P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was the defendant (tenant) and the opponent was the plaintiff (landlord) in a suit for recovery of possession of the suit premises and arrears of rent. The suit in so far as it related to the relief of recovery of possession was founded on only one ground namely that the petitioner was a tenant in arrears of rent who had forfeited the protection of the Rent Act The Trial Court found that the case was covered by sec. 12 (3) (a) and that the opponent was entitled to a decree of eviction. Alternatively it found that the petitioner was not entitled to be protected even under sec. 12 (3) (b) in as much as within one month of the service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) he failed to make an application under sec. 11 (3) for fixation of standard rent. In view of the findings aforesaid the Trial Court passed a decree of eviction. In appeal the Appellate Court confirmed the material findings of the Trial Court and consequently affirmed the decree of eviction. Hence the present Revision Application. ( 2 ) ). THE question whether the petitioner is entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) will therefore require fresh consideration at this stage. In order to claim the protection of the said sub-section three conditions require to be satisfied; (1) on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix the tenant must pay or tender in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due; (2) the tenant must thereafter continue to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided; and (3) the tenant must also pay costs of the suit as directed by the Court. It is well-settled that in order to earn the protection of the said sub-section the tenant must comply with all the conditions laid down therein and that if he fails to do so the Court has no discretion to deny a decree to the landlord for possession (See AMBALAL V. BABALDAS 3 G. L. R. 625 AT PAGE 647 ). It is well-settled that in order to earn the protection of the said sub-section the tenant must comply with all the conditions laid down therein and that if he fails to do so the Court has no discretion to deny a decree to the landlord for possession (See AMBALAL V. BABALDAS 3 G. L. R. 625 AT PAGE 647 ). The approach adopted by the Supreme Court in declining to grant the protection of the said sub-section to the concerned tenants in VORA ABBASBHAI V. HAJI GULAMNABI 5 G. L. R. 55 AT PAGES 61 and 62 DHANSUKHLAL V. DALICHAND 9 G. L. R. 759 AT PAGE 765 AND M/s. PIONEER PAPER BOX FACTORY V. SMT. THAKURDEVI A. I. R. 1971 SUPREME COURT 1781 AT PAGE 1782 also points in the same direction. It would thus appear that in order to claim the pro- tection of sec. 12 (3) (b) the petitioner will have to show that he has complied with all the aforesaid conditions laid down in the said sub-sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 3 ) THAT takes me to the consideration of the main question in dis- pute between the parties and that relates to the satisfaction of the third condition namely the payment of costs of the suit. It is not in dispute that in this case the Trial Court had not issued a direction before the decision of the suit with regard to the payment of costs. The costs were awarded only by the decree of the Trial Court and they amounted to Rs. 122. 89 p. The deposits made by the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal left a little- balance after accounting for the rent due upto the date of the decision of the appeal. However the said balance was not sufficient to cover the entire decretal costs and there was a short-fall of Rs. 89. 50 after adjusting the said balance towards the decretal costs. This led to the argument advanced on behalf of the opponent to the effect that since the petitioner had not fully paid the costs of the suit as directed by the Court the third condition of sec. 12 (3) (b) must be held not to have been satisfied and the petitioner must be denied the protection of the said sub-sec. The question is whether this submission is well-founded. 12 (3) (b) must be held not to have been satisfied and the petitioner must be denied the protection of the said sub-sec. The question is whether this submission is well-founded. ( 4 ) IN order to examine the validity of the contention it would be necessary to bear in mind that costs of the suit are awarded under sec. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is applicable to the Rent Courts. Under the said section the costs of the suit are in the discretion of the Court and the Court has full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid and to give all necessary directions for the said purpose. The normal rule under the said section is that the costs shall follow the event unless otherwise directed by the Court for reasons stated in writing. In a Full Bench decision of this Court in Civil Application No. 629 of 1975 with First Appeal No. 294 of 1971 M\s. ANANDJI HARIDAS and CO. PVT. LTD. V. STATE OF GUJARAT WHICH WAS DECIDED ON APRIL 30 1976 NOW REPORTED IN 18 G. L R. 271 it has been explained that the principle in the matter of taxing party and party costs is that the costs are awarded not as a punishment to the defeated party nor as a bonus to the party which receives them but as a recompense to the successful party in order to indemnify him thought not completely for legal expenses to which he has been subjected in prosecuting his suit or his defence. A successful party would be entitled to come to the court and say: This is a matter in respect of which I am entitled to get costs because I have been put to expense and the law as administrated in this Court allows me in that state of things to be indemnified by the defendant to the extent of party and party costs. It is this principle which in the main governs the exercise of discretion and provides the guideline for the exercise of power relating to the award of costs under sec. 35. It is this principle which in the main governs the exercise of discretion and provides the guideline for the exercise of power relating to the award of costs under sec. 35. In a rent and possession suit therefore the Court may justifiably award to the landlord costs of the suit in the event of his success in order to indemnify him though not completely for the legal expenses to which he might have been subjected in prosecuting his suit. If the costs are accordingly awar- ded to him the landlord would be entitled to recover them by executing the decree of costs unless it is set aside in appeal by the higher Court The question however is whether in order to earn the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) it would be obligatory for the tenant to pay to the Landlord such decretal costs without driving the landlord to execution. In other words the question is whether an order of costs passed by the Rent Court under see 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure while disposing of the suit amounts to a direction to pay costs of the suit as directed by the Court within the meaning of see. 12 (3) (b ). ( 5 ) WHILE resolving this question it will have to be borne in mind that the provisions of see. 12 place an embargo on the right of the land- lord under the general law of the land to evict the tenant once he has terminated the lease by a valid notice to quit. the various sub-sections of sec. 12 enact certain limitations and restrictions procedural as well as substantives on the right or the landlord and give protection to the tenant at different stages Clause (b) of sub-sec (3) of sec. 12 with which we are immediately concerned in substance provides that in cases not falling with clause (a) that is to say in case in which rent is not payable by the month or in which there is a dispute regarding the standard rent and permitted increases or in which rent is not due for six months or more no decree for eviction shall be passed upon the fulfilment of the condi- tions prescribed therein one of them being that the tenant pays costs fo the suit as directed by the Court. This part of clause (b) fell for construc- tion in Vora Abbasbhai Vs. Haji Gulamnabi 5 G. L. R. 55 at page 61 and the following pertinent observations bring into limelight its essential contents:to bring his claim within sec. 12 (3) (b) the tenant must pay or tender the standard rent and permitted increases on or before the first day of hearing or on or b-fore such other date as the Court fixes and also costs of the suit as may be directed by the Court. It may be noticed that the statute imposes upon the tenant obligation to pay or deposit the amount of costs if the Court so directs and not otherwise. The observation made by the High Court to the contrary viz:- it is therefore. clear that the tenant in order to be entitled to claim the protection of sec. 12 (3 (b) must deposit cost of the suit along with the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases. . . . . . . . . (1963 V G. L. R. 282 at p. 297) is in our judgment erroneous. Similarly in Lalchands case (supra ). the aforesaid material words in clause (b) came up for consideration and the following observations were made in that context:a completely new notion is introduced by these last words namely payment of the costs and it is with reference to this payment of costs that the words as directed by the Court have been provided by the Legislature. Obviously until an order for costs is actually drawn up a litigant will not know what costs he has to pay or tender or deposit in Court and hence if the Court so directs he has to pay the quantum of costs as directed by the Court. It is only for this limited purpose of payment of costs that the words as directed by the Court have been laid down by the Legislature. . . . . . . . . Ordinarily the amount of costs would be known only after the decree is passed and the amount of costs is fixed by an order of the Court hut sec. 12 (3) (b) contemplated that the tenant in order to earn the benefit of sec. . . . . . . . . Ordinarily the amount of costs would be known only after the decree is passed and the amount of costs is fixed by an order of the Court hut sec. 12 (3) (b) contemplated that the tenant in order to earn the benefit of sec. 12 over and above the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases may also have to pay the costs of the suit before the suit is finally decided. Since the amount of costs is not known to the tenant in advance that is before the of is decided and the decree of the Court is passed the Court may have to give directions regarding the quantum of costs and if the Court gives directions as to costs the tenant has to pay such costs also before the suit is decided. (underlining supplied)IT would thus appear that to seek the protection of clause (b) the tenant must inter alia pay or deposit the amount of costs if the Court so directs and not otherwise Clause (b) it is significant to note largely deals with the conduct of the tenant during the pendency of the suit. Until the suit is decreed and order of costs is actually drawn up a tenant will not know as to what would be the costs of the suit. Besides the pay- ment or deposit of cost of the suit is made a condition for earning the protection of clause (b) and in the very nature of things therefore the tenant must have an advance intimation of the imposition of such condition to enable him to avail of such protection It is for this reason that the words as directed by the Court have been used by the Legislature and an entirely new notion is introduced namely payment of costs of the suit even before the suit is finally decided- Therefore if the Court in the exercise of its power under clauses (b) wishes to impose upon the tenant condition about payment of such costs it will have to quantify the costs and direct the tenant to pay the same Within such time as it fixes. Such a discretionary order will be made if the facts and circumsta- nces of the case justify it bearing in mind the statutory guideline namely that the sub-section is intended to protect a tenant who shows his readiness and willingness to pay the rent. ( 6 ) IT would appear from the foregoing discussion that by its very nature an order of costs which has to be complied with by payment or deposit of such costs in the Court in order to earn the protection of clause (b) is a distinct order from an order of costs made under sec 345 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The principle regulating the exercise of disc- retion with regard to the direction of payment of costs under the two different provisions namely sec. 12 (3) (b) and sec 35 cannot in the very nature of things be Identical. While exercising discretion under sec. 12 (3) (b) the Court will have to bear in mind as earlier pointed out the facts and circumstances of the case and the guiding principle that a tenant who is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases would be entitled to protection and that if the circumstances of the case justify it a further direction with regard to payment or deposit of costs as a condition precedent to the earning of such statutory protection might be made. While exercising discretion under sec. 35 however an order of costs would be ordinarily made as a matter of course consequent upon the res- ult of the suit unless for some special reasons to be recorded in writing the Courts thinks otherwise. It follows therefore that merely because in its decree costs of the suit are awarded by the Rent Court to a landlord it cannot be treated as a direction under sec. 12 (3) (b) the failure to com- ply with which would disentitle the tenant to claim the protection of the said sub-section. ( 7 ) THE view which I am inclined to take as aforesaid can be fortified by an illustration. Take a case where a decree of eviction is sought on two grounds nonpayment of rent and change of user. The Trial Court decides against the plaintiff on the issue of nonpayment of rent but passes a decree on the ground of change of user and awards the costs of the suit. Take a case where a decree of eviction is sought on two grounds nonpayment of rent and change of user. The Trial Court decides against the plaintiff on the issue of nonpayment of rent but passes a decree on the ground of change of user and awards the costs of the suit. In appeal the finding of the Trial Court on the issue of change of use is reversed. The plaintiff tries to support the decree of eviction on the ground decided against him namely nonpayment of rent. The Appellate Court finds that there was non-payment of rent and comes to the conclusion that the case was not covered by sec. 12 (1) and that sec. 12 (3) (a) was also not applicable. It then proceeds to consider the question whether the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) were satisfied so that the tenant can be protected against eviction. Could it be said in such a case that failure on the part of the tenant to pay the costs of the suit as directed in the decree would deprive him of the benefit of the protection of the said provision? The answer must clearly be in the negative. The Trial Courts decree of eviction was not based on the ground of nonpayment of rent and in such a case it would be difficult to hold that the order as to costs was a direction to pay costs within the meaning of sec. 12 (3) (b ). The tenant was never faced with a decree of eviction on the ground of nonpayment of rent and he could not have foreseen that an order of costs made under sec. 35 C. P. C. in a suit where decree of eviction was passed on a ground other than nonpayment of rent if not complied with by payment or deposit in the Court would perate to deprive him of his statutory protection under sec. 12 (3) (b ). ( 8 ) LET us now proceed to examine in the light of the aforesaid view of the relevant condition in sec. 12 (3) (b) whether failure on the part of the petitioner to pay or deposit full costs of the suit results in forfeiture of the protection of the said sub-section. 12 (3) (b ). ( 8 ) LET us now proceed to examine in the light of the aforesaid view of the relevant condition in sec. 12 (3) (b) whether failure on the part of the petitioner to pay or deposit full costs of the suit results in forfeiture of the protection of the said sub-section. The Trial Court awarded costs to the opponent but in so doing it made a very pertinent observation which indicates that it was an order of costs made in exercise of its discretion under sec. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It observed. AS the plaintiff succeeds on major part he is also entitled to costs from the defendant. It would thus appear that in ultimately passing the order as to costs of the suit the Trial Court went by the principle that costs follow the event It had never applied its mind to the relevant statutory guideline prescribed by sec. 12 (3) (b) nor did it make the payment or deposit of costs a con- dition for the earning of protection under the said sub-section. It also did not specify the date on or before which the costs could be paid or depos- ited by the petitioner in order to earn the protection of the said sub-sec- tion. The decree having been passed under sec. 12 (3) (a) there was in fact no occasion for the Trial Court to apply its mind to the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b ). Under such circumstances in my opinion failure on the part of the petitioner to pay or deposit the costs of the suit cannot deprive him of the protection of sec 12 (3) (b ). ( 9 ) IT was however urged on behalf of the opponent that in the pres- ent case there was a specific direction by the Appellate Court with regard to the deposit of costs and that since the said direction was not complied with the petitioner was not entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b ). A few facts bearing on this question may be set out. Along with the Memo of appeal the petitioner had presented in the Appellate Court an applica- tion for stay on January 4 1971 The Appellate Court passed an order below the said application on the same day granting ad-interim stay till the return of notice. 12 (3) (b ). A few facts bearing on this question may be set out. Along with the Memo of appeal the petitioner had presented in the Appellate Court an applica- tion for stay on January 4 1971 The Appellate Court passed an order below the said application on the same day granting ad-interim stay till the return of notice. After hearing the other side the Appellate Court made the following order on the said application on February 22 1971 stay to continue. The appellant to deposit costs of the suit and rent and continue to do so in future. In default the stay shall stand vacated. Appeal expedited. It is this direction with regard to the payment of costs which has been pressed into service in support of the argument that the petitioner had forfeited the protection of sec 12 (3) (b) In my opinion the argument is thoroughly misconceived. The terms in which the order of stay was made clearly indicate that the condition with regard to deposit of cost was imposed upon the petitioner as a condition for obtaining the stay in accord- ance with the normal practice prevailing in the Courts in this State which requires that in case of a money decree unless the appellant deposits the amount in the Court no stay shall ordinarily be granted. The Appe- llate Court as the very tenor of its order suggests exercised the power in regard to the imposition of such condition under Order 41 Rule 5 and in consonance with the practice aforesaid and the only effect of its nonco- mpliance if any would be that if such non-compliance was brought to the notice of the Appellate Court it could have vacated the order of stay. The imposition of such a condition cannot be read as an exercise of power under sec. 12 (3) (b) last part by the Appellate Court at the stage of the admission of the appeal itself. In this connection it also requires to be noted that an order as to costs passed simpliciter under sec. 35 C. P. C. by the Trial Court without application of mind on the question whether it should be treated as a direction under sec. 12 (3) (b) last part cannot at the stage of the admission of the appeal be modified and converted into a direction under sec. 35 C. P. C. by the Trial Court without application of mind on the question whether it should be treated as a direction under sec. 12 (3) (b) last part cannot at the stage of the admission of the appeal be modified and converted into a direction under sec. 12 (3) (b) with regard to payment of costs as a con- dition precedent to the claiming of protection under sec 12 (3) (b) at the appellate stage. It would thus appear that merely because there was non- compliance if any with the order of the Appellate Court made at the stage of the admission of the appeal while granting the order of stay it cannot be said that the protection of sec 12 (3) (b) should not be accorded to the petitioner. ( 10 ) IN my opinion therefore the fact that the total amount deposited by the petitioner in the Court till the appeal was finally decided fell some- what short of the costs of the suit awarded to the opponent it cannot be said in the facts and circumstances of the present case that he has forfeited the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b ). Since all other conditions of the said sub-section are found to have been satisfied the decree of eviction will have to be set aside. ( 11 ) IN the result the Revision Application succeeds and is allowed. The decree of eviction passed against the petitioner is set aside and the suit is dismissed so far as it relates to the relief of recovery of possession. There will be no order as to costs of this Revision application. Application allowed. .