Judgment :- 1. The matter has come before us for orders in the following circumstances: The appellant filed an Execution Second Appeal with a court fee label of Rs. 2/- alone on the memorandum of appeal under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act 1125-. The suit related to 1958. The Office having noted that there was deficit payment of court fee, returned the petition for curing the defect. Counsel for the appellant however maintained that by virtue of the provisions contained is S.87(2) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 10 of 1960, the appellant need pay court fee only under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act in as much as the suit from which the execution arose was of the year 1958. It may incidentally be noted that the suit was disposed of only on 7 6-1975 and the execution application was filed only thereafter. S.87(2) relied on by the counsel reads: "87(2) All suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act and all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom whether instituted before or after such commencement shall, notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts be governed by the provisions of the said Acts and the rules made thereunder." On an earlier occasion an identical question bad come for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court which consisted of Raman Nayar, Acting C.J. and Govindan Nair J. It was an unnumbered appeal from E. P. No. 55 of 1965 in O. S. No. 96 of 1953 of the Sub Court, Ottappalam. Dealing with the question, what the Division Bench observed reads as follows: "This appeal is from the order in E. P. No. 55 of 1965 and not from the decree in O. S. No. 8 of 1966 even if the decision in the E.P. followed upon the decision in the suit. Whether or not 2. So far as court fee is concerned, we do not think that an application for execution can be said to arise from the suit in which the decree was passed within the meaning of S 87(2) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and of the same section of Madras Act XIV of 1955 so as to attract the provisions of the court lees statute in force when the suit was instituted. E.P. No. 55 of 1965 was instituted after the Kerala Act came into force and this appeal is therefore governed by the provisions of that Act. Under Art.3(iii)(A)(1)(a) of Schedule II of the Kerala Act the fee payable is Rs. 10/-." 2. Art.3 (iii)(A)(1)(a) reads as follows: "Memorandum of appeal to the High Court from an order ether than an order under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958." The order sought to be appealed against, it our view, is not an order arising from the suit. It is an order passed in the proceedings in execution of the decree. Therefore it does not fall within the purview of "all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom." This being the position we. are respectfully in agreement with the ruling given by the Division Bench referred to earlier. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the decision given by the Division Bench earlier requires reconsideration and in support of his arguments he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. M/s. S.G. Films Exchange, AIR. 1960 SC. 980. That was a case where a suit was filed prior to 141954 on which date the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954, levying enhanced court fees, came into force. The question was whether in the absence of provisions giving retrospective effect to the amendments, the court fees payable on the memorandum of appeal filed after the relevant dale (14 1954) were payable according to the law in force at the date of filing of the suit (which was prior to the relevant date) and not according to the law in force at the date of the filing of the memorandum of appeal (which was after the relevant date). After having considered the facts of the case, in Para.12 of the judgment at page 984, S. K. Das J. observed thus: "It is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantiate right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment." The argument of the counsel that even in the absence of specific rules a provision enabling the appellant to file an appeal paying court fee at the rates specified under the previous Act is a vested right has no relevance here in as much as the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider in this decision whether the appeal arising out of execution proceedings was proceedings arising out of the suit. Yet another decision cited by counsel for the appellant is of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Kunhipennu v. Special Tahsildar,1961 KLT. 484. It was a matter relating to an appeal from an order on a reference under the Land Acquisition Act. In Para.12 of the judgment, what has been said by M. S. Menon J. reads as follows: "All the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the claim the enquiry and award by the Collector under S.11, the reference to court under S.18, the award of the court under S.26 and the appeals under S.54 are only further stages in the evaluation of the compensation founded on the claim filed in pursuance of the notice under S.9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There can also be no doubt that proceedings under that Act are proceedings contemplated both by Central Act VII of 1870 and Madras Act XIV of 1955. This will be clear from S.19 (xxii) of the Central Act and S.72 (xviii) of the Madras Act. They say that nothing contained in those Acts shall render any "application for compensation under any law, for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of property for public purposes" chargeable with any fee under those enactments. 13. This will be clear from S.19 (xxii) of the Central Act and S.72 (xviii) of the Madras Act. They say that nothing contained in those Acts shall render any "application for compensation under any law, for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of property for public purposes" chargeable with any fee under those enactments. 13. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the court fee payable in this case has to be calculated not under the Madras Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 (Madras Act XIV of 1955) but under the Court fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) and direct the appellant to effect the payment on that basis." This again, we find, has no relevance to the matter in issue. As already stated, we are, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in unnumbered appeal from E. P. No. 55 of 1965 in O.S. No. 96 of 1953 of the Sub Court, Ottappalam, and direct the appellant to pay court fee as required under Art.3 (iii) A (1) (a) of Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 10 of 1960. Time for payment of deficit court fee: one week from this date.