Judgment :- (RAMAPRASADA RAO, J.): 1. The subject matter In this Civil Revision Petition presents at once an inconvenient and a provocative situation. It is inconvenient for the reason that many of the High Courts other than our High Court, excepting a single judge of oar court, have taken a view different from the one we intend taking, and it is provocative because this case is responsible for us to give notice to the Advocates Association, to the Bar Association and to the Women Lawyers Association end on the top of its request a senior counsel like Mr. K. Parasaran to be oar Amicus curiae to assist us to solve out certain apparent riddles which the case confronts us with. 2. The facts are very simple. The petitioner-plaintiff filed O.S. No. 518 of 1978 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Tirupathur, North Arcot District and contemporaneously filed I.A. No. 2382 of 1973, and sought for i an ed Interim temporary injunction against the respondents defendants or their agents restraining them from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. On 24th November, 1975, the learned District Munsiff passed an order to the following effect: “Ad interim injunction and netiee by 20th December, 1975.” The respondents took up the matter in appeal in C.M.A. No. 72 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tirupathur and filed I.A. No. 595 of 1975 therein seeking for an interim suspension of the order of interim injunction passed by the learned District Munsif. The learned Subordinate Judge, on the 29th November, 1975 passed an order to the effect that the interim injunction granted in I.A. No. 2382 of 1975 in O.S. No. 518 of 1973 dated 24th November, 1975 by the District Munsif, Tiiupatbur, be suspended. As against this, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the plaintiff-petitioner. When the case was set for admission before our learned brother, V. Rsmaswami, J., the judgment of Mabarajan, J, in Mangai Achi v. Asoken 1973-1-M.L.J. 128: 86 L.W. 449, was brought to his notice. The learned Judge made the following observations: “There are a number of petitions pending disposal which are against the interim orders made by the lower courts. When the case was set for admission before our learned brother, V. Rsmaswami, J., the judgment of Mabarajan, J, in Mangai Achi v. Asoken 1973-1-M.L.J. 128: 86 L.W. 449, was brought to his notice. The learned Judge made the following observations: “There are a number of petitions pending disposal which are against the interim orders made by the lower courts. When District Munsif or an Appellate Authority grants an Interim ex parte order, without seeking to vacate that order by filing so application for the it me, the parties ate resorting to file appeals and revisions against the ed interim ex parte order Itself, on the basis of a decision of this Court given by Mabarajan, J., in Mangol Achi v. Ashokan 1. The question whether an appeal or a revision is maintainable against the ex parte interim order, when there is an alternative remedy of vacating it by filing an application before the same court has to be authoritatively dacided by a Bench. Papers may, therefore, be pleased before MY LORD the Chief Justice for orders.” It is in this context that the Civil Revision Petition is set before us for a decision. 3. Mr. Sivasubramaniam appearing for Mr. Gandhi raised a preliminary objection that the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiropathur as an appellate Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to take on its file the appeal C.M.A. No. 72 of 1975, and in consequence, the interlocutory order passed by him suspending the ad interim injunction granted by the learned District Munsif is ultra virus and without jurisdiction. He would try to distinguish the case before Maharajan, J., referred to above, and after referring to the fundamentals governing the issuance of an interim injunction, or for that matter any order by a Civil Court and with particular reference to the provisions in the C.P.C. itself, the learned counsel will say that the appeal itself is not maintainable, and therefore, the order sought to be challenged in this Civil Revision Petition ought to be set aside as being passed without jurisdiction. As the question raised certain, as already stated, Inconvenient and provocative problems, we sought the assistance of Mr. Parasaran, Senior Counsel, to assist us as Amicus Curiae . We also thought it fit to give notice to the various Bar Associations, and before us, besides the counsel appearing on either side in the civil Revision Petition, Mr. As the question raised certain, as already stated, Inconvenient and provocative problems, we sought the assistance of Mr. Parasaran, Senior Counsel, to assist us as Amicus Curiae . We also thought it fit to give notice to the various Bar Associations, and before us, besides the counsel appearing on either side in the civil Revision Petition, Mr. N.C. Raghavachari, and Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan also made their representations. Excepting for the hesitant argument of Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan and the vociferous assertions of Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, everyone before us would say that both on the ground of expediency and on the established practice and also on the foot that the C.P.C. which has set a procedure, undoubtedly makes a dichotomy between the orders which are purely interlocutory in the sense they are not grounded on reasons given by the judicial authority concerned and those which are orders passed on stated hypothesis and justifiable gonads. It is in this context learned counsel for the petitioner and the other members of the Bar would say that even though the text of O. 43, R. 1(r) of C.P.C. enables the filing of an appeal against an order issued by a Civil Court, under O. 39, R. 1 or 2, yet, such appellate provisions could only be invoked in cases where the judicial authority issuing an order of temporary injunction has applied its mind, stated his grounds and set forth its reasons on which such an order of injunction is based. Mr. Venkatachari, on the other hand, relying upon a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court, in Zila Parishad v. B.R. Sharmal A.I.R. 1970 Alll 376 (F.B.) as also the judgment of our Court (that of Maharajan, J. in Mongal Achi v. Asokan 1973 1 M.L.J. 128. 86 L.W. 449, would say that on a prima facie reading of the language of O. 43, R. 1(r), the appeal is competent even as against an unreasoned order of a Civil Court when it says such an order is under the purported exercise of judicial powers under O. 39, R. 1 or 2, C.P.C. 4. This leads us to an investigation into the fundamentals as to what is a ‘judgment’ and what is an ‘order’ and what is ‘decree’. S. 2(9) of the C.P.C. defines ‘Judgment’ as meaning a ‘statement’ given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. This leads us to an investigation into the fundamentals as to what is a ‘judgment’ and what is an ‘order’ and what is ‘decree’. S. 2(9) of the C.P.C. defines ‘Judgment’ as meaning a ‘statement’ given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. S. 2(14) says that an order means the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree. S. 2(2) of the Code says that a decree means the formal expression of adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. If, therefore, a court has to interpret the real meaning and purport of an order, it has to look into Ss. 2(9) and (14) to find out what possibly could be an order which could be pronounced by a Civil Court in a Court of law. The order is not to be understood as a mandate in the laymans sense, but it should be one which should be taken to be meaningful, and purposeful, besides being one which tantamount to the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court and which decision again is based on certain intelligible grounds. This appears to be so from decided cases as well. 5. In Dodha Malliah v. State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 216, Venkatesam, J., speaking for the Bench after referring to the above statutory previsions observed as follows: “These three definitions under the C.P.C. make it manifest that both a decree as well as an order are formal expressions of any decision of a Civil Court. But a decree conclusively determines rights of the parties. which words do not occur in the definition of the word “order”.” The Supreme Court in Vidyacharan v. Khulchand A.I.R 1964 S.C. 1099 had occasion to consider, not in a position in pari materia, but a similar provision, the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, and Subba Rao, J, as he then was, after noticing that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to trials of election petition before the statutory Tribunals constituted under the said Act stated thus: “There is no provision in the Act defining how the decision should be given. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the Tribunal need not give the statement of reasons for its decision It is the duty of the Election Tribunal to give a statement of reasons for its decision.” It is, therefore, fairly clear to us that any order passed by a judicial authority to which the C.P.C. applies should not ordinarily make it an “order”, without basing it on intelligble grounds or reasons. If no such data is given for the passing of such an order, or it does not ex facie appear in the order itself, then it would case to be a formal expression of a decision which is the primordial garb to clothe the mandate of a Court with the badge of an “order”. With this background, we shall now proceed to analyse O. 39, R. 1, C.P.C. with which we are concerned in this Civil Revision Petition. O. 39, R. 1 states thus: “Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or Wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or, (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors the Court may, by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and revencing the wasting, damaging alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Court tanks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders,” Two eventualities are contemplated in this clause under which courts could grant a temporary injunction. O. 39, R. 1(a) speaks of a subsisting dispute over a property, and the property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, etc. O. 39, R. 1(b) is preventive in scope, and contemplates quiatlmet action. In a case where the plaintiff allegest that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to retrain such act, etc. O. 39, R. 2 deals with the grant of injunctions to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. In a case where the plaintiff allegest that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to retrain such act, etc. O. 39, R. 2 deals with the grant of injunctions to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. We are, for the present, not concerned with the text of O. 39, R. 2, C.P.C. The language deployed in O. 39, R. 1 gives us the impression that the procedural norms prescribed therein, which would entail the grant of temporary or ad interim injunction, could be broadly pigeonholed in two distinct and separate beads The first broad division it that such ad interim injunction could be granted by the Court until the disposal of the suit. The Second division is that such an interim injunction could be granted until further orders. This distinction made in the text of O. 39, R. 1 has to be given effect to while the Civil Court exercises jurisdiction either under O. 39, R. 1 or under the other provisions relatable thereto including the provisions relating to the vacating of such orders and appeals against such orders. The very fact that the Court finally determines that an interim injunction should be issued until the disposal of the snit verily indicates its mind to a large extent, and conclusively determines the entitlement of the plaintiff to such a grant, and it would thus mean that there baa been an application of the mind of the Court to the subject before it, when it made such a grant until the disposal of the suit. Such a more or less conclusive determination of the right of the plaintiff or the other party in the matter of the grant of an injunction until the disposal of the suit, obviously involves the hearing of both the sides, as, otherwise the principles of natural justice also would be affected. Therefore, in our view if any order under O. 39, R. 1, is made in and by which a temporary injunction is granted until the disposal of the suit, that by itself pre-supposes that there was a hearing on the subject matter, and both parties were before the Court at or about the lime when such an order was made. Therefore, in our view if any order under O. 39, R. 1, is made in and by which a temporary injunction is granted until the disposal of the suit, that by itself pre-supposes that there was a hearing on the subject matter, and both parties were before the Court at or about the lime when such an order was made. The second broad division which we have referred to concerns itself with the issuance of such temporary injunctions until further orders. The severity of such injunction is lesser in scope than the one which is granted by the Court while exercising jurisdiction under the first part of O. 39, R. 1(b). In the second part where an ad Interim injunction is issued until further orders, as in this case, it cannot be said that the order was issued after the court has formally expressed its decision on the question, but it is reasonable to assume that such an ad Interim injunction and notice which is usually issued by our Courts are made on a prima facie reading of the plaint and the affidavit which are the only documents available to the Court for issuance of such a temporary order. In such a case, the question which arises immediately for consideration is, whether an ad Interim injunction issued under the second head as above would also be subject to the same treatment in the judicial process, and more particularly, in the matter of the invocation of the appellate jurisdiction of the higher hierarchy of Courts, which are contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. 6. O. 43, R. 1, C.P.C., is the relative appellate provision with which we are concerned. O. 43, C.P.C., deling with the appeals from orders, provides in R. 1(r) that an appeal shall lie from an order under R. 1, R. 2, R. 4, or R. 10 of O. 39. The inhered concept in an appeal is to provide to the appellate Court an opportunity to affirm or reverse the orders or judgments of the Courts below. Such orders should necessarily be formal expressions of a decision which should be bated on grounds and reasons. Even in affirming judgments of the appellate Courts, it becomes sometimes necessary for it, unless otherwise not required to state the reasons for such affirmance of the orders and judgments of the courts below. Such orders should necessarily be formal expressions of a decision which should be bated on grounds and reasons. Even in affirming judgments of the appellate Courts, it becomes sometimes necessary for it, unless otherwise not required to state the reasons for such affirmance of the orders and judgments of the courts below. It should appear on the face of the appellate order that it has considered the reasons given by the lower court and in its opinion, there is no compelling reason to differ from it. On the other hand, if it is a reversing judgment it follows that the appellate court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction should not only substantiate its decision by laying threadbare its own hypothesis on which it decides but also give adequate and sufficient reasons to differ from the findings of the trial court and the reasons given by it. These are the normal features in an appellate judgment. Therefore, when the appellate court is asked to consider the non-speaking order and an order not based on any grounds, and in particular, an order which is not even supported by any data, then the appellate court should invariably concert itself into a trial court and hear both the parties and admit evidence and render its decision for the first time on merits. O. 41, R. 27(1) and (2) read as follows; (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary in the Appellate Court, but if— (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (b) the party seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the Appellate Court that such evidence notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the time when the decree under appeal was passed, or (c) the Appellate Court requires any documents to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. (2) Where additional evidence is allowed to produce by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reasons for its admission.” O. 41, R. 27(1)(a) and (b) are clear and clinching. (2) Where additional evidence is allowed to produce by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reasons for its admission.” O. 41, R. 27(1)(a) and (b) are clear and clinching. But, could it be said that when an appellate court is seized of a subject like the one under examination, it could require any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or could do so for any other substantial cause in cases where it is examining a non-speaking, non-reasoned dad groundless order. We are of the view that it cannot. This is so because O. 41 R. 27(2) provides the key for the admission of such additional evidence by appellate courts. It says that where additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission. We are unable to comprehend that in an appeal like the one under consideration what reason the appellate court can possibly give compelling the parties to produce either oral or documentary evidence. We shall advert to this at a latter stage. Afortiorarl in a case where the order of iris trial court does not furnish any grounds or a decision on which it is based, then in our view, calling for additional evidence either oral or documentary, is not provided for either in S. 107 or O. 41, R. 27, C.P.C., An order such as “ad interim injunction and notice” does not come within the purview of the first division which we have made in the text of O. 39, R. 1(b). It squarely comes under the second division which we thought of. So, it is purely an order which is a step-in-aid to a reasoned order which has to be passed after notice and after hearing both parties. Therefore, even though O. 43, R. 1, expressly refers to an order made in O. 39, R. 1 as an appeasable order, nevertheless that order should be a decision, based on some grounds and not a mere preliminary order for the maintenance of the status quo between the parties. 7. It is in this light, the in-built safeguards in the infra-structure in O. 39. loomp large. 7. It is in this light, the in-built safeguards in the infra-structure in O. 39. loomp large. Inter alia O. 39, R. 4 provides that an order for an injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the Court on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order. This in-built safeguard in O. 39. R. 4 by itself is indicative of the fact that a summary or a cursory interim injunction granted by the courts under the second part of O. 39 R. (1)(b) could easily be varied, discharged or set aside by the Court on an application made thereto by the aggrieved to whom invariably notice of such order is given. Though an ex parte order of injunction prima facie projects a case of affection of rights, yet it is not so grave at that stage, because it is more or less a quiatimet remedy which contemplates the maintenance of the status quo or the for bearance from doing an act imminently prejudicial to the plaintiff who obtains the order. In such a ease, the court passes an ex parte order which ensures preservation of existing rights until further orders or until finally adjudicated upon by it. So, it appears to us that the invocation of the jurisdiction of the appellate court under O. 43, R. 1(r) at that stage would be to allow a party not seriously injured to initiate legal action contrary to the maxim. Actio non datum non damnificato. An action is not given to him who is not iujured. The injury should be an actionable injury, otherwise, the party is non damnificatus and it is a case of damnum sine injurla. The formally affected party on receipt of the notice of the injunction, can seek to vacate it or modify it under O. 39, R. 4. This sub-Clause to O. 39, R. 4, introduced out of necessity and therefore has to be understood as having been introduced because it is necessary, Such a provision cannot be lightly ignored or hopped over so as to seek umbrage under O. 43, R. 1(r), as it would be premature to do so besides being unnecessary. This sub-Clause to O. 39, R. 4, introduced out of necessity and therefore has to be understood as having been introduced because it is necessary, Such a provision cannot be lightly ignored or hopped over so as to seek umbrage under O. 43, R. 1(r), as it would be premature to do so besides being unnecessary. Therefore, the recourse to the appellate court at that inchoate and imperfect stage with no evidence excepting the self-serving pleadings of the complaining party and with an order sans reasons would not have been the intention of the Legislature, when it provided for an appeal under O. 43, R. 1(r) against orders made under O. 39. R 1. In our view, such appeals are intended as against orders passed after hearing all parties and containing reasons and grounds for the grant or refusal of such temporary injunctions and which grant or refusal dandifies or injures the affected party in the realistic sense. The Civil Justice Committee referred to by Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan has made certain recommendations as early as 1926. They have pointed out the reasons and the gravity involved in the grant of such ad interim Injunctions. To quote would be better.(—The Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, Vol. 1 Page 17); “It appears to us that interlocutory injunctions are, throughout India, granted much too freely and without sufficient case to impose terms. The question whether such an order should be granted involved a great deal more than mere compliance with these conditions laid down in order 39) it involves a certain amount both of law and common sense. 1 Page 17); “It appears to us that interlocutory injunctions are, throughout India, granted much too freely and without sufficient case to impose terms. The question whether such an order should be granted involved a great deal more than mere compliance with these conditions laid down in order 39) it involves a certain amount both of law and common sense. Again, we consider that a court which is not prepared to hear the defendant on an application of this sort in a few days and Which gives an ex parte injunction which it knows must continue for weeks is exercising its jurisdiction in a highly dangerous manner Such injunctions when granted at all should invariably be limited to bold good only until a specific and early date By ‘early’ is meant for this purpose not a month but a Week or less, i.e., a minimum time within Which a defendant can come effectively before the Court assuming that to get rid of the injunction he will be prepared to use the greatest expedition possible So far at comparatively junior officers are concerned, we are convinced that no great improvement Will be effected in this matter unless they are made to appreciate that the granting of an ex parte injunction is a serious responsibility; that having granted the injunction they are under a duty to take the greatest pains to do everything possible to protect the absent defendant-” Viewed in this background of such enlightened observations of the Civil Justice Committee made in 1926, it would be adding fuel to the fire if we accede to the argument of Mr. R. S. Venkatachari that a bare order, such as ad interim injunction and notice, is an appeasable one within the meaning of O. 43, R. 1(r). We are of the view, that O. 43, R. 1(r) could be invoked only in cases where the lower appellate Court after hearing the affected party makes a decision within the meaning of S. 2(9) and (14), C.P.C., and so expresses itself formally so that its reasoning and the grounds on which its decision is based could be scrutinized by the higher court. 8. 8. Examining the precedents touching on this subject as well as those decisions which are analogous to the discussion which we are in, we find a bare groundless, reasonless order which is on the top of it an ex parte one, cannot be the subject matter of an appeal. 9. In Luls v. Luls I.L.R. 12 Mad. 186, the question was whether an appeal lay against an order for issuance of a notice under S. 494 of the old Code which is equivalent to O. 39. R. 3, C.P.C. The learned Judges while negativing the contention that an appeal would lie even as against such an order, made the fallowing observations, which are vary important for our purposes: The order made by the Subordinate Judge was not the formal expression of his decision on the question, whether an injunction should be granted or not,” A Division Bench of this Court which rendered the decision was aware that no appeal lay expressly to the appellate court against orders passed under S. 494, old C.P.C., equivalent to O. 39, R. 3. C.P.C. (1908). We are referring to this judgment only to point out that an appeasable order should be one which should be the formal expression of a decision of a court on the question. As the members of the Civil Justice Committee have pointed out, such matters ought not to be interpreted in a wooden way, but should always be tempered and allowed by commonsense. Even according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, a decision means, action of deciding (a contest, question), etc. Obviously, two parties are required for a contest and two opinions should be available to decide a question. While issuing an ad interim injunction ex parte , no such occasion arises. The Federal Court in Syamkant v. Rambhajan A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 74, while deciding the question whether in order made by a civil Court under O. 21, R. 66, C.P.C. is an order or not, as understood by the other provisions in the C.P.C. itself, the Court said that such an order is not a judicial adjudication of any question arising between the parties. Analogically in two decisions of our Court, two learned Judges have taken the view that an order under S. 9(1) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act 24 of 1956) will not take into its campus every decision and that the expression “every decision” in S. 9(2) of the Act, referred only to a ‘final decision’ in regard to rights of parties with reference so the dispute under S. 9(1) and would not include orders passed on interlocutory applications. To the same effect is the decision of our Court in Perla Maria Gounden v. Ramaswami Gounder 1962.1. M.L.J 106. 10. After having proceeded thus, we can now conceive of the real position as to what should the appellate court do in such circumstances. We have already touched upon this aspect and opined that the appellate Court, cannot in the peculiar circumstances of this case invoke their jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 27(c) and require the appellant or the respondent before it to produce any witness so as to enable it to pronounce a judgment or call for the same for any other substantial cause. If they attempted to do so, as was done by Maharajan, J. in Mangal Achi v. Asokan 1973-1-M.L.J. 128: 86 L.W. 449, it is a decision not contemplated in the Code at all. In an appeal against an Interlocutory Order which it bereft of reason and ground and cannot be characterised as a formal expression of a decision, the appellate court is confronted with only the self-serving pleading of the plaintiff, namely, the plaint and the affidavit in support of the application for the grant of an injunction. In our view, the appellate Court at that particular time and in that situation need not call for additional evidence to enable it to give a judgment, for, it would be tantamount to usurpation of the duties of the trial court which would ordinarily be obliged to entertain such evidence and pass a final order under the first part of O. 39, R. 1(b). In fact, a decision cited by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, though, of course, is in his favour in so far as the conclusion therein is concerned, touches upon this question. In fact, a decision cited by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, though, of course, is in his favour in so far as the conclusion therein is concerned, touches upon this question. The learned Judges in that decision, namely, Chhaganlal v. Niwasdas A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 208, observed as follows: where, however, an appeal against an interim order has been Sled the appellate court will not be bound to apply its mind to all those matters which the original court is bound to consider on cause shown by the party affected by ad-interim order I do not feel inclined in this case to go into the merits of the various questions to which the trial Court will be bound to apply its mind before arriving at a decision whether the order of temporary injunction should continue during the pendency of the suit.” These observations are certainly pointers to our view that it is neither just, convenient nor expedient for the appellate Court to sit in the arm chair of the trial court and call for evidence and adjudicate the matter, as if the subject matter has come up before it for the first time. O. 20, R. 4, C.P.C. dealing with the judgment and decree, equally provides necessary intelligence which might be taken as guideline for adoption in such matters. O. 20, R. 4, Cl. 2, says: Judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision.” We have already referred to S. 2(9) which says that judgment means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Therefore, it appears to us that even if an order is passed, it is mandatory on the part of the Court making that order to decide the points for determination and be should give the reason for his decision. When this is absent, we fail to see how an appeal can lie against such an order. 11. The anomalous result, which is likely to flaw from the acceptance of the contention of the counsel for the respondent can easily be illustrated. When this is absent, we fail to see how an appeal can lie against such an order. 11. The anomalous result, which is likely to flaw from the acceptance of the contention of the counsel for the respondent can easily be illustrated. Supposing a suit is filed by X against A, B, C, and D, and X secures an ex parte ad interim injunction with notice to A, B, C, and D. If A, B, C and D, are represented by different counsel, it is possible that A and B might invoke O. 39, R. 4, C.P.C., and seek to vacate the interim order of injunction, and C and D might file an appeal against the same order in the appellate Court. There is every possibility of conflicting orders being passed by these two judicial functionaries. In order to secure consistency and primarily to harmonies and reconcile the situation, it is necessary to find a solution. In such situations, the manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment should be avoided. Though Ita seriptumest is the first principle of interpretation, yet, if the application of the text in an enactment, when read in conjunction with other provisions, leads to a result so unreasonable that it is self-evident that the Legislature could net have meant what it has said, than, it is the duty of the Court to reconcile and harmonies the situation. The C.P.C. being a codified law regarding procedure, and being comprehensive enough, must be taken and read as a whole, and its provisions and the intent and object of such provisions upheld “Division of a statute into parts or chapters is for purposes of convenience. The object of such division is not that each part or chapter should be read independently of each other as a complete code by itself.” In order to sat at rest such glaring anomalies the only solution appears to be to hold that no appeal will lie against an ex parte ad interim injunction, but that the specific remedy available in O. 39, R. 4 C.P.C. has to be availed of by the interdicted party so that a final reasoned order could be obtained in the trial court itself against which the Code has provided an obvious appeal under O. 43, R. 1(r), C.P.C. 12. We shall now take up the serious contention of Mr. We shall now take up the serious contention of Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, who, after referring to the catena of decisions, relied upon the decision in Mangal Achi v. Asokan 1978 I M.L.J. 128 and took us through the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Zllla Parishad v. B.R. Sharma A.I.R. 1970 All. 376 (F.B.). We may point out at once that the occasion for the Full Bench to decide on the subject was that there was difference of opinion between the two Division Benches of that Court. In Raja Deo Singh v. Kr. Shamkho Krishna Narin 1960 All. L.J, 124 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the view that no appeal lay against such interlocutory and reasonless order make under O. 39, R. 1, or even under O. 43, R. 1(r), C.P.C. The Full Bench said that the language and to object of R. 1 of O. 43 and the scheme of Rr. 1 to 4 of O. 39 show that an appeal also lies against the ex parte order of injunction. Broadly stated, this proposition is prima facie right. But, when it comes to a question of considering the order, which is not as equation of a decision made by a civil Court, which decision has to be founded on reason, then the problem becomes somewhat baffling, and it is, therefore, the question arises whether a literal compliance of the appellate provision under O. 43, R. 1, alone is the remedy available under the Act, or is there anything else available in the alternative. No doubt if alternative provisions of procedure are available in the C.P.C., it is open to a litigant to adopt one or the other provided for. No doubt if alternative provisions of procedure are available in the C.P.C., it is open to a litigant to adopt one or the other provided for. But, read in conjunction with the other provisions of the C.P.C. and the nature and contest of a non-speaking order, which is passed by a civil Court, and having regard to the practical difficulties to a litigant, the enormous delay in the disposal of appeals, the prohibitive costs involved in the invocation of such appellate provisions and the danger inhered in such ex parte injunctions granted sometimes without care and without application of commonsense, are all the factors which enter into the computation to find whether O. 39, R. 4 of the C.P.C. is not the only remedy in cases where such orders of ad Interim injunction were passed by the trial Court with contemporaneous notice to the other side. We are of the view, respectfully differing from Maharajan, J. whose judgment we shall presently consider, that in cases where such interim orders or ex parte orders are not founded on any reason, and they cannot reasonably be characterised as formal expression of a decision made by a Judge and which decision in turn is not based upon intelligible and acceptable grounds, the remedy available to a party affected is under O. 39, R. 4, and not by invoking the appellate provisions under O. 43, R. 1(r), C.P.C. In a case where there is a reasoned judgment after hearing the parties, and a decision based on various grounds is made one way or the other by the trial court, then obviously that would be an order which would come under the first division which we have set out above in our preface on O. 39, R. 1, and it would be an appeasable order. 13. One other factor, which prompts us to accept the argument of Mr. Parasaran, who assisted us to a great deal in this case, is the longstanding practice prevailing in this court. In Mangal Achi v. Asokan 1972 I M.L.J. 128 though Maharajan, J. followed the Full Beech of the Allahabad High Court, he allowed the parties to let in evidence by affidavits and examined the subject matter by himself as if be was a trial court and ultimately disposed of the appeal. In Mangal Achi v. Asokan 1972 I M.L.J. 128 though Maharajan, J. followed the Full Beech of the Allahabad High Court, he allowed the parties to let in evidence by affidavits and examined the subject matter by himself as if be was a trial court and ultimately disposed of the appeal. We find in the course of his judgment that the parties in the appellate stage have led affidavits setting forth all the relevant fads and the respondent filed counter affidavits in which he does not dispute the truth of such facts. Therefore, the situation before Maharajan, J. was this. Though the parties objected to the maintainability of the appeal, yet they would furnish and feed the appeal with relevant material to enable it to decide whether an injunction should be granted or not as if it was a trial court. We have already expressed the view that such an invitation to the parties to file affidavits or to bring in fresh evidence at the appellate stage when the trial court itself did not give such an opportunity to the parties is not contemplated under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, equity demands that a fuller opportunity should be give to the parties and it invariably happens that the appellate courts which are in seizing of small appeals, cannot afford to give larger time to the litigants but take only affidavit evidence and dispose of the matter. This again might, in some cases, lead to miscarriage of justice. 14. For all the reasons stated above and also for the reason that longstanding practice in a Chartered High Court cannot be lightly disturbed and set at naught, we are of the view that such orders which as we characterised above are without reason and are not based on any grounds, can only be the subject matter of challenge under O. 39, R. 4, and cannot be the subject matter of appeal under O. 43, R. 1, C.P.C. 15. Learned counsel, who appeared before us represented to us as a whole, the Bar Associations in our High Court, and they have in one voice said that no such practice existed in the past. No one including Mr. R.S. Venkatachari brought to us any decision of our Court, which agreed with the maintainability of inch appeals or by the filing of such appeals. No one including Mr. R.S. Venkatachari brought to us any decision of our Court, which agreed with the maintainability of inch appeals or by the filing of such appeals. In those circumstances, the well-known principle cursus curiae would apply. In the words of the learned Chief Justice in Annamalal Mudall v. Ramaswami Mudali 1941.1 M.L.J. 43 at 67: 51 L.W. 77 (F.B.) that it will not be desirable to depart from this long course of decisions and upset what was regarded in our Presidency as a settled cursus curiae for over 50 years. A more telling pronouncement is found in C.I.T., Bombay v. R.H. Pandit A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2060. There, the Supreme Court was considering a practice of that Court. The Supreme Court said that cursus curiae ext lex curiae, i.e., the practice of the court. Is the law of the court, and where a practice has existed, it is convenient to adhere to it because it is the practice. Having regard to such an established practice in the past and as no decision of our Court has been brought to our notice, which enabled the filing of appeals under O. 43, R. 1, against interlocutory orders not based on any grounds and being a formal expression of decision, we are unable to follow the decision of the Allahabad High Court and which in turn was referred to by Maharajan, J. in Mangal Achi v. Asokan 1975-I-M.L.J. 123; 86 L.W. 449. 16. We, therefore, find that the order of the Court below, which issued an order directing interim suspension of the order of the trial court in I.A. No. 595 of 1975 in C.M.A. No. 72 of 1975, is an order which is absolutely without jurisdiction. We therefore, set aside the same under S. 115, C.P.C. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. 17. We express our thanks to Mr. Parasaran, who assisted us as Amicus Curiae and, who has taken a great interest in the subject matter and to Mr. Narayanaswamy, President of the Advocates Association, Mr. Srinivasaviradachari, representing the Bar Association, Mrs. Radha Gopalan of the Women Lawyers Association, Mr. N.C. Raghavachari and Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan who assisted us to solve the inconvenience as well as the provocation given to us. Before leaving this matter, we would like to make some practical suggestions. Narayanaswamy, President of the Advocates Association, Mr. Srinivasaviradachari, representing the Bar Association, Mrs. Radha Gopalan of the Women Lawyers Association, Mr. N.C. Raghavachari and Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan who assisted us to solve the inconvenience as well as the provocation given to us. Before leaving this matter, we would like to make some practical suggestions. We have already accepted a portion of the report of the Civil Justice Committee. Even in 1926, it was desired that such ad interim injunctions should not stand, unless affirmed or dissolved, for more than a week. It is, therefore, desirable that the trial Courts, which pass such orders should not give more than a weeks time to enable the other side to appear and if the other side files an application under O. 39, R. 4, C.P.C. to vacate or modify the same, such application also have to be heard within two weeks thereafter. The entire matter should be settled within a month. Otherwise the litigants would be frustrated, and the hope that the poor litigant has in a court of law will become a dupe. We, therefore, suggest, that in all such situations, the Courts which are guided by expediency and avoidance of delay should dispose of such applications at least within 30 days from the date when they Issue such ad interim injunction orders. In the instant case, we direct the District Munsif to take up the application I.A. No. 2382 of 1975 on its file and dispose of the same by 15th April 1976. The appeal C.M.A. No. 72 of 1975 on the file of the Subordinate Judge is to be automatically and should be deemed to have been dismissed.