable to be quashed. 14. In the result both these appeals are allowed. The judgment and the order of the learned Single Judge in each oi these two cases is set aside and the orders of reversion of the appellants are quashed The appellants will be entitled to their costs.