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1976 DIGILAW 151 (PAT)

peyarchand Ram v. State of Bihar

1976-07-28

D.P.SINHA

body1976
JUDGMENT D. P. Sinha, J. The petitioner, namely, Peyarchand Ram and one Sitaram Sao were tried together on the allegation that they had committed an offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for having violated the provisions of Imported Foodgrains (Prohibition of Unauthorized Sale) Order, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') and of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Lincensing Order, 1967. While Sitaram Sao was acquitted, the petitioner was convicted under Section 7 of the Act, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/and in default thereof, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month by Shri N.K.P. Sinha Munsif Magistrate. 1st class, Gaya. He preferred an appeal to the Court of Sessions which was heard and decided by Shri Amar Nath Singh, Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Gaya. The appeal was dismissed. The petitioner has now come up in revision. 2. The short facts of the case are these. The petitioner and Sitaram Sao owned a mill at Kathokar Talab within the Jurisdiction of the Kotwali Police station of Gaya. The mill was inspected on 28th January, 1967 and sealed by a Magistrate (P.W.1) on that very day. The, mill was revisited on 10th February, 1967 and was further inspected after breaking open the seal. Two bags of Milo, two bags of Milo Aata and one bag of barley were found stored in the mill. They were all seized by the Magistrate and a seizure list (exhibit 1) was drawn up. It was alleged that the articles seized were imported foodgrains and the petitioner did not hold any licence for storing such foodgrains. It was further alleged that he had contravened the provisions of the Order. Accordingly, the police officer (P.W. 6.) who was there in the party of the Magistrate drew up a Fardbeyan on the basis of which a case was registered by the officer-incharge of Kotwali Police station (P.W.7) who after investigation, submitted charge sheet against the petitioner and Sitaram. It has already been mentioned that while Sitaram was acquitted, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced under section 7 of the Act. 3. It has already been mentioned that while Sitaram was acquitted, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced under section 7 of the Act. 3. The defence of the petitioner was that the mill in question had been sold out to the Multi-purpose Co-operative Society and as such at the relevant time the petitioner was not responsible for the storage of the foodgrains. It was further contended that even on the facts proved in the case, the petitioner could not be held to have committed an offence under section 7 of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the courts below should not have accepted the evidence of the lay witnesses with regard to the allegation that the foodgrains seized were 'imported foodgrains' within the meaning of the Order. He further contended that the evidence of the said witnesses that even the Aata which was found by the inspecting party was of imported milo was too flimsy to be accepted as true in as much as it was well nigh impossible for the witnesses concerned to say with any amount of certainty that it was Aata of imported milo and not of the kind of milo which is grown in this country. Learned counsel also pointed out that there was no evidence that the quantities of milo, barley and Aata had been stored in the mill for the purpose of sale when the business of the mill was to grind foodgrains like milo, barley etc. into flour for its customers. 5. The contentions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner appear to be well founded. The following quantities of grains had been seized by the inspecting party : (i) One bag containing 64 Kg. of milo. (ii) One bag containing 24 Kg. of milo, (iii) One bag containing 82Kg. of Aata, (iv) One bag containing 40Ks. of Aata, (v) One bag containing 95 Kg. of barley. The petitioner has not been convicted for having stored for sale the above quantity of barley as there was no evidence to the effect that this was imported foodgrain. Three witnesses have given evidence that the milo was 'imported foodgrain' and that the Aata was also of imported milo. Those witnesses are P. Ws. 2, 5 and 9. There is another witness, P. W. 4, who bas stated that the Aata was of imported mila. P. Ws. Three witnesses have given evidence that the milo was 'imported foodgrain' and that the Aata was also of imported milo. Those witnesses are P. Ws. 2, 5 and 9. There is another witness, P. W. 4, who bas stated that the Aata was of imported mila. P. Ws. 2,4 and 9 are Supply Inspectors and P. W. 5 is the Police officer on whose report the case had been registered in the thana. 6. 'Imported Foodgrains' has been defined in item (b) of clause 2 of the Order to mean "foodgrains imported from outside India by the Central Government and supplied by that Government either directly or through a State Government, to authorized dealers for sale to the public. In the circumstances, it was hardly enough for the purposes of this case for the witnesses to state that the foodgrains were 'imported foodgrains'. Evidence should have been led to show that the foodgrains had been imported from outside India by the Central Government and supplied by that Government either directly or though the State Government to authorised dealers for sale to the public. The relevant provision prohibiting unauthorised sale of imported f'oodgrains is contained in clause 3 of the Order. It lays down that "No person other than an authorised dealer shall sell, or store or offer for sale, imported foodgrains in any quantity either split or unsplit or mixed with other grains.". There is an Explanation appended to that clause which says that "the storage of imported foodgrains in quantities exceeding two quintals, shall unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be storage for the purpose of sale". It is with the aid of this Explanation that the petitioner has been convicted under section 7 of the Act, for having violated the provisions of said clause 3 of the Order. the court below has taken 88 Kg. of milo contained in two bags plus 122 Kg. of the Aata contained in two bags which quantities together come to 210 Kg. into consideration for holding that since the quantity of the Aata and milo together stored exceeded two quintals, therefure, the presumption was that the said quantity (2. 10 quintals) had been stored for the purpose of sale. of milo contained in two bags plus 122 Kg. of the Aata contained in two bags which quantities together come to 210 Kg. into consideration for holding that since the quantity of the Aata and milo together stored exceeded two quintals, therefure, the presumption was that the said quantity (2. 10 quintals) had been stored for the purpose of sale. It may be mentioned that so far as the evidence is concerned, no allegation has been made by any bf the witnesses that the grains and the Aata seized had been stored in the mill for the purpose of sale. The courts below appear to have failed to notice the fact that the business of the mill was to grind grains into flour and as such it was not unlikely that customers might have brought the said quantities of grains for getting them converted into flour. It was necessary to examine this aspect of the matter closely particularly in view or the fact that one of the bags contained 64 Kg. of milo while the other bag contained only 24Kg. Similarly, the Aata in one bag was 83 Kg. and in the other it was 40 Kg. These small quantities kept in different bags in spite of the fact that the grains were the same may lead one to the inference that they had been brought by different customers for being converted into Aata. 7. There is another circumstance which has to be seriously considered. While the witnesses, namely, the Supply Inspectors (P. Ws. 2, 4 and 9) who, by virtue of the nature of their duties, might have become familiar with 'imported foodgrains' and may be considered to be competent if they say so (in this case they have not said so) to testify to the fact that the milo in the said bags were 'imported food grains' within the meaning of the order but it was well nigh impossible for them to say with any amount of certainty that the Aata in the two bags was also of imported milo. The courts below appear to have just taken for granted the evidence of these witnesses without noticing this important fact which introduces an element of uncertainty in the evidence of the said witnesses. The courts below appear to have just taken for granted the evidence of these witnesses without noticing this important fact which introduces an element of uncertainty in the evidence of the said witnesses. The evidence of the police officer (P.W.3) is even worse in the sense that it has not been shown as to how he was competent to say that the milo was imported foodgrain and it is interesting to find that the said police officer has not only testified the milo to be 'imported foodgrain' but also that the Aata was of imported milo. It is true that the appreciation of evidence has to be made by the courts of fact and this is not a matter for the revisional court to consider but where the evidence is of such a nature that no reasonable person would accept it or take it for granted, the revisional court should and must in a proper case take notice of it and refuse to accept the same. Since it has not been shown how the said witnesses were competent to say that the milo was 'imported foodgrain' their opinion with regard to the same could not have been accepted. At any rate, the evidence of the said witnesses in so far as it related to the Aata being of imported milo, had been improperly accepted by the courts below. If out of 2.10 quintals, 1.22 quintals of Aata is deducted, the remaining quantity would be 88 Kg. of mila. On the basis of that quantity the presumption arising out of the Explanation to clause 3 of the Order would not be available and since there is no evidence that the said quantity of milo had been stored for sale, the conviction of the petitioner under section 7 of the Act, for having violated clause 3 of the Order cannot be sustained. 7. It may further be pointed out that one of the contentions of the petitioner in support of which they have also led evidence was that the mill in question had already been sold out to the Multi-purrose Co-operative Society and that, therefore the petitioner Was not liable for the presence of the foodgrains concerned in the mill. One of the prosecution witnesses had admitted that there was a signboard of the Co-operative Society hung up at the mill. One of the prosecution witnesses had admitted that there was a signboard of the Co-operative Society hung up at the mill. While the trial court had given some reasons for not accepting this defence, the appellate court did not at all advert to it. In the ordinary course, the order of the lower appellate court would have been set aside and the case remitted back to him for considering that defence in the light of the evidence On the record but it is not necessary to do so because the conviction of the petitioner cannot be sustained in view or what has been stated above. The petitioner is, accordingly, given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted of the charge under section 7 of the Act. The application is allowed accordingly. Application allowed.