THANKAM v. DAMODARAN — 1976 DIGILAW 152 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. These two appeals and the cross-appeal arise out of the judgment and decree in a suit for redemption, O. S. No. 20 of 1969 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Trivandrum; A. S. No. 343 of 1972 is by defendants 4 to 9; A. S. No. 344 of 1972 is by the 2nd defendant; and the cross-appeal therein is by the plaintiff in the suit. 2. The main submission made on behalf of the appellants in A. S. No. 343 of 972 when the appeals came up for hearing before the Division Bench was that the purchaser is a revenue sale derives no title to or interest in the property sold till the date of confirmation of the sale. The Division Bench having doubted the correctness of a decision of this Court in Krishnadas v. P. S. Sama Iyer ( 972 KLT.178 D. B.) on which the appellants placed reliance, referred the matter to a Full Bench; and that is how the matter has now come up before this Full Bench. 3. 19 cents out of 231/4 cents of land and the buildings and other improvements thereon described in the schedule to the plaint were put up in revenue sale on 30-3-1955 for the recovery of abkari and income-tax arrears due from the plaintiff's father Madhavan Damodaran, and it was knocked down to the plaintiff. The sale, however, was confirmed only on 1111957. In the meanwhile, in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 1323 of 1123 obtained against the plaintiff's father Madhavan Damodaran, the first defendant who was the mortgagee in respect of the property, purchased the property in court auction on 25 111955 and that sale was confirmed by the court on 3 11956. The plaintiff's suit for redemption of the mortgage over the plaint schedule property created by the original of Ext. P-1 mortgage (melotti) deed dated 26 5 1953, was resisted by the first defendant, the mortgagee, who also claimed to have purchased the equity of redemption in respect of the property in court sale in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 1323 of 1123 on 25 111955, contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not derive any title to the plaint schedule property so as to enable him to redeem the mortgage over the property. It was also contended by the 1st defendant that the revenue sale conducted on 30 31955 was collusive in character, that the purchase by the plaintiff was benami for his father and that it was vitiated by fraud. The trial court rejecting the contentions of the first defendant decreed the suit for redemption. While defendants 4 to 9, the legal representatives of the 1st defendant who died pending proceedings, canvass the correctness of the judgment and decree of the court below on the grounds mentioned above, the 2nd defendant, in whose favour a sub-mortgage is stated to have been created by the first defendant, in her appeal, A. S No. 344 of 1972, challenges the correctness of the judgment and decree of the court below in regard to the value of improvements awarded in her favour. The cross-appeal in A. S. No. 344 of 1972 also pertains to the value of improvements awarded by the court below. The 3rd defendant, who is the mother of the plaintiff, has been made a party to the suit in view of the fact that the portion of the plaint schedule property not covered by the revenue sale in favour of the plaintiff was transferred by the plaintiff's father in her favour. 4. On the main question regarding the nature of interest, if any, derived by the plaintiff before the confirmation on 1 111957 of the revenue sale held on 30 31955 (before which date the court auction in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 1323 of 1123 in favour of the 1st defendant held on 25 111955 was confirmed on 311956), we have been referred to the ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Krishnadas v. P. S. Sama Iyer (1972 KLT 178) which reversed the decision given by Sadasivan J in the same case, reported in Bhagwandas Krishnadas v. P. S. Sama Iyer (AIR 1969 Ker. 263). The question that came up for decision in appeal before the learned single judge in that case was whether the purchaser in a revenue sale was entitled to profits of the property sold from the date of sale. 263). The question that came up for decision in appeal before the learned single judge in that case was whether the purchaser in a revenue sale was entitled to profits of the property sold from the date of sale. That appeal before the single Bench was decided in favour of the auction-purchaser, upholding his contention that he was entitled to profits from the date of sale, not from the date of confirmation of the sale; the view taken in that decision was that the Code of Civil Procedure was not made inapplicable to sales under the Revenue Recovery Act, and so, even though the property did not vest with the purchaser until the sale bad become absolute, when it did vest in him on the sale becoming absolute, it was to be deemed, by virtue of the operation of S.65 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have vested in him from the time when it was sold. After having (at page 264) quoted S.43 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, Act II of 1864, which reads: "Arrears of rent which on the day of sale may be due to the defaulter from his undertenants shall, in the event of the sale, be recoverable by him after the sale by any process, except distraint, which might have used by him for that purpose before the said sale," the learned judge observed as follows: "This means that the defaulter is not entitled to collect any rent from his under-tenant after the sale. Even though the sale is confirmed and the sale certificate issued at a later date, the right of the defaulter (defendant) to collect rent from his under-tenant ceases by the sale. This is because his right has been lost by the sale. Thus there cannot be any dispute on the point that from the date of sale the plaintiff is entitled to the usufructs of the property." In appeal against the second appeal, the decision of Sadasivan J. was reversed by the Division Bench, accepting the contention of the appellants-defendants that S.65 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to a sale under the Revenue Recovery Act and that the principle embodied in the section cannot be applied to such a sale. Referring to the interpretation given to S.43 of the Madras Revenue Recovery, Act by Sadasivan J, the following observation has been made by Raghavan C. J., who spoke for the Division Bench, at page 181: "We find it difficult to agree with this: in our considered opinion, what is provided by S.43 is that the defaulter has no right, after the sale, to collect the arrears of rent due to him from his under-tenant on the date of sale by distraint; he may use only other methods of of collecting the arrears. It is also our opinion that, in such a case, the arrears that fell due thereafter (if the defaulter is entitled to them) cannot also be collected by distraint. In other words, this provision does not indicate that the defaulter is not entitled to the arrears from his under-tenant subsequent to the date of sale: for that, if at all, other provisions should be found in the Act. Therefore, on this aspect of the case also, we disagree with the second appellate judge and hold that, from S.43 of the Revenue Recovery Act, it cannot be held that the defaulter is entitled by arrears of rent only up to the date of sale and not thereafter." 5. Though we see the force of the reasoning that the provisions of S.65 of the C. P. C. do not have direct application to a sale under the Revenue Recovery Act, we find it difficult to agree with the interpretation sought to be given by the Division Bench to S.43 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act which (except for verbal changes) corresponds to S.45 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act (Act VII of 1951). The approach made by Sadasivan J. in coming to the conclusion that S.65 C. P. C. would be applicable to revenue sale as the C. P. C. has not been made in applicable to such sale, appears to proceed on a wrong assumption of the legal position. It also appears to us that the conclusion reached by the Division Bench on the reasoning that there was, in the Revenue Recovery Act, no provision which laid down that the confirmation of the sale related back to the date of sale as embodied is S.65 CPC. is not acceptable. 6. It also appears to us that the conclusion reached by the Division Bench on the reasoning that there was, in the Revenue Recovery Act, no provision which laid down that the confirmation of the sale related back to the date of sale as embodied is S.65 CPC. is not acceptable. 6. We are of the opinion that the nature and extent of the title to and interest in a property sold in a revenue sale derived by the purchaser have to be construed in the light of the scheme of the Revenue Recovery Act, without unnecessarily getting entangled by the consideration of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which do not directly apply to such sales, as the legislature is not seen to have prescribed the same procedure to be applied to court sale and revenue sale, though similarities and parallel provisions could be noticed in the Code and the Act. In this context it has to be emphasised that the object of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act was to provide a speedy and more efficacious machinery for the recovery of public revenue, without need to resort to prolonged or vexatious litigation. It would therefore be necessary for us to have a brief idea about the scheme of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act in regard to attachment and sale of immovable property in general and a detailed scrutiny of the provisions of S.36, 38, 39, 40 and 45 of the Act. 7. It would therefore be necessary for us to have a brief idea about the scheme of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act in regard to attachment and sale of immovable property in general and a detailed scrutiny of the provisions of S.36, 38, 39, 40 and 45 of the Act. 7. S.24 enjoins a demand to be served on the defaulter prior to attachment of immovable property; S.25 lays down the procedure to be adopted when the defaulter neglects to pay the amount demanded; the rule of attachment of immovable property h as contained in S.26; S.27 to 31 deal with the management of the property attached; S.36 lays down the rules to be observed in the sale of immovable property; S.37 deals with stay of the sale on tendering the payment of arrears and costs; S.38 provides for the application to the Collector for setting aside the sale and the order to be passed by the Collector on such application; S.39 requires the Tahsildar who conducted the sale of immovable property to report on the conclusion of the sale the result thereof to the Collector; S.40 provides for the publication of the name of the purchaser and the date of the purchase together with a declaration of the lawful succession of such purchaser to all the rights and property of the former land-bolder in the said lands before the issue of the certificate referred to in S.39; S.45 provides that the arrears of rent which, on the date of sale, may be due to the defaulter from his under-tenants shall, in the event of the sale, be recoverable by him, after the sale, by any process which might have been used by him for that purpose before the said sale; S.55 confers revisional power on the Board of Revenue in regard to any orders passed or proceedings taken by the Collector, Tahsildar or Proverthicar, under the provisions of the Act; and S.56 makes provision for suing the Government in civil courts in case the parties are aggrieved by any decision or order passed or proceedings taken under the Act. 8. Sub-section (3) of S.36 of the Act lays down that the sale of immovable property attached shall be by public auction to the highest bidder. 8. Sub-section (3) of S.36 of the Act lays down that the sale of immovable property attached shall be by public auction to the highest bidder. As per sub-s. (4) a sum of money equal to id per cent of the price of the land shall be deposited by the purchaser with the officer conducting the sale at the time of the purchase, and when the balance of the purchase-money may not be paid within thirty days, the money deposited shall be liable to forfeiture. 9. The procedure when the party fails to make the deposit, or to pay the balance of the purchase-money, appears to be distinct from the relevant provisions in that regard in Order XXI of the CPC. What is provided in sub-s. (5) is where the purchaser refuses or omits to deposit the sum equal to 15% of the price of land or to complete the payment of the remaining purchase-money, the report shall be resold after notice, as prescribed in clause (3) of the section at the expense and hazard of such purchaser, and the amount of all loss or expense which may attend such refusal or omission shall be recoverable from such purchaser in the same manner as arrears of public revenue; and where the lands may, on the second sale, sell for a higher price than at the first sale, the difference or increase shall be the property of him on whose account the said first sale was made. This sub-section makes it clear that though the purchaser obtains substantial interest in the property and the title also passes to him, it will not become absolute if he either fails to deposit a sum of money equal to 15% of the price of the land at the time of the purchase or to pay the balance of the purchase price within 30 days from the date of the sale. The penalty for failure to deposit the balance purchase-money within the stipulated period is not only the forfeiture of the sum of money equal to 15% deposited by him at the time of purchase, but also the resale of the property at his expense and hazard. The penalty for failure to deposit the balance purchase-money within the stipulated period is not only the forfeiture of the sum of money equal to 15% deposited by him at the time of purchase, but also the resale of the property at his expense and hazard. From a reading of the provisions contained in R.86 of Order XXI C.P C., it could be easily found that these provisions contained in sub-s. (5) of S.36 are more stringent and onerous from the point of view of the purchaser committing default. 10. S.38 provides for making application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit of a sum equal to five per centum of the purchase-money, and a sum equal to the arrears of revenue for which the immovable property was sold, together with interest thereon and the expenses of attachment, management and sale and other costs due in respect of such arrears, to be determined by the Tahsildar at the time of sale. It is incumbent as per sub-s (2) of S.38 on the part of the Collector to set aside the sale if such deposit and application are made within 30 days from the date of the sale. 11. The question of confirmation is dealt with in S.39. Sub-section (1) of S.39 requires the Tahsildar as soon as may be after the conclusion of the sale to report the result thereof to the Collector. Sub-section (2) of S.39 lays down that at any time within thirty days from the date of such sale, application may be made to the Collector to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting it; but except as otherwise provided, no sale shall he set aside on the ground of such irregularity or mistake unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Collector that he has sustained substantial injury by reason thereof. Sub-s. (3) of the Section provides that if the application be allowed, the Collector shall set aside the sale and may direct a fresh one. Sub-s. (4) of the section lays down that the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale on the expiration of 30 days from the date of the sale if no application to have the sale set aside is made under S.39 (2) of the Act or an application made and was rejected. Sub-s. (4) of the section lays down that the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale on the expiration of 30 days from the date of the sale if no application to have the sale set aside is made under S.39 (2) of the Act or an application made and was rejected. No doubt, it also provides that if the Collector shall have reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside notwithstanding that no such application was made or on grounds other than those alleged in any application which had been made and rejected, he may, after recording his reason in writing, set aside the sale. As per sub-s. (4) of S.39 it is clear that if the sale was validly held, and it was not set aside on an application made within 30 days as provided under the provisions of S.38 or 39, the Collector has no other option but to confirm the sale unless after recording bis reason in writing he sets aside the sale. S.39 does not lay down that the sale shall become absolute on the Tahsildar confirming the sale. It would be worthwhile to compare the wordings of sub-section (4) of S.39 with the wording of sub-rule (1) of R.92 of Order XXI CPC., which reads as follows: "Where no application is made under R.89, R.90 or 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." (underlining ours) Sub-s. (4) of S.39 is conspicuous for the absence of the mention "and thereupon the sale shall become absolute". All that the Collector does under sub-s. (4) of S.39 is to confirm the sale if it was not set aside within the stipulated period. The act of confirmation relates to what took place on the date of sale. Considering the scheme of the Act with regard to attachment and sale of immovable property, confirmation in effect means a declaration that the vesting of the property in the purchaser has become absolute, in the sense that it was not liable thereafter to be set aside on applications contemplated under S.38 and 39 of the Act. It may, in this context, be noted that the grant of certificate under Order XXI, R.94 CPC. is on the sale of immovable property having become absolute. It may, in this context, be noted that the grant of certificate under Order XXI, R.94 CPC. is on the sale of immovable property having become absolute. There is no reference to the sale becoming absolute in sub-s. (6) of S.39, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "After the confirmation of any such sale, the Collector shall register the lands sold in the name of the person declared to be the purchaser, and shall execute and grant a certificate of sale bearing his seal and signature to such purchaser." Confirmation in terms of the Act is the declaration of a pre-existing right and title to the property inasmuch as the right of the purchaser to the property fully crystallises before that time. In the absence of a provision in the Act that the property sold shall vest in the purchaser only on the sale becoming absolute on confirmation, and taking into account the distinctive features of the provisions regarding the sale of immovable property as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Act, and the fact that if the purchaser in a revenue sale has complied with the conditions of the sale in terms of the provisions of the Act and such sale is not set aside in the manner prescribed in the Act, it shall stand confirmed, it is only reasonable to construe that the purchaser's title to the property relates back to the date of sale with his inchoate or defeasible title becoming absolute and indefeasible by the formal act of confirmation by the Collector. 12. S.40 seems to make the position further clear. It reads as follows: "Before the issue of the certificate referred to in S.39, the Tahsildar shall publish in the villages in which lands sold are situated and in the Proverticar's Cutcherry, the name of the purchaser and the date of the purchase, together with a declaration of the lawful succession of such purchaser to all the rights and property of the former land-holder in the said lands." Emphasis is given not only to the name of the purchaser, but also to the date of purchase, the declaration of the lawful succession of such purchaser to all the rights and property of the former land-holder in the said lands, which should impliedly relate back to the date of purchase in revenue sale. 13. 13. We have earlier passingly referred to the observation of the Division Bench in Krishnadas v. P. S. Sama Iyer (1972 KLT.178) with respect to the significance of S.43 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act which corresponds to S.45 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act which reads as follows: "Arrears of rent which, on the day of sale, may be due to the defaulter from his undertenants shall, in the event of the sale, by any process which might have been used by him for that purpose before the said sale" We are of the opinion that this provision in S.45 of the Act is a clear indication that the purchaser in a revenue sale becomes the owner of the property entitled to profits therefrom on and from the date of the sale. The contrary view expressed by the Division Bench appears to be opposed to the intention of the legislature, particularly in view of the fact that there is no mention anywhere in the Act that the defaulter shall be entitled to collect arrears of rent for the period from the date of sale to the date of confirmation. In construing that the Section only lays down the mode of recovery, not the period up to which the right to collect the rent extends, the Division Bench, with due respect, has given too restricted a meaning which does not fully reflect the legislative intent of the relevant provisions. S.65 of the CPC., in our opinion, has been incorporated in the Code by way of abundant caution in view of the specific provision contained in R.94 of Order XXI therein which provides that the certificate granted under that Section shall bear the date the day on which the sale became absolute, whereas the legislature intended the sales to be effective for all practical purposes from the date of the sale, not from the date of confirmation. 14. In an attempt to support his contention that title to the property sold in auction passes to the purchaser only on confirmation of the sale by the Collector, the counsel for the appellants has cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in Manilal Mohanlal v. Sayed Ahmed (AIR. 1954 S. C. 349); Bombay S. & C. Industries v. Q. Johnson (AIR. 958 S. C. 289); Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh & another ((1967) I SCWR. 1954 S. C. 349); Bombay S. & C. Industries v. Q. Johnson (AIR. 958 S. C. 289); Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh & another ((1967) I SCWR. 863); and Navalkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das (AIR. 1970 S. C. 2037). These decisions, in our opinion, cannot be of any assistance to the appellants inasmuch as none of them deals with sales under the Revenue Recovery Act or under any enactment containing provisions analogous to those contained in the Revenue Recovery Act. The principal question which fell for consideration in Manilal Mohanlal v. Sayed Ahmed (AIR. 1954 S. C. 349) was whether the failure to make the deposit under O. XXI, R.84 and 85 CPC., was only a material irregularity in the sale, which could only be set aside under R.90, or it was wholly void, the argument being that the case fell within the former category, and, the application under R.90 being barred by limitation, the sale could not be set aside. On the facts of the case the Supreme Court in Para.8 of the judgment held as follows: "The provision regarding the deposit of 25 per cent by the purchaser other than the decree-holder is mandatory as the language of the rule suggests. The full amount of the purchase money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale but the decree-holder is entitled to the advantage of a set-off. The provision for payment is, however, mandatory ... (Rule 85.). If the payment is not made within the period of fifteen days, the court has the discretion to forfeit the deposit and there the discretion ends but the obligation of the court to re-sell the property is imperative. A further consequence of non-payment is that the defaulting purchaser forfeits all claim to the property ...(Rule86)." What came up for consideration in Bombay S. & C. Industries v. L. J. Johnson AIR. 1958 S. C. 289) was a sale conducted under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Para.10 of the judgment, at page 292, as follows: "It is clear from the rules and the conditions of sale set out above that the declaration that a person was the highest bidder at the auction does not amount to a complete sale and transfer of the property to him. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Para.10 of the judgment, at page 292, as follows: "It is clear from the rules and the conditions of sale set out above that the declaration that a person was the highest bidder at the auction does not amount to a complete sale and transfer of the property to him. The fact that the bid was to be approved by the Settlement Commissioner shows that till such approval which the Commissioner is not bound to give the auction-purchaser has no right at all. It would further appear that even the approval of the bid by the Settlement Commissioner does not amount to a transfer of property for the purchaser has yet to pay the balance of the purchase money and the rules provide that if he fails to do that he shall not have any claim to the property. The correct position is that on the approval of the bid by the Settlement Commissioner, a binding contract for the sale of the property to the auction-purchaser comes into existence..." Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh & another (1967) (I SCWR. 863) was a case in which the question was whether the appellant auction-purchaser was entitled to the confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. Mitter J. who spoke for the Bench observed as follows: "The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless a stranger auction purchaser is protected against the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales in execution would not attract customers and it would be to the detriment of the interest of the borrower and the creditor alike if sales were allowed to be impugned merely because the decree was ultimately set aside or modified. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 makes ample provision for the protection of the interest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree ought not to have been passed against him. On the facts of this case, it is difficult to see why the judgment-debtor did not take resort to the provisions of Or. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 makes ample provision for the protection of the interest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree ought not to have been passed against him. On the facts of this case, it is difficult to see why the judgment-debtor did not take resort to the provisions of Or. xxi R.8)." It was also observed in that judgment: "It does not seem ever to have been doubted that once the sale is confirmed the judgment-debtor is not entitled to get back the property even if he succeeds thereafter in having the decree against him reversed. The question is. whether the same result ought to follow when the reversal of the decree takes place before the confirmation of sale. There does not seem to be any valid reason for making a distinction between the two cases. It is certainly hard on the defendant-judgment-debtor to have to lose his property on the basis of a sale held in execution of a decree which is not ultimately upheld. Once however it is held that he cannot complain after confirmation of sale, there seems to be no reason why he should be allowed to do so because the decree was reversed before such confirmation." In Navalkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das (AIR. 1970 S. C. 2037) the Supreme Court was concerned with a sale under the provisions of S.273 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. It was observed in Para.6 of the judgment as follows: "The principles which should govern confirmation of sales are well established. Where the acceptance of the offer by the Commissioners is subject to confirmation of the Court the offerer does not by mere acceptance get any vested right in the property so that he may demand automatic confirmation of his offer. The condition of confirmation by the Court operates as a safeguard against the property being sold at inadequate price whether or not it is a consequence of any irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion." 15. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion." 15. We have also been referred to three decisions of the Privy Council: Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh (AIR. 1931 P. C. 33); Raghunandan v. Commr., Income-tax (AIR. 1933 P. C. 101); and Jagannatha Rao v. Surya Rao (AIR. 1936 P. C. 204). In none of these cases the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act came up for consideration. Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh (AIR. 1931 P. C. 33) was a case in which by virtue of the rules made by the Local Government under the Co-operative Societies Act II of 1912 the award by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Central Provinces and Berar, was enforceable in the same manner as the decree of a civil court. On 15th September 1923, the property belonging to the respondent judgment-debtor was put to auction and was knocked down to the appellants who paid at the time of the sale the prescribed 25% of the price. On 24th September, 1923, before the sale was confirmed, the respondents, judgment-debtors, put in an application to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the sale. On this application, issues were framed by the Subordinate Judge of Noshangabad and the matter proceeded to trial, the confirmation of the sale standing over to await the result. On 15th June 1924, when there appeared to be some chance of the proceedings coming to an end, the society came forward with another application alleging that the judgment debt had been adjusted as between them and the respondents. It was prayed that the adjustment might be recorded and certified, and the property sold to the appellants might be released. On 10th January 1925 by a combined order the Subordinate Judge held that no fraud or material irregularity resulting in substantial injury to the respondents having been established, the sale could not be set aside as prayed for in the first application. Upon this finding the Subordinate Judge was bound by R.92 of O. XXI, CPC., to confirm the sale, which thereupon would become absolute, subject to any variation on appeal. Upon this finding the Subordinate Judge was bound by R.92 of O. XXI, CPC., to confirm the sale, which thereupon would become absolute, subject to any variation on appeal. No such order, however, was in fact made. Second application was also rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of the finding entered on issues Nos. 6 and 9 which read as follows: "6. Has the Court no jurisdiction to confirm the sale in view of the fact that the decree-holder has admitted satisfaction of the decree? 9 Has any interest or title accrued to the purchaser under the auction sale, and if so, could it be defeated by a compromise arrived at in his absence?" In appeal before the District Judge the contention of the respondents was upheld and the sale was set aside. Though the matter was taken up in revision before the Judicial Commissioner by the appellants, that application was eventually dismissed. Their Lordships of the Privy Council did not agree with the reasoning given by the Judicial Commissioner on the subject in Nilkanth v. Yeshwant (AIR. 1922 Nagpur 348) on the basis of which the appellant's case was set aside by the Judicial Commissioner. The Privy Council held as follows:- "...When once a sale has been effected, a third party's interest intervenes, and there is nothing in this rule to suggest that it is to be disregarded. The only means by which the judgment debtor can get rid of a sale, which has been duly carried out, are those embodied in R.89, viz. by depositing in Court the amount for the recovery of which the property was sold, together with 5 per cent, on the purchase money which goes to the purchaser as statutory compensation, and this remedy can only be pursued within 30 days of the sale: see Art 166, Sch.l.Lim. Act, 1908. That this is so is, in their Lordships' opinion, clear under the wording of R.92, which provides that in such a case (i. e., where the sale has been duly carried out), if no application is made under R.99: the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute' It In Raghunandan v. Commr. Income-tax (AIR. 1933 PC. Income-tax (AIR. 1933 PC. 101) one of the points that arose for consideration by the Privy Council was whether the title of a purchaser in court auction becomes complete only on confirmation of sale by the court. The case related to an income-tax assessment, and the question was when the assessee, a money lender, who had purchased certain properties of his judgment-debtor in execution for the amount payable to him under a decree, could be said to have realised his debt. It was held that the interest on the debt could be deemed to have been realised only when the sale was confirmed. Their Lordships did not have to consider the position of a judgment-debtor in relation to the property sold in court-auction, after the expiry of the period prescribed for setting aside the sale, but no confirmation followed immediately; this decision, therefore, is no authority for the view that the judgment-debtor has, in such circumstances, a saleable interest in the property. In Jagannatha Rao. v. Surya Rao. (AIR. 1936 P. C. 204) the decree-holder having purchased certain properties of his judgment-debtor at a court-sale in execution of a mortgage decree entered into a compromise with the judgment-debtor's guardian under which one of the properties purchased was to be left to the judgment-debtor in consideration of the latter having agreed to pay a certain sum, and to abstain from raising objections to the sale of the properties. The compromise was sanctioned by the Court which confirmed the auction sale of the properties with the exception of the item which was agreed to be left to the judgment-debtor and issued a sale certificate covering the other properties. A mortgage deed in respect of the excluded property, subsequently executed for the sum agreed to be paid under the compromise, having turned out to be inoperative for want of due attestation, the question arose whether the compromise amounted to a sale by the decree-holder purchaser creating a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money in his favour. A mortgage deed in respect of the excluded property, subsequently executed for the sum agreed to be paid under the compromise, having turned out to be inoperative for want of due attestation, the question arose whether the compromise amounted to a sale by the decree-holder purchaser creating a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money in his favour. In upholding the claim, and overruling the objections that there could be no sale by the auction-purchaser to the judgment-debtor as the title to the property in question never passed to the former under the auction sale which was not confirmed in respect of that property, their Lordships observed: "That village, along with other mortgaged property, was, as stated, sold to the plaintiff on 28th October 1920; and the period with which the judgment debtor could apply to the court for setting aside the sale was 30 days from the date of the sale. During that period no such application was made by him, and the title of the auction-purchaser became unimpeachable. It is obvious that after the expiry of the statutory period for setting aside the sale, there was no person who could question the title of the auction-purchaser, and a certificate of sale granted by the Court would in such case be a formal document of title. In the absence of an order setting aside the sale the Court is bound to confirm it, and the law does not prescribe any special period for an application for an order of confirmation." 16. The principle underlying the three decisions of the Privy Council referred to above was considered by Patanjali Sastri J. as he then was, in Ramaswami Iyer v. Komalavalli Ammal (AIR. 1941 Madras 277; (D. B.). After referring to the dictum laid down by the Privy Council, his Lordship has stated as follows: "These observations are, in our view, decisive of the point now under consideration. They show that after the expiry of the period for an application to set aside an auction sale, the auction purchaser can effectively sell the property purchased even in the absence of a confirmation of the auction sale by the Court or in other words, that he has a 'saleable interest' in the property. They show that after the expiry of the period for an application to set aside an auction sale, the auction purchaser can effectively sell the property purchased even in the absence of a confirmation of the auction sale by the Court or in other words, that he has a 'saleable interest' in the property. If he has acquired such interest it is difficult to see how the judgment-debtor can also be said to have a saleable interest in the same property, there being no question here of subordinate interests carved out of the property being owned by different persons. (Underlining ours) We are respectfully in agreement with the views expressed by Patanjali Sastri J. in the passage quoted above. If, after the expiry of the period prescribed for setting aside the auction sale under the provisions of the CPC., the purchaser acquires saleable interest, even in the absence of confirmation by an order of the court, in spite of the provisions contained in R.92 and 94 of Order XXI, CPC., the position in regard to derivation of title and saleable interest by the purchaser in revenue sale under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, which does not expressly state that the sale shall become absolute and the property shall vest in the purchaser only on the sale being confirmed by the Collector, is much stronger. In this view we hold that after the expiry of the period prescribed under Ss 38 and 39 of the Act Madhavan Damodaran, the defaulter, had no saleable interest in the property, and that being the position the 1st defendant, by virtue of the court auction held on 2511 1955 (stated to have been confirmed on 31 1956), has no precedence over the plaintiff in regard to the plaint schedule property. 17. Counsel for the appellants had also placed reliance on certain decisions of other High Courts, and they include Vishnu Shankar v. Yusuf (AIR. 1925 Bombay 483); Fazlur Rahman v. Sardar Ali (AIR. 1928 Calcutta 338); Girdharilal & another v Mohd. Ishrat Ali (1937 Oudh Weekly Notes 1153); and Mt. Ram Sri v. Jai Lal (AIR. 1947 Allahabad 171). We do not consider it necessary to advert to the details of these cases inasmuch as they are not directly concerned with the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. 18. 1928 Calcutta 338); Girdharilal & another v Mohd. Ishrat Ali (1937 Oudh Weekly Notes 1153); and Mt. Ram Sri v. Jai Lal (AIR. 1947 Allahabad 171). We do not consider it necessary to advert to the details of these cases inasmuch as they are not directly concerned with the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. 18. It was then contended by the counsel for the appellants that the revenue sale in favour of the plaintiff was null and void on account of the non compliance with the mandatory provisions like notice, attachment and sale proclamation. The argument or the counsel is that before the plaintiff could seek to redeem the plaint schedule property in enforcement of the rights stated to have been derived by the revenue sale, it was up to him to prove that the sale certificate issued to him by the Collector is preceded by all the necessary steps required to be followed under the Act. We find no force in this contention. The latter part of sub-section (6) of S.39 of the Act reads as follows : "Such certificate shall state the property sold and the name of the purchaser, and it shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of the purchase in all the Courts and tribunals where it may be necessary to prove the same; and no proof of the Collector's seal or signature shall be necessary unless the authority before whom it is produced shall have reason to doubt its genuineness." The presumption under S.114(e) of the Evidence Act also is available to the plaintiff. On the side of the first defendant no evidence worth the name was adduced to establish that the sale was bad for want of notice, attachment or proclamation. As a matter of fact, the evidence of dw.1, the brother of the 1st defendant who was examined in an attempt to support the aforesaid contention, could not be of any assistance to the appellants, as in cross-examination be categorically stated that he did not know anything about the revenue sale or anything about what is contained in Ext. P-4, copy of the mahazar prepared in connection with the revenue sale. We note that Ext. P-4 contains the description of the property to be sold as well as the particulars of the abkari and income-tax arrears due from the plaintiff's father. P-4, copy of the mahazar prepared in connection with the revenue sale. We note that Ext. P-4 contains the description of the property to be sold as well as the particulars of the abkari and income-tax arrears due from the plaintiff's father. It shows the expenses incurred in connection with the service of demand notice as well as the expenses incidental to the attachment. From Ext. P-4 it is also found that there was due publication of the sale in the gazette dated the 1st March 1955 and that notices were also affixed at the Village Office, the Taluk Office and in the property. Ext. P-5 is the sale certificate issued to the plaintiff under S.39(6) of the Act (Act 7 of 1951). It refers, inter alia, to the gazette publication dated the 1st March 1955 regarding the sale to the plaintiff on 30-3-1955 for a sum of Rs. 755/-, the plaintiff being the highest bidder in the public auction held, and the confirmation of the sale in favour of the plaintiff. Ext. P-6 would go to show that symbolic delivery of the property was given to the plaintiff on 25-4-1960. Ext. P-7 dated 13-5-1967 evidences tax paid by the plaintiff in respect of the property. Not only there is no evidence in support of the contention raised by the 1st defendant that the sale is bad for want of notice, attachment and proclamation, there is, apart from the presumption available to the plaintiff, acceptable evidence that all the formalities as required under the Act had been followed before Ext. P-5 sale certificate was issued in favour of the plaintiff. The appellants in A. S. No. 343 of 1972 are, therefore, not entitled to succeed on this ground also. 19. The third and the last contention raised by the appellants in A. S. No 343 of 1972 before us to attack the judgment and decree under appeal is that the learned Subordinate Judge ought to have found that the revenue sale was the result of collusion between the plaintiff's father and the authorities concerned with the collection of taxes, that the purchase by the plaintiff was benami for his father to defeat his creditors and that the transaction on the whole was vitiated by fraud. No evidence regarding the collusion alleged was let in by the 1st defendant. No evidence regarding the collusion alleged was let in by the 1st defendant. The first defendant did not also succeed in establishing that the purchase by the plaintiff in revenue sale was benami for his father. As pointed out by the counsel for the plaintiff, Ext. P-3 would go to show that under a partition decree of the year 1953 the plaintiff along with his mother and sister had got possession of some properties; and pw.1, the plaintiff, bad also sworn to the fact that he had funds of his own at the time of purchase. It was argued that at the time of the sale the plaintiff was only a minor aged 17 years and that in Ext. P-5 his age was wrongly shown to make it appear that he was a major even at the time of the sale. Ext. P-2 is a copy of the receipt executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant on 26-5-1953 and that would show that in the year 1128, corresponding to 1953, the plaintiff was aged 19. The Ist defendant having failed to establish by any acceptable evidence that the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sale, we think that the appellants' contention on that score has only to be ignored. It has also not been shown as to how the 1st defendant was competent to challenge the validity of the revenue sale on the ground that the plaintiff was at the time of the purchase a minor. We, therefore, reject, also, the 3rd contention raised on behalf of the appellants in A. S. No. 343 of 1972. 20. The contentions in A. S. No. 344 of 1972 and the cross-appeal therein, as already noticed, relate to improvements effected by the defendants and the value thereof to be paid to them. This is covered by issue No. 6 dealt with by the learned Subordinate Judge in Para.10 to 15 of the judgment under appeal. It is in evidence that the 1st defendant had renovated the old building and had also effected some modifications to it. The flooring was done in mosaic, the terrace was paved with brick jelly, electric rewiring was done and the building was painted with plastic emulsion paint. She had also put up a kitchen, latrine and a cattle shed besides laying water pipes and putting up granite compound walls. Ext. The flooring was done in mosaic, the terrace was paved with brick jelly, electric rewiring was done and the building was painted with plastic emulsion paint. She had also put up a kitchen, latrine and a cattle shed besides laying water pipes and putting up granite compound walls. Ext. C-1 is the report of the commissioner. After having considered the commissioner's report, the objections put in by the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant, and the evidence available on the disputed points, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the defendants are entitled to receive value for improvements reported by the commissioner in Ext. C-1. except for items 9,10,12 and 15 shown therein. In regard to the cost of the items of improvements allowed by the court the 2nd defendant challenged the correctness pointing out some omissions and some mistakes, and also contending for the position that the commissioner ought to have accepted the P.W.D. rates for the purpose of computing the cost. The best evidence that could have been relied on by the second defendant would have been her own accounts; but she has not produced any accounts. It cannot be that the 2nd defendant, who wanted to claim value of the improvements, did not keep accurate accounts for the expenses incurred; if she did not do so, she has to thank herself. The commissioner has made valuation on the basis of the information he gathered by consulting certain contractors who usually do such works. dw. 3 is the husband of the 2nd defendant. Though he is an Executive Engineer of the PWD., while finding fault with the commissioner's report, he has not furnished any useful or acceptable data for substituting the commissioner' report. The court has made whatever modification were found to be necessary in regard to the commissioner's report in the light of the evidence available. We are satisfied on a consideration of Ext. Cl report of the commissioner, the evidence of dw. 2 the commissioner, and dw. 3 the husband of the 2nd defendant, and the objections filed by the parties, that the value of improvements decreed by the court below is just and fair and that no interference is called for by this Court in appeal. 21. Cl report of the commissioner, the evidence of dw. 2 the commissioner, and dw. 3 the husband of the 2nd defendant, and the objections filed by the parties, that the value of improvements decreed by the court below is just and fair and that no interference is called for by this Court in appeal. 21. In the cross-appeal mainly two grounds have been raised: (1) the plaintiff was under no obligation to pay value of improvements effected by the 2nd defendant without express authority for effecting such improvements; and (2) in any event, the value decreed is unconscionably high. In the absence of of any express provision in Ext. P-1 mortgage deed prohibiting improvements we are of the view that the court below is justified in decreeing value of the improvements effected by the mortgagee in possession. As for the correctness of the quantum decreed, we have already found that it represents what could be termed as just and fair in the circumstances of the case. In the result, the appeals and the cross-appeal are dismissed with costs.