JUDGMENT : P. D. Desai, J. The petitioner, who was an unarmed third grade Head Constable and who had put in about 21 years of service, was suspended on August 28, 1967. On the same day, he was prosecuted along with other 16 accused for an offence under section 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 887. The trial ended in the conviction of the petitioner who was sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default to rigorous imprisonment for seven days. The petitioner carried an appeal to the Sessions Court against the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence. The appellate Court set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner and acquitted him. The order of acquittal was made on August 31, 1968. On January 29, 1969 the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet, the allegation in the departmental proceedings being the same on which the prosecution was launched, against him, namely, that he was found "playing gambling" on August 28, 1967. The petitioner in the course of the departmental proceedings, inter alia, contended that, since he was acquitted by a competent Court in respect of the same charge, no departmental proceedings could be initiated against him. At the end of the departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Officer found that the charge levelled against the petitioner was proved. Pursuant to the report of the Inquiry Officer, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and the disciplinary authority, by its order dated May 8, 1970, dismissed the petitioner from service. An appeal earned against the said order was dismissed. Thereupon the petitioner has tiled the present petition challenging the order of dismissal. 2. Though the order of dismissal is challenged on various grounds in the petition, it is not necessary to pronounce upon the validity of all of them, because, as would appear presently, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on one ground, namely, that having regard to the principle and policy adopted by the State Government in respect of departmental proceedings against its employees who have been acquitted in a criminal case, no departmental proceedings could have been initiated against the petitioner in the present case. 3. It is well-settled that there is no constitutional bar to a departmental inquiry being held on the termination of a criminal proceeding in favour of a delinquent. 3. It is well-settled that there is no constitutional bar to a departmental inquiry being held on the termination of a criminal proceeding in favour of a delinquent. There is also no statutory or legal bar against such proceedings. However, the Mate Government has m its own wisdom laid down certain guiding principles to be followed in initiating departmental proceedings against Government servants who have been acquitted in a criminal trial on the same charge. These guiding principles are to be found in the Circular, dated July 26, 1968 issued by the Government of Gujarat in the General Administration Department. By the said Circular, instructions in paragraph 6 of an earlier Circular dated August 1, 1966 on the same subject were to some extent modified and certain fresh directives were given. According to the said directives, there was no objection in holding a departmental inquiry on identical set of facts and allegations on which the delinquent might nave been previously tried and acquitted, provided the court recording the order of acquittal merely expresses a doubt as to the correctness of the allegations, or (2) it holds that the allegations are proved but that they do not constitute the criminal offence with which the delinquent is charged and it such proved allegations are considered good and sufficient for taking disciplinary action, or (3) the charge in respect of which the departmental inquiry is proposed to be initiated is not identical with or similar to the charge in the criminal case and its not based on any allegations which have been negatived by the criminal court, or (4) it the concerned allegations had not been examined by the court out are considered good and sufficient for departmental/disciplinary action. According to the said Circular, however, it the facts or allegations had come to be examined by a court of competent jurisdiction and the court has given a finding that the allegations are not the, then the consequent acquittal by the court is required to be generally respected, even though it might be open to the competent authority to proceed against the delinquent departmentally on the same charge and taking therein a different view from that taken by the court it would thus appear that the State Government, in exercise of its executive power, has laid down certain guide-lines to govern departmental proceedings against its employees on the same charge on which they might have been tried and acquitted earlier by a court of competent jurisdiction. When the State Government lays down such guide-lines, it will not be open to its limbs to deviate from the same at their sweet-will and pleasure and if there is any case in which they want to give a go-by to the said guidelines, they will have to justify the same on a rational basis so that the charge of arbitrariness or discrimination may not be levelled against them. These principles are well-settled and they flow from the mandate or Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 4. Against this background, let us examine whether the initiation of the departmental proceedings in the present case on the selfsame charge on which the petitioner was tried and acquitted by a court of a competent jurisdiction was permissible. In order to determine whether the case falls within one of the exceptions laid down in the circular, dated July 26, 1968, it would be necessary to briefly refer to the findings recorded by the Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 1968 which was preferred by the petitioner against the order of his conviction and sentence. In paragraph 36 of its judgment, the Sessions Court recorded the following findings :- "The prosecution witnesses have not witnessed the accused playing any game. Therefore, as discussed above they cannot be believed when they tried to suggest that the game rummy was being played on the tables Nos. 1 and 2 and that of flush was playing on the third table Their evidence on this point is only inferential. Therefore, as discussed above they cannot be believed when they tried to suggest that the game rummy was being played on the tables Nos. 1 and 2 and that of flush was playing on the third table Their evidence on this point is only inferential. 1 have shown above that they cannot be believed when they stated that flush was being played on table No 3. However, looking to the cards which the accused are found to be in possession it can be inferred that they might be playing the game of rummy. But that would not go to lead to the conclusion that they were playing with stakes. The game of rummy can be played for the purpose of making marry also without stakes. Therefore, the prosecution has to show that they were playing rummy with stakes. No money or counters were found from the pat or in the middle of the table. No paper or slip or anything else was found to show that the record of the points was maintained or any record about the winnings was maintained. The prosecution only wants to draw inference about their playing the game with stakes from the act that the tin boxes, found with accused Nos., 7, 12 and 17, were the boxes containing counters representing the No. 1 have shown above that their evidence on this point is not worthy of credence, and how the prosecution has tried to develop the case from time to time. The evidence is only inferential." Again, in para 19 of its judgment, the Sessions Court recorded the following findings : "I have discussed all the circumstances on which the prosecution relied to show that the accused were playing the game of cards with stakes and shown that the evidence is neither sufficient nor satisfactory on the point. It is not necessary to repeat the said discussion here. But, it can be said that there is no evidence except the police witnesses. There is no independent corroboration even on some material particulars. There is nothing to show that the game which the accused were playing was being played by putting stakes at the commencement of the game so that the stakes formed a pool and the winner was to take away the stakes in the pool. There is no independent corroboration even on some material particulars. There is nothing to show that the game which the accused were playing was being played by putting stakes at the commencement of the game so that the stakes formed a pool and the winner was to take away the stakes in the pool. There is also nothing to show that as a result of the game some persons gave counters or some papers in lieu of monies. No such pool was found within the circle of the persons playing the said game. There is also no evidence on record to show as to how monies could be own, or lost as a result of such a game. There is nothing to show that the club used to charge for the cards or used to collect sitting charges from the members who were playing the card game. Hence, there is nothing to show that the club collected anything from them for the purpose of using the club premises for gaming 1 here is not an iota of evidence to show that the club derived any profit out of the winnings. Therefore, simply from the fact that the accused were found from the club premises when it was raised and that a card play was going on and counters and monies were seized from them, 1 am not persuaded to come to the conclusion that the police officers who carried out the raid had reasonable grounds to suspect that the cards, monies and counters they had seized at the time of the raid were instruments of gaming. From these it is difficult to raise the presumption under section 7 of the Act so as to hold the accused liable for the offences with which they came to be charged ? Ultimately, in the concluding paragraph of its judgment, the Sessions Court summarised the discussion In the following words - "I come to the conclusion that in view of all the reasons stated above, the warrant ex. 67 is not valid, inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to prove that the D. S. P., who is the issuing Authority, had made any inquiry before issuing the said warrant. 67 is not valid, inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to prove that the D. S. P., who is the issuing Authority, had made any inquiry before issuing the said warrant. I have also shown that the evidence led by the prosecution is neither satisfactory nor reliable and it does not go to establish the fact that the accused were playing the game of cards with stakes in contravention of the provisions of the said Act, or that accused No 1 as the Secretary of the said club was receiving Nal i.e. profit out of the winnings of the members of the club for the use and benefit of the club I have also shown that the prosecution has, therefore, failed to show that the said club was a common gaming house or that accused Nos. 2 to 17 who were found there playing at the time when the raid was carried out gathered there for the purpose of gaming. I have also shown that the evidence on record does not help the prosecution to raise a presumption that can be drawn under section 7 of the said Act. The result, therefore, is that the findings of the learned Magistrate on these points cannot be sustained or upheld, and require to be set aside. It has to be held that the prosecution has failed to prove that accused No. 1 is guilty of the offence under section 4 of the Act as well as it has failed to prove that guilt of accused Nos. 2 to 17 for the offence under section 5 of the said Act. Therefore, the conviction of the said accused for the said offence respectively has to be set aside and the sentences awarded to each of them also require to be set aside." It might be stated for the sake of clarification that the petitioner was accused No. 17 in the criminal trial. 5. It would appear from the relevant findings recorded by the Sessions Court which have been extracted above, that this case cannot fall within one of the exceptions mentioned in the Circular dated July 26, 1968. This is not a case in which the Sessions Court merely expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the criminal trial. This is not a case in which the Sessions Court merely expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the criminal trial. The Sessions court came to an unequivocal finding that the prosecution had failed to establish that the petitioner was playing either flush or rummy on stakes and that it was also not proved that the club from the premises of which the petitioner was found was a common gaming house and that he had gone there for the purpose of gaming. Even the presumption under section 7, it was held, could not have been raised in the facts and circumstances of the case. In term the Sessions Court observed that the prosecution had failed to prove that the petitioner was guilty of the offence under section. The first exception will not, therefore, be attracted in the present case. Even the second exception would not come to the aid of the respondents because it applies only if the Could finds the allegation as having been proved but holds that no criminal offence can be said to have been committed on the basis of such proved allegations. That is not the case here. It is not in dispute that the charge in the departmental proceedings against the petitioner is identical with or similar to the charge in the criminal case and, therefore, even the third exception will not be attracted. The selfsame allegation having been examined by the Sessions Court and found to have not been established, the fourth exception is also out of the way it would thus appear that the instant case falls squarely within the injunction contained in the last part of the Circular, dated July 26,1968 and, therefore, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to proceed against the petitioner, departmentally on the same allegations on which be was tried and acquitted No exceptional circumstances are made out to depart from the guide lines laid down by the State Government in the present case. To upheld the departmental inquiry held under such circumstances would be to encourage violation of the Rule of law, for, it would result in the petitioner being meted out an arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. The impugned order of dismissal will therefore, have to be quashed and set aside as incompetent. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. To upheld the departmental inquiry held under such circumstances would be to encourage violation of the Rule of law, for, it would result in the petitioner being meted out an arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. The impugned order of dismissal will therefore, have to be quashed and set aside as incompetent. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of dismissal is quashed and set aside The petitioner will be deemed never to have been dismissed from service pursuant to the impugned order and be will be treated as having continued in service as if the said order was not passed and he will be entitled to all the benefits including the arrears of salary on such basis. The order as to the payment of arrears of salary will be made by the competent authority within a period of three months of the receipt of the writ. A writ will issue accordingly to the respondents. Rule made absolute with costs. Petition allowed.